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THE

RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.
THE

RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A

COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE

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REVISED AND EDITED FOR
THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

BY

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EDITORS PREFACE.

It is just ten years since the lamented Author of this Commentary gave to the world of scholars an *Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric*, containing, amongst other valuable matter, a general outline of the contents of the treatise and paraphrases of the more difficult portions. In the preface to that book, which is an almost indispensable companion to the present edition and renders any special prolegomena to these volumes unnecessary, the Author describes the *Introduction* as preparatory to the detailed explanation of the work itself in an edition of the Greek text which had been long in preparation and was to appear as soon as it could be got ready. This promise is now at last fulfilled, under circumstances however in which the pathetic interest naturally attending the publication of any posthumous work like the present, is in this particular instance, if I may judge of the feelings of others by my own, intensified into a sense of more than usually deep regret that the labours of a large portion of an eminent scholar's life-time must now see the light without the advantage of his own editorial care.

Mr. Cope died in the year 1873, but during the last four years of his life his work on the Rhetoric, though it had nearly approached completion, unhappily but unavoidably remained untouched. He was actively engaged upon it during the two years that succeeded the publication of the *Introduction* in 1867;—a year that was also marked by the appearance of a long-awaited edition of the Rhetoric by Spengel, which,
by the critical acumen and maturity of judgment generally displayed in its pages, and in particular by its wealth of illustration from the remains of Greek Oratory and the technical treatises of the later Greek rhetoricians, proved the most important aid to the study of the subject that had been published since the time of Victorius. With Spengel's earlier contributions to the criticism of his author, as also with those of Brandis and Bonitz and Vahlen and other eminent Aristotelian scholars on the continent, Mr Cope was of course familiar, as the pages of these volumes abundantly testify; but while preparing his own Commentary, he appears during the last two years of his active work to have only occasionally consulted and quoted Spengel's edition, refraining purposely from incurring any such indebtedness as would prevent his own edition remaining a perfectly independent work.

In June, 1874, the year after Mr Cope's death, his brothers took into consideration the desirability of publishing his Commentary; and, acting under the advice of two distinguished members of his own College, Mr Munro and Mr Jebb, did me the honour to invite me to undertake its completion and revision. The manuscript, so far as it was finished, consisted of nearly seven hundred closely written pages requiring a certain amount of general revision before they could be sent to press; and, owing to other engagements, I found it impracticable to arrange for the printing of the work to commence till June, 1875. During the progress of the work through the press in the last two years, my duties as reviser have proved more laborious than I had anticipated; as even apart from the necessity of reading several times over at various stages of progress not far from a thousand pages of printed matter, I have found it requisite to consult the reader's convenience by rearranging many of the paragraphs, by recasting many of the more complicated sentences, and by endeavouring to prevent the sense from being obscured by the partiality for parenthesis, which, in this case, happens to be characteristic of the commentator and his author alike. In a work of this compass, accidental repetitions of nearly identical notes in various parts of the Commentary are almost unavoidable, and though I have succeeded in detecting and
strik ing out some of these repetitions, oth ers still remain un removed.

It will probably occur to some of those who use this book that, in the way of retrenchment of matter and condensation of style, something might without disadvantage have been done by the original writer; but such correction, I may remark, was the very thing from which he consciously shrank; and as a mere reviser I felt that I had no right to assume the responsibility of abridging, still less of rejecting, what the writer himself clearly intended to leave standing. In the case of verbal alterations, however, which I was morally certain would not have been disapproved by the original writer, I have used such slight discretion as appeared to fall within my province; this kind of revision cannot of course generally appear on the surface, but wherever it is practicable any additional matter for which I am alone responsible is indicated by the use of square brackets with or (as the work proceeded) without my initial. Such insertions are generally very brief, and often take the form of simple reference to important works that have appeared since the Commentary was prepared; as it seemed only due to the readers of this edition and to the writers of the works in question, that I should endeavour to bring it up to date by referring as occasion served to books such as Dr Thompson's edition of the Gorgias of Plato (1871); Grote's Aristotele (1872); Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, ed. 2, 1874; Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, 1868, '74; and Professor Jebb's Attic Orators, 1876. In testing the references to other parts of Aristotle, I have made frequent use of the great Index Aristotelicus of Bonitz, which appeared in 1870, and was therefore not available when Mr Cope's notes were written;—a fact that only increases one's admiration at the wide and minute acquaintance with all the Aristotelian writings which he had acquired by his own independent reading.

In any trifling additions of my own, I have seldom gone beyond the briefest annotations, but in the case of the third book, which was left in a less finished state, and on which I had happened to have lectured on several occasions during the last ten years, I felt myself somewhat less restricted; and indeed, as Mr Cope's manuscript unfortunately comes to an
EDITOR'S PREFACE.

abrupt conclusion in the course of Chapter xvii of that book, I was compelled, for the convenience of those who use this edition and in accordance with the wishes of Mr Cope's representatives and the Syndics of the University Press, to endeavour to supply the deficiency in the three concluding Chapters by writing the notes that occupy the last twenty pages of the Commentary.

In so doing, I have tried to follow the general plan of Mr Cope's own work, and in particular have paid attention to such slight indications of his intended treatment of that portion as I could glean from the memoranda in the margin of his own copy of Bekker's Oxford text of 1837. This volume and an interleaved copy of earlier date, and of somewhat less value for this purpose, were kindly placed at my disposal by the authorities of Trinity College, and, as they contain part of the first rough material for the Commentary, they have proved of some use in verifying doubtful references and also in ascertaining Mr Cope's intentions with regard to the text on points of detail such as punctuation and various readings. But, holding as he did that an editor's main duty was explanation in its widest sense and accordingly devoting himself mainly to questions of exegesis, to elucidation of subject matter, to illustration of verbal expression, and to matters of grammatical and lexicographical interest, he was content on the whole to accept the text as he found it in the earlier editions with which he was familiar. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any intention on his part to make an independent recension of the text, I have thought it best to adopt as the text of the present Commentary the last reprint (1873) of Bekker's third edition (octavo, 1859); and instead of impairing the integrity of that text by altering it here and there to suit what I gathered to be Mr Cope's intentions, I have briefly indicated the instances in which the evidence of his translation or notes, or again the memoranda in his own copy of the Rhetoric already mentioned, pointed clearly to some other reading as the one which he deliberately preferred to that of Bekker's third edition, or in which he was at any rate content to acquiesce. In the margin, beside the references to Book, Chapter and Section at the top of each page, is marked the beginning of each page of Bekker's last
EDITOR’S PREFACE.

octavo edition, and also of that published in quarto in 1831: the former will, it is trusted, make this work easy to refer to side by side with the plain text in ordinary use; the latter, though it involves a cumbersome method of notation, is worth recording, as it is the mode of reference adopted in the *Index Aristotelicus*, in Spengel’s edition, and often elsewhere.

In an Appendix to the third volume, I have added Mr Shilleto's *Adversaria* on the Rhetoric, which I have transcribed almost exclusively from one of his two copies of the book, lately acquired (with a selection of his other books) by the Syndicate of the University Library. I have also constructed what I hope may be found to be a fairly comprehensive Greek index to the text and notes; and to this I have subjoined a supplementary index to the notes and subject matter, including amongst other miscellaneous items, almost all the passages in the rhetorical writings of Cicero and Quintilian referred to in the Commentary; the passages of Homer and other authors quoted in the text, and the illustrations from Shakespeare in the notes, and also (under the head of 'lexicographical notes') a series of references to Mr Cope's incidental contributions to Greek lexicography. In the transcription of both these indexes for the press, I have had much assistance from my brother, James Stuart Sandys, one of the undergraduates of St John's College.

I cannot close these few prefatory explanations of what I have attempted to do in discharging however imperfectly the editorial duty with which it has been my privilege to be entrusted, without recording the fact that Mr Cope (as I am assured by his surviving brother) fully intended, had he lived to see his work through the press, to dedicate it to one of his most intimate friends, Mr Munro. The latter, however, has kindly supplied a short biographical notice by which I am glad to feel that he will be as inseparably associated with the crowning work of his friend's career as if it had appeared inscribed by that friend himself with the honoured name of the Editor of Lucretius.

J. E. S.

*Cambridge,*

*2 July, 1877.*
CORRIGENDA.

(In the notes.)

VOL. I.

p. 40, line 14, for 'this ἀόρατος, this special excellence', and on p. 49, last line, read 'the' for 'this' in all three cases.

p. 56, line 10, read ἑκατοναχηνα.

p. 76, line 29, read ἥρουσαναρνα.

p. 93, line 1, for 'in' read 'is.'

p. 105, line 28, read ἢριθρανα.

p. 123, line 30, read ἔργαςανα.

p. 161, line 23, read 'fortitude.'

p. 173, line 31, for 'be' read 'the.'

p. 190, below text, read ἕρθυμα.

p. 239, line 32, insert (3) before διὰ λόγω.

VOL. II.

p. 56, note 1, l. 3, read 'Gorg. 522 D.'

VOL. III.

p. 13, line 21, read 'II 4. 9.'

p. 30, line 1, for 'by' read 'at.'

p. 65, line 19, read 'writings.'
EDWARD MEREDITH COPE.

Many of Cope's friends having expressed an opinion that it would be well if a short memoir of him were prefixed to this posthumous work, and his sole surviving brother having written to me that he and his nieces would rather leave it in my hands than in those of anybody else, I could not hesitate to undertake the task.

Edward Meredith Cope was born in Birmingham on the 28th of July 1818. He was for some time at the Grammar School of Ludlow under Mr Hinde, and then for about five years at Shrewsbury, where he remained until October 1837, when he commenced residence at Trinity College Cambridge.

During the first years of his Shrewsbury life Dr Butler, late Bishop of Lichfield, was Headmaster; for the last year and quarter Dr Kennedy. Cope throughout his school career was always first or among the first of boys of his own age and standing. For to a great natural aptitude for study and scholarship he joined a strong will and a determination to use his best efforts to excel in whatever was given him to do. Not that he was a bookworm by any means: for he enjoyed extremely the society of his friends and loved innocent recreation in almost any form. Thus though he was not made, and never sought, to distinguish himself in any of them, he thoroughly enjoyed nearly all the usual games and amusements of the place. This taste he retained for years after he took his degree at the University, and Mr Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, and many other friends will bear me witness that he was a consistent votary of Hockey up to the time when the Great Western Railway extinguished this pleasant game first at Eton and then at Cambridge.

The last year and quarter of his residence at Shrewsbury was of vital importance for Cope's future career. Greek was the main and favourite study of his life; and in the summer of 1836 Greek scholarship at Shrewsbury was, if not in comparison with other schools of the day, yet absolutely at a very low ebb. Boys were left in great measure to their own natural lights. Now the light of nature seems capable in favourable circumstances of doing a good
deal for Latin; but in the case of Greek it fosters often the conceit of knowledge, but rarely indeed can impart the knowledge itself.

When Dr Kennedy came to Shrewsbury in the autumn of 1836, he proved himself equal to the task that was before him. Knowledge and method, united with kindness and enthusiasm, effected at once a marvellous change; and all who were able and willing to learn felt in a few months that they had gotten such an insight into the language and such a hold of its true principles and idiom, as to render further progress both easy and agreeable. I would appeal to those who were high in the school at the time when the change in question took place, and ask them whether I have at all overstated the facts of the case; I would refer to Henry Thring and John Bather who came next to Cope in the Classical Tripos; to Francis Morse and others of the same year with myself, and to many others.

But none was more conscious of what he owed to Dr Kennedy, or was more ready to acknowledge it, than Cope himself. The judicious training and the well-directed reading of that year and quarter had an incalculable effect on his future career as a scholar; and, when he went to Cambridge in the October of 1837, he was prepared, as few are, to profit by the advantages the place afforded for classical study. There during his undergraduate days he led a blameless, industrious, and, I believe from what I observed myself and what he often told me, a thoroughly contented and happy life, enjoying the esteem and friendship of many of his worthiest contemporaries, some of them his old schoolfellows, others new acquaintances both in Trinity and in other Colleges, whose names are too numerous to mention. All the while his studies were pursued with a constant and uniform diligence; for none knew better than he to make a good and judicious disposition of his time. He became Scholar of his College as soon as the statutes permitted him to be a candidate, and, after taking his degree in the Mathematical Tripos of January 1841, he gained, as was generally expected, the first place in the Classical. For a year or two after this success he read with a few private pupils, though this employment was never very greatly to his taste. He was elected Fellow of Trinity in 1842: this Fellowship he retained till the day of his death. During the summer of 1843 he resided for some months in Jersey with a few pupils; and in the autumn of that year he made a short tour in Normandy, where he first imbibed, or first tried to satisfy, that intense love for Continental travel which exercised so marked an influence on his future tastes and development.

The moment he had been created Master of Arts at the beginning of July 1844, he threw off for a time the trammels of
Academical life and on the 4th of that month started for a continuous tour of more than fourteen months, never setting foot again in England before the 11th of September 1845. At the commencement of this tour he had for companions two friends, both of them now dead, James Hemery, Dean of Jersey, and Richard Pike Mate, Fellow of Trinity. He always dearly loved and would sacrifice much for the companionship of intimate friends in his travels. But for the greater part of the time he was moving about by himself. In these fourteen months he traversed Switzerland almost from end to end, being a good and indefatigable walker; saw Italy thoroughly, with its thousand objects of interest, as far South as Naples; made a short excursion to Greece in November 1844, seeing Athens well and visiting a part of the Peloponnese and landing in Malta and in Sicily on his return to Italy. I have before me now a full and precise Journal which he kept of the occurrences of every day during this 14 months' peregrination. The whole would make a good-sized printed volume. Here we find minutely recorded where he slept on each succeeding night; what he ate and drank; how many miles he walked each day and the number of hours spent in walking them. He was passionately fond of mountain scenery, and of mediaeval and Italian architecture and art. In this Journal all the varying phases of Swiss scenery are described; the buildings, the pictures and other works of art of every Italian town, great or small.

Cope possessed in a high degree the happy faculty, which does not by any means always accompany general power of mind, of readily picking up a foreign language by ear and conversation; and in the course of this journey he made himself an excellent Italian scholar, acquiring such a mastery over the idiom, as is seldom possessed by Englishmen who have not resided many years in the country. On this and his many subsequent tours he attained to no less facility in colloquial French. German seemed to give him more trouble, although by continued exertion he gained a sufficient acquaintance with it too. He never appeared to me to care very much for Italian literature, with however the very important exception of Dante; nor did the great French classics seem to have any very absorbing interest for him. German he made large use of for purposes of study and critical research, while at the same time Goethe and the other classics of the language were enjoyed for their own sakes.

This first comprehensive tour imbued him with a passion for foreign travel, which he indulged without stint until permanent ill-health brought it to a close. External circumstances compelled him however to confine and modify it in future years. While he was
on his travels in 1845, he was offered and accepted an Assistant-Tutorship at Trinity, the duties of which formed the main occupation of his subsequent life. These duties compelled him to be in residence for most of the year between October and June, and left only the summer months for travel, a time not the most suitable for some of the countries which he would have most liked to see. Palestine for instance and Egypt he never set his foot in; Greece he saw only for a few weeks in 1844; nor did he ever get again to Rome or Naples after his first visit. Between June and October however he continued to be a most indefatigable traveller, confining himself almost entirely to a few favoured lands, first and foremost his first loves, Switzerland and North Italy, next France, then Belgium, Germany, Austria, and the Tirol. I should calculate that, in the twenty-four years between 1844 and 1868 when he was compelled to give up travelling, he must have spent at least six years in the countries just enumerated. With the exception of 1848, an ominous time for continental travel, during the summer of which he visited the North of England and Scotland; of 1865 when he was again in Scotland, and of one other summer when he travelled in Ireland, he was on the Continent every one of these years.

Thus in 1846 he was abroad from June the 21st to October the 5th, traversing assiduously the South West and South East of France, the Pyrenees from end to end, the Tirol and South Germany, and finally crossing through France to Paris. In 1847 he was on the Continent from June the 25th to October the 6th, passing by the Rhine and Switzerland into North Italy and to Florence, in which place he found me to my delight and profit, and accompanied me home by Bologna, Milan, Como, Switzerland, the Rhine and Belgium. I have now in my hands twenty manuscript volumes of various sizes, filled with the most minute writing, in which he describes at length the proceedings of every day and almost every hour during all these years' travel, with the exception of the six years from 1854 to 1859. That he was abroad all or most of these years I know, and that he kept equally minute journals of them I have no doubt; but whether they are lost or where they now are, I cannot ascertain. In 1855 I well remember I was with him for some time in Germany and France and in Paris, seeing the great Exhibition of that year. The moment he quits the Continent, his Journals come to an end. So far as I know or can learn, he never kept any diary of his life at home. Had he done so on any thing like the scale which he has adopted in his Journals of travel, he would have accounted for almost every hour of his life.
His social disposition greatly enjoyed the companionship of intimate friends in these travels; and this he was sometimes able to have during his earlier journeyings. In the first of them he had for a time the society of the friends who have been already spoken of. In 1847 I can remember how thoroughly happy he was in Florence together with W. G. Clark and myself. He writes in his Journal of September the 10th, the evening before he left that city: ‘Altogether I dont think I ever enjoyed a visit to any foreign town more than this last three weeks at Florence. First I had very pleasant society of intimate friends which has rarely been my lot before—men that take an interest in the same things that please me; the weather has been delightful,’ and so on. Again in 1851 he had a long tour, from July 2 to October 16, in Switzerland and North Italy with two intimate friends and brother Fellows, H. R. Luard, now Registrary of the University, and C. B. Scott, the present Headmaster of Westminster. I joined them for a time in Venice and found him thoroughly happy.

But as time went on and he continued year after year to pursue his travels with unabated energy, it was not so easy for him to get his old friends for companions. They did not care to walk for twenty or thirty miles over an Alpine pass under pouring rain, or to defy the summer heats of the Pyrenees, or of the sweltering cities and dust-tormented plains of North Italy. For he hated to pass a single day in inaction, looking upon this as a dereliction of duty and an ignoble concession to laziness. His Journals, as years go on, become more and more instructive, as his taste grew more refined and his discrimination keener; and the ordinary guidebooks of the countries he so often visited might gain greatly by a judicious study of these volumes. At the same time I feel convinced that these later journeys overtaxed his strength and energies, created in him an unnatural excitement and irritation, and fostered the seeds of that malady by which he was subsequently struck down.

In October 1845 Cope commenced the work of what might be called his future profession as Lecturer at Trinity, and continued to perform the duties attached to this office, with energy and success and without the intermission of a single term, for twenty-four years, until the failure of his health put a final stop to all intellectual effort in the summer of 1869.

For some years his favourite subjects of lecture were the Greek Tragedians, the two elder of whom he very decidedly preferred to Euripides. In fact until the very end of his career one or other of their plays was almost invariably the subject of his lecture for the Michaelmas term. And thus by constant repetition and careful pre-
paration he gained a thorough insight into the texts themselves and a very extensive acquaintance with the voluminous literature connected with the Greek drama. But often one or other of the two great historians, Herodotus or Thucydides, or else Demosthenes or another of the orators supplied the text on which he discoursed.

If the best scholars in any of the twenty-four generations of Freshmen who listened to his teaching were consulted, I believe they would one and all avow that their knowledge of the language and of its literature was very greatly furthered by his learned and elaborate lectures.

He gradually established his reputation in the College and the University as one of the very best and soundest Greek scholars of his time: I could cite, if it were necessary, many distinguished names to bear me out in this assertion. In his efforts to be thorough, he would collect a great mass of materials, which he did not always take sufficient pains to mould into shape and symmetry. Indeed he often avowed to me that, when he had once put on paper his thoughts and collections on any question—and this he was in the habit of doing with very great rapidity—, he found it quite impossible to rearrange and rewrite what he had prepared. Hence no doubt there was often a great diffuseness and some want of clearness in his work,—defects with which I have most frequently heard him charged by his auditors. He was by nature too very mistrustful of his own powers, and consequently a great stickler for authority. He seemed to think there was something sacred in the printed text, as it presented itself to him, and was sometimes determined to explain the inexplicable and see a meaning in that which had none. But with all this he was an admirable Greek scholar and a most valuable and highly valued lecturer.

Sometimes, though rarely, he lectured on a Latin writer; but for Latin literature, especially poetry, he did not greatly care; though he quite felt and freely admitted the surpassing merits of style in the great prose authors. After a time however he almost entirely dropped the Classical Latin writers, except for purposes not connected with the study of the language, and took up a position of benevolent neutrality with regard to the whole literature. He treated the Latin in much the same way as he treated their compeers, the great French Classics.

When he had been Assistant Tutor about ten years, he undertook the College lecture on Plato, and afterwards on Aristotle as well; and these two philosophers he resolved to make the main object of his study henceforth. For a long time his great natural diffidence seemed to give him a disinclination to commit anything to the press. One of his earliest essays in print were his criticisms, in the Journal
of Classical and Sacred Philology, of Grote's famous dissertation on the Sophists. There is a good deal to be learnt from what he has written; but, if I am not mistaken, he has hardly caught Grote's point of view, which in this country at all events has I believe now gained very general acceptance among the best judges. In 1864 he published a translation of Plato's Gorgias. His translation is strikingly literal and very excellent in its kind; but this kind is peculiar. Mr Henry Jackson in his introductory remarks to Cope's translation of the Phaedo, a posthumous work which Mr Jackson has edited with great skill and diligence, has given a short and trenchant exposition of the principle which Cope has followed out in both these translations. A more elaborate effort is the Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, published in 1867 and designed to serve as a preliminary study to the present edition of that work. We find in this dissertation a very full exposition of Aristotle's principles, set forth with learning and research; but one feels perhaps here too that want of concentration and careful revision, which, as I have said, Cope used himself to acknowledge with regret as a peculiar feature of his style which he was quite unable to remedy. Anyhow I fancy a reader would have liked to have seen it incorporated in the present edition as an essential portion of it, neither of the two being a complete whole without the other. This edition it is not for me to offer an opinion upon: suffice it here to say that it was the main occupation of the latest and most mature years of his working life, and bears witness in every page to unsparing labour and genuine scholarship.

Cope was ordained Deacon in November 1848 and Priest in September 1850 by Dr Turton, late Bishop of Ely. A short experience with his friend Mate, then Vicar of Wyameswold, convinced him that, as he had already for some years devoted himself to a life of study, Parish work was not the sphere for which his tastes and habits were best adapted; and he contented himself afterwards with occasionally assisting one or other of his clerical friends, when he would make them a visit during a vacation.

Perhaps the most important crisis in the even tenour of his laborious College life was occasioned by the Greek Professorship becoming vacant in 1866, when he came forward as one of three candidates for that office. The votes of the electors, the Council of the Senate, having been equally divided between him and Dr Kennedy, the appointment finally devolved by statute on the Chancellor of the University who gave it to Dr Kennedy. There is no doubt that this result was a poignant disappointment to Cope at the time; it is no less certain that his strength and the tone of his mind
were already a good deal affected by ill-health. This I could illustrate from my own knowledge, if many considerations did not counsel silence on matters which neither his friends nor the public would care to know, or see paraded before them.

Every one, they say, has the defects of his virtues; and it cannot be denied that in his later years, when health became uncertain, Cope was too prompt to take offence and conceive causeless suspicions against his most intimate friends. But they could understand that this arose from excess of susceptibility and perversion of tender feeling; and the offence was forgotten as readily as it was conceived.

In August 1869 he was seized with that malady from which he never rallied during the four remaining years of his life. He died on the 5th of August 1873, and on the 14th of that month he was followed to his grave in the Church of England Cemetery at Birmingham by his two brothers, his nephew and a few of his oldest and dearest friends.

I never knew a kinder-hearted or more charitable man than Cope. Suffering of any sort excited in him an uncontrollable longing to relieve it, whether the relief were to be afforded by sympathy and personal attention, or by money. Many indeed are the acts of charity on his part which fell under my own observation; and I am sure that I never learnt but a small portion of them, for he loved to do good by stealth. Whenever a friend needed care and sympathy, none so prompt as he to offer them. When Robert Leslie Ellis, for whom he felt an unbounded admiration, was seized with fever at San Remo in 1849, off hurried Cope at once to render him all the assistance it was in his power to give. So when his poor friend Mate was struck down by crushing disease, Cope hastened at once to lavish on him his affectionate care. It was always among the chief pleasures of his existence to make a round of visits to his old friends who lived away from Cambridge. One of the oldest of them, R. W. Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, writes to me as follows: 'Of all my old friends of King's and Trinity he alone from 1848 to the year of his sad seizure visited me regularly at Shenstone. He preached in my Church, he taught in my schools, and rarely left me without contributing liberally to some Parochial charity, never without wishing to do so'. 'No one living', he adds with good reason, 'is more capable than I am of testifying to the warmth, the steadiness and depth of his friendship'.

H. A. J. M.
ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

Α.

"Ο Βίος βραχύς, η δέ τέχνη μακρὴν
ο δὲ καιρός ὀξὺς· η δὲ πεῖρα σφαλερῆ· η δὲ κρίσις χαλεπῆ.

ΗΡΩΘΕΣ.
"Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστὶν ἀντιστροφὸς τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἀμ-


The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the recitation of the choral odes. Ἀριστοφάνης denotes its movement in one direction, to which the ἀντιστροφὴ, the counter-movement, the wheeling in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being repeated. Müller, Diss. Eumen. p. 41. Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XIV § 4. Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. Bk. III. c. I § 15. Hence it is extended to the words sung by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of the Ἀριστοφάνης. And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart.

Hence in Logic ἀντιστροφή is used to express terms and propositions which are convertible, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely similar in all respects. On the various senses of ἀντιστροφή and its derivatives in Logic, see Waitz, u. a. In this signification, however, ἀντιστροφὸς does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Intro. p. 134).

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analogous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as likewise Isocrates, πρὸς δικαίως. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several places; Polit. vi (iv) 5, 1292 a 7, καὶ ἑστὶν ἀντιστροφὸς (corresponding)

AR. I.
PHILOLOGIA A I § 1.


Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, 'res contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,' in de Gen. Anim. II 6, 743 B 28, το ψυχρόν συνετηθέν, αντιστρόφων (as a balance) τῇ θερμαίᾳ τῇ περὶ τὴν καθῆκαν τῶν εὐκαλπίων. Trendelenburg, Comm. ad de Anima u. s., after defining ἀντιστρόφων as above, adds, ἀντιστρόφοι ex eadem chori similitudine significat ex altera parte respondere (this is from Cicero, u. s.) Arist. Rhet. I 1; quod non significat, rhetoricae in dialecticae locum succedere (i.e. can be substituted for it, step into its place, as a convertible term), sed quasi ex adverso esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corresponding opposite in a συντονία, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. II 17, 42, specie magis quam genere different.

The term ἀντιστρόφως therefore applied to the two arts, seems to represent them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row (see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof; both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one concluding by the formal syllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its inferences by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymema, never complete in form, and by the single example in the place of the general induction.

Rhetoric is afterwards described as ἱρατοφις, μήχων and ὄρωμα (infra c. II § 7). ἰρατοφις and μήχων both express in different ways the relation that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, branch, or part; a species or variety of the general art of probable reasoning: ἱρατοφις as a subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or tree—a term so far corresponding with ἀντιστρόφως, but differing from it in making Rhetoric subordinate, μήχων reduces it to a still lower level in comparison with the other. ὄρωμα implies no more than a mere general resemblance.

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII 6, occurs an explanation of ἀντιστρόφως, quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, ἱρατοφις, ἵν ἄντιστρόφως ἐστι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, (not referring apparently to this passage, but most probably to the συντομῇ τῆς τριτοφίας) τοῦτον ἑλικόντας, διὰ τὶ ἄλλῃ τῇ συντομῇ στρέφοντας (νεκώρις κύκλῳ), as Homer called Ulysses ἀρίθμων instead of ἱσθμὼν. Alexander (infr.) gives the same explanation.

Bacon Adv. of learning Bk. II IX 3, has antistrophe for 'correspondence', 'and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former hath.'

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. 90 foll.: I will here give a summary of them from Alexander's Commentary on the
Τοιχεία. p. 4. They are 1. that both of them are υπὸ προτοτίπα τῶν γενόμενων διορισμάτων: that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like the sciences, but argues or perorates upon any thesis or subject whatsoever that can be presented to it. 2. τὸ δὲ δὲν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως, no proof or conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable; exact demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike; πίστις, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not ἐπίστασις, the infallible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. μὴ δὲ εἰς εἰσοδήματα, they have no 'special, appropriate' first principles, such as those from which the special sciences are deduced; though they likewise appeal to the τὸ νοῦς, the κοινὸν δρᾶμα, the ultimate axioms and principles common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. τὰ εἰς ὑπὸ τὰ δηλουμένα ολίκα, they argue indifferently the opposite sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any proposition or problem; unlike science and demonstration, which can only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to have, two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable principles; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attainable. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, in the way of debate; and its discussions are of a more general or universal character; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a method of continuous narration or explanation (ἱερολογία), and deals in its conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or universal rules, maxims and axioms.

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordinary account of the derivation and original meaning of ἀνατροφος: τὸ γὰρ πάντα ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀνατροφοῦν τὲ καὶ πρὸ τὸ αὐτὰ στρεφομένον καὶ καταγεγραμμένον λέγει.


ἀριστεράμεσα] 'marked off, separated by a limit,' from everything else about it; and so 'definite, special' (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 πρὶ τι γένος ὑπὸ φαρμακεύματος, opposed to ὑπὸ τοῦ δολίτας. Polit. I 13, 1260 ὃ ἀναφερόμενον τοῦ δολίτας (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). 1b. IV (vi) 4, 1290 ὃ 25 ἀναφερόμενον. ἀναφερόμενον (ἐν τῷ γενέτῳ κύκλῳ) πρὸ τὸ ἀλλακτικά δεικτικά τῷ ἐγγὺς τοιχίᾳ. "this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distinguished, from all the rest by this function," de Anima II 4, 9, 416 a 20. The preposition is similarly used in the compound ἀναφθάνεις, which is 'to look away, or off,' from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the attention on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. Comp. Lat. definire, determinare.

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and
Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, II 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator.

§ 2. συνήθειαν, habituation, familiarity, practice, acquired by association (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 2, 101 b 3.

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τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν
θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἦδη πάντες ἃν
3 ὁμολογήσαμεν τέχνης ἔργων εἶναι. νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς
téχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὁλίγων πεπορικασίαν
αὐτῆς μόριον ἄρ γὰρ πίστεως ἐντεχύν ἐστὶ μόνον, τὰ
δ' ἀλλα προσθήκαι, οἳ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνδυμαμάτων οὐδὲν
λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ
tὰς ἄρχει ἢ έδο袈. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 25, ᾧ ἡ προσθήκη ἢ δορθορίμα for
the more usual μέθοδος: and again ἢ δορθορίμα, de Comp. Verb. c. 4 sub fin. From
this usage of the Greek word the Latinists seem to have borrowed their via
or via et ratione, which frequently occurs in precisely the same sense.
See Cicero de Fin. III 5, 18, IV 4, 10; Orat. III 10, XXXIII 116; de Orat. I
25, 113. Quint. II 17, 41 esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo
nemo dubitaverit; and x 7, 6 via dicere.

The verb ὅδοισθαι is found in the same sense, Met. A 3, 984 a 18.
螵δοθοτα ὅς ἐστιν, ὑπὸ τὸ ἄργυρον ὅδοισθαι αὐτῶ καὶ συνήθειαν ἐργῶν,
and Rhet. III 12, 3 (according to MS A and some others); and the sub-
stantive ὅδοίσθαι, III 14, 1.

῾προσθήκαι, which occurs several times in Aristotle (as Rhet.
II 2, 10, III 17, 3; Prob. XXX 1, 954 b 12, de part. Anim. II 4, §§ 4, 5, 6, III 9,
8, de gen. Anim. IV 4, 9, ὡδὲ Μνημεῖα, I 11. Polit. II 9, 1270 a 4, IV (VII) 17,
1336 a 32, and V (VIII) 3, 1338 a 35 πρὸ ἢ δορθορίμα), has a meaning slightly
differing from the preceding. The metaphor is now taken from the office
of pioneers, who precede an advancing army, and prepare, clear, or 'pave
the way' for them.

ὅτι δὲ ... τοῖς arise is here grammatically the antecedent to ἢ,
the cause, arises, being in the relative pronoun expressed as an abstract
notion ('the cause, which thing') in the neuter. A similar change from
feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima 1 3,
407 a 4 τὸν ἱερὸν τοῦ πάντων (φυσική) τοιοῦτον εἶναι βουλτῆς οὗ τοῦ δὲ
καλομένος σώζει, Pol. II 2 init., καὶ δὲ ἢ ἄρχει φορεῖ δὲν πειροδετήθηκα... οὖ
φαίνεται συμβαίνου ἐκ τῶν λόγων, and in Eur. Iph. T. 900 (Herm.) ἢ ἄρ
ἄρχει ταῦτα ἄρτων κρίθηκε πάνω, καὶ ὅτι τὸν οὗτον κρίθηκε πάνω, οὗτος me must be understood as neuter:
see Hermann on ν. 1038.

§ 3 seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δὲ δὲ μὴ λανθάνων δὲν πάντα ἢ ἢ
τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιοῦτα πρὸς φαίλων γὰρ ἀκροατή καὶ τὸ ἢ ἢ τοῦ πράγματος
ἀκούστη, ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἢ, οὐδὲν δὲν προσθηκαὶ—ὡς the vehicle for
appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges
personally, which were usually introduced into the προσθήκα.

worthy] rhetorical, not demonstrative proofs; modes of belief, of
things probable; all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being prob-
ably merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note.

προσθήκας...τοῦ τῶν προϊστως All kinds of indirect proof are secondary,
subordinate, non-essential, mere 'adjuncts' or 'appendages', like dress or
ornaments to the body: 'the body' being the actual, logical, direct and
substantial proof of the case. What is here called 'the body', meaning
tων έξω του πράγματος τα πλείστα πραγματεύουνται. διαβολή γὰρ και ἔλεος καὶ ὀργή καὶ τὰ
the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by ‘the soul’
in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents
and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg.
(quoted by Ernesti, Lexicon Technologicum Graecae p. 110, Art. ἐνυπόμαμα)
iota παλαιός ὄντες τι εὖ όντος τὸ λόγον υπάρχει εἰ σῶματος το συναρτησον καὶ
ψυχής ψυχή μὲν καλούμενη τὰ ἐνυπόμαμα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλαίων
συναρτησον σώμα δὴ τῆς φράσεως καὶ τὸ ἐξωθημένο κάλλος, δὲ τούτων
ἐπιστρέφων αἱ δέοι. And Cicero, Orat. xiv 44 nam et inventire et indicare
quid dicis magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam omnis instar in corpore.
Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously
limit the province of Rhetoric as an art—αἰ πλοῖος ἐν εὑρίσκομαι μόνον—to
the employment of the ‘enthymeme’, the rhetorical representative of
the logical and demonstrative ‘syllogism’; with the exclusion of all that
is, strictly speaking, ‘beside the subject or real issue’, all that is beside
the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof,
namely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to
the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces
of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the
only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres
to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian’s description is
as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs
are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably
does not refer immediately to him: Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores
qui nos volum videre studant oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus
duplici ratione exclusendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis
animi perturbatione; deinde quia indicente veritatem depelli misericordia vel
sae se similiusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, quam
vincenti tantum gratia disceretur, non modo agentis superius ac sed vis
On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26
sec.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. περὶ διαβολῆς § 321.
προμαχίσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 a 30.
προμαχίσθαι περὶ τινός περὶ τίνος is dicitur ab Aristotelis, qui in inves-
tigandis et cognoscendis aliqua re via ac ratione procedit; itaque con-
junctum legitur cum verbis διαβολήσαντοι, ετώς, διαβολῆς. ‘The primary
sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes
into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit,
and hence of ‘a special study’, ‘a systematic treatment of a particular
subject of investigation, or practice’ (as in this present case, of Rhetoric,
comp. § 10). προμαχία, like μόδος, τικεῖ, ἐπιτίμω, φιλοσοφία, and
many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual
process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise,
or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17,
note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waits on Anal. Post.
§ 4. διαβολή from διαβόλλω ‘to sunder or set at variance’; and so
to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties', in its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument; and with its opposite ἀδικολέων, 'to absolve oneself, clear away from oneself ill-feeling and suspicion', forms one of the principal topics of the ἀπολογίασις (see Intro. pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the πάθη or emotions such as ἀγωγή and ἀργή. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter says, 'διόλλα non est πάθος, sed pertinent ad judicem ponendum et πάθος.'

Τοπ. Δ 5, 126 a 31. [διαβολῶν τίνων διαβολῶν διαβολής καὶ ἀγωγῆς γενίτων τῶν φίλων. These words, which seem to be a mere gloss upon διαβολῶν in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one MS only, marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his edition, Vol. II p. 144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of διαβολή.

On πάθος and πάθη, see Intro. pp. 113—118.

ἐν περὶ τοῦ πρὸγματος διαστάσεως] Appeals to the feelings are ἔτως τοῦ πρὸγματος: they are 'beside the proper subject, the real question, the direct issue', which is the fact and the proof of it; and 'directed to the judge', intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect kind of proof of the justice of our case.

ἀπὸ ét περὶ πάθους—λέγωσιν] Similarly in Rhet. Η 1, 4, it is said of the ornaments of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed διὰ τῆς μορφῆς τῶν πολήσεων; in well-governed states they would not be permitted at all.

§ 5. τοῦ μὲν...οὗ 'either...or'. The one only think that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (sai, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, καὶ χρήσται.

Ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγω] Heindorf ad Theat. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, καὶ τοῦτο κάλλιστον ἔσχεν τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ συντεθέναι, διὸ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν Ἑλλῶν δικαστηρίων, ἀφοῦ
γαρ δει τον δικαστην διαστρέψειν εἰς ὅργην προά-
καλ παρ' αυτών ἀμαλογηθεὶν τοὺς δικαιώματος δικαίως
κοινωθεὶν τὴν κρίσιν. πολεῖ δει καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀποβλέπωσε μὴ ἑντάξεις τοὺς ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος
λέγοις 'κ.λ.

Lucian, Hermiotimus, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν Ἀρεαστράτην αὐτὰ πεισθαν' ὅτι ὅσιον καὶ ἡσύχον δίκαιους, αὐτὲ μεν τοὺς λέγοντας ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ λέγοντα ἀποβλέπουσι. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I. p. 805), and again, Anacharsis ἐ. de Gymn. c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) ὁ δὲ (δικαζόμενος) ἐσ' ἀν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγοντας ἀνίχνευται ἢ βοσκῆ καθ Ἰνόμοις ἀπεστάλεται. ἦν δὲ τις ἡ φρονεμόν εἰπεν πρὸ τοῦ λέγοντος, ἣν εἰς περίπτορα ἀναργύρως ἀνετοῦν, δ’ ὅλους ἡ λέγοντας ἀξιόηκαν ἐπάγει τὸ πράγματα, ὥσπερ ὑπόττυμον παῦει εἰς τοὺς δικαστάς μηχανώς, παραλλάδον δ’ ἀρξε λακευμένους εἰδώς, ὥσπερ ἐὼν ληστὴν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν ἡ.λ. There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X 1, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements—Quintilian’s carelessness in extending to all the lawcourts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in II 15, 9.

Διαστρέφειν to warp, or distort to wrest out of the straight (‘right’) line or proper direction, to pervert or 'deform the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in στριβλὸν. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the ‘right’ line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; σκολὸς, and ὅρϑος, εὐθεῖα δὲ δίκαιον σκολεῖν, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, σκολεῖς ἐδοξει πατῶν, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theat. 173 A &c. &c. So ἐκεῖς, Eur. Androm. 448 εὐθεῖα καθοδεύει ὅποις ἀλλὰ πᾶσι περίς φρονεῖτε. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253. ἔδωκεν... γι' αὐτὸν... &c. &c. &c. &c.


'Crooked' for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and crooked generation. Ps. cxix 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they forward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson's Dict. Art. 'crooked'.

Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of
the rhetorical preposition ἀλέξωρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χάρι δὲ καὶ τοις δικαιώτατοι εὐθύναι διερεύσατο, δι' δικαιωτᾶ ἡμεῖς καὶ δικαίωμα εἰσίν. συμπαραλληλογραφήσον δὲ καὶ τὰς ελατούσες, εἶν τοὺς ἀντίδικας καταδέωρος ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγων ὑπὸ πράττειν ἡ ἀλλὰ τὶ πρὸς τὸν ὅγιον. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμβλητῶν τὸ νεύμα ἐκ τοῦ νόμομα καὶ τὸ συμβίοιρο καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀδόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art.

προϊσταμένεις] Comp. III 14, 7, and note.

καὶ εἰ τειχίσματι] The process by which ἂς in this and similar forms of expression—ὡς ὃς ὃς, ὅστηρ ὃς ὃς, καθότηρ ὃς ὃς, ὅστηρ ὃς ὃς, and the like—has lost its force, become inactive, (consophium, 'gone to sleep', Butt.) in the sentence, is explained by Buttman in his note on Dem. Md. § 15, p. 530. The conditional ἂς belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, καὶ τειχίσματι, παρακατέκοιτο, ὅν τι ἔργον ἐίναι, 'as one would do, if he were to do.' Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which ἂς supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβούμενος ὅστηρ ὃς ἐν παί, Pl. Gorg. 479 A 'fearing as a child would': ἄρ. παραστάτημα πρὸς κατανοησία 1 2, 2 ὅτι ὅστηρ ἐν ἑλε στήν ἐν φοβίζω ἐν, 'whose natural habit is, as it might be (ἀν), talkative'; de Anima 1 5, 5, 409 B 27, ὅστηρ ὃς ὅς τῆς ἰσχύος τοῦ πράγματα νομίζει. in such cases the ἂς is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases analogous, ἂς is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 430, 1, for some instances [Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik § 398 p. 209 sq. s.].

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining καὶ εἰ with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. II 1 init. καὶ εἰ τειχίσματι, c. 2, ὅστηρ ὃς ὃς σταθώ μετὰ πλεῖον εἰκόνα, and III 8 καὶ εἰ συμβαίνει, also Poet. I 5, καὶ εἰ τιμη αὐτοῦ τεχνώμενον. Καὶ εἰ μὴ τε οὖσιν is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. ix 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute διοκεύω. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Aj. 1078 δοκεῖν παιδίν τί καὶ (it might be even) ὅ τι ἔμμορον ὁμοιός. Xenophon, Symp. II 20, ix 4, Cyrop. I 3, 1, Memor. III 6, 4, and 10, 12. Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 A, Rep. vi 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to
RHETORIKHEΣ Α 1 § 6.

Those already quoted, Rhet. II 20, 4, ἄνευ ὑπὲρ ἣν αὐτὸς, Eth. N. v 7, 1132, 11. Ib. v 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fn., p. 1143, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, ἀδὲ καὶ διόν, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) ἀδὲ καὶ διόν, and several more; Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV 11, 11, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotles it has become habitual. The analogous use of ὑπὲρ with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 b 4, ἄνευ ὑπὲρ ἄλλου γενόμενοι; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, 1, ἵνα καθὸ λέγονται, and II 6, 6, ἵνα καθὸ λέγον, where ὑπὲρ may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, Beiträge zu Ar. Poet. I p. 35—37; Eucken, de Ar. dicendi ratione 1 p. 61—64. 8.]

§ 6. On the 'legal issues', ὀρθοδοξία, ἀκμαίοπρόθετης, which, as Victorius remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397, Appendix E to Bk. III.

§ 7. κειμένος κὸμοιο, κείσθαι and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of τίθημι. κείσθαι itself 'to be placed, fixed, established' = τίθημι; κείσθαι 'to be put together or composed' = σύντιθημι; διακείσθαι 'to be disposed' = διαστίθημι; τοκείσθαι (as 1 2 13) 'to be assumed' = ἑπιστίθημι or ὑπολαμβάνω. τῆς κοιμομενος κοιμοης, τοις κοιμοης] On the different senses of κοιμεω and κοιμηται as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note 1; and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of ἔνωσις to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note 1.

ἔνωσις τοις κοιμεω[ται] ἔνωσις, and so depending, upon; hence ἔνωσις, in the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 ἔνωσις τοις κοιμοεισθαι. This primary, literal, and physical sense of ἔνωσις, (in this application of it,
λαβεῖν καὶ διλέγον ῥάον ἡ πολλοῦ εὐ φρονοῦντας π. 1354.β. καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικαζεῖν. Ἕπειθ' αἱ μὲν νομοθετεῖα ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεφαμένων γίνον
tαι, αἱ δὲ κρίσεις εἰς ὑπογνοῦ, ἠπτεὶν χαλεπῶν ἀποδι-
δόναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνον-
which represents the object of the preposition as the διὰς on which some-
ting stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen
Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have
consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost
and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass
of illustrations of the various usages of ἐνι accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032
—1045, in p. 1038, col. 2.

αἱ νομοθετεῖα ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεφαμένων γίνονται] 'legislation arises
from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration'. Thuc. 1. 58,
ἐκ πολλοῦ πράσσωντες οὖν τῶν ἀποτελεσ.

ἐν ὑπογνοῖ] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford not. var. prefers ὑπογνοῖ,
and so L. Dinolt, on Xen. Cytr. vi 1, 43.) ὑπογνοῖ πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός,
Hesychius. ἐν ὑπογνοῖ παρ' αὐτῷ, ἀποκατατυπώσει, ἐκ τῶν σύνεχων, Suidas.
By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀποθ (Gaisf.), ἐν ὑπο-
γνοῖ λέγεται ἀπὸ ἀνταρκτικῆς; and in Eustath. (ap. eun.)
it is said to be derived from γίνεσθαι in the sense of γίνω (compare Theocr.
Idyl. xxii 81 and 121; the 'hand' is the member, par excellence), from
which likewise he deduces ἐγγύς, ἐγγυφι, and ἐγγυλῆς; and ὑπόγνοι, ὁ
καὶ ὑπὸ γνῶσει λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγύς φαινον προσδόκειμον, ἢ παρακτικά γεγονός, καὶ
ἐν αἰνιῶν πρόχειρον, ἢ μᾶλλον ὑποχειρίαν. Examples may be found,
all bearing the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and
a still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s.v., to which add Rhet. ii 22, 11;
Pol. vii (vi) 8, 1321 b 17. ὑπόγνισθαι (the readiest way or means)
391. In Isocr. 111. 4, and Epist. 6. 2. p. 418 B, it stands for 'close
at hand', ὑπὸ γνῶσιν μοι τῆς τοῦ βλου τελευτής οὖσης, and similarly Ar.
Euth. Nic. iii 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., διὰ θάνατον ἐπιφθαίρει ὑπογνοῦ δύνα.

It appears from all this that ὑπογνοῖ means 'under the hand', as an
unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. ii
1. 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐν ὑπογνοῖ, 'from under the hand', cor-
responds to our 'off-hand', or 'out of hand', and is used to express any-
thing 'sudden and unexpected' or 'unpremeditated', 'extemporaneous',
a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐν χείροις, ἐν
χείρες, 'off-hand'.

ἀρχὴν [a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its
elementary senses that of 'to give back', ἰδότης; ἐν as in ἐκφύομεν,
ἀπολαμβάνωμεν, ἐπιστέψεως, ἐπεπείθομεν, ἐπικαλέσεως, ἐπικαλέσωμεν (see Sturm. Lex. Xenoph.),
from which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be
deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is 'to give forth',
or 'produce', as the earth produces her fruits, and this also might be
applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as
this signification is likewise deductible from the other—for production, as
when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or 'return' of something as due—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, *epaddere*. So in Eth. N. II 11, 1103, a 27, b 22, *τὰς ἐπεργάσεις ἀποδίδουσι* is not simply 'to produce', but to produce energies that are *due to the system*, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Arist.* § 55, p. 132, "ἀποδίδουσι proper est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (declarare) is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 a 3) nihil enim est alium quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere."

ἀποδίδουσι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as a due, 'assign' (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of due distribution, *suum cuique*; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδίδουσι λέγων, 'to render an account', to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, *ἀποφαίνως, declarare*. To one or the other of these I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred.

I will add a few examples in the way of illustration—Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 § 56, τοῖς ἐχθρῶι πουιείσ σώμα ἐξ ἐχθρῶι μῆρες κολάζουσι ἀπίδιδον (assigns as a due) ὁ νόμος; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 ε (a good example), οὐκ ἀποδίδοσιν ημῖν ἐπίωσι γίνεται (pay back in return), ἀλλὰ τοῖς χειλὶς (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) ἐστίν ἡ φύσις; ἡ ἀποδίδουσι κ. κ. λ. de Anima I 11, 403 b 1, τοῖνυν δὲ ἐὰν μεν τὴν ὑπερ ἀποδίδουσιν, 'assigns' or 'applies', that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. C 4, 408 a 3; and ἀπονέμεων, in precisely the same sense, ib. ν 1, and Pl. Tim. 34 a. ἀποδίδουσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀπὸ λειτουργίας de part. An. III 14, 9, 'duly to fulfill certain functions (services)'. Ib. II 14, 5, (ἡ φύσις) πανταχοῦ ἀποδίδοσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαβόντα ἅρπου πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος. Top. A 1, 121 a 15, et passim, ὁ ἀποδίδον γένος, ἀποδίδουσι γένος. Top. A 18, 108 b 9, τὸν ἀπὸδοταν τῶν ἀρκεμέων, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere. de part. An. III 7, 18, ἀπὸ τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I 1, 43 ἀπὸ τὸ ἄρτιν τί ἔστιν, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 a 16, ἐπιμελοῦσί τίνα ἀποδίδουσι (to produce, effect everything) οὕτως ἄρτιτος ἀναξ. ἐκ τῶν ἀνέρων. Eth. Nic. III 1, 110 b 8, ποῖα δὲ τοῦτο ἁμαρτία ἀποδίδουσι, to give an account, explain.

So here ἀποδίδουσι is 'duly to assign, distribute, or apportion' and again I 2, 5, ἀποδίδουσιν ὑπὸ τὸν ἐπιλεγεῖ 'we render our judgments'. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, 21 508 E, Phaedr. 237 C, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 205 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολογίζομαι, occurs with the same sense of ἀρχή, I 11, 3. ἀπονέμεων is used in exactly the same sense, 'to assign as a due'; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 δ 18, ὁ τοῖς ἄριστοι ἀπονέμεως, Ib. ν 35, τιμὴ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, Ib. 1124 a 9.
By this time, now that we have come to them, 'they actually decide.' So in the next line, τὸ φθεῖν ἂν καὶ τὸ μονὸν 'this time', in their case, not in the former, of something new, special, and marked. ἂν therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. Rhet. Gr. Vol. 1. Pref. p. v. 'paule post alterutrum ἂν abundat, puto prius.' However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14.

It may be while to say a few words on this very common usage of ἂν and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. ἂν and its analogues ἂν, ὁδέ, ὁδῶν, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of 'already', a definite time which we have just reached; 'point', or 'stage', or 'degree' attained being substituted by the metaphor for 'time' in the original sense of the word.

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. παρὰ μὴν καὶ ἀκαμάθως c. 2, 16, ὅσπερ φῶς ἂν τὸ ἤδη, 'habit, already by this time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second nature.' Met. A 21, 1022 b 18, ἡν δὲ [τρόποι πάθους λέγων] νομίζων ἐνεργείας καὶ ἀλοιπονίας ἂν, 'one sense of πάθος is, the actual energies and changes of these'. ἂν, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have actually become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, a 4, ἂν αὐτὰ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἂν προσαγωγοῦσον, 'which may now (at this stage) be fairly called a ἁμαρτία'. περὶ ἐρμηνειῶν c. 9, 19, a 39, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἁμαρτήσας ἂν, οὐ μένοις ἂν, (not yet actually, not quīle, not yet arrived at the stage of,) ἀλλὰ μὴν τετελεῖ. Polit. II 8, 1268 b 20, ἔκεινον ἂν ἐκκύκλωσαί. I. I. 7, 1279 a 40, παῖδες δὲ ἂν συναίνειν ἱκμηθοῦσαν. VIII (v) 8, 1308 a 15, ἦσαν γὰρ ὅπως δήμου ἂν ἦσαν ὁ δῆμος, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ὁ δῆμος, at this stage, by this time, it is now quite true that they may be regarded as a δῆμος. Eth. Nic. v 3, 1132 a 2, πρὸς ἐπεφανεῖν καὶ ἐν ποιμενί ἂν δὲ ἄρχων, 'when a man has come to be a ruler, he must then,...' in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler must, actually, live or act in relation to others and in society'. Rhet. I 6, 24, πῶς ἂν ὁμολογοῦσιν, I 10, 11, ἂν διαφέρει, 'it does make a difference'. C. II 3, ἃ τοῖς ἐκκυκλώσαν ὁ παίδευσι τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἂν γίνεται. I. b. II 6, 26, ἐπον ἂν γίνεται. 11 6 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, ἣτο ταχὺν τὴν ἂν Ἀλεπτοῦν: and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) πρῶς πῶς ἂν κενέμοις ἔρισα."
The use of *demum* is precisely similar, and common in most Latin writers. Sallust, Cat. **xx idem vella atque idem nolle ea demum (that and that alone) firma amicitia est. Quint. II 5, 1, atqueque de qua logium bonis demum (to the good, and to them alone) tribus volunt. VII Praef. init. nesque enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exspecti sumus. VII 2, 21, VIII Prooem. 3, IV 5, 7, XI 1 § 44, 3 § 68, et passim. Cic. Tusq. Disp. I 19, 43, saeque et demum naturalis est sedes, et seq., de Orat. II 30, 131, hic loci si demum oratori prodesse possunt. Rarer is the analogous use of *denique* and *tandem*: Cic. de Orat. II 30, 131, c. 34, 145, tum denique scrutari locos, c. 75, 304, quantum est in eo tandem mal? c. 77, 315, hisce omnibus rebus considerati, tum denique id... Hor. Ep. I 17, 2, quo tandem factus... On *iam* in this same usage, see Munro, on Lucr. I 600, 613, II 314, 426; add, II 974, and Virg. Aen. V 179, *iam senior*, VI 304, VII 46, 735.

Similarly in a negative sentence, *obvo* sometimes introduces the notion of time in estimating the amount or degree, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 a 11, *ὅτῳ* δὲ οὖν, ὅτι προχρήσθη, ἀδίκημα ἢτοι, πρὶν δὲ προχρήσθη *obvo*, δι' ἄλλ' *δίκημον*. Ib. 23, *δίκημον* ὑπὲρ *δίκημον* δὲ *obvo*. Ib. b 24, *οὔ περὶ τῶν δίκημων*—in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as *not yet amounting to* the actual crime or unjust *act*; and in the third case this distinction is applied to the *διάφορα*, which, though a wrong in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the *vice*, confirmed evil habit, of *ποικίλλω*—also VI 10, 1142 b 14, *αὕτη γὰρ ὄπως φαίνει*. Ib. 25, *οὖν* ὀπισθειν τῷ *ὑποβουλεύον*, and 28.


*σοφόρος* [Bekker and Spengel. Alii *σοφόρος*] *with whom are connected...* In *σοφός* *οὗ* *σοφός* expresses a mere general reference, *with respect to whom*, *in whose case*; and *σοφόρος* *are often taken into*, embraced in, the account, *σῶν*, together with their proper business, the mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient authority for *σοφόροι* in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. Phaedr. 249 B, *ἔς εἰς λογισµὸν σοφόροι*, but even this is something different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of *σοφός* is certainly rather strained. *Probably *σοφόρος* is right.*
θεωρεῖν ἰκανῶς τὸ ἀληθὲς, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ κρίσει τοῦ ἰδίου ἦν ἡ λυπηρόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀλλῶν, ὡσπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ οὐκ ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύριον τὸν κριτήν· περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονότος ή μὴ γεγονέναι, ἡ ἐςεσθαι ή μὴ ἐςεσθαι, ή εἶναι ή μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλεῖπεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν δυνατον ταύτα τὸν νομοθέτην προίδειν. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' οὖν ἐξεί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦντι δόσι τᾶλα διορίζοντι, οἷον τί δεῖ τὸ προόμοιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἐξείν, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἔκαστον μορίῳ οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιῶν τινα

τὸ ἀληθὲς] No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. III 16, 1287 a ult. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονται 'γάρ' ἐναντίον οἱ λαρμοὶ κάμποτες ἔλλοι λαρμοὶ, καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γνωμαξόμενοι παιδοτρίβαι, οὐκ οὐ δυνάμαι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ολείων καὶ εἰν τά τέσσερα.

ἐπισκοτείν] 'to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow'. Dem. c. Mid. 356, 25, ολείων ὑεμοδομέων ἐν Ἔλευσιν νοσάντων δότε τῶσον ἐπισκοτεῖν τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ. Infr. III 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, ὁ Εὐθυδήμος ἐξεστὶ τῷ Κηφηνίῳ τῷ θέασιν; an odd and unexplained use of this word. It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting in the way, obscured or darkened Cesippus—not however in the ordinary sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and so darkening by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (ἡς ἔλαιος gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb).

In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr. ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (ind. ad Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. Vol. v Pt. 1 p. 393,) for instance, Eubul. incert. Fr. 11 (Mein. III 267) τῶν ολον τῷ φρόνειν ἐπισκοτεῖν; and in other authors. See also Victorius; and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18.


τὸ ἐξο τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦν] infra § 11; comp. de Anima I 3, 406 b 26 καὶ ὁ Πτόμων (Plato, in the Timaeus) φυσιολογεῖ τῆν ψυχὴν κυων τῷ σύμβουλῳ.

διορίζων] to separate by a limit or boundary line. Herodot. IV 42 διαφανῶς ἄρθρω τα καὶ λαβεῖν. Hence to separate a thing from others, to mark off as a special province or domain, and so of 'the definition', which includes all that is essential to, or characteristic of, the thing defined, and excludes everything else. The word here of course means something more than a bare definition; it expresses the limitation or 'determination' of the proper contents of the προόμοιον.
POLITIKHEΣ A I § 10.

ποισῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑντέγνων πίστεων οὐδὲν
deiknvousin' τούτο δ' ἐστὶν ὦθεν ἂν τις γένοιτο
ἐνθεματικός. διὰ γὰρ τούτο τῆς αὐτῆς ὀφθας
μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικαίωκα, καὶ καλ-
λιόνος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγμα-

[.hexiropiastcs] are the regular systematic proofs by enthymeme and
example, the σῶμα τῆς πίστεως § 3, and opposed here, not merely to the
ἀγνός πίστες of c. 15, the witnesses, documents, torture, oaths and such
like, which we do not invent, but find ready to our hand to be employed
in the support of our case; but also to the irregular appeals to the
feelings (νόμος), and to evidence from character (δοκ.).

§ 10. πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας πραγματείας, here ap-
plied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric; see
on § 3—πολιτικωτέρας. There are three possible senses of this word, firstly,
'more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen', more agreeable to the
position and duties of a citizen, 'better and worthier'; secondly, 'more suitable
to a public man, statesman, or politician', larger, more comprehensive,
and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupa-
tions of private citizens: thirdly, more public and common, wider, more
general; εἰσοδ., as opposed to δοκ. and δοκ.: the second seems to be the
most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase.
[p. 134 of the Introduction: "nobler and larger and more liberal (or
'statesmanlike', or 'more worthy of a citizen') vid. not. ad loc."]

μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικαίωκα] The third kind of Rhetoric, τὸ
eπιστηκτικὸν, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1.

τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας ἡ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλαγματα] 'The most
general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is συναλ-
λαγμα, συνθήκη, συμβόλαιον'. Meier und Schömann der Attische Process
p. 494. The difference usually taken between συνθήκη and συναλλαγμα
appears in Rhet. I 15, 22 ἢτι πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων
(ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions), καὶ τὰ
εἰσοδα καὶ συνθήκαι (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here
only with the first and third of these, συναλλαγμα καὶ συμβόλαιον.

The ordinary signification of both of these is a contract, or covenant,
or mutual agreement, or interchange (συναλλαγμα), between two or more
parties. They are thence extended to any dealings, especially business
transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between
man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to
a suit at law. These are δια συμβόλαια or συναλλαγματα: see Dem. de
Cor. p. 298 § 210, τὰ τοῖς καθ ἡμέραν βίον συμβόλαια, with Dissen's note:
Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78. v. antil. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ
συμβόλαια τὰ γεγονόμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὕτως. § 309 ἢν τοῖς ἐγκατ' ἥν περὶ τῶν
συμβόλαιων. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in
general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33, 34. Arist. Eth.
N. π. 1, 1103 δ' 15 πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλαγματα τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους γεγονότα οὐ μία διέσωσι δὲ ἀμφότεροι. Rhet. I 15, 22 ἢτι πράττεται
πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκοῦσα κατὰ τὰς συν-
That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is plain also from Eth. N. v 1131 a 2. (This passage is quoted at length on I 15, 22.) τῶν γὰρ συμβολᾶρων τὰ μὲν ἐκκύνη, τὰ δὲ διὸ ἀκούονται (the 'voluntary' being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrowing, whereas 'involuntary' are all of them crimes, ληστεία or θέμα: all of them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to these ήδη συμβολὰ or συμβολάρως are the public (κοινά) international commercial treaties, σύμβολα. See further on σύμβολα, note on c. 4 § 11.

συμβολή is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxfr.) § 2 περὶ τῶν πρὸς διάλεκτου πλείου συμμαχίας καὶ συμβολαίων. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D ἐπειδὴ τῶν λόγων οὐ δεῖ χρώμαν ὅμοιον ἐν τοῖς συμβολάλοις. Rep. I 333 A τί διδᾶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ἢ κτῆσιν ἢ ἐλαφίν φαίνει ἢ χρήσιν εἰσά; Πρὸς τὰ συμβολάλα, δὲ ἀπαρτεῖ. Συμβολή δὲ λέγεις κοινωνία πάρα, ἢ τι δίκαιον; κοινωνία πάρα, δηλαῖς, and several others in Ast's Lexicon. Arist. Polit. IV (VI) 16, 1300 b 22, and 32 περὶ τῶν μικρῶν συμβολάρων, δέσμευσις καὶ πεπόθραυσμα καὶ μικρὰ πλεῖστον. Ib. 15 ult. 1300 b 12, ἔρχεται ὁ τὸν πρὸς τὴν ἐγκόσμην συμβολήν (dealings) κυρία. Comp. c. 8 sub init. ἐρχεῖται περὶ τὰ συμβολάλα. VI (VII) 2, 1317 b 27, III 13, 1283 b 30, and elsewhere.

πρὸς ἔργου 'to the purpose'; anything 'for', or 'in favour of', and therefore 'likely to promote', any 'work' we may have in hand; and hence generally 'serviceable' or 'profitable' to any purposes. πρὸς ἔργου (which also occurs ἐνάθα I 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in general, appears as προίρουν. Some examples in Fritsche ad Eth. Eud. A 3, 1215 a 8.


A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public and national concern (κοινότερον), in which accordingly the audience, who

AR. I. 2
LOGIAS, OTI KOUVTERON. ENTAUWA MEN YAR O KRTIS PERI OIKEION KRINEI, OIST OUDEN ALLO DEXI PLANH APODEIXAI OTI OYTOS EXEI OIS PHAIW O SUMPBOULEUON EN DE TOIS DIKAIKOIS OYCH IKANON TOUTO, ALLA PRO ERGOV EOSTIN APOLABESIN TON AKROATIN. PERI ALLORTIAN YAR HE KRISIS, OISTE PROS TO AUTWV SKOPOUVNEI KAI PROS XAVON AKROIMENOU DDHASSI TOIS AMFIOBHT-

are all members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the expediency or inexpediency of the policy recommended or condemned, affords much less room for these deceptive arts ad caprandum, dixi tov praphmatoy, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the pleader has therefore to create an interest in them by these irregular methods: this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, Thuc. 1 120, 3 KOVOS KPAIDY OIS HKE PROSEKHNES IOMA. (This is a more correct mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 141.)

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicas, careless, ignorant, and unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the professional judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business and a duty.

Ω ΚΡΑΝΗΣ] applied to the δικαιωσθη in the general sense of 'judge' or 'critic' of the question or arguments employed: supr. § 7. Introd. p. 137, note 1.

' δικαιωσθη is to 'bring back', 'recover'; hence to 'gain over', 'conciliate', as and in δικαιωσθη, δικαιωσθη, δικαιωσθη, δικαιωσθη k.t.l.

Membranae Balliolenses, captare: Mureus, accurrare, escipere: Portus, reficere, recreare, η μεταφορα αβ αγετος; vel conciliare. Omnes hae notions a primaria resumendi, ad se reciprodiendi, facile deducuntur.' Gaisford. The order is, (i) to 'get or bring back'; thence, (a) to 'bring back into the proper and normal state', as of 'recovery' from a disease—the notion of something as due being again implied as in δωδον, note on § 7—

and thence again, (3) as here, to 'restore', as it were, the audience to their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. Hence, lastly, the senses of reparare, reficere, recreare, and the like; abundantly illustrated in Steph. Thes. ed. Did. Vol. 11 pp. 431—2.

τούσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κρίνονσιν. διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῖ, ἃσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἶπομεν, ο νόμος καλίει λέγειν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος. ἐκεῖ δ' αὐτοὶ οἱ κριται τοῦτο τηροῦν ἁκανὼς. ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερῶν ἔστιν οτι η μὲν ἐνεχηκος μέθοδος περὶ τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἣ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξις τις (τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον οταν ἀποδεῖξις-χαὶ υπολαβομεν), ἐστὶ δ' ἀπόδειξις ῥητορική ἐνδυμα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων, τὸ δ' ἐνδυμα συλλογισμός τις, περὶ δὲ συλλογισμοῦ ὁμοίως ἀπαντος τὸς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστίν

ἐνδιδόναι, ἐνδιδόναι, ἐνδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, ἀποδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, (ἢδοὺ παραδοῦ, Pl. Phaedr. 250 b), παραδοῦ (Herod. ἐς), ἐνδιδόναι (Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become intransitive, viz. by the eclipse of the reflexive pronoun.

§ 11. ἤ δὲ πίστεις ἀπόδειξις τις ἀπόδειξε, in its strict, proper, and highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, coming from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, properly speaking, pareloplòs (παραλόγισμα τε παραλογισμοὺς ἀποδιδόμεθα καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀπαντοῦμεν, Eth. Nic. I. 1. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός ἀπομακρύνεται, Anal. Post. I 12, 71 b 18. ἦ δ' ἀναγκαῖον ἢ ἀναγκαῖον ἀναγκαῖον ἀποδείξεις, c. 4, 73 a 24. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός διεκτεινόμενος αὑρίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τούτων, b. 12, 24 b 85 b 23. ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν, όταν ἐξ αὐθεντή καὶ πρῶτον ὁ συλλογισμός ἐπ' ἐκ τοιαύτων διὰ τοῦ πρώτον καὶ διά τοῦ πρώτον τῆς προϋπάρχουσας τῆς ὀρθῆς ἐπίκρατος, Top. A 1, 100 a 27. Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Post. Vol. II p. 293 seq. πιστεύει therefore, whose premises and conclusions are never more than 'probable', cannot properly be said to be 'a kind of demonstration'. It resembles it however, and may be regarded as a 'sort of demonstration' in this; that probable proof often produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as often, as a general term including proof of every kind. A similar misapplication of ἀπόδειξις to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. II 1, 2, and II 20, 9. So συλλογίζομαι, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in general; Rhet. I 6 § 17, 10 § 23 and II 22 § 4, where συλλογισμός stands for 'Enthmemenes'; Poet. 4, 5, συμβαλλω διαφανείας μαθημάτων καὶ συλλογίζω τι ἔπαικτον. Phys. II 1, 193 a 7, συλλογίζω τινὰ ἔστι τι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τούθι πρὸς τὴν ἐν τούθι. Similarly, ἀποδεικτικός of a rhetorical argument or speech, Rhet. II 1, 2, πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὑπὲρ, ὅπως ἀποδεικνύει ποντόν. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of expression occurs I 4, 5, where Θηλετικὴς is called ἀποδεικτικὴ ἔννοια. The rhetorical enthymeme, a' kind of ἀπόδειξις', is subsequently and this time correctly, called κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων. See Introd. p. 92.

ίδειν, ἢ αὐτής ὄλης ἢ μέρους τινος, δὴνος ὁ θεωρεῖν, ἐκ τινῶν καὶ πῶς γίνεται συννομισμός, οὕτως καὶ ἐνθυμητικός ἀν
εἰς μάλιστα, προσλαβών περὶ ποιά τ' ἕστη τὰ ἐνθυμητικὰ καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφορᾶς πρὸς τοὺς
λογικοὺς συννομισμοὺς· τὸ τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ

1 δὴνος ὁ θεωρεῖν, omitted by one MS, and rejected by Buble, Schrader, Bekker, and Spengel, is retained and defended by Victoriou and Vater.
It is justified not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see Buttm. Exc. XII on Dem. c. Mid. de partícula δὲ in apodosi, p. 150; the
passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also
by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. 17 1 1, Vol.
1 p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. 1 1 4, Vol. 11 p. 5, who quotes
examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet. 1 4 4 2, 1 10 4 4 1 11 8 6 and
11, 11 25 1 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with
ἐὰν. Similarly Vol. VII (iv) 13 init. ἐὰν δὲ δὸ ἄστω (a long parenthetical
of several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) δεὶ ὁ ἐν ταῖς
ἐπιθέσεως κ.α. de Anima 1 3, 406 a 4 and 10. Phys. VI 8, 2, 1 ὁ μεν... ἐπιθέσεως ὁ. See also Stallb. on Phaedo 78 C. The particle is thus used
in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding δὲ,
and in these cases may be translated by "I say". It repeats in order to
recall the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing
protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases
where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the
influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I
had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself
with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. I 11, sub init.,
ἐρντοὶ δὲ ἀδριακοὺς μᾶχες ἐκράτησαν, (parenthesis) φαίνεται δὲ κ.α. I 18
init., ἐπεὶ δὲ (ten lines) μὲτὰ δὲ τήν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν κ.α. I 65,
ἐπεὶ τὸ ὁ πάλης κατέτητο, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προήγος τῆς
dίονυσος. I 132, δὲ Περίδηκες κ.α. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by
some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phaedo 78 C, τὰ ἔτη
ἀλλοτρίων ἄλλως καὶ μὴδενοσα ἀταντά, ταύτα δὲ ἐνα τὰ ἐνθυμητικά.
A good example may be found in Phaedo 87 A, B, δοῦντι δὲ—ὁ δὲ τούτο...

' opponitur τῷ λογικῷ τῷ ἀναλυτικῷ 84 a 8, 86 a 22, 88 a 19, accurata
demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili
quod ratione contenta est.... Unde fit ut logicae idem fere sit quod
dialektikon. And this is its usual signification... Quamquam (he adds,
referring to the present passage) '1355 a 13, quum logicae συννομισμὸς et
t hic et in is quae proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (ἐνθυ-
μάτων), veram demonstrationem significare videatur.' To the same effect
is what follows, where τὰ ἀληθὲς exact truth and knowledge, scientific cer-
tainty, is represented as the object of the λογικοὺς συννομισμοὺς, and τὰ ἀριθ-
µοὶ τῆς ἀληθείας (probability, τὰ ἐπεδογχ, which has only a resemblance to truth),
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α I § 11.

ομοιον τώ ἀληθεί τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως ἰδείν, ἀμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀνδροστι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθές περὶ καὶ τὰ πλείω τυχανούσι τῆς ἀληθείας. διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἐνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἐχεῖν τοῦ ὁμοίως ἐχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀληθείαν ἐστίν.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσιν, καὶ διότι μᾶλλον ἀπονεύκασι πρὸς

as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme: and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are serviceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice of his art.

πρὸς τὰ ἐνδοξα ‘things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty’; the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. A 10, 104 a 8, ἄδει δὲ πρὸς αὐτόν διαλεκτικ ἐχεῖν ἐνδοξα, κ.κ. Ib. c. 1, 100 b 21, ἄδει δὲ τὰ δοκιμάντα πάνω ἐκ τῶν πλείστου ἀπὸ τῶν πλείστων, καὶ νοτὰ πάνω ἐκ τῶν πλείστων ἐκ τῶν μάλιστα γνωρίσματα καὶ ἐνδοξα. Cic. de Orat. 1 23, 108, sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem populi retorique sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dictionis.

diót] ‘that’, = ὅτι. The earliest instance of this use of ὅτι appears to be in Herod. II 30. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. I 11, to the examples in Sturt’s Lexicon), Plato, Ep. I 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 184, but each time in a document. Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid. § 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263, π. τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦ § 43, πρὸς Κάλλιμαχον §§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler’s note, Prael. p. v note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on Paneg. § 48, ‘Isocrates ubicunque diáσ usurpavit, id fecisse videtur hiatus evitandi causa’ [see esp. Isocr. Loc Vit. § 7, where ἐνθυμομένως ὅτι is followed by καὶ διότι...]. It is found several times in the Rhet. ad Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 a 16, c. 39 p. 1437 a 19, and elsewhere, but it is in Aristotle that it first becomes common; too common to need further illustration. See however Waitz on Anal. Pr. 58 b 7, Comm. I p. 495. For diáσ = ὅτι, Steph. Thea. Vol. II 1544 cites Criton Com. ap. Athen. 4, p. 173 C, ἡντον ἄκοινον διόσ παραστή τόσον οὖσι τρία μένον ὑγαῖα κατέστατο δεκα. Its ordinary sense is ‘because’.

It has also a third signification, ‘why.’; the indirect interrogative, corresponding to the direct, did τι, as ὅτι to πώς, ὅτινες to πώς, ὅτινες to πώς, ὃς to ὃς, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, (four other examples in Ast’s Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4, 7, ἠκοὶ ἡγεῖται ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὅτι; Demosth. Philo. A 46, 10; Isocr. Archi. § 16, and in Aristotle, Rhet. II 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding τῷ ἀληθείας), Polit. IV (VI) 11, 1296 a 22. Met. A 1, 981 a 29, where again it is explained by τῷ ἀληθείας. πρὶν ἀποκρυφώσεως 14, ult. and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de
12 το δικολογείν, φανερῶν' χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ρητορική διὰ τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττων τάληθεν καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀπετε ἡν κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αἱ κρίσεις γίγνονται, ανάγκη δ' αὐτῶν ἠττάσθαι: τούτῳ

Anima II 8, 12, 421 a 4, φανερῶν δ' καὶ διότι οἱ ἴθιβα δῆμαρχοι, οὐ γὰρ ἤκουσι φάρονα. In Rhet. III 11, 14, it is explained by το αίτησιν. Cf. Amphiss Dith. Fragm. 1 ap. Meineke, Comm. Fragm. III 306; B. διὰ τι δ' οὐκ ἔγνων εἰς τὸν δύνα τουτο; Α. διότι φυλήν περιμένει.

With διότι 'that', compare ὀνειρεῖα and ὀδούνεια in Sophocles, as Philoctet. 674, the reason, the what for, passes into a mere statement of fact; because, into that. See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. ὀδούνεια.

ἀνάγκη, to bend the head away from something else and turn the attention to a particular object; hence, to incline, to fix the attention upon: ἀνά as in ἀποθέουσαν, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theact. 165 A, ἐκ τῶν ψευδῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γνωστικάν ἀπεκτέεισαν. In Plat. Legg. VII 815 A, ἔκπνευσεν πληγών καὶ βολῶν, is declinatio, the bending of the head aside to avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1155 Herm. οὐ δ' ἐσ τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ' ἔκπνευσας ἐκεῖνος, ἔκπνευσας is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann, followed by Paley, derives it from ἑκνίων εναδεί, referring to Valckenier on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable that the sorist belongs to ἑκνίων ἀβυσσειν, opposed to ἑκνίων ἀνακεισαι, and that the meaning of the line is "It was natural, or reasonable, for thee to decline, reject, their offer, εἰς τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ', looking to, in respect of, in regard of, thy duty to the goddess". This sense of the word seems to be more in conformity with what precedes; and it occurs again in line 1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, ἑχινον' ἀνακεθεῖν, beckoned us off, "gave us a sign to stand aloof".)

§ 12. χρήσιμος—ἀντιέξομαι] This passage is cited by Dionysius, Epist. ad Amm. I c. 6. He reads διὰ γε for διὰ τι, and διὰ σκαλαί for διὰ σκαλαί (six lines below).


But of the (irregular) correlative δι' in for δι' at the beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 a 2—6, οὗτος (parenth...) πρὸς δι' τούτων.

ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἠττάσθαι.] The argument of this clause, γρήγοροι δι'- ἀντιέξομαι, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12) Dind. ἀνέμοντι δι' πολλάν χρὴ δι' ὅτι δικαίος ἦσαν εὐθύλασον φίλοι. It is to the effect, that truth and right—having a natural superiority over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to assert and enforce that superiority; to bring truth to light, and detect and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right, do ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned themselves, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἠττάσθαι, who have failed to avail themselves
of this powerful instrument. Rhetoric is therefore 'corrective' or 'remedial' of the perversion of truth and right to which legal decisions are always more or less liable from misrepresentation of facts, fallacious arguments, or the blinding of the judgment by appeals to the feelings.

According to this translation of δ' αὐτῶν, it is correctly and logically said that it is a consequence (δύτης) of the natural superiority of truth and right to their opposites, that if those who have truth and right on their side are defeated, their defeat must be due to themselves, to their own neglect of Rhetoric, which would have enabled them to enforce this their natural superiority. Whereas if we follow Victorius (and Spengel who assents to his view, Arist. Ars Rhet. Vol. II p. 26) in explaining δ' αὐτῶν by δ' ἔντυσεν, δύτης becomes incorrect or meaningless: for there is neither truth nor sense in saying that it follows from the natural superiority of truth and justice that these, in the case of a wrong judgment, are defeated by their opposites; and not only so, but with this interpretation ἔντυσε is also wrong—the consequence, if there be one, is certainly not necessary—and δ' αὐτῶν should be εν' αὐτῶν.

In the Introd. p. 144 note, I have referred to Waitz's note on Anal. Pr. 55 α 14, who gives examples of αὐτῶν &c. for the reflexive αὐτῶν &c. The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illustration. A good example is de Anima II 5, 6, 417 b 24, δόλοι μεν ἐν' αὐτῷ, διότας ὑπελεγεί. ἀλλάζων δ' οὐκ ἐν' αὐτῷ. Rhet. 1 4, 9, εν' αὐτοῖς, 'in their own power'.

πρὸς ἑνῶς] in dealing with some'.

διδασκαλίας] de Soph. El. c. 2, 161 δ 1, quoted in Introd. p. 75. Genuine and complete 'Instruction' by demonstrative proofs. Top. Α c. 14, 105 b 39, πρὸς μέν αὐτούς φιλοσοφία καὶ ἀλήθεια (i.e. δ' ἔντυσεν) περὶ αὐτῶν προγνωστικῶν, διακειμένως (and therefore also ῥητορικός) πρὸς δόξαν.

διακρινά τὴν ἐντύσιν λίγος ἐντύσημα διεξαγορά τοῦ δόξαν ταύτα καὶ δόξα, δι Γέμεν ἐντύσημα καθάλον καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δὲ αναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδείχεται ἄλλως ἔχει...οἴ δ' δέ δόξα διδάσκαλον.


τοίς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντύσεως] Topisc. u. s. Metaph. Γ 5, 1009 a 17, ἐστὶ δ' οὖν πῶς αὐτῶν πρόσοφ πρὸς πάντα τῆς ἐντύσεως οἷο μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦ δέομεν, οἴ δ' βιάς, where in line 20, ἐντύσημα is substituted for ἐντύσεις. Isocr. πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἡ 20, τὰς ἐντύσεις μὴ ποιοῦ (hold conversation, intercourse) ποιεῖ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. Alex. ad Top. I. c. ἐντύσεις λέγει τὰς
τάναντια δεί δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, ὦν ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὗ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαύλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ λαμβάνῃ τῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λείειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμιὰ τάναντια συλλογίζεται, ἣ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόνα τούτῳ πουοῦσιν ὁμοίως γὰρ εἰσίν ἀμφότερα τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑπο-κείμενα πράγματα οὖν ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τάληθι καὶ τὰ βελτίων τῇ φύσις εὐσυλλογισμότερα καὶ πιθανότερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτοποι εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἐναντὶ, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἠδῶν ἦστιν Ρ. 1355 Α. 13 ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ' ὦτι μεγάλα πρὸς πολλοὺς συνυπολογίας, ὡς δὲ μὲν ἐντυγχάνειν κοινωνικῶς δοταὶ καὶ φιλανθρώπους καὶ ἐντυγχάνειν ἀφολίμως.

Ἐγγραφέας is therefore a citing upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting which leads to a 'conversation'; or, as arising casually out of that, a dialectical 'encounter'.

ὡς ἐχεῖν 'the true state of the case' (how things really are).

αἰσχρός solvers, állhros, 'to loose, unite, the knot of a fallacy', or difficulty; and so to solve as a problem. ἡ γὰρ ὑποχρεωθεῖσα λόγος τῶν προτέρων ἀπορομαίων ἔστιν, λόγῳ δ' οὖν ἠτίων ἢρουσεταὶ τῶν διακόσιων Ἔφ. Β 1, 955 a 28. λόγος opposed to διάς, Ρεπτ. c. 18, §§ 1, 2. On λόγος and λόγων see Introd. on ΠΠ 25, p. 267, note.

τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν—τῶν ἐναντίων] Introd. p. 78.


§ 13. εἰ δ' ὡς μέγαλα βλαβέοιν ἂν (ἔφθασεν τι) κ.τ.λ.] On the abuse of arts and natural gifts, and the answers to the argument from the abuse to the use of them, see Quint. Inst. Orat. II 16, 5, Isocr. περὶ ἀνδικότητος
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 1 § 14.

βλάψειν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος αὐτός τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τούτῳ γε κοινῷ ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλῆν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμοτάτων, οἷον ισχύος ὑγείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· τούτου γὰρ ἂν τὰς ἑφεξήκειται τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειν αὐτός.

14 ὅτι μὲν ὄνων οὐκ ἐστὶν οὕτε ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένον ἡ μητρική, ἀλλὰ καθήκερ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερός, καὶ ὅτι οὗ τὸ πείσαι


§ 14. οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένον ἡ μητρικὴ, ἀλλὰ καθήκερ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ] See note and ref. on § 1 p. 3.

οὗ τὸ πείσαι ἄρομον αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ. ἐν ἀριστοτελείας alteration and improvement of the original definition of Rhetoric by the Sophistical school of Rhetoricians, see Introd. p. 32 seq.


The notion of art, or proceeding by rule of art, consists not in the result, or success of the process, which is often unattainable, but in the correctness of the method followed. Top. Z 12, 149 b 25. τοιοῦτος δὲ τοῦ μητρικοῦ καὶ τοῦ κύβισαν ὁροῦ, τέτερον ἔτερον μὴν ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων τὸ ἐν ἐκάστῳ πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ μᾶθει παραλλαγῆς, κλέπτει τῷ τὸ λάθρα λαμβάνει. δόλον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτοι ἐν ἐκάστῳ μὴν ἐγκαθίστατος ἄλλο εἰ ἐκάστῳ εἰς ἄλλο ἐγκαθίστατος ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλο εἴπαν ὅτι ἔλθαν λαμβάνειν ἄλλο εἰς ἄλλον καὶ μᾶθειν. εἰς ἐκάστῃ τοῦ χαρακτῆρος τῶν τῆς ἐπιστήμης (of the successful result of the artistic process), ἄλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 b 12.

Topics, A 3, ἔρωξαν ἐν τῇ τῆς τῆς μέθοδος, ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὅπως ἐπὶ μητρική καὶ ἐκάστῳ καὶ τῶν τοῖς λαμβάνεις. τοιοῦτο δὲ τὸ ἐν τῶν ἐνδεχόμενον τοῖς ἑκατογμένου ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης, οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μητρικὸς ἐς ποιτείς τρόπους ἐπεκτά, οὔτε ὁ ἐκάστῳ ἐμπεσεί, ἀλλ' ἐν τῶν ἐνδεχόμενον μὴν παραλλαγῇ, λογος αὐτῶν ἔρως τῆς ἐπιστήμης φήσεως. Comp. Top. E c. 7, 136 b 57, and 137 a 5.
RHΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 1 § 14.

ἐργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ υπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἐκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικής τὸ ύγιὰ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὐ εὐδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἐστι γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων μεταλαβεῖν ύμεῖας ὡμος θεραπεύει καλῶς. πρὸς δὲ τούτου ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τὸ τε πιθανόν καὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἰδεῖν πιθανόν, ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλογισμοῦ τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμοῦ. ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δύναμι ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει πλὴν ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐστι δὲ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν ῥήτωρ, εἰκεὶ δὲ σοφιστής μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαιρέσιν ἀλλ' κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. περὶ δὲ αὐτῆς ἤδη τῆς μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πὼς τε καὶ ἐκ τῶν δυνησόμεθα τυχάνειν τῶν προκειμένων. πάλιν οὖν οἰον εἰς ὑπαρχῆς ὄρισάμενοι αὐτήν τις ἐστὶ, λέγωμεν τα λοιπά.

Quint. II 17, 23 seq. Cic. de Inventione I 5, 6. Bacon, Adv. of learning; Bk. II x 2. 'For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. 'The master in the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage.'

πρὸς δὲ τούτου (φαινόν) δὲ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν The explanation and connexion are given in the Paraphrase, Introd. p. 148, and note 3.

Comp. Met. Γ 2, 1004 β 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ...ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῇ προαιρέσει, and Bonitz' note. Top. Δ 5, 126 a 35, πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαίλοι κατὰ προαιρέσιν λέγονται. Z 12, 149 β 29 u.s. οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάβορα λαμβάνων ἄλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάβορα λαμβάνει ἐλπίς τινι. Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 β 15, οὐκ ἐν τῇ δύνα- μει δ' ἐστιν ὁ διάλογος, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει. Rhet. I 13, 10.


μεθόδου] Note on ἀδικούω, § 2.

πάλιν οὖν—λέγωμεν τα λοιπα] 'Let us then take as it were a fresh start, and so first define it, and then proceed to the rest.'
§ 1. On this definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. pp. 33—4; and note on paraphrase, p. 149: on the other current definitions of it, Ib. pp. 27—36.

On Rhetoric as a δύναμις, Ib. p. 14 seq.

ὑποκείμενον [on 1 1, 12 p. 24 σύμφα.

ψηφιακῶν] Three different senses of this word are distinguished, Top. A 15, 100 δ 33, τὸ ψηφιακόν πλεονασθῇ, τὸ μᾶν ψηφιακὸς ποιητικός, τὸ δὲ φύλακτος, τὸ δὲ σημασιεῖον.

τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάντα τοῖς μεγάλοις] These are usually called συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτὰ in Aristotle's terminology, i.e. absolute, necessary consequences (rather than accidents) of the essence or definition of a thing. The ordinary συμβεβηκότα are separable accidents, qualities or properties, which do not form part of this essence of the subject, or consequently of its definition; with or without which the essence of the subject, (that which constitutes its being, or makes it to be what it is,) remains the same. The συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτὰ are distinguished from the ordinary συμβεβηκότα in this; that although they are not of the essence, and therefore do not enter into the definition, still they are immediately deducible from it, and inseparable from the subject, and are therefore the proper objects of study. They are in fact identifiable with the θεα or προφια of the five predicables. The συμβεβηκότα πάντα τοῖς μεγάλοις in the text are accordingly 'the inseparable properties of magnitudes'; as 'the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles' is a necessary property of the triangle, though not included in the definition, which is 'a plane figure bounded by three straight lines': still the property is deducible from the definition, and thus is inseparable from the notion of it: the triangle cannot exist without this property, though it is not of its essence, and therefore not part of the definition. This example is given in de Anima I 1 § 8, 402 δ 19. See the whole section. And again de part. Anim. I 3, 10 συμβεβηκότα γὰρ τὸ (καθ' αὐτὰ) τῇ τριγώνῳ τὸ δυὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τὰς γωνίας. See further in Trend. ad de Anima I 1, 1, Comm. p. 188 seq. Bonitz ad Metaph. Δ 30, 1025 a 30. Anal. Post. 1 7, 75 a 42, ἐν τοῖς ἀποδείκταις...τρίγων τῷ γένει τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὐ τὰ τὰρη καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις...οὐ μή τινι ἀριθμητικῇ ἀνθέλεις ἐφαρμοσαί ἐκ τοῖς μεγάλέσσι συμβεβηκότα.

On πάθη see Introd. p. 114.
§ 3. **Προτοικής A 2 §§ 2, 3.**

θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθανὸν. διὸ καὶ φαμέν αὐτὴν ὦ περὶ 2 τι γένος ἰδιον ἀφορμισμένον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικὸν. τῶν δὲ πίστεων αἱ μὲν ἀτεχνοί εἰσιν αἱ δ' ἐντεχνοί. ἀτεχνοί δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεποίηται ἀλλὰ προϋπήρχει, οἷοι μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφαῖ καὶ ὅσα τοιαύτα, ἐντεχνοὶ δὲ ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθοδοῦ καὶ δι' ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατῶν, ὡστε δεῖ τούτων 3 τοῖς μὲν χρήσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν. τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ P. 1356 λόγου ποιημένων πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστὶν' αἱ μὲν

§ 2. On ἀτεχνοὶ and ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεως, see Introd. p. 150 (paraphrase), and on the general subject, analysis of 1 c. 15, pp. 193—207.

τοὺς μὲν χρήσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὑρεῖν] The former lie ready at hand, and require only to be employed; the latter, proofs of all kinds, direct and indirect, πίστεως, ἤδος, πάθος, must be ‘discovered’ or ‘invented’ for this occasion by the speaker himself. Hence the distinction of **invention** from the other parts of Rhetoric by the Latin Rhetoricians. So Cicero, de Inventione (this title is adopted to represent the whole domain of Rhetoric, because ‘invention’ or proof of one kind or another is the **σῶμα τῆς πίστεως**), 1 i § 3, by far the most prominent and important part of the entire art) VII 9, quae materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur ea, quam Aristoteles visam esse diximus; partes autem haec quasi plerique disserunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronunciatio (invention, order and arrangement of parts, style, memory, and delivery including action). **Inventio** est excogitatio verum verarum aut veri simillimum quae causam probabilem reddant &c. Similarly Quintilian, Inst. Or. I 12, 4, Quid? nos agendi subita necessitate depræhensit nonne alia dicimus alia providemus, quum pariter inventio verum, electio verborum (style in single words), composition (combination of words in sentences), gestus, pronunciatio, vultus, motusque desiderentur? XII 1, 30, bonos nuncquam honestus sermo (style) deficiet, nuncquam verum optimum inventio.

§ 3. **πίστεως τρία εἶδη**] Compare Rhet. III 1, 1. This threefold division of rhetorical proofs, due to Aristotle, is recognized by Dionysius, de Lys. jud. c. 19, ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτῷ τῶν καλομένων ἐνέχων πίστεων, καὶ χωρὶς ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρου μέρους διαλέξειμαι. τρικά δὲ νομιμῶν τούτων, εἰς τὸ πρόγαμμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἤδος κ.τ.λ.: and by Charmadas, in Cic. de Orat. I 19, 87, where only the ἤδος and πάθος are directly mentioned, but the other, which is absolutely indispensable, must of course be assumed as a third division: by Cicero himself, de Orat. II 27, 115, ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuandum rebus est nixa; ut probemus vera esse quae defendimus; ut conciliemus nobis eos qui audiant; ut animos eorum ad quaecumque causa postulabit motum vocemus. This is repeated in §§ 121 and 128 and the ἤδος and πάθος described at length in c. 43 and the following. These two latter are again referred to Orat. XXXVII 128; and again in Partitiones Oratoriae XIII 46 the three **πίστεως** are thus ingeniously distinguished in a twofold division. Argumentandi duo
γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἥθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθείναι πως, τὰ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύειν ἐλθεῖσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ

sunt generis, quorum alterum ad fidem directe spectat, alterum se infectit ad motum. (These are the 'direct' and 'indirect' proofs and arguments.)

Dirigitur cum proposuit aliquid quod probaret, sumpsitque ea quibus niteretur; atque his confirmati ad propositionem se retulit atque conclusit. Illa autem altera argumentatio, quasi retro et contra, prior sumit quae vult eaque confirmat, deinde id quod pronunendum fuit permotis animis iaciit ad extremum.

Quintilian touches on this subject in many places of his work; the most detailed account of ἡθος and πάθος is given in the second chapter of his sixth book: the description and distinction of them occur in §§ 18, 19. They are both referred, as subordinate species, to the general head of 'affectus', § 8, comp. § 12; and these are again distinguished from the direct and logical arguments, § 3. In this and the following section he compares these two classes of arguments together in respect of their rhetorical value and importance, and comes to a conclusion precisely opposite to that of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds that these indirect proofs, though necessary to the orator by reason of the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μορφήν, 111 1 §5, and therefore not to be excluded from the theory or practice of Rhetoric, yet are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, standing in the same relation to the direct proofs as dress and personal ornaments to the body, serviceable but not essential. Quintilian on the contrary pronounces that these in comparison with the overpowering force of the appeals to the feelings are only not contemptible in respect of their power of persuasion; quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles credo ne quid perish essi indici sit ignotum; atque ut dicam quod sentio, dignos a quibus causas diserti docerentur § 3: that those that use them therefore are only fit to lay before the judges the facts of the case, not to influence their decision, and to instruct the real advocate, who can sway their minds and feelings at his will, and force them to decide in favour of his client: ubi vero animis indicum vis afferenda est, et ab ijsa vera contemptione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est § 5.

It may be observed in concluding this note, that there is a somewhat important difference, which I have pointed out in the Introduction, between Aristotle's view of the use to be made of ἡθος in the practice of Rhetoric, and that of the Latin Rhetoricians, as well as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.; see c. 39 (38) 2. Quintilian's auctoritas—and compare Cicero in de Oratore, 11 43—expresses the influence of character upon opinion, in general: but in Aristotle's system the ἡθος means something more; the effect must be produced immediately by the speech διὰ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὸν ἱστορίαν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδιάχουσαν ποιεῖν τὴν ῥητορικήν, Rhet. 1 3, 4; and hence it finds a place in Rhetoric as an Art, whereas in the other view the auctoritas exercised may have been previously acquired, and altogether ἡθος τοῦ πράγματος, acting independ-
§ 4. On ἴδος, as auctoritas, see Introd. p. 151 note.

τοῖς ἐπιεικεῖσιν] 'worthy and respectable people'. Eth. Nic. v. 14 sub init. καὶ δει μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπωνύμεσα καὶ ἄνθρωπον τοῦ τουπόθου, δεικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ ἔλατῳ ἐπωνύμησε μεταφορὰς ἀντὶ τοῦ ἅγιον, τὸ ἐπιεικείτερον δὲ βλέπων ἔλατον δηλοῦτοι. The primary sense of ἐπιεικεῖς is therefore 'equitable', one who has a leaning to the merciful side and of an indulgent disposition, as opposed to one who takes a strict and rigorous view of an offence, puts a harsh construction on men's motives and actions, is inclined to enforce on all occasions the letter of the law. From this, and because we think this the better disposition of the two, ἐπιεικεῖς is transferred' by metaphor (i.e. the metaphorā ἕως τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, the second of the four species of metaphors, Poet. XXI 7) to the general (or generic) signification of 'good'.

ἀλλά] has various usages. It may for instance mean (1) 'simply', opposed to συνθέσεις or κατὰ συμπλεκτὴν: and this appears to be the primary sense of the word, in accordance with the derivation. Thus as the elements of nature are often called ἀλλὰ σύμφωνα in their simple, uncombined state, so we have ἀλλάς, de Anima II 14, 8, to denote 'simply, or simply, by itself' (καθ' ἑαυτῷ Themistius), without the admixture of any other element; δεικῆ δὲ τοίνυν ὁ τῷ πυρὸς φιόνις ἄλλας αὐτὴ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως ὑπὸ. Similarly when applied in a moral sense to human character, it denotes 'simplicity' (of composition), 'singleness' of heart and purpose, as opposed to 'duplicity', (Plat. Rep. III 397 B, οὐδ' ἄλλας ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ πολλαπλασίας. VIII 55, 4 D, Rhet. I 9, 29, Eur. Rhes. 395 φιλὸς λέγω ταλίδε καὶ καλὸν διήλθε πέθεν ἀνήρ. Ruhnck. Tim. p. 86).

The commonest signification however is that of (2) simpliciter et sine exceptione 'generally' or 'universally', as opposed to καθ' ἑαυτοῦ, 'specifically', 'particularly', 'individually', Eth. N. I, 1095 a 1, or to ἐστιν ὡς 'partially', or κατὰ μέρος, de Anima II 5, 4, νῦν γὰρ ἄλλας ἀλήθειαν πυρὸς αὐτῶν, in general terms—we must now come to particular. Hence it signifies 'altogether', 'absolutely', οὕτων, as oὐδὲν ἄλλας 'none at all', de Part. An. IV 13, 9, ἀδιάνοιαν ἄρα 'absolutely impossible'. Plato will supply abundance of examples of this usage. See also Waitz, Comm. on Org. Vol. I p. 354, who exemplifies it from Aristotle.

From this again may be distinguished a third sense (3), in which it is equivalent to καθ' αὐτός, and opposed to πρὸς τῷ 'the relative'. In this sense it is defined, Top. B 11, 115 b 33, δὲ μὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιφανείᾳ διὰ ἐπικρατεῖν δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν τουπόθων ἄλλας δηλοῦνται. de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 22 and b 37, where τὸ ἄλλας and μὴ ἄλλας are opposed as the absolute and relative in a paralogism of the substitution of the one for the other. Anal. Post. I 4, 83 a 15, κατηγορεῖν μὲν μὴ ἄλλας κατὰ συμπλεκτὴν δὲ κατηγορεῖν. Eth. N. I 3, 1095 b 3, Polit. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 17, καὶ ἄλλας (absolutely, in itself) καὶ ἥμιν (relatively to us).
RHETORIKHEΣ  A  2 § 5.

δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δει δὲ καὶ τούτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιών τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα: οὐ γάρ ὡσπερ ἔνοι τῶν τεχνολογοῦντων τιθέασιν ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος ἐς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανὸν, ἀλλὰ σχεδόν ἀς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἡθος. 5 διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν οὗ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες πρὸς ἐς καὶ μονον πειράζονθαὶ φαμὲν πραγματεύονταί τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δηλοθεῖται καθ' ἐκαστών, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν λέγω-

From these three may perhaps be distinguished a fourth sense (4) in which it occurs; for instance, in Met. A 6, 987 a 21, 7 Προφανείᾳ... λας ἀπὸ τὴν ἐπαγωγήν “treated the subject too simply,” i.e. too carelessly, without taking sufficient pains with it, with insufficient elaboration. Bonitz ad loc. q.v. On the various modes in which ἀπὸς is opposed to the relative and particular see Schrader on I 9, 17.

κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἡθος] ‘is the most authoritative, effective, instrument of persuasion’. On the influence of character on the judgment add to the passages already quoted, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (39), 2, and Isocr. ἀριστοκρατ. §§ 276—280.

The oratorical artifice here described is well illustrated by Marc Antony’s speech in Julius Caesar, Act III Sc. 2, “I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts,” &c.

κύριος in this and similar cases seems to derive its meaning from the “authority” or ‘influence’ exercised by any one or any thing that has the power of doing so, of which general notion it is a special application. It corresponds to our ‘sovereign’ as when we speak of a sovereign remedy. Trendelenburg, on de Anima 11 5, 7, Comm. p. 368, would connect this signification with the κύριος νόμος, ‘ratio e iudicii et foro tracta videtur. κύριος νόμος, qui duo oppositus est, lex est quae rata viget &c.—ita hic κύρια ἀνάμεσα, quatenus eorum auctoritas valet.’ This is perhaps unnecessarily narrowing the signification. Other persons and things, besides laws, exercise authority. A good instance of κύριος in this general sense, implying superiority, authority, mastery, occurs in de Anima 11 8, 3, 419 b 19, οὐδὲ δέ τι διὰ τοῦ κύριου κύριος ὁ δὲρ οὐδὲ ὁ ὄμος, where κύριος may be interpreted ‘absolute master’, the air and water are not absolute masters of sound: some other conditions are required to produce it. lb. 419 b 33, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὅρθως λέγεται κύριος τοῦ ἀπόκινος.

§ 5. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἄριστοκρατ. κ.τ.λ.] Comp. ΙΙ 1, 4.
§ 6. \( \delta \delta \) \( τού \) \( λόγων \). In § 3 we are told that there are three kinds of \( πίστεις \) or rhetorical proofs, which are conveyed through the channel or \( μέσον \) of the speech. These three are then described \( σεριάτικα \). The first, § 4, is \( διά τοῦ \) \( ἰδέας \); the second (§ 5), \( διὰ τῶν \) \( διηκόνον \), \( όταν \) \( οἷον \) \( πρὸ τοῦ \) \( λόγου \) \( προερχόμεν \); and the third, § 6, \( διὰ τῶν \) \( λόγων \), plainly in the sense of the direct \( πίστεις \) or arguments proper, \( όταν \) \( αὐθεντικά \) \( δεικτών \) \( εἰς \) \( τὸ \) \( περὶ \) \( ἔστω \) \( πιθανόν \). \( διὰ \) \( τῶν \) \( λόγων \) is the reading of all the MSS except \( A \), which has \( τῶν \) \( λόγων \); but this, as an unnecessary and unaccountable departure from the construction of the parallel expressions, \( διὰ τοῦ \) \( λόγου, τοῦ \) \( ἰδέας, τῶν \) \( διηκόνων \), and afterwards \( διὰ τούτων \), seems to be self-condemned.

By these \( λόγων \) we may understand either the actual words which are the instruments or \( μέσον \) of the reasonings, or better the reasonings or arguments themselves which the words convey. This explanation appears to be sufficiently rational and consistent, and in accordance with the ordinary usages of the language. Spengel, however, in his paper \( übber \) \( die \) \( Rhēt. \) \( des \) \( Arist. \) (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 26, and again in his edition of the Rhetoric, Vol. II p. 46, thinks that the text requires alteration, and would read \( δὲ \) \( αὐτοῦ \) \( δὲ τοῦ \) \( λόγου, \) or \( δὲ \) \( αὐτοῦ τοῦ \) \( λόγου \), which seems to be totally unnecessary. The explanation above given is confirmed by the rendering of the \( Vetus \) \( Translatio \) 'per orationes autem credimus,' where 'orationes' plainly stands for the 'words of the speeches in which these arguments are expressed'.

\( αὐθεντικά \) \( δεικτών \). The second of these terms denotes the fallacious branch of Rhetoric, 'the apparent, unreal, sham' arguments, exemplified in II 24, and corresponding to the spurious branch of Dialectics treated in the \( Συμμάχια \) \( Πλάγια, \) and appended to the Topics. The illustration of these is allowed to enter into a scientific treatise only for the purpose of detecting and exposing these fallacies, and enabling the pleader or dialectician to confute them when employed by an adversary. \( ἔστι \) \( γὰρ \) \( τοιαύτη \) \( φαινομένη \) \( σοφία \) \( ὑπάρχει \) \( δὲ \) \( αὐτῷ \), de Soph. El 1, 165 a 21.

§ 7. \( ἐστὶ \) \( δὲ \) \( αὐτῷ \) \( — \) \( καὶ \) \( πάρ \) \( "\) "seeing then that these are the channels, or modes of communication of rhetorical proofs, it is plain that to grasp, or get possession, or make himself master of them (\( λαβεῖν \)) is a task for one who has a capacity for logical reasoning, and for the contemplation or study of characters, and thirdly [for the discernment] of the emotions—and of the latter, what each is in itself, and what are its qualities and properties (\( μορφῆς \) \( ὡς \), and from what sources (what motives and impulses, \( ἔς \) \( τίνων \)), it may be excited, and in what modes (\( παρά \))."

— ταύτα. ἄντι \( λαβεῖν \) τοῦ \( συνελεγχαμένου \) \( δοθήκον \), lit. 'it belongs to the student of logic to get hold of them'.

Of these the logical branch belongs to Dialectics, which teaches the habit of reasoning and discussion, the other two to the study of Ethics,
which deals with human beings as individuals, and investigates the fixed habits, virtuous or vicious (ἰδιός), which constitute their characters (ὁθη), and the moral χάρα or 'emotions', which when developed by exercise, according to the direction which they take, become virtues and vices. The consequence is, δότη συμβαίνει, that Rhetoric may be considered a scion or offshoot of the study of Dialectics and Ethics, the latter 'which may fairly be called Politics' (because it treats of men in society and therefore includes the science of the individual, ἡ μὲν οὖν γένος (Ethics) τῶν ἤφεσεν, συνείρθη καὶ σωσία). Eth. Nic. 1 1, 1074 6 11), standing to them in the relation of the offshoot to the parent plant. Sed idem (Aristoteles) et de arte rhetorica tres libros scrispis, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed et particulam civilitatis sicut dialectics assignat. Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 4.

συλλογίσασθαι improperly applied here, as ἀποδείξει above, 1 111 p. 19, to rhetorical reasoning. But as there the rhetorical πίστει are called a kind of διάδοση, 'a sort of', or subordinate variety of, demonstration in a general sense, so here the syllogistic process is allowed to stand for reasoning in general, to which even rhetorical reasoning, though not syllogistic in the strict sense, but enthymematic, of course belongs.

παραφύτης which usually appears under the form παραφύτως in Aristotle and Theophrastus, properly denotes either a branch or a separate plant 'growing alongside' of the parent plant, and proceeding either from the stem or the root, as a scion or offshoot. In the latter of these two senses it certainly occurs in Theophr. Hist. Plant. II 2, 4, ἐὰν ἀνθράκτης ἢ παραφύτης ἢ, though here also the hypothetical εἴπω admits the other possibility. Also παραφύτης, Hist. Plant. III 17, 3, ἀνθηκονίν ἐκ καὶ ἐπεκυών παρα- φύτως (grows from the root) καὶ ἀναβλαστάνει. This word and its cognates, παραφύτωσις, παράφυτος, ἀνθρώπος (Hist. An. II 1, 53, de part. An. III 5 § 1, 10 § 5, 14 § 14, Theophr. Hist. Plant. I 6, 6, VII 2, 5 and 8, &c.), παραβλαστάνεις, παράβλασθε, -πλάσθε, are applied by Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus primarily to plants, and by analogy to the corresponding parts of animals.

It occurs again as a metaphor in Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 a 21, παραφύτως ἀνθρώποι διοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότοι τοῦ διαστοί, that is, το καθ ἰθύντας τι, συμβαίνει τι, in the same relation as parent plant to offshoot. 'Similitude, explicante Giphanio, a pullis arborum desumta, qui Graecis dicuntur παραφύται. Zell, ad loc. So that Rhetoric is represented by this metaphor as a scion derived from two stocks or plants, Dialectics and Ethics, not identical with either, but with a general or inherited family resemblance to both. (The analogy will not bear
πραγματείας, ἵνα δίκαιον ἐστὶ προσαγορευέναι πολιτικῶς. διὸ καὶ υποδύεται υπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ ἤθορκη καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιούμενοι ταῦτα τὰ μὲν δὲ ἀπαιδευτικά τὰ δὲ καὶ δὲ ἀλλὰς αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς ἐστὶ γὰρ μόριῶν τι τῆς δια-

pressing: one does not see, for example, how a young plant can be the scion or offspring of two others, but this general meaning is clear, that it bears a likeness to both, though differing from each of them.)

ὑποδύεται υπὸ τὸ σχῆμα | 'creeps under, insinuates itself into, the form
| or figure'; 'assumes the mask or disguise of (for the purpose of acting a
| part)', 'personates', Plat. Gorg. 464 C, ἡ κολλακτικὴ...ὑποδύεται υπὸ ἑαυτῶν
| τῶν μορίων προσωπέως εἶναι τοῦτο διὰ θεῦ...ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν λατρευκὴν ἡ
| ἑφημωνὴ υποδύεται... Sopater, ap. Stalb. not. ad loc. υποδύεται, τοῖς
| ἕστω ὑποχρέωται, ὑποκρίνεται, ὡς ἔτειν ταῦτα δοκεῖ εἶναι.
| Metaph. Α 2, 1004 δ 17, οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρωποὶ καὶ σφυκτοὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὑποδύομενα σχῆμα τῆς
| φυλοσοφίας.

Διαζωή implies both presumption and imposture; either a character
between both and a mixture of both (as Theophrastus' Διαζωή, 'the
braggart', of which Pyrgopolinices in the Miles Gloriosus, Thraso in
the Eunuchus, and Captain Bobadil in Every Man in his Humour, are
the three types, ancient and modern; and probably also the Sophisti-
cal Rhetoricians here referred to): or again a character in which either
presumption or imposture is characteristic and predominant. For ex-
ample, the insolent assumption, arrogance, and swagger appear more
prominently in this picture of the Διαζωῆ drawn by Xenophon, Cyrop. II
2, 12, ὁ μὲν γὰρ Διαζωῆ ἵππους δοκεῖ δυσμα κείσαν πρὸ τοῦ προσωποιμένου καὶ
πλησιώτερος εἶναι ἢ εἰς, καὶ ἐπεξεργάτωρ, καὶ τούτων ὡς καὶ ἱερατικῶν
καὶ τῶν φαντασματικῶν δοκεῖ τὸτε λαβέντων τι ἄλλων καὶ
κρῆναι τοιούτων. This last mercenary element is not found else-
where in the character of the Διαζωῆ. In Aristotle, Eth. Nic. ΠΙ 7, IV 13,
empty pretension, ostentation and swagger are the leading characteristics
of the Διαζωῆ. The vice is one of the extremes of which Διαζωῆ, the
social virtue of frankness, sincerity, and plain dealing is the mean,
the opposite extreme being εἰρωνεία, 'mock' in conversation, Socrates'
habit. It is the extreme in προσωποίσις, 'pretension', of which Διαζωῆ
is the mean state. Whereas in Aristophanes it usually represents rather
the other side of the character, its quackery and imposture; and Διαζωῆ
is 'a quack or a humbug'. Of course Socrates and his brother Sophists
are the great representatives of the class. Nubes 102, 1494, et passim.
And this is also the side of the character which is generally uppermost in
Plato's view of it. See Rep. VI 486 B, 490 A, VIII 560 C, Phaedo 92 D, Ἰ-
δαφί...Διαζωῆς...Διαζωῶσθοι, Phil. 65 C. The definition of it given in
the Platonic Σφον, p. 416, is that of undue pretension, assumption, imposture.
ἐὰν προσωποποίησις φασᾶν ἢ φάσον τὰς μὲν ἄριστα.
Quackery and imposture are also predominant in the application of it, Rhet. II 6, 11.

ὅτι "Διαζωῆς ἀνθρωπικάς" 'incident to humanity', implying the
infirmities, imperfections, frailties, miseries, and especially errors to which
§ 8. The eighth and ninth and part of the tenth sections of this chapter are quoted by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. 1 c. 7, from τῶν δὲ διὰ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ ὑπολείπειν. The variations are, διέκυσθαι (koi) for διέκυσαν, ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτοῖς for ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτοῖς, the omission of ἦ διελεύσατο, and of αὐτῶν ταὐτάρηχα; for ἦ περὶ τὰ διὰ τούτοις συμβαλλόντω, ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν εἰμι, we have ἦ περὶ τὰ διὰ τούτοις εἰμι, also φανηκὼ δὲ καὶ ὅτι for ὅτι καὶ, further v omitted before τὸς, and ἦ σαρκεῖον κατὰ τὸ διά τοῦ διάλεξος, and lastly ὑπογεία for ἰμποραία.

τῶν δὲ πλοῦτων.

ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτοῖς] Dionysius has διαλεκτοῖς, which Spengel has introduced into the text, with the remark, certe Aristoteles τῇ διαλεκτικῇ scripsisset (Rhetores Graeci p. 5, Praef. p. 5); and again, über die Rhet. des Arist. Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 44, Aristoteles sagt nur ἐν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ, nicht ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτοῖς; in reply to which I will merely quote Rhet. ii 22, 14, where ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτοῖς again occurs. Even without this evidence
γισμός τὸ δὲ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὀμοίως· ἐστι γὰρ τὸ μὲν παραδείγμα ἐπαγωγῆ, τὸ δ’ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός. καὶ δ’ ἐνθύμημα μὲν ἰησοῦκον συλλογισμόν, παραδείγμα τὸ ἐπαγωγῆς ἰησοῦκον. πάντες δὲ τὰς πιστεῖς ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικύναι ἅ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἃ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ π. τ. παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἢ ἡστὶ εἰπερ καὶ ὀλως ἀνάγκη (ἡ)

1 οὐδὲν πως.

I can see no reason why an author who speaks habitually of others of his works in the plural, as τίς ἀναλυτικός, ήδικα, πολλικά, μεθοδικά, should be denied that privilege in the special case of the Topics. Nor do I see why the single testimony of Dionysius should override the authority of all the Aristotelian MSS. I have therefore retained the old reading.


σοκόμων δὲ πάνα διαπεράζει, ἡστι παρὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν ἢ μὲν γὰρ δ’ ἐπαγαγείς, ἢ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. The reference here is most unmistakeably to the opening words of the Anal. Post., an additional evidence, against Brandis (see the succeeding note), that the reference in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν is either directly and exclusively to this passage of the Analytics or at any rate includes it with the others.

ἡ ὀντισοῦν is rejected by Spengel on the authority of Dionysius, who omits it, and against that of the Aristotelian MSS, which, as appears from Bekker’s revision, all agree in retaining it. It is not merely perfectly intelligible, and absolutely unexceptionable on all critical grounds, but when compared with the commencement of the Anal. Post., to which reference is immediately after made, it seems to tally so precisely with what is there stated, that it might almost be regarded as a necessary addition. In the passage of the Analytics we are told that every kind of instruction and learning, proof scientific and popular, mathematical or dialectical knowledge, is conveyed by way of syllogism or induction; and it is then added, ὡς δ’ αὐτῶς καὶ οἱ μητρικοὶ συμπειδοῦσιν’ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, ὃ ἐπιγγαγεῖς, ἢ δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἄπερ ἐστι συλλογισμός, a statement with which the ἡ ὀντισοῦν of the Rhetoric seems to correspond to a nicety. And for the same reason I hold that this passage is referred to in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, as well as Anal. Pr. II 23, 58 δ 9, (quoted in the preceding note,) and the continuation of the subject there suggested in chapters 24 and 27, (which contain the logical description of induction and example, and the enthymeme), though Brandis, in his tract on the Rhetoric in Schneidewin’s Philologus iv 1, p. 24, would confine the reference to the latter passage.
συλλογικόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντο δεικνύναι ὑπόνοια (ἵλον δ' ἡμίν τούτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἐκάτερον 9 αὐτῶν ἐκατέρφω τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τίς δ' ἐστὶν διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος, φανερῶν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς εἰρθαί πρὸτερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὅμοιων δεικνύοντο ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστὶν ἐντάθα δὲ παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν οὗτων ἔτερον τι διὰ ταύτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταύτα τῷ ταύτα εἶναι, ἢ καθόλου ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐκεῖ μὲν 10 συλλογισμὸς ἐντάθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται. φανερῶν δ' ὅτι καὶ ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἴδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἰρθαί, ἢ ὡς ἐκατέρφω.

§ 9. ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] On this reference to the Topics see note in Introd. p. 154, and note on 11 25, 3 in this Commentary. The reference to the Topics there made is precisely similar to this: that is, it is made to the work in general and its contents, and not to any particular passage: what is stated here may be gathered or inferred from the Topics.

§ 10. φανερῶν δ' ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἴδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς. 'It is plain that either kind of Rhetoric (the παραδείγματος or the ἐνθυμηματος) has good in it, that each of them has its own particular virtue and excellence, or advantage. Buhl construes the words τὸ εἴδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἔχει ἐκάτερον ἀγαθῷ. 'Rhetoricum utroque bene frui. et enthymeremate et exempla.' (He takes τὸ εἴδος τῆς ῥ. for a mere periphrasis. So in fact it occurs in Pol. 1 4, 1253 θ' 28, ἐν ὑφισσὺν εἴδος "in the shape of an instrument", de gen. et corr. 1 3, 10, ἐν ὅλη εἴδος—but εἴδος in this usage does not seem to admit the definite article.) We have a similar use of ἀγαθὸν ἔχων in Rhet. 11 20, 7, εἰς δ' οἱ λόγος διηγομένων, καὶ ἡμῶν ἐφάντων τούτο, ὅτι ε.τ.λ.

ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς] 'Scheint eine mittelstellung zwischen analytik und dialectik eingemessen zu haben', Brandis, u. a. p. 13. The work is mentioned twice by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. 1 cc. 6 and 8, each time in company with Analytics and Topics. From this circumstance and from the reference here, it is natural to conclude that its subject was connected in some way with Logic. Diogenes Laert. v 1, 23, includes in his list of Aristotle's writings μεθοδικα in eight books, and § 25, μεθοδικοῖν in one? the former comes amongst the logical, the latter amongst the rhetorical works. It appears also in the list of the 'Anonymous' author of the life of Aristotle (in Buhle, Vol. 1 p. 62), again in near connexion with works on Logic, 'Ἀναλυτικῶν, Ἀναλυτικών Ἀναλυτικῶν, Μεθοδικα. Hesychius Milesius in his life of Aristotle (Buhle, Vol. 1 p. 72), describes it thus; πρῶς μὲν οὖν τῇ εὐρέως, τά τοι κατά μεθοδικά παρέδωκε
καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰςὶ γὰρ αἱ μὲν παραδείγματῶις ῥητορεῖαι αἱ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαὶ, καὶ ῥήτορες ὁμοίας οἳ μὲν παραδειγματώις οἳ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοὶ. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἦττον οἱ λόγοι οἱ προτάσεων πλῆθος, ὡς ἄπλος τὰ προβλήματα πιθανοῖ ἐνεχθηματικῶν ο绹ώτεν εὐθυρρίων: classing it, like Dionysius and Diogenes, with the Topics and Analytics, the latter of which is mentioned immediately after. Simplicius ad Categ. fol. 7 a (quoted by Buhle) speaks of it as one of Aristotle's ὑπομηματικά, commentarii; ἐν τοῖς ὑπομηματικά, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικά, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομηματικά, καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαρέσοντι, καὶ ἐν ἔλλο ὑπομηματικά. Brandis, u.a., adds a reference to the Schol. in Arist. p. 47 b 40.

ῥητορεῖα] 'rhetorical exhibitions or displays' Probl. XVIII 3. The word is a 'rare one, and as distinguished from ῥητορεῖα, denotes rather the practice and results of Rhetoric, speaking and speeches, than the system and theory of it as embodied in the 'art.' It is found in Plato, Ptoî. 304 A, where Stallbaum notes, 'νος ῥητορεία a Platon et videtur ut ars oratoria nobilior et generosior distinguereetur a varia illa ῥητορεία cuus nomen profanaverant qui ad expandas suas cupiditates abusi erant.'

The fact, that the word was a Platonic invention, and the ground assigned for the distinction, seem equally unauthenticated. It occurs also in Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν § 21, for 'the practice of rhetoric' in general, also Panath. § 2, Phil. § 26; and amongst the later writers, in Plutarch and Lucian: ῥητορεία, in Plato, Isocrates, and Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 35. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν—οὶ ἐνθυμηματικοὶ] Anal. Pr. 11 23, ult. φοινικὸς μὲν οὖν πρόφανος καὶ γραμματέρος ὁ δὲ τῶν μέσων συλλογικά, ὡμιὸν δ’ ἐνεργότερον ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας. The objects of sense and observation from which we derive our inductions and examples are 'nearer to us,' more readily apprehensible by us, than the universals of the syllogism: and therefore, Top. Λ 12, 105 a 16, δεδομεν ἣ μὲν ἐπαγγελία πιθανοτέρον καὶ σαφέτερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αληθήν γραμματέρον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινοῖ, ὁ δὲ συλλογικὸς μακαριστέρον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργότερον, 'induction is a mode of reasoning which is clearer (to us) and more persuasive, because its materials are better known to us,' the example must be familiar and well known or it will not produce its effect in the way of proof; also some kind of induction is constantly used by every one, τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινοῖ; the syllogism and enthymeme are more 'cogent' and 'effective' against an adversary in a debate, and are therefore 'more applauded', ὃρατεν δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοὶ.

There is no real contradiction between what is here said and in Probl. XVIII 3. In the Problem the question is why people in general are better pleased with examples than with enthymemes, the fact being assumed. The answer is, that they learn more from them, and are therefore more amused, and the facts which are adduced by way of examples are more familiar and interesting; the enthymeme (as the syllogism in the Topics) proceeds from universals, which we are less acquainted with than with particulars. Consequently, examples are more pleasing and therefore plausible (πιθανοὶ), whilst the conclusive
διὰ τῶν παραδειγμάτων, θυρισοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ
11 εὐθυμιματικοί. τινὶ δ’ αἰτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔκατέρω
χρημάτευν, ἐρωτεύειν ὑστερον· νῦν δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ-
των μᾶλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρῶς.

ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανὸν ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ μὲν
εὐθὺς ὑπάρχει δι’ αὐτὸ πιθανὸ καὶ πιστὸν τὸ δὲ τὸ
δεικνύουσθαι δοκεῖν διὰ τοιούτων, οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκο-
πεῖ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν, οἶνον ἡ ἰατρικὴ τὶ Σωκράτει τὸ
ὐγιεινὸν ἐστὶν ἡ Καλλίς, ἀλλὰ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ ἡ τοιῶν
toιοῦσιν (τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐντεχνὸν, τὸ δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν
ἀπερειπτεῖ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστήτῃ), οὐδὲ ἡ ῥητορικὴ τὸ καθ’
ἐκαστὸν ἐνδοξὸν θεωρήσει, οἶνον Σωκράτει ἡ Ἰππίς,
ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτο, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ διαλεκτική. καὶ
γὰρ ἐκεῖνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ εἴ ἢν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται
argument, the enthymeme which leaves the adversary without reply, is
more striking, and therefore more applauded.

θυρισοῦσθαι, ‘to be applauded’, is a regular formation of the passive.
For although the usual construction of θυρισθεῖν is with δι’ and the
dative, many examples of the transitive use of it are found. See the
§ 233, (ὁ λόγος) ἔκτημενος ἢ καὶ τεθρωπημένος: and Rhet. II 23, 30,
tῶν συλλογισμῶν θυρισθέντα μᾶλλον τοιαύτα δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. I 9, 49,
quoted in Intro. p. 155.


πιθανόν] ‘plausible’, that which readily persuades; πιστόν, ‘credible’,
that which is to be relied on; the latter represents the higher degree
of trustworthiness. διὰ τοιοῦτον, πιθανὸν καὶ πιστῶν.

The connexion of the argument of this section is given in the para-

Art and science deal with universals, art prescribes rules for classes,
not individuals; practice, ἐμπειρία, follows the opposite method. Rhet.
II 19, 27, τὸ δὲ παρὰ τούτῳ τι ζητεῖν περὶ μεγάλου ἀλλὰ καὶ
ὑποχρεῖται κενο-

λογεῖν ὦτιν’ κυριότερα γὰρ ἐστι πρὸς τὴν χρὴσιν (for use or practice) τὰ καθ’
ἐκαστὰ τῶν προγράμματος. Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1143 a 32, διὸ τὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὰ
cal τῶν ἔχοντων πάντα τὰ πρακτικά κ.τ.λ. Met. A 1, 981 a 12, πρὸς μὲν οὖν
tῶν πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲ δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄπειρχα-
nονται ὁμοῖοι τοῖς ἐμπειροῦσι τῶν ἔννεπτας λόγιον ἔχοντων. αὐτοὶ δ’
διὸ τὶ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν ἢ ἔσχεν ἢ, ἢ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθολίκων, αὐ
tὶ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενεᾶς πᾶσαι περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἐκαστῶν εἶναι.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ εἴ ἢν ἔτυχεν κ.τ.λ.] Compare Top. A 10,
104 a 4, 11, 105 a 3—9, οἱ δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πάντως θέουσι ἐπισκο-
πεῖν, ἀλ’ ἢ ἐπιφανείως ἢν τι τῶν λόγων δηομένων, καὶ μὴ κολάσσως ἢ ἀληθεὺσυς’
oi μὲν γὰρ ἀπορούστες πότερον δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ τιμῶ καὶ τοῦ γοαίς ἄγαμος, ἢ ὁ,
γάρ ἀττα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ P. 1357-
τῶν λόγων δεομένων, ἢ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἴδι θη βου-
12 λευσθαι εἰσθότων. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περὶ τε
τοιούτων περὶ δὲν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν,
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἄκροαται οὐ ὅπως ἄνωτεραι διὰ πολ-
ρ.8

λῶν συνοραν' οὖδε λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα

1 συνορᾶ ἵνα.

καλάς ὁ διόνυσος, οἰ δὲ πάντων ἡ χώρα λευκὴ αλοθής, κ.κ.λ., καὶ Eth. Eud. 
1 3, quoted in Introd. p. 156, note.

ἐξ ὧν ἔργων] sc. ἐξ ἐκείνων ἢ ἔργων: 'any materials, or propositions 
taken at random, any chance propositions'. So Rhet. I 5, 11, διὰ τὸ μη-
θέν ἐσχῶν ἢ τὸ γήρως λαμβάνειν. On the attraction of the relative from its 
proper case after the verb to that of its antecedent, see Matth. Gr. Gr. 
§ 473, and note on Rhet. I 5, 11.

§ 12. τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς] The proper office, the special function, busi-
ness, 'work', ἔργον, of Rhetoric, is exercised in such things as we are 
obliged to take advice about, where there are no definite rules of art 
ready laid down to guide us.

The ἔργον of anything is that which it is specially appointed (by 
nature) to do, its proper special work. It is in the execution, the carrying 
out or fulfilment of this ἔργον, that this ἄρετή, this special excellence of 
everything, resides. Nature always works intelligently with a purpose 
in view, πρὸς τὸ γενός ταῦτα, everything has its own special ἔργον. This is 
especially manifest in all 'instruments', ἔργων (things in which the pur-
pose is apparent); as of an axe or knife the office or purpose is to cut 
(large and small things), of a horse to run, of an eye to see, of the mind 
to think, and so on; and the purpose or office being the same in kind 
and differing only in degree, in doing a thing at all and in doing it well, 
the ἄρετη is shewn in and measured by the performance of this special 
work; sharpness in the knife to cut well, swiftness in the horse to run 
well, is the due fulfilment of its ἔργον. Eth. N. vi 2, 1139 a 16, ὅ 
δὲ ἄρετή πρὸς τὸ ἔργον τοῦ λοιποῦ. This doctrine is first laid down by Plato, 
Rep. I 352 E seq. and borrowed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I 6, and II 5, 
where the theory of moral virtue is based upon it. Hence Pol. I 2, 1253 
a 23, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἔργα ἀρισταί καὶ τῇ δυνάμει. Eth. Eud. II 1, 1218 b 38, 
περὶ ἄρετής, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ βελτίωτη διάθεσις ἡ ἐκ 

καὶ τῇ δύναμις ἐκατοντα, δεινῶν 


διὰ τολῆν συνορᾶν] 'to take in at a glance through the medium, or 
along the line, of many steps of proof or syllogisms', 'to take in a long 
chain of arguments at one view'.

λογίζεσθαι πάροδον] expresses much the same thing as διὰ τολῆν 
συνορᾶν, to deduce or string together syllogisms in a chain from a long 
way off or back, 'to string together a long chain of connected syllogisms'.

With πάροδον here, compare the similar use of it in II 22, 3, and Top. 
A 11, 105 a 8 οὖν δὲ δὲν σύννγγεν ἢ ἀπότειξε, οὐδ' ὅπως 

βουλευόμεθα δὲ] On the proper objects of deliberation compare Eth.
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该文档的自然文本如下：

de perì tòn fainomènòn enédèxesthai ámfotéropos òçhein; perì gábr tòn ádunátwv allòs hè genvésthai hè ékeísthai

13 hè òçhein oudeis bouleúontai ouçwos upolambánwv oudeìn gábr pléon. Enédèxetai de sylllogízèsthai kai synágev

Nic. III 5, VI 2 legeón ou de tòotwa (tòv tòv wuchí moríwv) tòv mìn èpisthèmè
nikòv tòv de logistikòv, tòv gábr bouleúontai kai logízesthai taítwv, oudeis de 
voulésthai perì tòn mìn èndexoménv allòs òçhein. C. 5, 11.40 a 32, bouleús-
estai oudeis perì tòn dòusatòv allòs òçhein, oude tòn mìn èndexoménv autòv 
pràxei. de Anima III 10, 4, 433 a 29, praktòv ò òçti tò èndexoméno kai 
allòs òçhein. We deliberate and act only in cases where the event or 
issue is uncertain (may be in either of two ways, ámfotéros); where the 
event is necessarily this or that, i.e. certainly one way, and not the other, 
or where it is not in our own power, where we have no control over it, no 
one either deliberates whether or no anything is to be done or tries to do 
it. tà èndexoména ámfotéros òçhein is usually expressed by tà èndexoména 
allòs òçhein, things contingent and uncertain in their issue; opposed to 
tà mìn èndexoména allòs òçhein, things certain and necessary, which can be 
only in one way, which have only one possible issue, and cannot be in 
one way or another, indifferently.

ouçwos upolambánwv) 'on that supposition', i.e. if he actually supposes 
them to be necessary and unalterable: because it is possible that he 
have deliberated or even attempted in action things which he did 
not know were beyond his control, in mere ignorance.

oudeìn pléon 'there is nothing to be gained by it, no advantage in it'.

Valèkénaí, Diatr. in Eur. Fràgm. p. 150(16), supplies numerous 
examples. In three MSS (Bekker) the words oudein gar pléon are followed immedi-
ately by ò ouçw enédèxetai sygboolwv. They were first omitted by 
Bekker, though previously suspected by Muretus. The origin of this 
interpolation, for such it seems to be, may thus be accounted for.
The words sylllogizòsthai and synàgev being very nearly synonymous, some 
one may have added in the margin ò ouçw enédèxetai ò sygboolwv—
meaning that we might read sygboolwv in place of sylllogizòsthai to 
avoid the tautology, sygboolwv referring to the deliberative branch of 
Rhetoric, or public speaking: ò ouçw, 'or thus', merely expressing the 
possibility of a variòs reading, òndèxetai ò sygboolwv. The essential 
stop after ouçw was then omitted or overlooked, and the words finally 
introduced into the text as an appandage to pléon, with the sense, as 
rendered by Gaisford, 'nihil enim amplius profici potest, quam quod sic 
deliberatur: i.e. incassum enim instituitur ista (altera) consultatio'.

§ 13. syndégwv, (satione) colégere. Rhet. II 22, 3 and 15. The σών 
in words of this kind, which denote a process of reasoning or understand-
ing, as συνέλαβεν, συμβάλλειν, (to comprehend, comprehendere) and sylllogí-
ζεσθαι itself, denotes the bringing of things together in the mind for the 
purpose of comparison, upon which either a judgment is founded and a 
conclusion drawn, or the understanding itself developed or enlightened.

συνάγων and sylllogizòsthai are found again together as synonyms, Met. 
H. init. 1042 a 3, ek òc tòn eirhménon sylllogízéamn òc, kal synagógon 
tó kefalwv tòv òc eisitív.
ῬΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 2 § 13.

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλογισμῶν πρότερον, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀσυλ-
λογίστων μὲν δειμένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ
eἶναι ἐνδοξά. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι
eἰσπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριθῆς ὑπό-
κειται εἰναι ἀπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ
 omapoumeinōn εἶναι μηδ' ἐνδόξουν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον τὸ
tε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περὶ τῶν ἐνδε-
χομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παρά-
δειγμα ἐπαγωγῆν τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμοῦ, καὶ
ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἑλλαττόνων ἡ ἐξ ὧν ὁ
πρῶτος συλλογισμὸς· ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ τι τούτων γνώριμον,
οὐδὲ δὲι λέγειν· αὐτὸς γὰρ τούτο προστίθησιν ὁ
ακροατής. οἶον ὅτι Δωρεύς στεφανίτην ἀγώνα νενε-

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλογισμῶν πρότερον] ‘the conclusions of previous
syllogisms’, which serve as major premises to new syllogisms, and so on
through the entire chain of demonstration.

ἁπλοῦς] ‘a simple, uncultivated person’, Germ. einfach. This use of
the word belongs to the first of the three varieties above distinguished
(note on ἁπλεῖς, § 4 p. 30). It is opposed here rather to the ‘complications’
of an advanced stage of civilization and refinement, than to duplicity
of character, and expresses ‘an elementary state of cultivation’. Similarly
Pol. II 8, 1268 β 39, τοὺς γὰρ ἄρχαλους νόμους λιγάν ἁπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ ἀβαβελ-
κοὺς ‘rude and barbarous’.

99—108.

ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός] πρῶτος ‘in its earliest, most elementary’, or
‘normal, typical, form’. ἑλλάττωμα τε τῆς πρῶτης (primary, in its original
form) πάλινος, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 17. ἄριστοπρεπαὶ μέλιτα τῶν ἄλλων
παρὰ τῆς ἀξιούσην καὶ πρῶτην. 1 Ib. c. 8, sub fn. Pol. VII (VI) c. 4, 1319 a
39, τῷ ἁλίττῳ καὶ πρῶτην δημοκρατίαν. On this passage, see note on
II 21, 6.

οἶον (πρὸς τὸ δηλοῦν, συλλογιζομένα ἀποδείξαι) δὴ. Infrr. § 19, οἶον δὴ
ἀποδείξει συλλ. and c. 1 § 13.

Δωρεύς] the type of an Olympic victor; son of Diagoras of Rhodes,
to whom Pindar’s seventh Olympian ode is inscribed. See Introduct. p. 158,
ote note 1.

στεφανίτην ἀγώνα] This is the title distinctive of the four great games,
of which honour was in reality the prize, the garland being merely a
symbol or external sign. They were hereby distinguished from ἄριστος
χρηματιτίαν or ἀργυρίαν (Plut.) in which the prize was money, and in
which therefore mercenary motives might possibly enter into the compe-
tition. Pausanias X 7, 3 tells us that it was not till the 2nd Pythiad that
the Pythian games became an ἄγων στεφανίτην. Add to the instances
κηκεν, ἵκανον εἰτεῖν ὅτι Ὁλύμπια γὰρ νεῖκηκεν
tὸ δὲ ὅτι στεφάνυτο τὰ Ὁλύμπια, οὐδὲ δὲὶ προσεθε-
ῬΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 2 §§ 15—17.

οὐ τὰ ἔνθυμηματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαία ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλείοντα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. λέγεται γὰρ ἔνθυμηματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων, ὡστε ἀνάγκη τούτων ἐκάτερῳ ἐκατέρῳ ταὐτῷ εἶναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἔστιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον, οὐχ ἀπλῶς δὲ, καθ' ἀπερ ὀρίζονται τίνες, ἀλλὰ τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀλλως ἔχειν, οὕτως ἔχον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο πρὸς ὁ εἰκός, ὡς P. 1357 ᾧ P. 9.

16 τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος· τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ μὲν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς τῶν καθ' ἐκαστὸν τί πρὸς τὸ καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαίον τεκμηρίου, τὸ δὲ μὴ 17 ἀναγκαίον ἀναίγματος ἔστι κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν. ἀναγκαία μὲν οὖν λέγει ἐξ ὧν γίνεται συνλογισμός. διὸ καὶ τεκμηρίων τὸ τοιούτων τῶν σημείων ἐστὶν· ὅταν γὰρ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι οἶνται λῦσαι τὸ λέγθεν, τότε φέρειν οἶνται τεκμηρίου ὡς δεδειγμένον καὶ πεπερασμένον· τὸ γὰρ τέκμαρ καὶ πέρας ταὐτόν ἔστι κατὰ· ἐνδεχόμενον ὡς ἄκο καὶ πλείοντα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.] Ἰτι πλὴν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαία ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλείοντα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ] Ἰτι πλὴν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαία ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλείοντα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ]

λέγεται ἔνθυμηματα ἐξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων] Comp. I 3, 7, II 25, 8, where paradείγματα are added. Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 a 10.

On εἰδῶν and ἱστοί, Introd. p. 160—163. The meaning and connexion of the following sections on the rhetorical instruments of proof are explained in full detail in the paraphrase, to which the reader is referred (Introd. p. 163—168).

§ 17. Λύσαι τὸ λέγθεν] On λύσιν, λύσει, λυτόν, see Introd. on II 25 p. 267 and note 1.

τέκμαρ] Eustathius ad II. H. p. 665, 45. τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ τελεύτων, ἀπὸ τοῦ τέκμαρ, ὁ δηλοὶ τὸ τέλος. τὸ μὲν τούτου τεκμαίρεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ σημείον, ἀφ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τέκμαρ τὸ σημεῖον, οἱ μὲν ὁμορρ ρεῖς. 'Antiqua lingua, quam mox commemorat Aristoteles, non erat ab Homeri dialecto diversa.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 2 § 18.

18 τὴν ἄρχαίν γιλῶτταν. Ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ καθ' ἐκαστὸν πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ὁδῇ, οἷον εἰ τις εἴπειεν σημείον εἶναι ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γάρ σοφὸς ἦν καὶ δίκαιος. τούτῳ μὲν οὖν σημείον ἔστι, λυτὸν δὲ, κἂν ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἀσυλλογιστὸν γάρ. τὸ δὲ, οἷον εἰ τις εἴπειεν σημείον ὅτι νοσεῖ, πυρέττει γάρ, ἢ τέτοκεν ὅτι γάλα ἔχει, ἀναγκαῖον. ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριοι μόνον ἐστὶν· μόνον γάρ, ἂν ἀληθές ἢ, ἀλυτὸν ἔστιν. τὸ δὲ ὡς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος ἔχον, οἷον εἰ τις εἴπειεν, ὅτι πυρέττει, σημείον εἶναι, πυρκὸν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖ. λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ, κἂν ἀληθές ἢ· ἐν-δέχεται γὰρ καὶ μὲ πυρέττοντα πυνευτιᾶν. τὸ μὲν


§ 18. τὸ δὲ, οἷον εἰ τις...ἀναγκαῖον.] The auctor ad Heren. ii 25, 39, gives two ‘signs’ of an opposite, fallacious, or refrutable character, derived from the same sources, Necessa est quoniam pallet aegrotasse: aut, ne-cesse est peperisse, quoniam sustinet purum infantem. These illustrations had doubtless become traditional, and commonplace in the rhetorical books.

πνευτιαῖ[‘to have an affection or disease of the breath.’ A large class of verbs in αὐ and ύαυ are either desiderative (like those in ιεὐ and in Latin in serio) or expressive of an affection, usually some form of disease; the latter can be extended to a ‘mental’ affection. Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 330, Obs. 3 α and Obs. 4, would separate these into two classes (1) desideratives in αὐ and ύαυ, and (2) verbs in ύαυ, which express a state of illness [Kühner’s Ausführliche Grammatik § 328. 8]. Buttmann also in his Gr. Gr. § 119 and p. 294 (Engl. Transl.) assumes a distinction between some varieties of them, which is not very clearly made out. They fall under three heads, first desideratives, second imitatives (as
46 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 2 § 18.

οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, εἴρηται μὲν καὶ νῦν μᾶλλον δὲ φαινομένον τυραννὸς, to play the tyrant); “but,” he adds, “it is improper to rank verbs denoting diseases (the third), ἄθλομαι, ἠθλομαίνω, ψευδαράκτω, &c., in the same class (as the imitatives),” these belong rather to a preceding division, viz. verbs in ἀω formed from nouns, “and expressing, chiefly, the having a thing or quality, and performing an action; as κομψός, χολός, βεβήλω, γαμήλιον, τοβικάμι.”

A much better and more exact account of these forms of verbs, in respect of the connexion and distinction of their senses, is to be found in Lobbeck’s learned note on Phrynichus, p. 79—83. “Verbs in ἀω and ἦν,” (this is not true of all these verbs and requires qualification; δάφνη, γίγνομαι, ἀπήλθα, for instance, can hardly be said to denote either a bodily, or mental affection. It should be “some verbs” or “a large class of verbs in ἀω”) “in both forms, are properly used of affections of mind and body. σπαθαρχία, τὸ σπαθόν ἀγκών ἀλτών, λεμπή, κρησφύς, μολύβδης express bodily ailments; δυσνοορεία, νυκτοφυσία, ποσερχόμην, and all deservatives (which have either of these terminations) express some affections of the mind, either as a malady, a longing, or in some other form.” This is an amplification of what Lobbeck actually says: and it is also I think implied that the bodily affection is the primary significaion, which is extended by metaphor to the mental. A long list of examples is there given, chiefly of rarer words. I have collected some examples from various Greek writers, which, as most of them do not appear in Lobbeck’s list, or in the grammars, I will here add.

In Aristophanes, as was to be expected, they most abound. ἄθλομα ὁδός 207 b. βοσκολόμιον ib. 1280, λυματίνων 494, ἔρωταν 481 and Πας. 702, δαμασίαν, δαμασίαν Thesm. 1054 (and in Aeschylus, Eur. Xenophon). ἀργυρῖνα (quoted by Schol. on Ran. 905, Xen. Anab. VII c. 33, Dem. de F.L. § 337 “to have an itch or mania for commanding an army”), ἡμίφων Nub. 44, λυματίνων 326, καταστάσεως 183, κυριεύς 1387, σιμιλήτης ἐκ 81, κορανιαμάστερον Vesp. 8, βουληματίαν Plut. 870, φύσιν Soph. Phil. 1209 (Hesych. τὸ ἐπὶ φόνου μαίνεσθαι), τοβικάν Ἀρ. 580 (τοβικάν ἐνδεικνύει, Schol.), δαμαφον τόνον Phyl. ad Phil. 1 c. 7, δαμασίαν (to long for death) Plut. Phaed. 64 b, κυριεύς Theaet. 191 A, Legg. 1 639 B, καταστάσεως ἀγνοεῖ Gorg. 494 E, ψυκτός καὶ καταστάσεως ib. c. (Arist. Eccl. 919), ποιμέαρι Alcib. II 139 E, 140 A. In Aristotle we have στηργοφυσία (to be infected with the disease of office-hunting), Pol. viii (ν) 5 sub fin., δαμασίαν, of mental distress or anxiety, Rhet. 1. 9, 21. Many in the works on Nat. Hist., as τομασία, κπηία, ἀγαφία, καταστάσις (or καταστάσις), all implying a sexual impulse, Hist. An. vi 18 §§ 12, 14, 17, vi 20, 41, στηργοφυσία vi 21, 5, στηργοφυσία de Gen. An. iv 3, 22, ἀγαφίαν ib. v. 8, 13, ἀγαφίαν ib. ν 20, 5, στηργοφυσία (also Arist. Thesm. 616, Plat. Legg. xi 2, 916 A, στηργοφυσία, λόγον). Theophr. v. δάσκαλος, ἄγαφα, “to have a mania, or itch, for buying”, Diog. Laert. vit. Patt. iii 18 “οἱ λόγοι σου, φονεύ (ὁ Διονυσός), γυρρωτασίαν” (are infected with, smack of, old age), καὶ δεῖ, (ὁ Πλάτων), “οὐχ ὅτι γε τυρασίαν.” (If this is the passage referred to by Buttm. in quoting the verb τυρασίαν in his Grammar, above cited—no reference is given—he is wrong both in attributing it to the sense of “imitation”, and in assigning it to a separate class.)
καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν ἁσυλλογιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς ἀνα-
λυτικοῖς διάφοραι περὶ αὐτῶν. παραδείγμα περὶ ὅτι μὲν ἡ συνπληγγὴ καὶ περὶ ποία ἡ συνπληγγὴ, ἐλεύθερα· ἐστὶ δὲ οὕτω ὃς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὐθέν ὃς ὅλον πρὸς 
μέρος οὖθεν ὃς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ' ὃς μέρος πρὸς 
μέρος, ὃμοιον πρὸς ὃμοιον, ὃταν ἄμφως μὲν ἡ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμίαν δὲ θάτερον ἢ θατεροῦν, 
παραδείγμα ἐστιν. οἶνον ὁτι ἐπιβολεῖται τυραννίδι 
Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακὴν καὶ γὰρ Πεισιστράτω 
πρότερον ἐπιβολεῖται ἤτει φυλακὴν καὶ ἱκανῶν ἐτυ-
ράννεσσαι, καὶ Θεατένης ἐν Μεγάραις καὶ ἀλλοί ὅσον 
ἴσασι, παραδείγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονύσιοῦ,


§ 19. ἄμφως ἢ.] This union of neuter dual with verb singular, following 
the analogy of neuter plural in the same construction, is illustrated 
in Jell, Gr. Gr. § 384, Obs. 1. [Kühner's Ausf. Gram. § 364.]

ὁν ὁτι ἐπιβολεῖται τυραννίδι Διονύσιος κ.τ.λ.] The stratagem by which 
Dionsius actually succeeded in obtaining his body-guard (406 B.C.) 
contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Syracusan citizens is related by 
again refers to the attempt, Pol. III 15 ult. On the similar, and equally 
successful attempt of Pisistratus, Grote, H. G. Vol. III p. 208, 209. This 
occurred at his first usurpation of government B.C. 560. (Grote, Cl.θ.π.) 
Theagenses of Megara (Grote, H. G. Vol. III p. 59, 60) is mentioned by 
Aristotle, Pol. VIII (v) 5 sub fin., together with Pisistratus and Dionsius, 
as one of those who had succeeded in making themselves tyrants of 
their native countries, by imposing upon the popular party; Aristotle 
notices the stratagem by which he effected his purpose (τὼν εὐθέων τὰ 
ἐν τῇ ἐπιστράτευσιν, λαβὼν παρὰ τὸν πολεμὸν ἐπιστράτευς). Thucydides also, 
1 126, mentions him as having assisted Cylon in the attempt which he 
also made on the tyranny at Athens; Herod. v. 71. Cylon was his son-in-law, Thuc. u.s. Cylon's attempt was made in 620 B.C. (Clint. F. H. 
sub anno), and Theagenses κατ' ἐκείνων τὸν χρόνον ἐπιστράτευσε Μεγάρας 
(Thuc.). Cylon's attempt (and consequently the tyranny of Theagenses) 
took place, says Herodotus u. s., "before the age of Pisistratus." 
Theagenses was contemporary with Periander of Corinth, whose reign 
lasted from B.C. 625—585 (Grote u. s. p. 58).

αὐτῶν τὴν φυλακὴν] Plat. Rep. VIII 16, 566 B, τὸ δὴ τυραννεῖν αὐτὴν 
tὸ πολεμιστεῖν ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ ἔστιν τούτῳ προβαθμικῶς ἐξυπνοῦντες, 
αὐτῶν τὸν δῆμον φιλαλαίας νυν τοῦ σώματος, ἐνα σῶς αὐτῶς ἢ ὁ τοῦ δήμου 
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 2 § 20.

δὲν οὔκ ἦσαν τῷ εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἴτει. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυπανύτι φυλακὴν αἴτει.

ἔξ ὅν μὲν οὖν λέγονταί αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις ἡ 1358. ἀποδεικτικά, εἰρηται. τῶν δὲ ἐνδυμάτων μεγίστη 20 διαφορὰ καὶ μάλιστα λεληθοῦσα σχεδὸν πάντας ἐστὶν ἦπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν· τα μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν ὑστεροὺς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν [μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν], τὰ δὲ κατ' ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυνάμεις, τὰς μὲν οὗσας τὰς Δ' οὔπω κατειλημμέναι· διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσί τε [τοὺς ἀκροατὰς], καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπότιμοι

υπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου] "under the same universal," i.e. genus or species; which stand to the species or individuals subordinate to each respectively, in the relation of universal to particular. τὸ καθόλου is that which is universally predicable, or predicable of every member of a class. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 δ 29, τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου καὶ τὸ ἄλλο λεγόμενον ὀς ἄλλον τι ἐκ οὗτος ἐστὶ καθόλου ὡς πολλὰ περὶ τὸν καθόλου καθ' ἀκόντι καὶ ἐν ἄκαντα εἶναι ὡς ἀκόντι, ἐνος ἄλοιπος, ἑπτά, διὸ, ἄπεκαντα ἔκα. Ιβ. Ζ 13, 1038 δ 11, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοίνων τούτω γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὁ πλείωσιν ὑπάρχων περὶ χων. Anal. Post. Ι 4, 73 δ 26, καθόλου δὲ λέγω δ ἐν καθ' ἀκόντι τῇ ὑπάρχει καὶ καθ' αὐτῷ καὶ ὑπὲρ (see Waitz, Comm. p. 315), of which the triangle is given as an exemplification, as the universal notion of all three-sided figures; applicable to any one of them, τὸ τριγώνος, καὶ πρῶτος, the highest or primary conception of triangles (the troikhe, for example, a subordinate species, being only secondary): τὸ καθόλου δὲ ὑπάρχει τοῖς, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ τριγώνος καὶ πρῶτος δεικνύει. Thus the καθόλου is equivalent to the γένος under which all the species and individuals of the entire class are included, δ' καθ' ἀκόντι καθολικότερα, and is opposed to καθ' ἄκοδον καὶ καθ' ἀκόντι.

§ 20. κατειλημμέναι] 'fixed, established, settled'. καταλαμβάνεις is 'to lay hold of, to get into one's possession', or 'to occupy', as an army occupies a conquered city or country. See the Lexicon for primary sense of the word. Thence it passes into the significance of 'binding' by an oath, Ηεροδ. ΙΧ. 106, πίστις τα καταλαβόντες καὶ ὑπὲρλογίου ἐμέμην τα καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέμεναι. θυσ. ν 21 (ἐπονδέα) εὑρὸν κατειλημμένα (settled or concluded, 'confirmed', SchCl. ιογραφής) VIII 63, 3, τα δ' αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ὑπὲρ βασιλεῖαν καταλαβὼν (they secured, established or confirmed their interest in the army, Arnold). Plat. Legg. VII 73, 823 λ, ταίς γεμίσαι ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα (comprehension ex hūrān, Stalbaum). Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 2, 1324 δ 21, τα μὲν νόμων κατειλημμένα τα δὲ θέσεως, (fist gesetzts, Stahr). Eth. Nic. X, 10, 1179 δ 18, τα ἐκ παλαιοῦ τούτος θέσως κατειλημμένα λόγῳ μετατησάμενοι.
κατὰ τρόπους μεταβάινουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν. μᾶλλον δὲ

σαφές ἦσται τὸ λέγομεν διὰ πλειόνων ῥήθην. λέγω

γάρ διαλεκτικὸς τε καὶ ρήτορικος συλλογισμὸς

εἶναι περὶ δὲ τούτων τόπων λέγομεν. οὔτως δὲ εἰσίν οἱ

κοινὰ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν

καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μάλ-

λου καὶ ᾧττου τόπους οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἦσται ἐκ

τούτων συλλογίσασθαι ἡ ἐνθύμημα εἰπεῖν περὶ δικαίων


νοῦν ἀκοροσάč] should be omitted, with Muretus, Vater, and Spengel. The ‘oversight’ in question applies only to the rhetoricians, not to the audience.

καὶ μᾶλλον ἀντίμενον κατὰ τρόπους μεταβάινουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν] μᾶλλον be-

longs to ἀντίμενον and μεταβάινουσιν, “the more they handle their subject according to the ‘appropriate method’, the more they pass out of, or stray beyond, transgress the limits of, the true province of Rhetoric”. κατὰ τρόπους is equivalent or nearly so to διόντως, ‘duly’, ‘in the right and proper way’; and it is often found in Plato opposed to ἀπὸ τρόπου. πάροιχος τοῦ καθήκοντος, Schol. ad Theaet. 143 C. Gaisford from Steph. Thesaurus supplies examples from Plato and Isocrates, and others will be found in Stallbaum’s note on Rep. v 16, 470 B. διόντως itself appears in three MSS after τρόπου, being doubtless, as Gaisford supposes, a gloss on the preceding. I have followed Mr Poste, Introd. to Transl. of Post. Anal. p. 20, n. 3, in translating κατὰ τρόπους, ‘the appropriate method’, ‘in the right way, or in due order’, and it may very well bear that meaning. It will therefore be equivalent to κατὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν μέθοδον, the method which confines itself to the peculiar principles, the ιδεῖα or οἰκείαι ἄρχαι, of the special science which it investig-}


taxes. μᾶλλον ἀντίμενον κατὰ τρόπους is equivalent to, and explained by, διόντως. ἄν ὁ μετάβατος ἠλέγχητο τὰ προϊόντα, near the end of the next section, § 21; and the ἄρχαι, which are spoken of immediately afterwards, ἦν χαρὰ ἐντύχη ἄρχαι, are the ιδεῖα ἄρχαι, the special principles of each particular science above mentioned. Dialectics and Rhetoric have no such special principles, and their method is the ‘inappropriate’. Gaisford follows Mu-

reteus in inserting ἄν before κατὰ τρόπους ‘by handling them too properly’. The other interpretation seems preferable in itself, and requires no altera-

tion. μεταβαίνου is μεταβαίνω, εἰς ἄλλο γένος, technically used of passing from one science to another, and illicily transferring its appropriate principles. Comp. 1 14, 6. See Poste, u.s. p. 51, note 1, for examples from the Organon. Add Top. Θ 11, 161 a 33. Anal. Post. 1 7 treats of this subject.

On κοινῶν and οἰκείαι ἄρχαι see Introd. p. 73 note and the references there given.

§ 21. περὶ δὲ τούτων τόπων λέγομεν] (περὶ τούτων περὶ δὲ): to which we apply the term ‘the τόποι’, par excellence; the κοινῶν τόποι, namely. See below, § 22; and for this treatment of them, 11 19.

AR. I.
The former, the κοινὸν τούτον, will make no one any the wiser, will convey no intelligence or instruction to any one, about any class of things. This is the διδασκαλία or genuine instruction that belongs to science. διδασκαλία γὰρ ἐστίν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος (1 1, 12; see note on p. 23); comp. 1 4, 4, διά τὸ μέτε ὑποτροφία εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλ’ ἐμφρονοκτίρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς. Plato has employed the word in the same way, Legg. vii 14, 809 D τοῦ δὲ αὐτράσιον περὶ αὕτη μᾶλλον ἐμφρονοκτίρας ἀπηγαγόντα.—ἐμφρονοκτίρας belongs to the class of adjectives compounded with ἐπο, in which the preposition expresses the indwelling or inherence of something in something else, ἐξοφυτοῦ with soul in it, containing life, animated, ἐνεοῦς, ἐνήδος, ἐμναυς, ἐμψοφος, ἔχους, ἔπροχος, ἔνθος, ἔντομα (insects), Ar. Hist. An. iv 1, 5, ἐτοὶ δ’ ἐντομα διὰ κατὰ τοῦτον ἐπο ἐντομάδνα ἔχοντα κ.τ.λ.

Ἀλλὰ ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἄλλος, a comparative in form as well as in sense, naturally, like ἐπιστήμη, διάφορος, διαφέρων, et sim., takes the same construction, with the genitive. On the comparative form of ἄλλος see Donaldson, New Crt. §§ 165, 166.

κοινων ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, καὶ ἐν ταὐταῖς διαρετέοι τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτεύον. λέγω δὲ εἰδὴ μὲν τὰς καθ' ἐκαστον γένος ἴδιας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοῖς κοινων ἐμοίως πάντων. πρότερον οὖν ἐπιμενει περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν πρῶτον δὲ λάβωμεν τά γένη τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ὅπως διελέμενοι πόσα εστί, περὶ τούτων χαρίς λαμβάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

I Εἴστι δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς γένη τρία τὸν ἀριθμὸν. CHAP. II τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαται τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὄντες. σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἐκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὐ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὑπό, καὶ τὸ

§ 22. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς—﹤ληπτεύον﹥ Cum tanta formarum (i.e. τῶν εἰδῶν) locorumque differentia sit, quantum ipse supra demonstravit: ut scilicet illae fraudi dialectico et oratori, non recte usurpatae ab ipsis, esse possint, loci nullum tale periculum secum portent: aliaque etiam discrimina sint, affirmat oportere distinguere enthymematum species appellatas ab his qui loci vocantur, ex quibus ulla ipsa promuntur: ut in Topics factum est, ita etiam in his qui oratorem instruent libris. Victorius. 'We must here also, as well as in Dialectics, carefully distinguish the sources and materials (ἐξ ὧν ληπτεύον) from which the special and the general topics are to be derived'.

πρῶτες, a logical or rhetorical premiss or proposition, in syllogism or enthymeme: πρῶτος πραεμισθείς, 'est enim πρώτων (Top. Θ 1, 155 b 34, 38), vel πρῶτειναι (ib. c. 14, 164 b 4 &c.) eas propositiones constitutere unde conclusio efficaciam.' Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 2, p. 53.

τὰ στοιχεῖα (On στοιχεῖα, 'the elements' of rhetorical reasoning, see Intro. p. 127. Add to the illustrations there given Rhet. ad Alex. c. 36 (37) 9, στοιχεῖα καὶ εἰρήκα πάντως, apparently in this sense.

CHAP. III.

The triple division of Rhetoric, συμβουλευτικός, διασκόπικος, ἐπιδιευθυντικός, is, as we learn from Quintilian, II 21, 23, III 4, 1, and 7, 1, due to Aristotle: Anaximenes, his predecessor, had admitted only two genera, with seven species subordinate to these, III 4, 9.

Almost all writers (prope omnes) on the subject, subsequent to Aristotle, had accepted his division, as proceeding from the 'highest authority' (utique summas aequip antiquos auctoritatis) ΙΙΙ 4, 1. Quintilian in this fourth chapter mentions, besides Aristotle's division, those which were adopted by Anaximenes, Protagoras, Plato (in the Sophist), and Isocrates. He decides in favour of Aristotle's, as the safest to follow, both because the preponderance of authority is on its side, and also because it is the most reasonable.

4—2
$\S$ 2. θεωρόν ἡ κριτήριον This classification of the different kinds of 'audience' is made for the purpose of determining the divisions of Rhetoric; because, the audience being the end and object of the speech, that to which every speech is ultimately referred, and everything being defined or determined by its end ($τέλος$), the number of the varieties of audiences must fix the number of the divisions or branches of Rhetoric. Audiences are of two kinds; either mere 'spectators', like the θεατής in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition where amusement is the object, or at all events where there is no interest of a practical character or tendency; or else 'judges', where some real interest is at stake, and they are called upon to pronounce a decision (φαρμ κολειτικός, πραγματική Quint.). But these decisions, and those who pronounce them, again fall into two classes, according as they are referred to questions, (1) of political expediency and look to the future, or (2) of right or wrong in respect of past acts or facts.

So that we have three kinds of audiences, and consequently three branches of Rhetoric. The public or national assembly, to which the deliberative kind of rhetoric is addressed; the law-courts and their 'judges'; properly so called, the object of the forensic or judicial branch of the art; and thirdly the 'spectators'; those who go to be amused or interested by the show-speeches, or ψαλτεία, the Panegyrics (in two senses), funeral orations, burlesques, or whatever other form may be taken by speeches composed merely to display skill in composition without practical interest (where the δύναμις, the faculty, or skill shewn, is only in question); or, if they please, to criticise them, and so become 'critics'.

The term κριτής, 'judge', which belongs properly only to the second of the three branches, may also be extended to the other two, since they all have to 'decide' in some sense, to choose between opposite views, either on questions of expediency in matters of state, or right and wrong in legal questions, or the merits of a composition as 'critics'. Comp. II 18, 1, III 12, 5, and also Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18 (19), 14, where (comp. § 10) κριτήριον seems to be used in this general sense for all kinds of determinand.
Λευτικών, δικαίων, ἐπίδεικτικών. συμβουλής δὲ τὸ μὲν προτροπὴ τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπὴ· αἰὲ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἁδικὰ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ κοινῆ δημηγοροῦντες τοῦτων θάτερον ποιοῦσι. δίκης δὲ τὸ μὲν κατηγορία τὸ δ’ ἀπολογία· τούτων γὰρ ὀποτερονοῦν ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τοῦς ἀμφισβητοῦντας. ἐπίδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔταινος
4 τὸ δὲ ἴσον. χρόνοι δὲ ἐκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβουλεύει ἡ προτρέπων ἡ ἀποτρέπωσι), τῷ δὲ δικαίωματι ὁ γεγόμενος (περὶ γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων αἰὲ ὁ μὲν κατηγορεῖ ὁ δὲ ἀπολογεῖται), τῷ δ’ ἐπίδεικτικῷ κυριώτατος μὲν ὁ παρών, κατὰ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπαινοῦσι ἴσως πάντες, προσχρωνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γεγομένα ἀναμμηνησκούντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα
5 προεικάζοντες. τέλος δὲ ἐκάστοι τούτων ἔτερον ἔστι, καὶ τρισὶν ὀυκεὶ καί, τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέ-

§ 3. ἐπιδεικτικὸν ἵσα γεω γενομένα ψιθυρισμὸν. Quod genus videtur Aristotelis, atque eum sectum Thespastus, a parte negotiatis, hoc est praesagii, removisset, totamque ad solos auditores relegasse; et id eius nominis, quod ab ostentatione dicitur, proprium est. Quint. III 7, 1.

ὁ θεοκρίτων] Append. [This Appendix was apparently never written. S.]

§ 4. χρόνοι—τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων] I have already pointed out, Introd. p. 120, that Demosthenes adds τὸ παρών, 'present time', to the 'future' of Aristotle, as characteristic of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric; and Aristotle himself, in two subsequent passages of this treatise, I 6 § 1, and 8 § 7.

κυριώτατο] Οὐ κύριος, in its secondary and metaphorical application, see note on I 11 § 4. The kind of 'authority' which this 'present time' is here said to carry with it in the epideictic branch is, that it has of all the three the best right to be there; that it is most 'proper' or appropriate in that place. It has here very much the same sense as in the phrases κύριον ἡμέρα, κύρια ἑκάστη, a day or assembly which has a special authority, as 'fixed' and 'appointed' for a certain purpose; opposed to all ordinary days, and irregular assemblies, which are συγκλητοὶ, called together at a moment's notice on special emergencies.

τὰ γεγομένα—τὰ μέλλοντα] The accusatives are here attracted by the participles, instead of following the principal verb in the dative.

προεικάζοντες] 'with, in the way of, an anticipatory guess or presentiment', of future honours and distinctions of the subject of the encomium.
§ 5. ὁ δὲ ἀντρέπων οὐχ ἑρμηνεύει. (Fr. A. Wolf's einleuchtende Verbesserung geht in eine Bestätigung in den ungrammatischen Worten der paraphrase: ὁ δὲ ἁρμηνεύει ἃ τὸ ἑρμηνεύει (Brandis, ap. Schneid. Philol. p. 45). This alteration seems to me to be totally unnecessary. It is true that the ordinary construction of the verb in the sense here intended is ἀντρέπων τινὰ τοιοῦτον, or ἀντρέπω, as § 6, 'to divert or dissuade some one from something'. But it is plain it can equally well be adapted to the other form of expression adopted here, 'to divert the thing from the person—in the way of dissuasion—to turn it away from him, as (being) worse', i.e. 'to dissuade him from it (as the Greeks as well as ourselves usually say) as the less expedient course'. An author like Aristotle, always regardless of the ordinary usages of language, may very well be allowed such a liberty of expression. If, however, this be still objected to, we may, without alteration of the text—to be admitted I think, as a general rule, only as a last resource—understand ὁς ἑρμηνεύει as an absolute case, nomin. or accus., ὁ δὲ ἀντρέπων ὡς ἑρμηνεύει (ὅν τι), ἀντρέπεται (τινὰς αὐτὸν). See similar examples in note on II 8, 10.

§ 6. ἄν μὲν γὰρ τῶν Ἀλλων κ.τ.λ.] On the 'legal issues' here intimated, the ἀμφιβολίας (Aristotle, or κτίσεως (subsequent Rhetoricians and Lawyers), comp. I 13, 9; III 15, 2; 16, 6; 17, 1, and Introd. p. 397, App. E to Bk. III.)
καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προέ-ενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύοντι ἡ ἀπ’ ὧφε-λίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὀμολογήσαιεν ὡς δ’ οὐκ ἄδικον τὸν αὐτοῦ λυσιτελοῦσαν καταδουλοῦσαι καὶ τοὺς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοπούσιν ἡ 1359 εἰ συμφέροντα ἐπράξεν ἡ βλαβερὰ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήτας τοῦ αὐτῷ λυσιτελοῦντος ἐπράξε τι καλὸν, οἷον Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαι- νοῦν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἐπαίρῳ Πατρόκλῳ εἰδὼς ὅτι δεὶ αὐτόν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐξὸν γὰρ τὸν ἑκὼν τούτῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ γὰρ συμφέρον. 7 φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τούτων

ὡς δ’ οὐκ ἄδικον [i.e. τοῦ λέγειν ὡς, or τοῦ ἔστιν, 'the fact that'], οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. On the necessary limitation and qualification of this position of Aristotle, see Introd. p. 170.

ἐν ἑπαίνῳ πολλάκις τιθέασιν κ.τ.λ. Isocrates gives credit to the Athenian people, ἐν ἑπαίνῳ τιθέουσα, for this kind of disinterested policy, in a passage referred to by Victorius. Paneg. § 53 Ἀχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 179 Ε πεπνυμένοις παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ὡς ἀποθανοῦσα ἀτοπεκτείνει Ἡπειροκλῆσσα, μὴ ποιήσας δὲ τούτο οὐκ ἄπαθεν ἡμῖν τοῖς τελευτήσις, ἐνδοκρίνεις ἐπιθύμησιν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦσα τῷ ἐξαφερόμενῳ Πατρόκλῳ καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπερασφα-λέον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπειτούργας δεινελθείσων. Apol. 28 ο ἡ ὡθότοις ὁλος, δὲ τοιούτου των κυρίων κατεγράφησα παρὰ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦσα, ὡς ἐπιθυμηθῆναι ἐκεῖν ἐκεῖν ἐν μήτηρ αὐτῶς προσθομοποιήσῃ Ἡπειροκλῆσσα ἂν ἀτοπεκτείνει, καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπακούσας αὐτῆς γερας ὁ παῖς. Aeschin. comp. 2. 1. 410 seq. Aeschines likewise, c. Timarch. §§ 145, 150, refers to (in the one) and quotes (in the other) this same passage of Hom. II. 3. u. s., but with a totally different purpose.

τοῦτο δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ [ὡς (though life) συμφέρον] Ἐθ. Nic. IX. 8, 1109 a 18, ἔσχον δὲ περὶ τοῦ συνδιασκόμενος καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀνεκεί καὶ πράττειν καὶ τῆς παραδίκης, ἐὰν δὲ ὑπερασφαλείσθη...τοὺς δ’ ὑπερασφαλεισθῆσαν τούτῳ ὑπακούσαν αὐτοὶ ἔργον ὁμοίως καὶ μᾶλλ’ ἀνδρικὸς.

§ 7. The argument of this and the two following sections of this chapter will be found in a more connected shape in the paraphrase of the Introd. pp. 171—2. The sum of it is simply this: each of the two kinds of τόνος is equally necessary in all the three branches of Rhetoric; (1) the εἴθη, or ἴδοι τόνος, or ἰδια, from which the rhetorical propositions or premises, the εἴκος, σημεῖα, and τεκμήρια are necessarily derived, § 7: and (2) the four κοινὸς τόνος, here apparently reduced to three, the possible
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 3 §§ 8, 9.

ἔχειν πρῶτον τὰς προτάσεις· τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεία προτάσεις εἰσί τῇ ῥήτορικῇ· ὅλος μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ προτάσεως ἐστί, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς ἐστὶ συνεστηκός ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων προτάσεων. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐτε πραχθῆναι οἶδον τε οὐτε πραχθήσεσθαι τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὰ δικαία, οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἢ μὴ ἔσομεν οὐχ οἶδον τε τὰ μὲν πεπράχθαι τὰ δὲ πραχθῆσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλεύοντι καὶ τῷ δικαζομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἄδικατον, καὶ εἴ γέγονεν ἢ μὴ, καὶ εἴ ἐσται ἢ μὴ. ἕτερον δὲ ἐπεὶ ἀπαντᾷς καὶ ἐπαινούντες καὶ ἴδοντες καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες καὶ καθηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογοῦμενοι οὐ μόνον τὰ εἰρημένα δεικνύονται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι μέγα ἡ μικρὸν τὸ ἄγαθον ἢ τὸ κακόν ἢ τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσχρόν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τὸ ἁδικὸν, ἢ καὶ αὐτὰ λέγοντες ἢ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντιπαραβάλλοντες, δήλου ὅτι δέοι οὖν καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τῶν μείζονος καὶ τῶν ἐλάττων προτάσεις ἔχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἕκαστον, οἶδον τὶ μείζον ἄγαθον ἢ ἐλάττων ἢ δικαιόμενον ὑμοῖος δὲ

and impossible, 'fact past and future', and 'the great and small (the topic of magnitude or importance) either (1) absolute or (2) comparative (degree)'. §§ 8, 9.

§ 9. δικαίωμα] is used here and in c. 13 §§ 1, 3, as the opposite to δίκαιον, in the sense of 'an act of justice'. So Eth. Nic. ν ἔνα, 1135 a 8, διαφέρει δὲ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἁδικὸν καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον νῦν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ φύσει ἡ τάξει (i.e. νόμῳ, natural or of human institution.) τὸ δ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ὅταν πραξῆ ἄσκεσις ἐστί, πρὸς δὲ πραξῆς ὁμοιός, ἀλλ' ἁδικὸν. όμοιος δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικασφάγημα τό καλόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἑπαρπάζωμα τὸν δικαστήριον: where in the first clause it is used in its ordinary acceptation as 'a just act', = δικασφάγημα, and contrasted with δίκαιον, and afterwards distinguished from it in the more correct sense of 'a rectification of an act of injustice'. It is in this signification that Plato employs it, Legg. ix 8, 864 E, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δικασφάγων δείκνυον, 'all other penalties', which are as it were 'amendments of a wrong or injustice'. In Thuc. 1.41 init. it stands for 'just claims', 'rechtgründen', Poppo; rechtsanspruch', Heitz, l.c. In Arist. de Caelo,
ΠΡΩΛΙΚΗΣ Α 4 §§ 1—3.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὤν μὲν οὖν ἕξ ἀνάγκης
dei λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἰρητικὰ μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
diairetένων ἱδία περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦτων, οἷον περὶ ὤν
συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ ὤν οἱ ἐπίδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον
dὲ περὶ ὤν αἱ δίκαι.

I πρώτων μὲν οὖν ληπτόν περὶ ποία ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ

Chap. IV.

ο συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἀπαίτη
2 ἄλλ’ ὅσα ἐνδεχόμεναι καὶ γενόσθαι καὶ μὴ.
ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ή ἔστιν ή ἔσται ή ἀδύνατον εἶναι ή γενόσθαι,

3 περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή.

οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχόμενων ἀπάντων ἔστι γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἐνα

Ι 10, 1, it has a sense either derived from that rectification or amendment, an ἀπεκάθορωμα of a wrong view or argument, μάλλον ἐν εῇ πιστὰ τὰ μᾶλλονα

λεχθέντα ἐποκρικοῦσα τὰ τῶν μυθολογούσων λόγων δικαίωμα: or rather, as in Thucydides, it denotes a justification or just claim, meaning what the conflicting arguments have each of them to say for themselves.

δικαίωμα 'actio iuris, execucio iuris, iustificatio, ex qua (per arbitrarium)


οἷον 'for example', one of several, is used here, as constantly elsewhere, loosely and carelessly, by Aristotle, in the place of τῶν 'of', id est, videlicet, as a more explanatory repetition.

CHAP. IV.

§ 1. On the first of the three branches of Rhetoric, τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν

οἱ δημογραφοὶ γένος.

§ 2. εἶναι ή γενόσθαι] This 'fundamental antithesis' and cardinal
distinction of ancient philosophy is noticed by Gaisford, incredible as it may appear, for the sole purpose of making merry with it as a sophista-

cal quibble! 'Has Sophistarum infeitas facete ridet Antiphanes apud

Athenaeum, ΙI 99 Α.'

§ 3. καὶ φύσε...καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς γνώμης δυσκόλως] This same distinction of goods naturally and accidentally accruing to us, is found in Eth. Eud. Ι

3, 5, 1215 a 12, εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τῆς γνώμης ή τοῖς διὰ φύσες
tὸ καλὸν ἦν ἐκτὸς, διαφορῶν άρ νιν πολλοῦ. Τhese are opposed to those

advantages and objects of desire the acquisition of which depends upon ourselves and our own exertions and studies. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ δὲ ἐνέμελες ή

κατά σε οὐδὲ οὗτος οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πρακτικῆς compared with ὧν πέφυ-


κεν ἀνέθεται εἰς ἡμᾶς (to be referred to ourselves), καὶ οὐ η ἐν ἑαυτῇ
gnōmēs εἰς ἑαυτῶν estin. The gifts of nature and the good things that
result from accident cannot be included among the possible advantages,
the 'profitable' or 'expedient', which are the object and aim of the deliberative speaker, because they are not attainable by any exertions of our own; and so for the purposes of Rhetoric are just as useless as things necessary and impossible. The subjects of Rhetoric are the subjects of deliberation, and no one deliberates about anything which is beyond the sphere of his influence.

†

Note on c. 1 § 10 p. 17. 

§ 4. The following passage, §§ 4—6, descriptive of the rhetorical method and its necessary limitations, and the distinction between it and the method of scientific demonstration, one of the most important in the entire work, will be found almost literally translated in the Introduction, pp. 173—4, to which the reader is referred.

ἀκριβῆς διαρεισθασθαι 'to make an exact numerical division', or 'to enumerate in an exact division or analysis'. Plat. Phaed. 273 ε, Crat. 437 δ, Gorg. 501 λ, Legg. 1 633 λ, et alibi. It is used in a general sense of 'accurate distinction'.

διαλαβῶν 'to part, separate, divide, distinguish', is also familiar to Plato, Polit. 147 E, τὸν ἄμοιν πᾶνα δία διαλάβωσιν, Symp. 222 ε, οὐ χαρίς ἦν διαλάβῃ, Phileb. 23 C, πάντα τὰ νῦν δότα...διὰ διαλάβωσιν, and numerous examples in Ast's Index, s. v.; and still more διαρεισθαν in the same sense, and διαρεισθαν, Sophist. 225 λ, διαρεισθαν αὐτήν δίχα, Polit. 262 δ, καὶ ἐπὶ δύο διαρεισθαν, ib. 283 D, διαρεισθαν αὐτήν δύο μέρη, Phaedr. 273 E, καὶ ἐπὶ διαρεισθαν τὰ δότα. διαλαβῶν εἰς ἑκάτην, 'to classify by genera and species'. Similarly διαρεισθασίν.

περὶ δὲ εἰδάσκειν χρηματικῶς 'the subjects of ordinary business, i.e. deliberation (in the assembly)'. χρηματικῶς, which is properly to 'transact κρατέω or business' in general, is here 'transferred' by metaphor (of the class des γνώσεως τοῖς εἴδοσι, Poet. xx1 7), to the special signification of the particular kind of business which is transacted in the general assembly, its debates and consultations; so Pol. vi (iv), 14, 1298 δ 29, καὶ περὶ τούτων χρηματικῶς (of a general assembly as opposed to a Boule or pró-Boule) περὶ δὲ ὑπὸν προβουλευτῶν. Ib. c. 15, 1299 δ 39, ὡς ταῖς ταυταιαῖς ημερομνήσεις ἐν αἷς ὅ δέμου χρηματικῶς περὶ πάσης (holds its assemblies and discusses everything). Also to the consultations of the law-courts,
authors do not mean the same, or the same thing, as the authors of the preceding passage. For the latter part of the sentence, see above, note on c. 3 § 21 p. 30.

Wolf and MS A have πολλῷ, which is of course the more regular and strictly grammatical usage. On the general question of the meaning and distinctions of kal, dē, and te, with and without the negative, see Hermann's excellent dissertation in his Review of Elmsley's Medea, on lines 4, 5. Porson, Elmsley, and their English followers were in the habit of laying down rigorous and inflexible rules of Greek grammar, which were supposed to admit of no exception; any apparent violation of them was to be summarily emended; one of the great services rendered by Hermann to the study of the Greek language is the relaxation of these over exact rules, and the substitution of a rational and logical explanation of these differences of expression, and the analysis of their distinctions, for these often unwarranted alterations of the text. 'Kal particula est coniunctiva', says Hermann; 'te adiunctiva; dē disiunctiva.' In the case of odē and μῆθι, othē and μῆθι, when several things are subordinated to, and included under, one negative conception, the one or the other (dē or te) is used according as the writer had or had not any notion of a difference between them. If the things under the general negative conception are represented merely as subordinate and with no expression of difference or opposition between them, the adiunctiva te is employed, and the formula is odē...te...te, or odē...oθē...oθē, and similarly with μῆθι: on the other hand, if some difference between any of the subordinate members of the division is to be marked, te must be replaced by dē, and the formula will be odē...odē, or odē...odē, or odē...odē...odē...odē, and so on for other similar cases. And the change of te into dē in the second clause of the sentence before us, represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind of the thought that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigned as reasons for not introducing a regular scientific division into the treatment of Rhetoric (viz. its necessarily unscientific character, and the fact that its
60 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 4 § 5.

이는 τέχνης ἄλλη ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς, πολλῷ τε τελείω δεδοσθαί καὶ νῦν αὐτῇ τῶν 5 οἰκεῖων θεωρημάτων· ὀπερ γὰρ καὶ πρὸτερον εἰρηκότες τυχαίομεν, ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὅτι ἡ ρητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἡθη πολιτικῆς, ὡμοία δέ ἐστι τὰ μὲν τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τὰ 1 πολλῷ δὲ (see note).

province has already been unduly extended by previous professors), which requires to be marked, and accordingly is marked by the change of the particle. This, however, is not the only irregularity in Aristotle's sentence; for, evidently intending at the commencement to include both the subordinate members under the original negative, he introduces in the second clause a positive conception; contributing perhaps to enforce the distinction of the two, but in violation of grammatical accuracy.

τελείω δεδοσθαί...τῶν οἰκείων θεωρημάτων] 'far more has been already assigned to it than its own proper subjects of inquiry', refers doubtless to the sophistical professors of Rhetoric, his predecessors and contemporaries; who ὑποδοθήσατε ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτικῆς, and lay claim to the whole extent of the field of Politics, Rhet. 1 4, 7. What this assumption of the Sophists implies is explained in Eth. Nic. x 10, 1181 a 1, ὅτι δὲ πολιτικά ἑπαγγέλλοντας μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ πρὸ τοῦ αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ οἱ πολιτικῶν εἰς κ.κ. λ. ι. ὑποθέτον πάρος εἶναι τοῦ διδάσκειν οὔ χάρι ποιεῖν τι ἐστίν ὅ περ ποιεῖ ἢσαν οὐκ ἐν τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ μητροίδει οὔτα χεῖρον ἐνίθευσον κ.κ.λ.

§ 5. τῆς ἀναλυτικῆς ἐπιστήμης] See note on c. i 11, p. 19, ὅτι δὲ ποιεῖ ἀπόδειξις ἐστι.

ἀναλυτική, opposed to λογική (which is equivalent to διαλεκτικής, Waitz on Anal. Post. 82 8 35, p. 353, Poste, u. s., p. 19), properly implies scientific demonstration; and 'analytical' reasoning follows that method: see Anal. Post. 1 22, 84 a 7 seq. It is there said to be exercised ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς ἐπιστήμοις...ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐστι τῶν ἄσχημων καθ' αὐτὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν. On 'Analytics' comp. Trendel. El. Log. Arist. p. 47 sq. Waitz Comm. ad Anal. Pr. p. 366, 7. When Dialectics is here called an 'analytical' science, either 'analytical' stands for 'logical' in general (which is Mr Poste's view, l. c.), or else it represents and includes methodical systematic reasoning of all kinds, which proceeds by way of 'analysis', 'resolving' the objects of knowledge into their ultimate elements, to discover their causes (Trendelenburg, l. c.); and the latter is the explanation that I should prefer.

τῆς περὶ τὰ ἡθη πολιτικῆς] Ethics being a department or branch of the more general and comprehensive science of Politics, Eth. Nic. i 1, 1094 b 11, ἐὰν μὲν ὁντος μέθοδος (ἢ ἑξελεῖ) τοῖς εὑρίσκει, πολιτικὴ τες ὄντα: the end of both being the same, viz. human good, v. 6. Ib. 't 10, 1029 b 29, and c. 13, init. Ib. x 10, 1180 b 31, ὡμοίως γὰρ ἑδονή τῆς πολιτικῆς ἐδώκω. So that the two together make up the 'philosophy of humanity', of man as an individual and in society, ἡ περὶ ταὐτότητα φιλοσοφία, x 10, 1181 b 16.
§ 6. καθάπερ ἄν] On καθάπερ ἄν (κατασκευάζειν), see above, note on I 1, 5 p. 9.

It may be as well here to sum up the characteristics of Rhetoric which respectively entitle it to the name of 'art' and 'faculty'. In so far as it is systematic, and follows a method—a logical method—and can look forward to results (implying a knowledge of causes and effects) in persuading its hearers, it is an art; as a practical exercise, not admitting of absolute exactness, or universal conclusions, employing the propositions of all arts and sciences, and the axioms common to them all, only as probable and popular, and having itself no special subject-matter, taking opposite sides of the same question indifferently and arriving at opposite conclusions (so Alexander Aphrodisiensis), it is a δύναμις, a faculty, capable of development and to be exercised in practice.


μεταβαίνειν] See on 1 2, 20. Vater (who seems to have misunderstood the passage), without reason or authority, would omit the words τῷ μετα-

1 Of this so-called 'figure', πρόγμα, the illicit conjunction of the two heterogeneous notions or expressions under one vinculum, there are in fact two varieties, explained and abundantly illustrated from the works of Tacitus by Bötticher in his Lex. Tacit., Proleg. de Stili Taciti brevitate, p. LXXVIII sq., συλλήφας συλληφα and πρόγμα proper. The figure in general is thus described, 'qua aut generis aut personis aut alio quo modo diversa uniodemque constructionis genere comprehenduntur'; but as I have failed to enter into the distinction which Bötticher makes between the two varieties I will substitute my own explanation of the difference. In συλλήφας the two terms are united in one construction with a third, to which one is referred literally, the other metaphorically, or at all events in different senses. This appears in the instances given, as dissimulationem nix et lascivia exemertat: nocte ac lascitia inculcisse: praeda famaque onusti: mixti
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 4 § 7.

εἰς ἐπιστήμα τοὺς πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ 7 μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὅμως δὲ θὰ πρὸ ἔργου μὲν ἔστι

that name), 'a figure of speech', as it is briefly expressed in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, wherein two subjects are used jointly with the same predicate, which strictly belongs only to one, as in II. A 533, where ἔθνῳ must be supplied with Ζεύς.' So Herod. I 90, χρυσᾷ ἔργῳ καὶ ἔννοιαν, where of course λόγων is required with ἔννοια. Under this head comes the case before us, where to complete the intended sense we must supply ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον (not τῷ μεταβάλλειν, but τῷ ἐκπερπατεῖν ἐπιστήμα) λόγων.

ἐπιστήμα, 'to re-construct or re-constitute', is opposed to καταδινάω. The latter is 'to lay down (kata), settle or establish a system'; the former, 'to construct anew or afresh, to renew'. ἐκ (from the primary sense of direction to, in place, passes into a secondary one of direction or succession in time, after; hence, thirdly, it takes the meaning of repetition, as anew, afresh, re- (in comp.), and of development in the way of growth, as in ἐπιδόθη to augment or grow.' Hence ἐκπερπατεῖν is properly to 'refit', 'renew', 'repair', 'restore', as walls, ships, bridges, roads (Thucyd., Xenoph., Demosth., see the Lexx.), and thence transferred to 'reconstruction' of a science or study. A similar sense of ἐκ appears in the verbs, ἐπιστήμω 'to say after, or add the words', ἐπιστημον 'to collect after or in addition', ἐκπαθεῖν, ἐκπάθει, ἐκπαθείν, ἐκ−

§ 7. ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μὲν ἐκεῖ διδασκόντων, ἡ δὲ οὐκολογεῖν σκῆπος] Another case of grammatical irregularity and of the 'figure' [ἐγγίμα. ὅσα in the first clause is the accus. after διδασκόντω: in the second it must be repeated, as the nomin. to οὐκολογεῖν.—On πρὸ ἔργου, see supr. c. I § 10 p. 17.

copiis et laetitia. To these I will venture to add from a modern writer the case of Miss Bolo in Pickwick, who after her defeat at whist in the Bath Assembly Rooms retires 'in a flood of tears and a sedan chair'; to which Eur. Hel. 182, ἀναθέτει ἐν ταῖς χρωσίσεις ἐν ταῖς δόναις ἔργοις, is an exact parallel. In ἐγγίμα proper, this third term will not apply in any sense to both of the others, and some other word or phrase must necessarily complete the sense; as in the passage of Herodotus quoted above, and in the text of Aristotle.

Add to the examples collected from Tactitus by Bötticher, Hor. Od. III 4 11, ἱεροὶ σατιγιματυρκες συμμα. Liv. xxvi 16 sub fn. fatti sommo ac vigiliis (fatti vigiliis ac propriis somme gravem). Hom. II. K 98, καθότερ οὐκεῖν ἢτε καὶ ἄρη. Soph. Oed. R. 171, Electr. 73, 435, 6. Eur. Hercl. 312 Elms. ad loc., 839, 1040. Dem. de F. L. § 93, μὴ...καί, ἀλλ' ὡς κ.κ. Dorvill. ad Char. p. 394, seq. and Math. Gr. Gr. 634, Obs. 3, supply examples. Ernesti, in Lex. Teub. Gr. 1 17, thus defines ἐγγίμα: in qua figura unum ad verbum phares sententiae referuntur, quarum unamquamque desiderare illud, si sola ponenter. This use of the figure he has not illustrated. It seems to represent something quite different from the other; but what? The ἐγγίμα in fact is a kind of grammatical bracket, under which two heterogeneous expressions are improperly included. Another well-known example of this figure is the truly Irish epiphon on Boyle the Philosopher: 'He was the father of Chemistry, and grand-uncle of the Earl of Cork.'
The unaccountable difference between the list here given of the principal subjects of Politics with which the deliberative or public speaker will have to deal, viz. (1) πόροι, supplies, ways and means, revenue, finance; (2) war and peace (possibly including alliances); (3) the defence of the country; (4) exports and imports (commerce, trade); and (5) legislation; with that which is found in Politi. vii. 3wv), 4, has been already pointed out in the Introd. p. 176. In the corresponding chapter of the Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2, we have seven such subjects enumerated: religion, περὶ καρδίας; legislation, περὶ νόμων, (πόρων συμβολῶν θέου, Dem. de Cor. § 309, in a parallel passage); the constitution of the state (περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κατασκευῆς); alliances and commercial treaties (συμβολαίων) with foreign nations; war; peace; and revenue (περὶ πόρων χρημάτων).

In Xenophon, Memor. III 6, a conversation is reported between Socrates and Glaucion, whom the former cross-examines on the subject of his political knowledge, with the view of shewing him that he is not yet ripe for a statesman. The principal objects of a statesman’s care there enumerated are, the πρόσωποι, Aristotle’s πόροι, the revenue: the state expenses, with the view of reducing them, τὰ διαλέγματα: war, and the means of carrying it on: the enemy’s forces, naval and military, and your own: the defence of the country, ἡ φύλακα τῆς χώρας: mines, and the supply of silver (this is from the Athenian point of view): and the supply of corn and other food. These details, and in the same order, are all, with the exception of the mines in Aristotle, and the legislation in Xenophon, enumerated by Aristotle in the following sections, 5—11, so that Gaisford may possibly be right in his suspicion, ‘respextit fortasse Aristoteles Xenophonthis Mem. III 6.’

§ 8. ἀφαίρεσις ‘it may be reduced, curtailed, retrenched’, πρὸς τὰ υπάρχοντα προστιθήματες κ.τ.λ.] Not of course = πρὸς τῶν υπάρ-
64 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 4 §§ 8, 9.

θέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων. ταῦτα δ’ οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἱδία ἐμπειρίας ἐνδεχέται συνορᾶν, ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὑρημένων ἱστορικῶν εἶναι 9 πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὀπόση τε

χονών, ‘by adding to present resources’, but ‘with reference to them’, as πρὸς τούτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, and συμπαραλαμβάνω πρὸς ταῦτα, ςυμπαραλαμβάνω πρὸς ταῦτα, supr. c. 3, § 5. ‘For not only in respect of their existing resources do they become wealthier by adding to them (προστίθεντες αὐτοῖς).’

ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ θυγελίας, ‘from one’s own personal experience’. τὰ θυγελίας are the facts which have come under one’s own personal observation, i.e. the resources of our own country, and the system followed and methods adopted in providing, maintaining, and augmenting them, at home; not these alone are to be ‘inquired into’, ἱστορικὸν εἶναι, by the statesman and public speaker, but also the ‘inventions’, the practices and policy of other nations in regard of these same matters.

συνορᾶν ‘to take a comprehensive view’, ‘to look at together’, for the purpose of comparison. See note on συνάγων, c. 2 § 13 p. 41.

ἱστορικῶν] The termination -κῶν corresponds to the English -ive, and denotes a capacity for, or tendency to: ποιητικὸς productive, αισθητικὸς sensitive, δικτικὸς receptive, πρακτικὸς active, ποιητικὸς inventive, διδακτικὸς demonstrative, and so on: though in some cases there is no corresponding English word actually in use. According to this analogy ἱστορικὸν is ‘inquisitive’, qualified and disposed to inquire into things in general.

When Herodotus at the opening of his work uses the term ἱστορία, he means no more than the ‘inquiries’ or ‘researches’ which he is now collecting into a continuous narrative. (Comp. § 13, σε περὶ τῶν πράξεων ἱστορικῶν and the note there.) ‘It is not till we come to Polybius that the word assumes its modern significance, a scientific history, a systematic work that can be employed in education, Hist. 1 1, 2. It is now defined, and distinguished from other departments of study by the addition of πραγματικῆς, I 2, 8, the study of human actions and affairs. Its scientific character, which entitles it to the epithet ‘demonstrative’, ἱστορία ἀποδεικτική, II 37, 3, ἀνδρ. διήγησις, IV 40, 1, is derived from its method of tracing causes and motives of actions: ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐάν ἀφελῆ τις τὸ διὰ τι, καὶ πᾶς, καὶ τίνος ἐχὼν ἑπαρχῆ, καὶ τὸ πραγματεύων στόχον ἔδωκε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλείπόμενον αὐτῷ ἁγώναμα μὲν μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίνεται καὶ παρανικτα μὲν τείρης, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον συνὰν ἀφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.

But it is only the term, not the thing, that is new in Polybian’s time. Thucydides’ History, though not so called, (Thucydides is called a ἡγομαντικός, see Poppo on τὶς, τ. 2) is at least as scientific in all essential points as that of Polybius, or indeed any other.

On the distinction of λόγος, λογοσοφία, and ἱστορικός, see some good observations in Dahlmann’s Life of Herod. c. 6 § 2.
The verbs ὑπάρχει, ἔχω, γίγνομαι, stand to one another in the relation of past, present, and future; to be already in existence, to be (simple and absolute being, independent of time), and to become, to come into being from a state (if that be possible) of non-being. The aorist infinitive gives ὑπάρχει here a future sense, ‘to become or to be made’, which does not naturally, ex ivi verbis, belong to it. Hermann, in one of those notes which have thrown so much light upon the niceties of Greek grammar (on Ajax 1061 subsequently referred to without further discussion in the treatise de Part. Ἀυ IV, 2, Opuscula, Vol. IV), contends against Elmsley (who had condemned as a solecism this use of the aorist infinitive without ἄν, after verbs such as δοκεῖν, νομίζειν, οἴσειν, φανεῖν, λαμβάνειν, προσδοκάω, in reference to future time) in support of the usage; and distinguishes three modes of expression in which futurity is conveyed by the infinitive: first, the simple future inf. as δοκεῖν πεσιόμαι, which conveys directly the simple and absolute notion of futurity, without modification or qualification; second, the infin., aorist or present, with ἄν, πιστεῖν ἄν, πεσιόν ἄν, which indicates a merely conditional futurity, might or would fail, under certain circumstances or conditions; and thirdly, the present or aorist infinitive without ἄν, πιστεῖν, or πεσιόν, which, corresponding to the indefinite (in point of time) present and aorist, πιστεῖ and ἄνεσε, denote simply the possibility or likelihood of the object falling at some uncertain future time; caducum esse. The distinction between the present and aorist infinitive is this: Præsentis autem et aoristis infinitivis, sive accedat ἄν sive non, ita utuntur, ut aoristus rei transcurenti, praesens duranti adhibeatur.

Without disputing the truth of this, it is yet possible to explain the difference otherwise. Permanence (‘duranti’) does not seem to me to be in any way connected with the conception of present time, though the perfect often is; as when we say ‘this has been’ up to the present time, we often imply our belief in its continuance; and I should rather explain the present infinitive in these cases as expressing the mere fact of the existence of the thing named, or the abstract notion of it. The present tense, as it is called, I act, I do, to act, to do, is in reality independent of time: the time present is, I am acting, I am doing; and the present infinitive, ‘to do’ is the naked conception of ‘doing’ without any connotation of time (so the present infinitive with the definite article stands for a substantivum; τὸ ἔργον is the mere notion of being). The aorist infinitive again may derive its notion of futurity and likelihood, either, as Hermann thinks, from the indefiniteness expressed by the tense, or, in other cases, from the connotation of habit, implying liability, which is also one of its acquired senses. The broad distinction will be, δοκεῖν, ‘I think it will fall’, at some future time, and nothing more: δοκεῖ πιστεῖν ἢ πεσιέται ἄν, ‘I think it could, would, or might fall’, under certain conditions; δοκεῖ πιστεῖν, ‘I think the notion of falling belongs to it’, ‘I think it may fall’; that is, that it is liable, or likely, to fall, caducum esse: and δοκεῖ πεσιόν, implying also the liability or likelihood of the preceding, is distinguished from it (according to Hermann) by
representing the act or event as transient and not permanent. But such a distinction as this last, though it be intelligible, is at least untranslatable; as in such a case as νοθῆ δρᾶω (Soph. Phil. 918), 'what dost thou intend to do', where the expression of the liability must needs be omitted, and still more the transient nature of the proposed act. But we can hardly suppose that any distinction can be seriously intended when Sophocles writes νοθῆ δρᾶω: and then, three lines afterwards, v. 921, θέω νοθῆ. The choice between the two seems to be dictated rather by convenience than by any other motive.

With regard to the distinction of the present and sorist infin., it may be observed, that we are often obliged, as the practice of translation shows, to disregard whatever difference there may be conceived to be between them, as either inappreciable or at all events inexpressible, and to render them by the same English words. Take, for example, the ordinary phrase δεὶ λαβεῖν (it occurs, for instance, II 8, 12). It is quite certain that in this case past time is not directly signified; though it may possibly be included as an accessory in the notion of it in the way of an addition to the abstract conception of 'taking up, acquiring'—as representing the previous formation of the opinion, which has been taken up before. But at all events no one would think of translating δεὶ λαβεῖν in any other form than that of the simple verb 'to assume or suppose'.

διερχεσθαι διέρχεσθαι is here used, as is customary with other writers, as a personal verb; Aristotle generally employs it as an impersonal. Comp. note on c. 2, 14.

καὶ οὖν δεῖδοσον 'or indeed of those with whom war may be expected'. Supply for the sense, καὶ (δεὶ εἶδεν τὴν δύναμιν τούτων) πρὸς οὖν δεῖδοσον (ἡμῶν οὐ χρήσαται) πολεμεῖν. δεῖδοσον, 'subject to, liable to expectation', ἐν ἡμεῖς, note on I 1, 7, ἐν τοῖς κρίσισι. Similarly ἐπὶδοσος, subject to a διήκον, ἐπηχάμουν infr. I 14, 7, II 23, 21, ἐπιτίθεμος liable to blame, ἐπιτίθεμος, ἐπιτίθεμος, ἐπιτίθεμος (Demosth.), ἐπιτίθεμος, ἐπιτίθεμος (liable to trip) Pol. II 5, ἐπιτίθεμος, ἐπιτίθεμος, ἐπιτίθεμος. This notion is more directly expressed by ὑπὸ in composition, ὑπεδόθει, ὑπεπιθέμος, &c.

eἰρηνεύειν] eἰρηνεύειν, though used as a neuter in Plat. Theaet. 180 B, and in other authors, is properly transitive, 'to bring into a state of peace, pacificate, or reconcile' contending parties, and hence employed here as a passive.

ἐν' αὐτῶι] Note on I 1, 7 p. 10; and on I 1, 12 p. 22, δε' αὐτῶι: I 7, 35, τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπὶ, and note there.

καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις] (τῶν ὁμόρων ἀναγκαίων εἰδεναι) ποιτερον ὄμοιοι ἡ ἀνί-
καὶ ταύτη πλευνετείς ἡ ἠλαττοῦσθαι. ἀναγκαίον δὲ
cαὶ πρὸς ταύτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκεῖους πολέμους
tεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαλ-
nουσίν ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰ ὁμοία γίνεσθαι
τὸ πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθά-
nειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι
τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλα-
κτηρίων (τούτο δὲ ἀδύνατον μὴ ἐμπειροῦν ὅταν τῆς
χώρας), ἵν' ἐν' ἐλάττων ἡ φυλακὴ προστεθῇ καὶ εἰ
τις περίεργος αὐταίρεθη καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας τόπους

μοιαὶ (ὅλος τῶν οἰκείων). Αὐτὸ ταῦτα is well illustrated by Archidamus' com-
parative estimate of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces preparatory to
engaging in the war, Thuc. I 80, 3.

πλευνετείς ἡ ἠλαττοῦσθαι: properly contrasted, πλεύω ἡ Πλάτων ἡκὼς,
'to have too much or too little', 'more or less than your due'. So in
Thucyd. 1 77, ἠλαττοῦσθαι and πλευνετείς (the irregular passive of
πλευνετείς) represent the same notion, 'to come by the worse, or to be
overreached'. And so here, 'for in this point also we may be at an
advantage or disadvantage'.

ὅτι γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων κ.τ.λ.] 'for similar circumstances are naturally fol-
lowed by, or naturally give rise to, similar results'.

§ 10. ἐν' ἐν' ἐλάττων (ἐντὶ ἡ φυλακῆς), ἡ φυλακῆς προστεθῇ, or perhaps
rather, ἐν' ἐλάττων (ἐντὶ ἡ φυλακῆς), (ἐντὶ) προστεθῇ.

περίεργος is properly said of one 'who troubles himself over much',
(περικλαίμαι), either about his own affairs, or those of others; (these two sig-
nifications will be found illustrated in the Lexicons). Hence it acquires
the general sense of 'superficial', as here. Comp. Plat. Polit. 386 C, περί-
εργα λέγειν, and Apol. 19 B, Σωκράτης...περιεργάζεται ἤτοι τὰ
tὸν ἄλλο γεῖς καὶ τὰ ἑπεράνα (of an idle curiosity). Dem.? Phil. 9 150, 24, ἦμ
δὲ ἐργαζόμενος καὶ περιεργάζομεν τοῖς ἐνδυνάμοις ὅπως κυνικόνιν. Hb. 143, 17, περί-
εργοὺς καὶ μάταιοι ἀνθελλαμα, and elsewhere in Dem. and the other orators.
Arist. Ecles. 320, εἰ μὴ τι κακὸν ἄλλο περιεργάζετο. See also in Ind. ad

καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους τυρασω μᾶλλον] Translate the whole passage,
'in order that whether the defence (defensive preparation) be too little,
addition be made to it, or if superficial, it be retrenched, and their atten-
tion be rather directed to the watching or guarding (fortification) of
favourable positions'. ἐπιτηδείους τόπους are places favourable, defensible,
suitable to the purpose for which they were intended, viz. for protecting
the country. Thuc. II 20, ὁ χώρος ἐπιτηδεύουσα ἐφαίνετο ἐγκαταστάσεις:
Herod. IX 2, χώρος ἐπιτηδεύουσα ἐγκαταστάσεις: VI 102, ἐπιτηδεύουσαν
χώρου ἐνσπευσάμεαι, always apparently of a 'favourable' position, and this
seems to be here the natural, as it is the usual, sense of ἐπιτηδεύομαι and of
the passage in general. And so Victorius, ἐτ' ὑπερβλιτισ παραμ opportunis

5—2
11 τηρῶσι μάλλον. ἦτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση διαπάνη ἰκανή τῇ πόλει καὶ ποία ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ εἰσαγωγόμιος, καὶ τίνων τ' ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνδηκηκαί καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωσται: πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφοράττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεκκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρὸς τὸν κριτὲριον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους. εἰς δ' ἀσφάλειαν ἀπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαίον δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν, οὐκ ἕλαμψτον δὲ περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίνειν.

loçis magis idoneos tueantur.' (There is another possible—but I think not probable—interpretation of ἐνεργεῖον τούτου, viz. loca commoda or opportuna, suitable or convenient to the enemy, easy of access, readily assailable: τρεῖν, as before, being to guard or defend.)

§ 11. πρὸς τούτοις ἢ ἐπὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔτοι: those that are capable of providing them with that they want.

συνδηκαὶ καὶ συμβολαὶ] On συμβολαὶ and συνελάγματα see above, note on 11, 10 p. 16.

συνδήκης is a general term for a treaty, compact, contract, convention, usually of a public nature, between two states, but also all private contracts, covenants, and bargains; see Rhet. I 15, 20—23, περὶ συνδηκῶν. συμβολαὶ—here called συμβολαὶ, apparently a ἐναξ λεγόμενον in this sense; in Pol. III 9, 1280 a 38, συνδηκης and συμβολαὶ are contrasted—are technically confined by the grammarians to a particular and special kind of contract, international commercial treaties. Meier u. Schömann, Att. Process, p. 494, note 49. In the passage referred to, συμβολαὶ first occurs apparently in its proper sense, πάντες οἱ ἄνετοι συμβολαὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους: and then, as distinguished from συνδηκης, which here stand for commercial treaties in general, συνδηκης περὶ τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων, seems to be applied to those special and subordinate articles of commercial contracts which made provisions against the infliction of mutual damage and wrong, or established a system of compensation which protected the contracting parties against mutual injury, συμβολαὶ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδέσποτος. In the usual sense, Pol. III 1, 1275 a 9, τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀνὰ συμβολαῖς κοινωνοῦσι, 'even the members of different states who are connected by international commercial treaties have reciprocal legal rights, so that it cannot be this which constitutes a citizen'. In Thuc. I 77, the ἐνεργεῖα πρὸς τοὺς ἐνεργεῖαν δίκαιον denote the actions at law which arise out of these ἐνεργεῖα. Dem. c. Mid. 570, τὰ συμβολαὶ συγχέων. See Buttm.'s Ind., s. v.

πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφοράττειν κ.τ.λ.] 'for there are two classes of persons between whom and the citizens it is necessary that irreproachable conduct or behaviour, or a thoroughly good understanding, should be steadily, persistently (hāi, thoroughly, throughout), maintained.'

§ 12. περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαίνει] 'to understand the subject of legislation'.

In this section occur several points in common between the Rhetoric
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 4 § 12.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὡστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα τ' ἐστὶ πολιτειῶν εἰδή, καὶ τοῖα συμφέρει ἐκάστῃ, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε καὶ οἰκεῖων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐναντίων. λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὥστε ἐξ ἡς ἐποίησις πολιτείας αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνίμηναι καὶ ἐπιτει-

and Politics, which, though they may not be direct references from one to the other, yet serve to illustrate the relation between them. They are noticed by Brandis, in Schneidewin's Philologus, u. s. p. 33. I will compare them in the order in which they stand.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως} On legislation comp. I 1, 7.

That the laws ought to be supreme in a state, and not any one or several, or the entire body of citizens, is argued and concluded in Polit. III 15, 1286 a 7 seq. and again c. 16, 1287 a 18, τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἀρχειν αἰτεθότερον μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν πολιτιῶν ἢν τινὰ κ.τ.λ. The different forms of constitutions, and what is salutary and conservative or destructive of each of them, are treated, for instance, in Pol. III 6, and VIII (v) 1 et seq. And not only is the substance of the next sentence, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι κ.τ.λ., found in the discussions of the Politics VIII (v) 1, but the very same metaphor, from the tightening and relaxation of the strings of the lyre, is employed there, 1301 b 17, as here; and in c. 9, 1309 b 18, the same illustration, derived from the flat and aquiline nose, is used to represent the excessive exaggeration and intensification, or depression and relaxation of the constitution, as of the feature, which altogether effaces its true character.

ἀνίμηναι καὶ ἐπιτεινόμεναι] This metaphor from the screwing up or relaxation of the strings of the lyre, producing a difference of musical pitch or tone, which it raises or lowers, is a very favourite one both with Plato and Aristotle, and is used to represent, as I have already said, exaggeration or intensification on the one hand, (exactly as we speak of 'screwing up our courage' Macbeth I 7, 60), and depression or relaxation on the other. If for example the nose is lowered or depressed to excess in the way of flatness as a snub-nose, or exaggerated in the other direction to excessive sharpness and prominence as an aquiline nose, it ends by losing the character of a nose altogether, and is either altogether effaced or becomes a beak: and so with the constitutions of states.

τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι therefore means that forms of government are destroyed or change their character by the exaggeration or relaxation of their own proper and peculiar institutions, and it is in the 'mean' state alone between these two excesses that the constitution can be said to maintain its true character. For instance the ὅσος, definition or principle, of a democracy is equality; if this be intensified or exaggerated, or carried to excess, if the thing be logically carried out, and everybody actually becomes equal, the government degenerates into mob-rule or anarchy and thus loses its true democratic character; if it be relaxed and the equality diminished, the democratic principle and its institutions become
nómenai fθείρονται, οἴον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὡστε τέλος ἡξει εἰς ἀλγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτευμομένη σφόδρα, ἃστερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνεμένα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρυπτὰ γνώμων ἡ σιμνα ὀὕτω διατίθεται ὡστε μηδὲ μυκτήρα δοκεῖ εἶναι. χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μη μόνον ἐπαίειν 13 εἰς τις πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθῶν θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εἰδέναι, αἰ

so enfeebled, that the inequalities increase until at last it becomes an oligarchy, ἀνεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὡστε τέλος ἡξει εἰς ἀλγαρχίαν.

Plat. Lys. 209 B, Rep. IV 441 E, ὡς μὲν ἐπιτευμομένα καὶ τρέφοντα...τὸ δὲ ἀνέμον παραμεθομένη, VI 498 B, ἐπιτευμένα τὸ ἕλειπε γυμνάσαι, III 412 A, ἐπιτευμομένα καὶ ἀνεμένα, ib. 410 D, μάλλον ἂν ἐπιτευμόνες τὸν διόνοσον σελεῖρος τοῦ καὶ χαλεπὸν γένους ἃς...μάλλον ἀνέμον πρὸς μελακότοις κ.τ.λ.

Phaed. 98 C, οὔτε ἐπιτευμένα καὶ ἀνεμένα, 86 C, 94 C and elsewhere.

This was transmitted by the master to his disciple. In Aristotle it occurs, Pol. VIII (V) 1, 1301 b 16, ἡ οὖν ἐπιτευμόνες ἡ ἀνεμένα. ib. c. 8, 1308 b 2, τὸ τιμήματα ἐπιτευμένα ἡ ἀνεμένα, ἐὰν μὲν ὑποβάλλῃ ἐπιτευμόνως...ἀλλὰ ἀλλείπον ἁπάντας, ib. c. 9, 1309 b 18, ὡς ἐπιτευμόνως...ἀλλὰ ἀλλείπον ἁπάντας, ἐὰν μὲν ὑποβάλλῃ ἐπιτευμόνως...ἀλλὰ ἀλλείπον ἁπάντας, Eth. Nic. VI 1, 1138 b 23, ἐὰν τε σιγάτας πρὸς δὲ ἀποστειλάτως τὸ τῶν λόγων ἔχων ἑπιτευμόνας καὶ ἀνεμένας.

In Pol. VIII (V) 7, 1341 b ult., he says of music as a 'relaxation' πρὸς διαγωγήν, that it is πρὸς ἀνέμον τοῦ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς συντονίας (overstraining or exertion) ἀνεμένουs. Comp. Pol. VI (IV) 3, ult. ἀρμονίας συντονίασις καὶ ἀνεμένουs; whence ἐντονος (intense), σύντονος, ἀνεμένουs, ἀνεμένουs, are applied, the two first to braced nerves, vigorous exertion or character; the latter to relaxation or dissoluteness of life and manners, or to slackness, laxity, and effeminacy. In Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 a 30, it is said that children's sports should be neither ἐντονον nor ἀνεμένον and c. 4, 1326 a 25, that no well-constituted state should be ἀνεμένον, uncontrolled, slack, loose, relaxed, i.e. allowed to run to excess, in its numbers. Eth. Nic. II 4 sub. init. ἀρμονίας σφόδρας ἢ ἀνεμένουs, ib. III 7, 1114 b 5, ἀνεμένουs ζῆν, open, easy, careless, dissolve life. Comp. Thuc. I 6, II 39 ἀνεμένου τῇ διαίη, ἀνεμένον διαστήματοι. The corresponding Latin terms are intendere and remittere. Cic. Orat. § 59, Quint. X 3, 24, doubtless borrowed from the Greek.

οὕτω διαίητος ἢ ἐτειχισμένης κ.τ.λ.] 'it assumes such a condition or shape that it seems to be no nose at all'.

§ 13. ἐκ τῶν πρακτικῶν θεωροῦντι] 'by studying out of', i.e. 'drawing conclusions or deriving observations from the study of the past'.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle had already probably, when this was written, supplied the deliberative orators of his time with the means of acquainting themselves with this branch of political study, by his work called Πολιτεία, a collection of the constitutions
ποίαι τοῖς ποίοις ἀρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δὴ λαβεῖν ἑστὶ τοὺς τῶν ἑθῶν νόμους, πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς ἢ τῶν περὶ τὰς of 158 states existing at that period, and serving apparently as an appendix to the extant Politics. It is included in the lists both of Diogenes, v 27, and of the Anonymus in Bulle, Arist. Vol. I p. 65. Diogenes' title, which is more descriptive than the other, runs thus: Πολιτικὰ πάθην διὸν ἀφανῆς ἡμικόλα καὶ ἔκαστον, καὶ ἔτι δημοκρατικά, διαγραφικά, ἀριστοκρατικά, καὶ τυφοκριτικά. The extant fragments of this work are collected in Rose's Arist. Pseudepigraphus, Pt. 2, p. 391—537 (this collection is much more complete than that of Neumann, which is printed in the Oxf. ed. of Bekker's text, Vol. X p. 234, as an appendix to the Politics). The latest results of the researches on this subject are given by Heitz, Verlor. Schrift. Arist. p. 230, seq.

οἱ τῶν περί ἐκ Περιάθλοι ‘Travels round the world’, ‘survey of the earth’. These were books of Geography physical and descriptive, containing not only an account of the relative position of cities and countries, but also observations upon the manners and customs of the inhabitants. Hence they are recommended to the study of the Politicians. These were founded either upon personal observation, or upon the reports of travellers; whence the name periobios. Αρ. Meteor. I 13, 13, δὴ λαβεῖν τούτων δειομένους τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους τοῦτα τὰ μὲν τὸν ποιοτικοῦ πολλοὺς ὄντως ἀκρίβεσας, δῶσαι μὴ συμβρέθηται αὐτότπτας γνώσειν τοὺς λόγους (quoted by Victorinus). For a similar reason books of the same kind were called περιόδους, ‘circuitnavigations or nautical surveys’, as those of Scylax, Hanno, Κ. ο. περιογράφουσε. (Διονυσίαν ὁ περιγραφής. Διορίχρος ὁ περιγραφής, Athen. XII 591 E. Πολέμως ὁ περιγραφή, ib. IX 372 A, XXI 552 H.). One of the earliest and best known of them was that of Hecataeus, referred to by Herodotus, IV 36 γελῶ δὲ ὄριοι τὴς περιόδου γράφονται πάλιν δὲ...οἱ 'Αλεξανδρείαν ἄταντα γράφονταί περὶ τῆς γῆς ἄθροισιν κυκλοφορία γιὰ ὁ ἡ τούτων τῆς Μιλεσίου περιοδοῦς ἰσότ. In v 49 the term is applied to Aristagoras of Miletus famous θαρ., (by Strabo assigned to Anaximander), δυνατὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ ἄνωθεν περιόδους ἐνετειρμητα, καὶ διαλέγεται τὰ πάντα, καὶ θεαματικὰ πάντα. From the hints in Herod. IV. 36, Ar. Meteor. II 5, διὰ καὶ γελῶς γράφονται τῶν τῶν περιόδους τῆς γῆς' κ.λ. (where the author proceeds to say, following Herodotus, that the circular shape of the earth assigned to it by these writers is impossible), and from Pol. II 3, 1262 a 12, sub fin., the general nature of the contents of these works may be gathered. Eudoxus, the mathematician and astronomer, of Clidius, was the author of one of these works, referred to by Athen. VII 288 C, ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ γῇ περιοδου (Victorinus), also Ctesias, Dionysius, Diodorus, Elle. An account of Hecataeus' periōδουs is given by Mure, Hist. Gr. Lit. IV 144, Bk. iv ch. 3 § 3.

αἱ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεων γράφοντων ἱστορίαι] See note on ἱστορία, § 7. The addition 'about men's actions' is still required to define the kind of 'inquiries' in which 'history' engages: ἱστορία has not yet become technical, indicating a special department of study.}
CHAPTER V.

The analysis of Happiness.

The object of the public or deliberative speaker lies in the future, and is always something attainable; no one deliberates about that which is altogether out of his power. Now happiness or some form or part of it is the universal aim; the complete analysis of happiness, therefore, will include every object of προτοσωφη and ἀποτοσωφη which he can suggest to his audience, and every kind of political expediency.


ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν] 'to speak summarily', to sum up in one notion, to describe all human ends and aims by the single phrase 'happiness and its parts'.

ἐκείνω] 'to be informed or furnished'. 'The information' which he must 'have' is left to be supplied. Understand τὰς προτοσωφῆς, which generally stands in Aristotle for the 'materials' of Rhetoric which the speaker must have at his command.

λέγωμεν πάλιν] 'let us go back, begin again, take a fresh start as it were, and proceed to state...'. Compare the end of the first chapter. This form of expression and use of πάλιν are very familiar to Aristotle in commencing a new subject. See, for example, de Anima 11 1 init., c. 2 init.
2 εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῆς. ὡστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τι ἕστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης· περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτῃ αἱ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποτροπαὶ τάσαι εἰσὶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἢ τῶν μορίων τι, ὡς μεῖξον ἀντὶ ἑλάττων ποιοῦντα, δεὶ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθειρόντα ἢ ἐμποδίζοντα ἢ τὰ ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν. ἕστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία

§ 2. ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν] speaking broadly and generally, without descending to particulars. Opposed to καθ’ ἑαυτόν. See note on 1 2, 4, P. 30.

§ 3. ἕστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία] Brandis, u. s. p. 48, note 42, [after Spengel] remarks upon this use of ἕστω as marking the popular character of the definitions that follow—as if it were a matter of indifference whether they are right or not, provided that they are so generally acceptable as to be certain to satisfy the audience. The same form is repeated c. 6, 2; 7, 2; 10, 3; II 2, 1, and throughout the chapters on the πάθη. On the definition of Rhetoric, see Intro. p. 13; and on this definition of happiness, p. 176.

Aristotle’s own definition of happiness in the Eth. Nic., the result of his inquiries in that work, is something far different, ἐνεργείας ὑπῆρξεν ὑπ’ ἑννέκτημα, the fully developed activity or active exercise (implying full consciousness) of the soul in respect of its proper (and therefore highest) excellence: that is contemplation, ἐνεργεία, the exercise of the highest faculty, the nous, or intuitive reason; the highest faculties being the intellectual. This is the theory; but practically a lower view of happiness is admitted (Bk. Χ), which consists in the exercise of the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. Of the definitions here given, αὐτάρκεια ὑπῆς comes nearest to his own: it expresses a self-sufficing life, complete in itself, independent of all external aids and advantages, and is in fact essential to the notion of happiness. See Eth. Nic. 1 5 (quoted below).

The essentials of the three first of these definitions are found all united in the conception of happiness, the ultimate end of all human desire and effort, which forms the conclusion of the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, from the sixth chapter to the end. It contains first, the ἐνεργεία μὲν ὑπ’ ἑννέκτημα, in the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue, the intellectual being the higher and more perfect form of it, and in that the intuitive contemplative energy; secondly, the αὐτάρκεια τῆς ζωῆς, the self-sufficiency and independence of everything external, which is necessary to perfection and happiness; and thirdly, the life μὲν ἀσφαλείας, the happiness residing in ἐνεργεία being most secure because it is most independent and the nearest approach to the happiness of the Gods, who have all their wants and faculties satisfied in themselves, and want nothing more without (C. 7); and also ἦδυστος, because pleasure is the necessary accompaniment of
RHETORIKHΣ Α 5 § 3.

eὐπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς, ἡ αὐτάρκεια ξωῆς, ὁ ὁμοιος ὁ μετ’ ἀσφαλείας ἀδιστος, ἡ εὐδοκια κτημάτων καὶ every ένεργεια (active exercise, realisation in exercise, of any δύναμιν or capacity), and θεωρία being the most perfect form of ένεργεια, the pleasure that accompanies it must needs be the highest and most complete; and the exercise of the moral faculties in proportion to their comparative excellence. καὶ τῆς ἀνδρίας δὲ ἡ κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ποιησιῶν, ἀκρό τοῦτο μᾶλλον διάφορος, αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ένεργεια διστασιον. Eth. N. X 7 ult. (In the popular and lower sense of the words this definition of happiness would belong to the Ἐπίκουρειον school.) The fourth definition, εὐδοκία κτημάτων καὶ συμμάτων μετά δυνάμεως φυλασσεῖ τε καὶ πρακτική τούτων: is only applicable to a state. The Stoic definition of happiness was εὐδοκία ζωῆς. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. Γ § 172, πρὸς Πλούσιος § 30.

εὐπραξία μετ’ ἀρετῆς] Comp. Pol. IV (vii) 1, 1323 δ 20, ὅτι μὲν ἄλλης τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἰσέλλεται τουτούτου διὸ καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήματος καὶ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ κατά τούτα, ἵνα συνυπολογιζόμενοι Ἰμών, μέρη τῆς θεοῦ χρημάτων, ὡς εὐδαιμόνες μὲ ἕττο καὶ μακάριος, δέ οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν ἰδεώτερων ἀνάμιν ἄλλα δὲ αὐτῶν αὐτές καὶ τοῦ πολεμίου τις εἴης τῶν φύσεων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τῆς εὐτυχίας τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταύτα ἀναγεννηθον ἔτερον εἶναι κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 3, 1326 δ 12, ἀλλ’ εἰ τούτο λέγεται καλά καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εὐπράξιας διδότων καὶ κατὰ τάσεις πάθεων δὲ εἰς καὶ καθ’ εὐπράξεως λόγων δι’ ἄρετως.

By comparing this latter passage with the definition, it would seem that the sense of εὐπραξία in the latter must be limited to ‘well doing,’ and not extended to ‘well being,’ which it, like εὐδοκία, is capable of including. Pol. IV (vii) 1, καὶ πολὺ εὐδαιμονία τῆς ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ πράκτων πολλῶν ἀξίωσιν δὲ καλά πράττων τῆς μὴ τὰ καλά πράττοντα. Ib. c. 3 sub init. ἀξίωσιν γὰρ τὸν μονοῦ πράττοντα πράττειν εὖ, τὸν δὲ εὐπράξια καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας εἶναι ταύτα. Ib. c. 8, εὐδαιμονία...ἀρετῆς ἐνεργεία καὶ χρήσις τῆς τέλεως. C. 13, 1332 α 7.

αὐτάρκεια [εἰς] Eth. Nic. I 5, 1097 b 7, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτάρκειαν τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν (the notion of αὐτάρκεια leads to the same result, or conception of happiness as that of τέλεως, previously applied to determine it), τὸ γὰρ τέλεους ἀγαθὸν αὐτάρκεια εἶναι δοκεῖ...τὸ δὲ αὐτάρκεια νόμον ὧν μονοσομένοις ἀρετῶν ποιεῖ τοῦ βίου καὶ μοιράζοντος ἔννοιαν τούτον δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας οἰκεῖον εἶναι. Comp. X 6, 1176 δ 3, εὐδοκίας γὰρ ἐνεργείας ἢ εὐδαιμονίας ΔΛ αὐτάρκειας, C. 7, 1177 a 28, ἢ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια (which is essential to happiness, for τὴν θεωρήσεως μάλιστ' ἀν εἶτ' (and therefore the highest and most perfect happiness must consist in θεωρία). A similar αὐτάρκεια or independence is attributed to the perfect state in the Politics. On the notion of the perfect state or constitution in the second degree, that is, under the necessary limitations incident to a human condition, so far as humanity allows of perfection at all, see Pol. VI (iv) 11 init. In Pol. IV (vii) 5 init. αὐτάρκεια is thus defined, τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχον καὶ δεύτερον μηδενὸς αὐτάρκεις.

εὐδοκία] and εὐδοκίες are Ionic and also late Greek forms belonging to the κοινή διάλεκτος, for the Attic εὐδοκείν and εὐδοκείν εὐδοκείν, and denote a ‘flourishing state,’ or ‘prosperity’ in general. 'εὐδοκείν enim non tam robur (quod verbo εὐδοκείν subiecium est) quam vigorem et vitalitatem declarat, ut v. c. Athalei antiqui aut Hercules εὐδοκείν dicatur, sed vel
σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τοιῶν. σχεδὸν γὰρ τοιῶν ἐν ᾧ πλείω τῆς
4 ευδαιμονίας ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι ἁπάντες. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν
ἡ ευδαιμονία τοιῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγέ-
νειαν πολυφιλίαν χρηστοφιλίαν πλοῦτον εὐτεκνίαν
πολυτεκνίαν εὐγηρίαν, ἐτὶ τὰς τοῦ σῶματος ἁρετὰς,
οἶν ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχύν μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἁγιαστι-
tenerrima planta, quam laeto inuentae flore nitet, εἴθεν 
καὶ dicis possit. Et maximi quidem proprius de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque
uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de prospera rerum publicarum
privatarumque successu, deque omni ubertate et affluentia dictur. (From
an excellent note by Lobeck on these words, ad Phryn. &c. p. 465—7:
Lobeck derives εἰθενία from εἴθε and ἑθεῖ (σεθεῖ), comparing it with other
verbs of similar formation. The MSS of Arist. give sometimes εἰθενία
and εἰθενίῳ, but generally εἰθενία and εἰθενίῳ. Lobeck's note may
be applied as a corrective of Victorius' ad h. l.)
κυριαρχεῖν καὶ σωμάτων 'property' of all kinds, goods and chattels,
including especially flocks and herds; and 'population', here estimated by
'bodies', not by 'souls' as Christianity has taught us to reckon it.

§ 4. εὐνεκεία (εὐεκεία, εὔεκεία, εὔεκεία, εὔεκεία, Aeschylus and
Euripides), and εὐγηρία, εὔεκεία, and εὔερος, 'blessing in children, and
in old age'; are applied by Aristotle to animals, as well as to the human
race, in his works on Natural History: e.g. to birds, in the sense of
'prolific'; Hist. An. ix 11, 1; 12, 3; 17, 1; ix 12, 3; εὔγηροι ἄριζαν.
pολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, both defined by Aristotle himself in § 16,
'number of friends, worthiness of friends'. The latter is defined by Liddell
and Scott, 'the love of good men or good deeds', [a slip corrected, how-
ever, in a subsequent edition. s.]

τὰς τοῦ σῶματος ἁρετὰς] The ἀρετή or 'excellence' of anything is
determined by its ἀργαῦ or special function or business; that which it was
made to do. On this notion of ἀργαῦ, see the ref. given in note on c. 2,
§ 12. ἀρετή therefore is so far from being confined to moral virtue,
thought it is applied to this εἰσὶ ἤχοιη, that it may be extended to every-
thing which has any use or object, animate or inanimate; but in the
highest and most appropriate sense is attributed to human faculties
bodily, mental, and moral.

μέγεθος] So Homer and Hesiod reckon size as well as strength and
beauty amongst personal advantages. Od. § 376, τίς δ' ἄμερος
κολάζ τε μέγας τε γύμνος; Ἡ. § 248, περίσσει γυναικῶν εἰδος τε μέγα-
θες τε. § 252, οὐδὲ τί τοῖς δούλοις ἐπιρήσας εἰσορᾶσθαι εἴδος καὶ μέγα-
θες. § 218. § 373. Χ. B 58, &c. Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 3, and Plato, Alc. 1
p. 123 κ, in an enumeration of the personal qualities and other advantages
that a young man might be proud of, εἶ δ' οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι κάλλος τε καὶ
μέγεθος καὶ γένος καὶ πλούτου καὶ φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς. Charmid. 154 C, οὐκα-
στότε ἐφάνη τιν τέ μέγεθος καὶ τό κάλλος. So Ovid's Romulus, after his deifi-
cation, pulce et humano maior. Arist. Eth. Nic. iv 7, 1323 b 7, εἶ μέγεθος
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 5 § 4.

κὴν, δὸξαν τιμὴν εὐνυχίαν ἀρετὴν,1 οὔτω γὰρ ἂν αὐταρκεστάτος εἰν, εἰ ύπάρχων αὐτῷ τὰ τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. ἔστι δ’ ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμῆ. ἔτι δὲ προσήκεις οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τούχην·

1 ἢ καὶ τὰ μήρα αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδριάν δικαιούσῃ σωφροσύνη.


δόξα ἢ 'reputation', estimation in men's thoughts or opinion. ('Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, that last infirmity of noble minds, to scorn delights, &c.' Lyceidas).—τιμή honours, substantial and externally manifested, which are conferred upon a man, offices, titles, prerogatives, civil privileges, and such like. See further in § 9. On the value of τιμή in general, Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, μέγιστον δὲ τούτο ἐν θεῶν ἡ τοιε ἀπεσίμην, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφείσεται οἷ ἐν ἔασιμαι, καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοιε καλλίστοις ἀθλον. τοιούτῳ δ’ ἡ τιμή. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἑκτὸς ἀρχὸν, 1124 a 17.

εὐνυχίας distinguished from εὐδαιμονία, Pol. IV (vii) 1, 1323 b 20 seq., quoted above in note on § 3.

ἡ καὶ τὰ μήρα αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδριάν δικαιούσῃ σωφροσύνην] These words are omitted by MS A′, put in brackets as doubtful by Bekker [410 ed. 1831], and rejected by Spengel.

αὐταρκεστάτος] referring to the second definition, § 3. See note on § 3, p. 73. τὰ τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ] When Aristotle adds ‘besides these there are no others’, he includes, as he tells us in the following sentence, the goods of body and mind under the first head, τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. His usual division of goods, called the Peripatetic division, is into three kinds; goods of ‘mind, body, and estate’. This division, however, was not his own invention; as he tells us in Eth. Nic. I 8, 1098 b 17, τοῦτον τὴν δόξαν (the opinion in question) πολλοί οὖν καὶ διαλογομυσίαν ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν. Cic. Tusc. V 30, tr. genera honorum, maxima animi, secunda corporis, externa terti, ut Peripateticis, nec multum veteres Academici secus. Eth. Nic. I 8, 1098 b 17, τοῦτον τὴν δόξαν (the opinion in question) πολλοί οὖν καὶ διαλογομυσίαν ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν. Pol. IV (vii) 1 sub init. τοῖς σκοτῶν μερίσθ销售 τὸν τὰ ἐκτὸς καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ 
ψυχῆς· πάντα τοῦτο ὑπάρχει τοῖς μακροις δὲ. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 8, 2, Cic. de Fin. III 13, 43, et alibi. Schrader ad b. l. This division cannot be at all events confined to the Peripatetics or derived from them alone, for it appears in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2 Oxf.) 8, διαφάνεια δὲ τούτου (τὸ συμφέρον) τοῖς μὴ διδασκαλεῖ εἰς σῶμα καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ ἐνεργεῖα: unless indeed this be taken as an argument of the later authorship of the Rhet. ad Alexandrum.

δυνάμεις] either 'power' of various kinds, 'opes ac civilem potentiam'.
οὐτω γὰρ ἂν ἀσφαλεστατος ὁ βίος εἶην. λάβωμεν τοῖνυν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων ἑκαστον τί ἔστιν.

5 εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνη μὲν καὶ πόλει τοὶ αὐτοχθόνες ἢ ἀρχαῖοι εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρῶτους ἐπιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέναι ἐς αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑλπισμένοις. ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπό γυναικῶν, καὶ γυνιστότης ἀπ’ ἀμ-

Muretus, Victorius, ‘potentiam’, Vet. Transl.; or faculties and capacities, bodily and mental, ‘facultates’, Riccob. The next seems to agree better with εὐγένεια.

ἀσφαλεστατος [referring to the third definition of § 3.

§ 5. εὐγένεια] in an individual or family is defined in Pol. vi (iv) 8, 1294 a 21, ἢ γὰρ εὐγενεία ἔστιν ἀρχαῖον πλούσιον καὶ ἀρετῆς, and viii (v) 1, 1301 b 6, εὐγένεια εἰναι δικαίους ὁμοίους ἂν ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετῆς καὶ πλουσίους. Rhet. ii 15, 2, 3. Plat. Theaet. 174 E, τὸ δὲ δὴ γνώσις ἑλπισμένος, ἐς γεγονότις ἐς ἀπὸ πάντων πλούσιους ἐγιστὸν ὑπάρχει, which seems to have been the current definition of εὐγένεια at Athens in Plato's time.


καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοῖς πρῶτοι ἐπιφανεῖς ['and to have had for their first rulers famous men'], like Theseus at Athens.

καὶ πολλοὶ ἐπιφανεῖς—τοὶ τοῖς ἑλπισμένοις 'and many men sprung from their race renowned for things', personal qualities, feats of arms, noble deeds, and such-like] that are esteemed and admired'. ἐπί, 'standing, resting upon', 'upon the basis, terms, or condition of'.

ἰδίᾳ δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπό γυναικῶν [privately, in a family, it may be derived either from the father's or the mother's side', i.e. from famous ancestors on either.

γυνιστότης ἀπ’ ἄμφω ἢ ἀρμοφῶ] 'legitimacy on both sides', in birth and citizenship.

γυνιστός, opposed to νόδος, Π. Λ 102, ὡς δέων Πρᾶσσαι νόδον καὶ γυνι-

Plat. Rep. vii 536 A, τοῦ νόδου τε καὶ τοῦ γυνιστοῦ, and also to ποιητῶν, εἰσποιητῶν, δεδομένων, Dem. c. Leoch. 1095, 5, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γυνιστὸν ἐστὶν ὅταν ἢ γόνο γεγονείκαι, καὶ τὸ νόμο τεταρτοὺς ἐμπείρηκα, ἢ ἢ δεμοσιᾶ παρθή ἡ ἐφεξῆ ἡ πάσης ἐκ τούτης εἰς παιδας γυνιστοῦ...ποιητῶς ἢ ὅμοιογοι εἰναι φαίνεται οὐκ εἰσποιηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ τετελεσμένος αὐτοῦ k.p.l. and 1999, 19; and hence metaphorically 'genuine', real, true, as opposed to spurious, fictitious. Plat. Rep. ix 587 B, μᾶς μὲν (ἐδοξείς) γυνιστοῦ, διὸ ὅ ἐν τοῖς.

On the γυνιστός πολίτης, cf. Ar. Pol. iii 5. The conditions of citizenship vary according to the form of constitution, and the number of the population.

In the normal state no ἰδίων αὐτοῦ, no mechatronics or paid agricultural labourers, still less slaves, should be admitted to the rights of citizenship. When the number of the γυνιστοὶ πολίται (legitimate by birth) declines, νόδοι are admitted; in the opposite case a more stringent rule
PHILORISIHE A 5 § 6.

φοίν, καὶ ἀστερ ἐπὶ πόλεως τοὺς τε πρωτοὺς γυνωρί-
μους ἢ ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν ἢ πλοῦτῳ ἢ ἀλλῷ τῷ τῶν τιμω-
μένων, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους καὶ ῥ. 17.
ἀνδρας καὶ γυναικας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους.

6 εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἀδηλα. ἔστι δὲ τῷ ῥ. 1361.
kouiw mēn [eutekniia], neōtēs an ἢ πολλή kai agathē,
agathē de kai ἀρετὴν σώματος, oion mégebhos kálllos
iagwun dwmaim agwmatistikiaν ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη
cαὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταῖ. ἰδια δὲ εὐτεκnia καὶ πολυ-
teknia τὸ τὰ ἱδια τέκνα πολλὰ καὶ τουαίται εἶναι,

prevails; and then, ὁπερεντοῦς θ' ὠξει οἷα καὶ μικρὸν παραφυτεῖ τοῖς ἐκ
δολου πρῶτον ἢ δολης, εἶτα τού ἢ πολλόν γυναικῶν τόλμο
καὶ μέν ἐκ ἀρφον ἀντίων πολιτῶν—as was the case at Athens.

καὶ ὁπερ ἐν πόλεων ' and as in the case of a city (so in the private
family, ἰδια), the distinction of its founders for virtue or wealth, or any-
thing else that is highly valued, and a number of illustrious members of the
race, men and women, young or advanced in years'.

§ 6. τὸ κοινωνία 'the community, the commonwealth'. τοις κοινων τῶν ἱσων, Herod. V. 109, τῶν Χαρίων, VI. 14, τῶν Ἐπαρχιών, VI.
58. τὸ κοινὸν communi recte vertit Muretus, Latini enim Graecos im-
tantes gentem, nationem, rempublicam, civitatem appellant commune.
Cic. in Verr. 11 40, statucae a communi Siciliae, quemadmodum inscriptum
videmus, datae. Item, 1 28, quomodo iste commune Milliamum vexari.

ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταῖ. This is a statement of what
young men ought to be; their character, what they actually are, is
minutely analyzed and described in 11 12, under the second head of ἰδια,
c. 12—17. ἀνδρία appears as one of their characteristics in § 9: σωφρο-
σύνη, self-control, is not characteristic of this age, and is therefore not
mentioned.

εὐτεκνία] The strong feeling of the blessing of children, implied,
though not directly expressed, in εὐτεκνία, especially characteristic of the
Jews, appears also in the Greek writers, as Euripides, who uses εὐτεκνίας
and ὄντες εὐτεκνίας to express the possession and the absence of a family, as
though the possession of them were happiness, and the want of them
misery. See Ion, 699, 772, 775, Androm. 429 (Paley's note), and 713.

κοινωνία] 'such' as above described. On this use of κοινωνία, implying
a notion suggested by a previous expression, see Stallbaum's note on Plat.
Phaed. 80 C, ἐν μὲν τε καὶ καρπίων ἕκαν τὸ σώμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ ἐν τοι-
ντη (i.e. χαρίσεις) ἄρρη. Compare, inter alia, 59 A., 67 A. Thuc. III 58, 
νομίζων ἐν γῇ τα φίλα τιθέμεν καὶ παρʼ ἀνδραὶς κοινωνίας (of the like sort,
i.e. φίλους). Dem. d. F. L. § 103, ἀλλʼ ἄσων αὐτὸς ἀντίων σκεψάμενος, καὶ
χάραν, ἐν τοῖς δέξως ἔξω ἦ, καὶ κοινωνίας ὁργῆ, ἐν τοῖς ἱδια ('of that kind'
sc. ὁργῆς δέξια φαίνεται πεποιηκές, ποιοόθεν.) Arist. Pol. 1 8, 1256 a 36, εἰ δ'
καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρρενα· θηλείων δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, θυγατρὸς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἀνευ ἀνελυθρεῖας, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἱδία καὶ κοινή καὶ κατ' ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναικᾶς δεῖ ζητεῖ αἰσθὴν ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων· ὥσπερ τὰ κατὰ γυναικᾶς φαύλα ὀφέπερ Λακεδαιμονίως, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἴμαν τοὺς οὐκ εὕρηκαν ἀδικομονοῦσιν. πλούτον δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλήθος,

ἀφ' ἄλλως, διότι ἱμάτια καὶ ἐλλαδικά καὶ κοπαμοῦν ἂδοτὰς τοιούτα (of the same kind, suitable for fishing) προσωµοὶ. II 4, 1262 δ ἡ 2, δεὶ δὲ τοιούτοις εἶναι, ἢ ὡς (from the preceding) less friendly, VIII (v) 10, 1310 δ 12, τοιοῦτον γενοῦς, 'a similar family' (similar to what had been just described).

φιλεργία δὲν ἀνελυθρεῖας] 'industry, without (mean, sordid, illiberal) unadultlike habits'.

'ta kathai gynaikes, k.t.l.' 'the character and conduct of the women', Polit. II 9, 1262 b 12, ἦταν δὲ ἣ διπλά τῶν γυναικῶν ἄνωθεν (relaxation, laxity of manners) καὶ πρὸς τὴν προϊσμὴν τῆς πολιτικῆς βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως...ἀδεν' ἐν όσαι πολιτικές φαύλως ἦχε τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναικὰς, τὸ ἵμαν τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεὶ νομίζων ἀνοµισθήνην. δὲν εἰκό (at Sparta) συµβιβάσχη...ἐποίη γὰρ ἀκολούθως πρὸς πάσαν ακολούθων καὶ τροφῆσιν. Όν τὸν κρίσιν τῆς Σπαρτιακοῦ, ὥσον οὐκ ἀκολούθως πρὸς πάσαν ακολούθων καὶ τροφῆσιν. Οὔτε τὸν κρίσιν τῆς Σπαρτιακοῦ, ὥσον οὐκ ἀκολούθως πρὸς πάσαν ακολούθων καὶ τροφῆσιν.

In the condition of the Spartan women, and the difference in the account given of their moral character by Aristotle, here and in the Politics, on the one hand, and by Xenophon and Plutarch on the other, see Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. II. p. 310 seq.

§ 7. πλούτου μέρη νομίσματος πλήθος κ.τ.λ.] In the discussion of wealth, in the more exact and scientific Politics, this is denied of true wealth. Pol. I 9, 1237 b 8, καὶ γὰρ τῶν πλούτων πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλῆθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τῶν εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικήν καὶ τὴν καταγήν. ὡτι (sometimes) δὲ πάλιν λέγεται (mere nonsense, a mere joke or farce) εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισµα καὶ νόμος πατάσσει (an absolute convention, with no reality, no true nature, φύσιν, in it), φύσει δὲ οὐδέν, διὰ μενομισμὸς τῶν χρεώνων οὐδέν ἢ οὔθεν χρήσιμον πρὸς οἴκον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀφετέρως, καὶ νομίσματος πλούτων πολλάκις ἄνωθεν τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς· καίτοι ἄποικον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλούτου ὠν εὐπορίων λιμῷ ἀπολύεται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἅπεξεν...διὰ ζητοῦσιν ἄρα· τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν, ἀρδεύας ζητοῦσι...πλούτος is defined, Pol. I 8, sub fin. ὥσπερ πλῆθος ὄργανον χρηματιστικῆς καὶ πολιτικῆς, 'a stock, or number, of implements or instruments for economical (domestic) and public or political uses'.

This confusion of money and wealth, the foundation of the famous 'Mercantile Theory', is exposed by Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk. IV. See also J. S. Mill, Pol. Econ. Prelim. Remarks, Vol. I. p. 2 seq. 'To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves.' p. 81.

1 It is well worth while to compare the chapters of the first book of the Politics in which the gergs of the supposed invention, the science of Political Economy, already appear, with the corresponding passages of the Wealth of Nations. The
γῆς, χώριων κτήσεως, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐπίπλων κτήσεως καὶ βοσκήματων καὶ ἀνδρατόδων πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταύτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ χρήσιμα. ἕστι δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ

γῆς, χώριων κτήσεως] γῆ, 'territory', the acquisition or possession of public property, χώρα (dim. of χῶρος or χώρα, little places, regions, countries, 'spots'), 'farms', 'estates', 'domains', private properties. Or perhaps rather, γῆ merely 'land' in general, and χώρα the divisions of land, the actual private properties.

ἐπιλα, (a division of property) 'moveables', moveable furniture or property of all kinds: opposed to 'fixtures', such as houses and land.

Xen. Oecon. 10 6 includes in it all sacrificial furniture or apparatus; and articles of dress, shoes, female ornaments; and of house furniture, as beds. In Thuc. III 68, ἥν ἐν τῷ τοίχῳ ἔπιλα, κηλᾶς καὶ σίδηρος, it stands for household furniture of bronze and iron: everything of this kind which was in the fort, the Laced., after the capture of Platea, converted into couches (κλῖνα) and dedicated to Ἰππα. In Arist. Pol. II 7, 1267 b 12, καὶ κατασκευή πολλῆ (a large stock) τῶν καλουμένων ἐπίπλων, it is opposed, first, with money, slaves and cattle, to land, and then, secondly, to the three former. Similarly in the present passage, they are distinguished from cattle and slaves as inanimate moveable furniture, or 'pleasing'. Herodotus writes the word ἐπίπλα in 1 94; elsewhere, as usual, ἔπιλα. The derivation appears to be, τὰ ἐπιπλής σεισμός, τὰ ἐπιπλόματα, superficial'. They are said to be 'superficial', to 'lie on the surface', because they are not fixed or rooted, like land, houses, trees; which are all 'property' nevertheless.

ταύτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθερία καὶ χρήσιμα] All the kinds of property just mentioned are 'secure', (in the sense, 'that of the use of it is always in your own power', infra), not liable to risk, as money made and employed in trade or commerce; and 'liberal', such as befit a gentleman, a man of 'liberal' education and pursuits, cultivated and accomplished and refined, ὁ πασχαιμόνος (παιδεῖα, ἡ διαγωγογία καὶ τὰ κολά καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 260); and also ‘useful’, πρὸς τῷ ὑπ⊇ καὶ τῷ σε (⊇), and therefore a part of genuine wealth (with which money is here included, contrary to the true theory).

ὀλυμβίῳ, as here applied, expresses the general notion of liberality, in character and habits of mind. In the Ethics, and most frequently in the ordinary language, it is restricted as a moral virtue to a species of liberality, that namely which manifests itself περὶ δῶν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν. Eth. Nic. II 7. The ὀλυμβίῳ represents the gentleman resemblance is sometimes so close—see, for example, Aristotle's account of the origin and use of money in 1 9 above referred to, and of the three earliest stages of civilisation indicated in c. 8, the hunting, the pastoral or nomad, and the agricultural stage (though it is true that Smith, and with him Mill, Pol. Econ. u. s., inverts the order of the two first and adds a fourth, the commercial stage), that it seems almost impossible that the notions at least should not have been suggested by Aristotle, though as far as I am aware Smith never mentions his name.
from the democratic point of view; he embodies the notion of 'freedom which is the δοσ, the principle, and the end and aim of the democratic commonwealth; he is the type of a free citizen, and therefore as expressive of character' the term denotes 'that which a model free citizen ought to be'; and connotes or implies those qualifications, particularly education and enlightenment, which enable him efficiently to discharge the proper functions of a free citizen, and those social qualities and habits which fit him for such a society. This is opposed to the aristocratic conception of a gentleman which makes the character or notion depend rather upon birth, wealth and station; and according to which the ἀγαθοί, ἄρρητοι, ὀρεινοί, the boni, optimi, optimates, &c., are the nobles, the men of rank, and of good family in a state. See further on this subject, Donaldson, New Cratylos, §§ 321—328.

Another characteristic of Greek feeling, which deserves notice, is brought into view in the application of the term ἐλευθερία to distinguish a particular kind of property; and this is, the contempt for trade and commerce as a profession and a means of acquiring wealth, which as R. St Hilaire observes (note on Transl. of Ar. Pol. p. 36) was common to all antiquity. A similar observation is made by Böckh, Publ. Econ. of Athens, Bk. I c. 8 p. 43 (Transl.).

Plato's writings abound with contemptuous epithets and expressions applied to ἀμοιβὰς, καπηλεία, χρηματιστεῖα, χρηματισμός, and all arts and professions of which money-making was the only object; for instance, Legg. IV 1, 705 Α, ἰμπορίας γὰρ καὶ χρηματισμοῦ διὰ καπηλειῶν ἐμπλαθα αὐτή, ὡς ποιμένω μόνον καὶ δίκαιον τὰς γυναῖκας εὐπρεπούσας, αὖθις τὸ πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖον καὶ δύολον ποιεῖ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς δύολους θεράστοις ὑποτελεῖται, where trade is represented as corrupting and demoralizing. In XI 4, 918 D, in the course of a discussion on the legitimate objects and uses of trade, he makes the remark, διὰ πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν καπηλείαν καὶ ἰμπορίαν καὶ παρακεκλήθη γίνεται (in the actual practice of them) διαβεβληται τε καὶ εἰς αἰχμάσεις γέγονεν δινάκειαν, which results from their general tendency to corrupt the character of those who follow these pursuits, by the immoderate desire of gain which they stimulate and foster. Accordingly no citizen of the model state is allowed to follow any retail trade; this must be confined to metics and strangers, μίστοποι τοιοι χρωμένοι ἢ ξίνοι δὲ δὲν μελέτησαν καπηλείας. VIII 11, 847 D, καπηλείας δὲ ἑνάκια χρηματιστεῖα μέτρια αὐτῶν μέχρι άλλου μεθηρεῖν εἰς τῇ χώρᾳ διή καὶ πάλιν ήμιν γίγνεσθαι. On Plato's general views on this subject, as expressed in the 'Laws', see Grote, Plato, III 431.

Aristotle similarly condemns trade and the business and practice of interchanging commodities, so far as its object is mere money-making, χρηματιστεῖα. This is the accumulation of unnatural, artificial property: the only kind of property or wealth that is natural, φόντα, is that which can be applied directly to one's own use, πρὸς χρήσειν, and ultimately πρὸς τὸ τέλος, and falls under the province of αἰκονομική, from which χρηματιστεῖα is excluded. Pol. 1 9. Hence of the two kinds of κτητεῖα, the one, which may be called αἰκονομική, because it forms part of the science of economics (domestic economy) properly understood, is neces-
de lege

and laudable; the other, ἐγγυμία or μεταθεσία, with its offspring usury, which breate money out of money, and is thence called τὸ σε, 'is justly reprehended' and usury 'most reasonably the object of abhorrence'. τὴν μεταθεσίας ὕψος ἡμίσιας διακαίρει, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἄλλ' ὅπερ ἀλήθεια 

On the character and tendencies of λατρεία, compare Xen. Σεκον. τὴ περὶ τοῦ τόπον του πολεμιστοῦ εἰς τὴν εὐτατίαν καὶ τοῦ ἁλφ' διακρίνων, κ.τ.λ. I 10 sub fin.

In the same treatise, c. 1 12, 13, 14, a distinction is taken, similar to that of Aristotle, between χρήματα, wealth or property which you can see directly, which does you direct service, and money, which is excluded from the notion of property in this sense. Xenophon, like Aristotle, approves of nothing but the agricultural mode of life as the best both for mind and body, and as cultivating and promoting the habits which go to form the best of citizens. See Σεκον. c. vi 8, 9, 10, c. xv 9.

These extracts will throw light upon the meaning of the word ἔκτην 

property employed in business, and therefore productive, ἀφ' ὧν τοι ἱπποδομα 'from which one derives one's income', is more useful, but carries with it the notion of sordidness or meanness; the other, because it produces nothing but the enjoyment, which proceeds from using it, because it is not corrupted and degraded by any contact or connexion with money-making, better befits the cultivated man, who should hold himself aloof from such pursuits, and partakes more of the notion of καλόν. Comp. 19, 25, καὶ τῆς καὶ τῆς τῶν καλῶν, αἰτεῖ τῇ γὰρ ἄκρα ἔστη. § 26, καὶ εἴτε ἄκρα (καλά ἐστι). ἔλευθερότερα γὰρ. Eth. N. IV 8 sub fin. (of the μεγαλόπρεπος), καὶ οἷος κατηχθήσα τὸ μέγα καὶ ἄξια τῶν καρπῶν καὶ ἀφελίμων—the contrast of 'honour' and 'profit'.

Comp. Metaph. A 1, 981 b 17, on the ascending scale of arts, in the order of superiority in knowledge and general excellence. πλείονος ὤν τῆς εἰρηκομένης τεχνῆς, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἀγαθὴν (παραιτοῦσα, pastime, diversion) οὐκ ὠν, καὶ συνοφίστευσον τοῦ τοιούτου εἰκότων ὑπολογίζομεν, διὰ τὸ μὲ πρὸς τὶ κρίνειν εἰσεὶ τὰ ἐπιστήμων αὐτῶν. The highest in degree are 'sciences', the invention of which is due neither to necessity nor to the mere desire of amusements, and requires 'leisure': whence it happened that mathematics were first studied in Egypt by the priestly class.

δ' ὃς καὶ δέος] and emphatic 'which is in fact at all worth mentioning'.

1 ἀναλαυσεῖ is properly 'sensual enjoyment'. In Eth. N. 1 3, where the three kinds of lives, the ἀναλαυσεῖς, πρακτικές or πολιτικές, and θεωρητικές are distinguished and compared, the first is that which has ὡθήσεως for its sole object, the gratification of the animal appetites and desires, the satisfaction of τὸ ἀναλαυσεῖον; the second has ἡρμηνεία moral virtue for its τόκον; the third, θεωρία, the highest activity of the intellect.
RHOPOLIKEΣ Α 5 § 8.

δρος δὲ ἀσφαλείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτηθῆσαι ὡςτ' ἐφ' αὐτῶ εἶναι τὴν χρήσιν αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ ὁικεῖα εἶναι ἢ μῆ, ὅταν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπαλλατισθῇ.

λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλατισθῆναι δῶσι καὶ πρᾶσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλούτειν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρησθαί μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτηθῆσαι καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐστὶ τῶν τοιούτων

καὶ ἡ χρήσις πλούτος. εὐδοξία δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ πάνω σπουδαίων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι, ἢ τοιούτων τι

1 ὑπ' ἑπεράτος τοῦ δὲ δὲν ἐξελάνεθα, quod in scripto libro, quod Victorius adstat, existat.' Spengel, q.v.]

δύον (λέγω). This emphatic use of καὶ, to enforce the meaning, usually of the single word following, and attract special attention to it, is so common in all Greek authors as scarcely to require illustration. It may be worth while to quote one or two prominent examples. Thusc: πάντες βίους, δόσι καὶ (actually) γένοιτο. 97, τούτων δὲ δὲστοι καὶ γένοιτο... Ἑλλάσσον, II 51, δὲ καὶ γένοιτο εἰ τούτο ἐνελθήναι. Arist. Nub. 840, τὸ δ' ἐν παρ' ἑξελανον καὶ μάνθοι (what could one learn?) χρηστὸν τι ἐπὶ Ευρ. Hippol. 91, τοῦ δὲ καὶ μὴ ἐκστορείς πέρι; 224, τι κυηγολον καὶ σοὶ μελέτη (what is thy concern with hunting?), Ιον, 241, δὲ καὶ δόμης, 346, ταῦτα καὶ μαρτυρίαι. Aesch. Agam. 97, δὲ καὶ ἄγαθος (Schäfer's note). Porson ad Phoenix. 1373 $ in interrogation, Wunder ad Antig. 720.

ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω] 'in such places and in such a way, as to &c.'

τοῦ τούτου πάνω δὲ μὴ κατ. The definition of their being our own or not (of ownership), lies in the power of alienation, that is, giving or selling.

δημος δὲ τὸ πλούτειν κατ.] Polit. 19 referred to above, pp. 79 and 81.

ἡ ἐνέργεια This technical term, and the opposition of δόματος καὶ ἐνέργεια which pervades Aristotle's entire philosophy, represents ἀλήθεια as a mere δόματος or dormant faculty or capacity, until it is 'developed' or 'realised' and 'set in action' (energised) by use (ἐργαζόμενον) by application to 'service' of its owner. On this 'fundamental antithesis' of δόματος καὶ ἐνέργεια as a physical, moral, and metaphysical conception, consult Metaph. Θ 6–9, and Bonitz Comm.; Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 6, p. 61, Kategorienlehre, p. 157 seq., Comm. ad Ar. de Anima, Lib. II p. 395–312; Grant, Essays on Ethics, Ess. IV. p. 181 seq. (1st ed.) [p. 231 (3rd ed.)].

§ 8. σπουδαίων As ἐνέργεια is transferred from the special sense of a particular kind of goodness, i.e. equity, or merciful consideration, to the sense of 'good' in general, (see antie, note on 1 2, 4); so σπουδαίς (serious, earnest, Xen. Cyrop. 11 2, 9, 3, 8, as opposed to καλλικτικοῖς in Jctk), to levisy and frivolity; and thence, in the sense of something solid and substantial,

1 Eth. Nic. 8 6, 1177 a 3, βολίως τὸ λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαία τῶν γελων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδῶς, καὶ τοῦ βολίως ἄει καὶ μερίς καὶ ἐνθύμητον σπουδαίστερα τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
sound and true, to φαιλος, light, empty, trifling and worthless) acquires a moral sense coextensive with ἀγαθος, and is opposed to φαιλος, Plat. Rep. VII 519 D, Legg. VI 757 A, &c. as the sound and solid to the light, empty, and unsubstantial. This familiar application of the word is recognized (as in the parallel case of ἐπιμετω, Eth. N. v 14) by Aristotle, Categ. c. 8, 10 b 7, ὅλον ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρτης ὁ στουδαίος τῷ γὰρ ἀρτην ἠξε λέγεται, ἀλλ' ὁ παρανύμφων ἀντὶ τῆς ἀρτης (i.e. the notion is derived from ἀρτη, but not the word itself). Plat. δροε, p. 415 D (ed. Tur. p. 888) στουδαίος ὁ γελίους ἀγαθος.

There is however one point of difference between ἐπιμετω and στουδαίος, that στουδαίος is extended to 'every kind of excellence, like ἀγαθος, whereas ἐπιμετω is confined to the expression of excellence in human character. Also στουδαίος has another sense distinguishable from the preceding, as opposed to γελίους, the 'serious' to the 'jocose' or 'ridiculous'. Xen. Cyrop. II 3. 1, τοιαία καὶ γελίου καὶ στουδαίος ἀλγέω, and Symp. VIII 3, στουδαίος δήμος, 'grave and serious'. στουδαί and στοιδα 'jest' and 'earnest', 'serious work' and 'play' or 'sport', are constantly brought into contrast by Plato.

§ 9. σημεια εὐεργετικῆς δόζες) 'a sign or mark' (in the recipient of the honour) of a reputation for beneficence, of a capacity for or tendency (ινεις) towards doing good'. All these 'marks of honour' here specified, being intended for the use of the public speaker, have themselves a public or national character. Eth. Nic. IX 16, 1163 b 4, τῷ μὲν ἁρ δρετι καὶ τῇ εὐεργεσίᾳ τῇ μὲν γέρα...οὕτω δὲ ἠξεν νῦν καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολείταις φαινεται. οὔ γάρ τιμάτω ἀ μηδὲν ἄμαθον τῷ κοινῷ παρίζον τό κοινώ γὰρ δίδουν τῷ τό κοινῷ εὐεργετικῷ τιμῇ δὲ κοινώ.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλα 'not but that', 'though at the same time', marks a qualification of, or exception to, too large and unlimited an assertion: οὐ μὴν (δεικν) ἀλλά (τάκε). 'Those who have already done good are fairly and more than all others entitled to such signs of reputation—not however that this need be understood absolutely, so as to exclude the capacity or inclination to do good as a title to honour.'

§ 11. ἐπανασκινεῖ η ποτέ 'either entirely, absolutely, or at particular places or times'.

πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα κ.τ.λ.] Trifles acquire importance, and confer honour, on special occasions, under special circumstances of time and place. Thus what is in ordinary cases a very trifling and unimportant action, as the gift of a cup of cold water, becomes under the circum-
τόποι καὶ οἱ καροί αἵτιοι. μέρη δὲ τιμῆ θυσίαις,
μνημεῖα ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη,
προεδρία, τάφοι, εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρ-
stances in which Sir Philip Sidney gave it at the battle of Zutphen a
renowned act of self-denial and heroism. And under other and different
circumstances the same cup of water may assume an importance which
does not naturally belong to it. 'For whosoever shall give you a cup of
water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say
unto you, he shall not lose his reward.' Mark ix. 41, Matth. x. 42.

μέρη τιμῆς] Some of these are enumerated in Homer, II. Μ 310,
Γλαύκη, τῇ δὲ νυν τετυμφησθα μάλιστα ἔργα τῷ κράσιν τῇ ἄλλῳ δυνα-
σαί ἐν Δυσι; πάντες δὲ, θεοὶ ἄς, εἰσορῶμει; καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα
Χάνθος πωρ' δύνας,—καλὸν, φυταλίη καὶ δροῦρη πυροφόρῳ; comp. Ζ 194,
Θ 161.

θυσίαις] as those that were instituted by the Amphipolitans in honour
of Brasidas, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1134 b 24, οἷον τῷ θεῷ Βρασίδικι, Thuc. v 116,
καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ Ἀμφιπόλειται περιέχοντες αὐτοῦ τὸ τιμημένον ὡς ἤρωι τε
ἐστίμουσι καὶ τιμᾶς δεδώκασιν ἁγάς καὶ ἐγεῖνιος θυσίαις κ.τ.λ. Victorius
quotes from Plutarch, Vic. Flâm. c. 16, p. 378 b, the honours paid by
the Chalcidians to T. Quinctius Flamininus, ἤτι δὲ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτήν χειρο-
τοποιός ἀνεδίδοτον Τιτοῦ, καὶ δυσανοῦσα αὐτῷ τῶν σπονδῶν γενομένων ζῶοις
παῖναι πενθομένων.

μνημεῖα ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων] 'Memorials in prose and verse',
possibly epitaphs; but rather, as these may be included in τάφοι, to be under-
stood (as Vict.) of poems and prose compositions in memoriam, such as
the English work that bears this title, poems in honour of the illustrious
dead, and panegyrics in prose, like some of Isocrates' speeches and
 Xenophon's Agesilaus. Philosophical dialogues too were sometimes
inscribed to the memory of departed friends and named after them, as
 Aristotle's Gryllus and Eudemus, and Theophrastus' Callisthenes, &c.
Intro. p. 53.

γέρας] gifts of honour; as μεσθαῖ, 'rewards of merit', not money,
for mere use; such as privileges conferred on princes and persons of dis-
tinction ἤτι ὅτι γέφυρας παρακάλεα Βρασίδη, Thuc. I 116; constantly in
Homer, (παρὰ πρακτικὰ, δοναὶ πρακτικὰ, προκρὶ πρὸς αἰλίς δαν.,
Damm, Lex. Homer.) as the prime of the spoils, the fairest of the captives,
καὶ ἐτοι, ἦν ἐπὶ μοι (Achilles) γέφυρα ἤδειον ὑπὲρ Ἀχίλλεως, II. Π 56, the largest
portion of meat, or drink, at the banquet, II. Μ 312 (quoted above).
Eth. Nic. v. 10, 1134 b 8, μισθαὶ ἄρα τῆς δοτικῆς, νῦντο ὑπὲρ τιμῆ καὶ γέρας.
Fritzsche, ad h. l., quotes Plato, Rep. VII. 516 C, τιμαὶ καὶ ἔργα καὶ γέρας,
Legg. xi 922 a.

τεμένων] From τέμνων, something 'cut off' and appropriated, as
a portion of land, to the special service of a God or hero; also to chieftains
and kings during their lifetime for their own use. Frequent in Homer,
as II. Μ 313 (u. s.). Ζ 194, καὶ μὴν οἱ Λύκεοι τέμνων Ταμών ἤδειον ἅλλου,
Υ 184, 391.

προεδρία, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι] The privilege of the 'foremost or front
seat' at public spectacles, public assemblies, games, the theatre, &c.
(Herod. I 54, IX 73 &c.), and 'maintenance at the public expense'; at
βαρικά, οινον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δωρά τα

Athens in the Prytaneum or Θεός (Dem. de F. L. §§ 379, 361), σήμερον ἐν Πρυτανείᾳ, Arist. Ran. 764, Pac. 1084, Acharn. 125, Dem. u. s. and §§ 35, 359; both of these privileges were conferred in acknowledgment of merititious public services, and are often named together, Arist. Equit. 573, καὶ στρατηγεῖς οὐδὲ ἐκεῖ | τῶν πρὸ τοῦ σήμερον ἐκείνου ἔργους Κλεάνθους | καὶ ὅ τε ἦν μὴ προσήκοντος καὶ τὸ σῶμα, | ὡς μαχητικαὶ φασόν. Ἰδ. 702, Κλέανθος ἄνω οἰκῆς τῆς προσήκοντος τῆς ἐκ Πύλου. ’Ἀλ. Πούρα προσήκοντος ὀινοῦ ἐπωσμαί ʼήμερος, ἐν τῷ προσήκοντος θεάσιν θεάσιν. 709, ’Ἀλ. ἀνθυμισθεῖς ἀνὴρ τῆς Πρυτανείας σήμερον.

τα βαρβαρά, ὁινον προσκυνήσεις] προσκύνησις, from πρότει, and κυνέο, 'to kiss', denotes the oriental and 'barbarous' custom of saluting by 'kissing the hand to' another, in token of inferiority and subjection, and thence is applied to any act of servile obeisance or homage, or to worship and adoration in general: in the last or metaphorical sense it is found in most of the best Greek writers. This practice may very likely have been accompanied by the analogous one of prostration, as the two are often found associated together in one expression. It was distinctive of Oriental barbarism; and prevailed amongst the Medes, Herod. 119, of Harpagus and Astyages, the Persians, Id. 1 134, ἐντυγχάνοντες δὲ ἀδελφοί ὑμῖν ἑδοὺς, τίς δὲ τῷ ἔλεγεν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχει οὐκ οἷοι ὡς οἱ συντυχόντες. αὐτὶ γὰρ τοῦ προσεκομοίου ἀδελφοῦ, πωλοῦσιν τοῖς στόμισι. ὡς δὲ ὕποτε νεώτερος ὁ ἄγνωστοι προσεκόμοισι, προσεκόμοισι, καὶ τῷ ἄγνωστῳ, and the Egyptians 11 80, ἀντὶ τοῦ προσεκομοίου ἀδελφοῦ οὐχ ὑμῖν ἑδοὺς προσκυνοῦσιν κατάμενοι μέχρι τοῦ γούστου τῆς χείρα. Obeisance by prostration, the salām or kōto, differs from this, though they probably were often used together. It is the latter that is as a barbarous practice and unworthy of a free Greek, by Aeschylus, Agam. 919 (Dind.), and Pers. 594, comp. 152. They appear to be confounded by Euripides, Orest. 1507, προσκύνειν ἀδελφοῦ, διὰς, νόμους μαθέρωσαμεν προσεκομοίσιν. Plato distinguishes them, Legg. X 887 b, προσκυνεῖσιν ἀμαὶ καὶ προσεκομοίσις. Stall., in his note on this passage of Plato, cites, in illustration of the προσκυνήσις, Lucian. Encom. Deumoth. § 85, καὶ τὴν χείραν τυχόμενοι προσάγοντας, οὐδὲν ἄλλα προσκυνοντες ἔντειλον. [Cf. Isocr. Paneg. § 151, (ο βαρβαροι) λέγεταιμοι προς αὐτούς τοῦς βασιλείους καὶ προκαλούμενοι καὶ πάντα τρόφιμα μακροθυμεῖ χειρεῖ, οὗτος μὲν άδερ προσκυνοῦντες καὶ δαίμονα προσεκομοίσιν, κ.κ.λ. 8.]

ἐκστάσις is the abstract conception of 'getting out of the way'. This 'making way or room' for the passage of a person of rank seems also to have been characteristic of Persian manners. Victorius quotes Plutarch, Artax. c. 11, π. τοιτον, ἔπαυμαν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιγράφοντα, χαράζουσιν, διεξάγοντες διδαχήν τοῦ ἄλλου, 'εξιστάθηνεν παραβιασθεί'. ('out of the way, beggars'), διότι δὲ περιστρεφίμενοι αὑτῷ βοηθοῦς, οἱ μὲν 'εξιστάθη προσκυνοῦντες. Herodotus, II 80, says of the Egyptians, συμφέρεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἄλλο Ληστοὺς ἐλλείψεις μονάδως λακεδαιμονίας οἱ πρόσεκομοισιν προσεκομοίσιν συνυγχάνοντες εἰκόνις τῆς ἄδου καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντες καὶ ἐπιστεύοντες εἰς ἑρεμίας ἐπιστεύεται. So Simonides to Hiero (Xenoph. Hiero VII 3, comp. § 9), in enumerating his privileges as a tyrant, ὡς παραπάντοι τὰ μὲν ἔδωκεν ὅδων τε παραχωρόσι: and Aristotle of the respect due
ΠΗΤΩΡΙΚΗΣ Α 5 § 10.

παρ’ ἐκάστους τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δώρον ἐστὶ κτήματος
dόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημείον, διὸ καὶ οἱ φιλοχρήματοι καὶ
οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίστηκαν αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέρους γὰρ ἔχειν ἡμᾶς. 12
οὐ δέονται καὶ γὰρ κτήμα ἐστίν, οὐ εὑρέθη αὐτοὶ οἱ
φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμῆν ἔχειν, οὐ οἱ φιλότιμοι.

10 σῶματος δὲ ἀρετὴ υγίεια, αὐτὴ δὲ οὕτως ἠστε ἀνό
σους εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σῶμασιν πολλοὶ γὰρ
υγιαίνουσιν ἦσσπερ Ἡροδίκου λέγεται, οὐς οὐδεὶς ἀν
εὐδαιμονίσεις τῆς υγίειας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι

from youth to age, Eth. Nic. IX 3, 1165 a 28, καὶ παρὶ δὲ τῷ προσβεύοντος
τιμῆν τὴν καθ ἤλειαν, ἐπεβαίνοντο καὶ καταλάβοντο καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Cic.
Cato Maior 18. 63. On the reference paid to old age, enjoined by law at
Athens, see Aesch. c. Tim. § 24. Xen. Symp. 31, ἐπιστάμεται δὲ μοι ὁδὴ
cαὶ θάνατος, καὶ ἔδωκε ἑξιστάμενοι οἱ πλοίοι, and de Rep. Lac. xvi 6, of the
customs at Sparta, καὶ ἔδωκε δὲ τὸντε ἑπιστάμενοι βασιλεί, πλὴν οὐκ
ἐφοροῦ κ.κλ. Another illustration of ἑκάστους is the custom, once
generally prevalent, of 'giving the wall' to a superior, as a mark of respect,
celer le haut du pavé. (Dict. Acad. Fr.) [Ovid, Fasti, v 67, (senex)
et mediis inuenum, non indignantibus ὄψις, idem et interior, si comes
nus erat and Horace, Sat. ii 5. 17, 'comes exterior'. S.]

προσκυνήσεις, ἰκανότητα] The plural of abstract nouns denotes the
various individual acts or moments or states included under the general
conception.

δώρα τὰ παρ’ ἐκάστους τίμια] 'quaes apud singulas gentes in pretio sunt',
Victorius: who illustrates by the olive crown as a prize in the Greek
games, and quotes Horace, Ep. ii 2. 32, clausus od iā factum donis ornar-
tur honestis, of the prize of valour, bearing a special value in the Roman
Military service, assigned to 'Lucullus's soldier'. Of the words by them-
soever this interpretation is perfectly fair and natural; but in connexion
with what follows (as Aristotle seems to have intended, καὶ γὰρ τὸ
δώρον...) they may be understood somewhat differently, and the παρ’
ἐκάστους referred to 'the individuals of the two classes' mentioned imme-
diately after, the φιλοχρήματος and φιλότιμοι.

§ 10. σῶματος δὲ ἀρετὴ υγίεια] Health, as a bodily excellence, neces-
sarily implies vigour and the power of active exertion for the fulfilment of
the duties of life, without these it is no ἀρετὴ at all, and no subject of
congratulation to the possessor. Health is said to be the ἀρετὴ of the body,
in reference to the doctrine of the proper ἴσων of anything; see
note on p. 40 c. 2 § 12. Life is the special function of the body (Eth.
Nic. i 6), and health is life in its best form, as far as the body is con-
cerned.

'Ἡροδίκου] a famous physician, native of Selymbria, in Thrace on the
Propontis; to be distinguished from another less known physician, Gorgi-
ias' brother, of Leontini, Plat. Gorg. 448 b, 456 b. On Herodicus and
11 τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἡ τῶν πλείστων. κάλλος δὲ ἐτερον καθ’ ἐκάστην ἥλικιαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τοὺς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ἢδ’ οὖν ὄντα ἱδεῖν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν, διό οἶ θεναθλοί κάλλιστοι, ὡτι πρὸς

his medical practice, see Plat. Phaedr. 227 e., and Heindorf’s and Ast’s notes; also Rep. III 406 a seq., where an account of him and his system of self-tormenting is given. Protag. 316 e.

τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων] See note on c. 1 § 7, δὲ ἄλλα αὐτίς ἀνθρωπεῖα.

§ 11. Personal beauty has no absolute standard or uniform expression, manifesting itself in the same forms at all periods and under all circumstances. It is relative, not only to the three stages of human life, youth, prime and old age, but also to the habits and functions natural and appropriate to each of those stages; manly and athletic exercises, in the way of training, to youth; military service, the imperative duty of an active and able-bodied citizen, to middle age; sedentary and intellectual pursuits, to old age, yet so that strength and vigour remain adequate to the endurance of ordinary or necessary labours—extraordinary exertions, as in athletic exercises and service in the field, being no longer required. The habit of body which is fitted to the exercise of these several functions at the corresponding period of life is a constituent element of its personal beauty.

νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος κ.τ.λ.] When it is said that the beauty of a young man consists partly in the possession of a body in a serviceable state for undergoing the labours and pains incident to the race and feats of strength, the meaning seems to be that the robust habit of body and the muscular development required for the one, and the indications of activity combined with strength, which appear in the outward form, necessary for the other, are pleasant to the eye, both in themselves and also as suggesting a fitness or adaptation or harmony of the exterior of the person with the habits and pursuits which are appropriate to youth.

πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν] means no more than the mere enjoyment afforded by the sight of personal beauty. Victorius, who suggests another interpretation, concludes finally in favour of this.

οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι] The combination of a natural aptitude or

1 Macaulay, in his celebrated Essay on Bacon, Edin. Rev., July, 1837, selects these opinions of Plato, which he describes at length from the passage of the Republic, as to the value of Herodicus’ system of medical practice, as one of the illustrations of the contempt for all that is useful and practical which pervades the Platonic philosophy; contrasting this, much to the disadvantage of the ancient philosopher, with the opposite spirit and tendency of the Baconian system, which aims, as he assumes, exclusively at practical and attainable good, and promotes the investigation of truth solely with a view to the substantial and solid benefit of the human race. Schrader cites Dial. de Orat. xxiii 4 Ne in corpore quidem valutudinem mediici probant, quae animi anxietate contingat. Parum est aegrum non esse; fortium et laetum et alacrem volo. Propo absit ab infirmitate in qua sola sanitas laudatur.
βίαν καὶ πρὸς τάχος ἀμαρτίαν ἀκμάζοντος δὲ
capacity (πεφύκατι πρό) for strength and speed, vigour and activity, as
evidenced by success in the various exercises of the πεντάθλον, and the
outward expression of these faculties in the configuration of the body,
when accompanied with beauty in the shape, symmetry, and expression
of the features, is the highest form of personal beauty in the young man.

'Die übung im Pentathlon war wegen der verschiedenartigkeit der
fünf wettkämpfe ganz vorzüglich das werk junger rustiger männer mit
elastischem leibe. Die Pentathlen zeichneten sich daher durch gleichmä-
sige stärke der glieder, allzeitige gewandtheit und körperlich harmoni-
nische bildung vor allen übrigen vortheilhaft aus, und werden daher
vom Aristoteles als die schönsten Agonisten genannt! Krause, Gymn.
us. Agon. der Griechen, Vol. 1, p. 494, absch. VI § 31. The exercise of
the πεντάθλον is therefore mentioned in the passage before us as belonging
solely to the period of youth.¹

The πεντάθλον consisted of five exercises as the name implies. These
are enumerated in an epigram of Simonides, Anthol. 67 (73), Bergk,
Fragm. Lyr. p. 791,

"Ἰσθμία καὶ Πυθοί Διοφῶν ὃς Φίλωνος ἤκεικα
ἀλμα, πῳδωκίερ, δίσκον, ἄκοντα, πάλην,

and in an epigram of unknown authorship quoted by Eustath. ad II. Ψ.
p. 1320, Anthol. Πνευμάτων αὐτοτοκία CCCCLIV,

ἀλμα ποδών, δίσκον τε βόλη, καὶ ἄκοντα ἑρωθή,
καὶ δρόμος, ἢδέ παλῆ: μιὰ δ’ ἐπετεί πάσι τελευτή.

The same five are named in the Schol. on Pind. Isthm. 1 35, and in
the Schol. on Plat. Erast. c. 4. 135 D, πάλη, σίγκρος (i. e. δέκων), ἀλμα,
cit. p. 476 seq. absch. VI § 29.

Παγύς, boxing, was therefore not included in the πεντάθλον; and we
are driven to suppose that the concluding words of § 14, ὃ δὲ πᾶσι πεν-
τάθλοι, which certainly according to the ordinary laws of the interpretation
of language ought to include it with the rest of the foregoing exercises,
are one amongst many instances of Aristotle's carelessness in expressing
himself, and affirm something which he could not really have meant.
πάσι, if it can be said to have any meaning at all, must be understood
simply to imply, that the πεντάθλον combines in one the greatest number
and variety of the single and separate exercises. Such is also the opinion
of Krause, Op. cit. p. 258, n. 6. He observes that such a conclusion (as
would naturally be drawn from the words of Arist.) is opposed to all the

¹ The πεντάθλον however, though by the number and variety of his accompl
ishments he is superior to all other athletes, yet in regard of certain special
excellences, as compared for instance with the runner or wrestler, he is only
second rate. Plat. Erast. 135 ε. The philosopher in the popular sense, Aristotel's
πεντάθλον, the man of universal attainments, is compared to the all-accom
plished athlete. ἢν ἕνωδος οἷον λέγεται τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; διόκει γὰρ μαί λέγειν
οἷον ἐκ τῆς ἀκραίας συνεργείας ὃ ποτε δρομαία ἢ τοῦ ἀλλαζόμενος. καὶ ἐὰν ἥν
καὶ ποιήσων μὲν λέγονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἔνδοι καὶ δεύτερον εἰπει πρὸς τούτους, τῶν
δὲ ἄλλων ἄκρητων πρῶτοι καὶ πρῶτοι αὐτοῖς.
notations which we find in the ancient writers. Aristotle, however, knew there in the
beneath the words that the most important делается, in the case of a more detailed account of a
definitions which are precised, and in a more detailed account, the fortuitous, as for instance, in the
definitions which are given in the next clause, and the first words of the sentence, десауос би (k.t.
"δε"). The simplest way of filling up the elliptical construction seems to be to supply καλλος after десауос, and γέροντος in the
next clause, and κνηφώμα to the immediately preceding κνηφώσων after πολέμακος in the former clause and λεικόν in the latter. The
required sense may be equally well supplied by repeating (as Victorius) the first words of the sentence, десауως δὲ (καλλος) (τὸ) πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τῶν πολέμακος (χρώματος ζεύγος τὸ σώμα); but the consideration of the imme-
diate proximity of κνηφώμα seems more in favour of the other.

λεικόν fit for, strong enough for, capable of.

δειλον] causing no pain, no painful impression or repulsion, in con-
sequence of the absence of all the ordinary deformities or disfigurements incident to old age.

ἡ τῆς κανάς λεικόν] i.e. κείινος καὶ τῆς γήρας λαβάται. This unusual and
irregular form of attraction of the relative to the case of its antecedent,
where, had the antecedent been expressed, the relative should have been the
nominative to a succeeding verb, is exemplified by Matthiae, Gr. Gr.
§ 473, obs. 1, from Herod. I 68, οὐδὲν καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ἵνα ..., Thuc. VII 67
φέρ' ὁμήρους ποιεῖν καρποκύκλως. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 334 C ἐν τούτῳ οἰκεῖν ἐν καλλος. oμαθαι, de Rep. V 465 D, εὐθυμιοντικόν κείται ἐν τούτῳ ὡς
in c. Steph. p. 1116, περὶ ὧν μὴ κατηγόρησαι λέγει, which has been
cited as an instance, κατηγόρησαι is the irregular passive 'has been ac-
cused', and therefore περὶ ὧν need not be interpreted as περὶ κείταις δὲ; it is for περὶ κείταις περὶ ὧν. Another doubtful example is Eur. Med. 262,
τῶν δόστωρ τ' αὐτῆς ὅρατοι, τοι' ἀκόμα, where Seidler retains this (the
v. 1.), and regards ἴνε as a case of attraction for αὐτῆσι. An analogous

§ 12. ἰσχύς] bodily strength, is defined, in a very superficial and per-
fundactory manner, with a special view to strength in personal encounter—
as appears in the several forms it takes, though it is afterwards more
definitely expressed in δύναμισσεῖ δέρη—as the power of moving some
one else (τερέω may possibly be neuter, something else, anything whatever), by pulling, or pushing, or lifting (possibly referring to the encounter
of Herakles with Antaeus, who showed his great strength by 'lifting' him off the ground into the air; or, if τερέω be neuter, by lifting any
heavy weight), or squeezing, or crushing; which seems to be intended for
κινεῖν ἑτερον ὡς βούλεται, ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἑτερον ἢ ἐλκοντα ἢ ἑθοῦντα ἢ αἴροντα ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὡστε ὁ ἰσχυρός ἦ τάσιν ἦ τούτων τισῖν 13 ἐστιν ἰσχυρός. μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπερέχειν κατὰ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσοῦτος μείζον ὡστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ 14 τὴν ὑπερβολὴν. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σφάζης ἀρετὴ σύγκειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ τάχους· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρὸς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ριπτεῖν

a complete analysis of the different ways in which a person or thing can be 'moved' by another.

§ 13. μείζον [agree with τινι understood after ἀρετῇ: the accusative μείζον, with τινι understood in τὸ ὑπερέχειν, would be more usual. Two MSS read μεῖζον. 'Excellence in size' implies superiority over the average (people in general), in length (height), depth (thickness), and breadth, but only (superior) to such an extent as not to impede the motions (of the body) by the excess (of size), lit. to one being only so much greater as not to make the body’s motions (slower than they otherwise would be, or than they ought to be, i.e.) lōs slow. ἡκος, βάθος, and χάραξις are the three dimensions of space; but it is not quite certain how they are applied here to the proportions of the human body; μῆκος or βάθος might possibly represent the abstract height. I have taken μῆκος in this sense here because it is found in Homer to represent the ‘stature’ of a man, and μῆκος for ‘tallest’. Odys. λ. 309, ὁτι δὲ μεγαλον τρήθη κῦδορος ἄρσον, and 312, ἄρσο μῆκος γε γενέσθαι ἐκείνου. v. 71, of the daughters of Pandareus, μῆκος δ’ ἄρσον ἄρσον ἄρσον, and in Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. II. 5, εἰς μῆκος αἰσχίνουσαν τὰ κύριο. Μῆκος therefore is the man’s height, χάραξις the breadth of the body, measuring from right to left, and βάθος the depth or thickness, measuring in the direction backwards and forwards. Βάθος, though it can be applied to vertical measure, up and down, yet as in the ordinary language it represents only what is below us, and not what is above, could hardly be applied to the more than average stature of a tall man.

§ 14. ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ τάχους] for boxing and wrestling; τάχους, for the foot-race.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρὸς ἐστιν] seems to be added as a mere passing observation, or note upon τάχους: and the γὰρ, which implies that this clause gives a reason for the preceding, must therefore be regarded as due to mere carelessness of writing, there being no logical connexion between the two sentences. (If there were any such connexion between the two, the meaning could only be, that the relation of strength and speed as genus and species, speed being only a variety of strength, is the reason for the introduction of τάχους into the list of agonistic virtues: the fact being that this could only be a reason for omitting it.)

ἵπτωμα λακτερον, μοτερίν λακτερον, of a repeated action. Hermann ad Aiac.
πως καὶ κινεῖν ταχύ καὶ πόρρω ἄρρητος, ὅ τε θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὅ τε ὄσαι τῇ πληγῇ πυκτικός, ὅτε ἄμφοτέροις τούτοις παγκρατιστικός,
15 ὅτε πᾶσιν πένταθλος. εὐγνήρια δὲ ἐστὶ βραδυτίς γύρως μετ’ ἀλυπίας ὡς γὰρ εἰ ταχὺ γηρᾶσκει, εὐγνη- p. 19.  

235, Trach. 776. See also Lobeck, Aj. 239, p. 177. This distinction, which has been doubted by some scholars, is now I believe generally accepted. At all events it applies very well here, where the simple notion of flinging or hurling, once for all, from you, as a stone, would be quite inappropriate to the motion of the legs intended to be described. βραδυτίς τα σκίλης is to ‘toss about’ or ‘swing the legs’, backwards and forwards, again and again.

κινεῖν πόρρω] ‘to take long strides’.
ἄμφοτέροις τούτοις] ‘These two last, boxing and wrestling; not running.
Supply therefore, in explanation of ἄμφοτέροις, ἀθλεῖν καὶ κατέχειν, καὶ ὄσαι τῇ πληγῇ δυσκόλως. Victorius (and also Krause, u. s., p. 534, n. 1) quotes Plut. Symp. 4, ὅτι γὰρ μέμεινο τὸ παγκράτιον ἐκ τῆς πυγῆς καὶ πάλης, δῆλον, and Quint. Inst. Orat. ti 8, 13, as confirming Aristotle’s statement. Other ancient authorities are given in Krause’s notes.

On the panкратium, and the size, strength, and skill required by those who engaged in it, see Krause, u. s. p. 534—538, adscrn. vi § 41.

Compare with the four preceding sections the following passage of Plato on the use of athletic exercises. Legg. viii 832 E seq. ἄστι γοῦν πάντων παλαιστικῶν ἢ σάμιων ἢ γυμνῶν πάντως, ἢ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἢ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν φυγίων μὲν καὶ ἔλασσόν τοῖς ποδαῖς, ἢ δὲ ἐν ταῖς σωματικαῖς (the pankration, and especially wrestling) μάχῃ καὶ σύντοσις ἰσχύος καὶ βραδυτη θεωρητικά.

§ 15. εὐγνήρια] supr. § 4, ‘fortunate old age, good fortune or happiness in old age’.

βραδυτής] ‘tardiness’, i.e. slow approach or progress.
εὐγνήριος] occurs under the form εὐγνηρός in Hippocrates, and Ar. Hist. Anim. ix 12, 3.

1 Lobeck in his elaborate dissertation on the question seems to leave the matter in doubt; and no doubt, from the uncertainty of the MSS readings, the distinction of the two forms of the verb being shewn in most cases merely by the difference of accent, it is difficult to decide in any particular case which of the two forms is to be preferred: and Lobeck shews by examples that (so far as the reading is to be depended on) the same notion of the verb is expressed indifferently by either form. At the same time in the somewhat obscure summing up at the conclusion of his note, he seems (as I understand him) to be in favour, as a general principle, of the hypothesis, that a difference of form in the termination of a verb radically the same (he cites ἄλιπος or ἐλλιπὼς and its numerous varieties as a remarkable instance) does express a corresponding variety in the signification; as in the instance given, the various terminations correspond to different varieties of the general notion of ‘rolling’.
РΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 5 § 16.

ρως, οὔτε εἰ μόνος μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ. έστι δέ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἁρτῶν καὶ τυχής· μὴ ἀνοσος γὰρ ὁμ ισχυρός οὐκ ἐσται ἀπαθῆς, οὐδ' ἄλπτος καὶ πολυχρόνιος [οὔτ'] ἀνευ τυχής διαμείνει εὖν. ἔστι δέ τις καὶ χωρίς ισχύς καὶ υγείας ἀλλ' ἀναμι μακροβιότητος; πολλοὶ γὰρ ἀνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἁρτῶν μακρόβιοι εἰσιν'. ἀλλ' οὔ, οὔάν ἡ ἀκριβολογία 16 χρήσιμος ἢ περὶ τούτων εἰσ τὰ νῦν. πολυφίλια δὲ καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἀθηλα τοῦ φίλου αἱριμένου, ὅτι ἐστιν τὸ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅς τις, ἂ οὔεται ἀγαθά εἶναι

ἀνευ τυχής) in Muretus' excellent emendation of v. l. ἐν τυχής.

ἔστι δὲ τις κ.τ.λ.] The causes of length and shortness of life in plants and animals are further investigated in the little treatise περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος, in the collection of tracts called the Parva Naturalia, appended to the work περὶ ψυχῆς. They all belong to the 'Physical' department of philosophy. π. μ. καὶ βρ. 1 § 4.

ἀλλ' οὔ, οὔάν ἡ ἀκριβολογία κ.τ.λ.] Nice, exact, or scientific analysis and the treatment of a subject in minute detail, are out of place in a rhetorical treatise. Any further details on the subject of longevity would be useless to the rhetorician. On the various senses of ἀκριβεία, see Grant on Eth. Nic. 1 7, 18: and on the mode of handling a subject appropriate to Rhetoric, Introd. on the 'materials of Rhetoric', p. 11—14.

§ 16. ἔστιν τὸ τοιοῦτος φίλος κ.τ.λ.] 'all such are friends, as, when they think anything good for some particular person' (ἐκεῖνη, some one in particular, that particular person, whoever it may be) 'are inclined to do it for his sake'. In this definition, friendship or love is described as a state of mind, a moral habit or disposition, not as a natural affection. The desire of doing our friend good for his own sake is a necessary accompaniment and consequence of the feeling or affection, but not identical with it. The definition is 'rhetorical', and does not give the 'essence' of the thing, as a scientific definition would. The definition of ἕλπις ας τὸν, II 4, 2, is in exact conformity with this, and equally deficient. In the Ethics, VIII 2, after quoting some of the ordinary current notions of love to be found in the preceding poets and philosophers, he proceeds to the establishment of his own. And here again the same conception of it reappears in the words τῷ δὲ φιλῷ φαντὶ δεῖν βουλεθῆναι τάγαθε ἐκείνου ἵκενα. Accordingly ἕλπις εἶναι ἐν ἀντιπαραθύρῳ reciprocal goodwill or affection; the reciprocity being essential to true φιλία or affection of two human beings to one another. For though we may be 'fond' of wine, φιλομορι, or 'fond' of animals, there is in these cases no true reciprocity of affection. Further, since 'fondness' is applicable to three classes of objects, the good, the pleasant, and the useful, three classes of corresponding 'friendships' or 'fondnesses' are hereby determined; but only the first of them, the love of the good, is the basis of true and perfect love; and consequently
the highest and perfect form of 'love' can only exist between the good, τελεία θ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ τῶν ἀγάθων φύλλα καὶ καὶ άρετὴν ἡ ὀρκοὶ γὰρ τάγαθ, ὀρκοὶ βουλοῦνται ἄλληθεν, ἡ ἀριθμοὶ ἀγάθοι δ᾽ εἰσὶ καὶ καὶ τῶν, c. 4, init. In the concluding definition of c. 2, the feeling or loving disposition is introduced in the word εὐνοεῖ, δεὶ ἢ ἐν ὑποκείμεναι καὶ βουλοῦμαι τάγαθα μὴ λανθανοντας δι᾽ ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις. These τα εἰρημένα are the three objects of affection. This is therefore the general conception of love according to Aristotle. The highest form of human love or friendship would be εὐνοεῖ...διὰ τὸ ἀγάθον.

éπιεικείαe Note on c. 2 § 4, p. 30.

§ 17. εὐνοεῖα 'good fortune or luck', accidental, transitory, fragmentary, is opposed to εὐδαιμονία, complete, permanent, substantial happiness, the essence of which resides in its αὐτάρκεια or independence of all accidental and external conditions. — Eth. Nic. II 5 (Bekk.), 1097 β 6 seq. η' τιγές χαρούμενος τινὶ διακόπτων όπως ταθείνης εἰσὶν αὐτῶι καὶ μακαρῶι, εἰ οὕτω δὲ τῶν ιδιοτερων ἀγαθῶν ἄλλα δι᾽ αὐτῶν αὐτῶι καὶ τῷ ποιῶι τι εἰσίν τῇ φύσιν, εἴτε καὶ τῷ εὐνοείν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ διὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἑτέρων εἰσὶν τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνον ἀγαθὸν αὐτῶν παράσχοντα καὶ τῇ τύχῃ, διεμένω καὶ οὕτω δὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστιν. Eur. Med. 1229, ἄλθεν δ᾽ ἐπιρροέοντες εὐρυγέτεροι ἅλλον γίνοιτω, αὐτῶι καὶ ὄπως, εὐδαιμονία καὶ ὄπως, where Paley quotes. Troad. 509, τὸ δὲ εὐδαιμονε μείζοντι τύχῃ(εἰρημένοις πρὸς το δὲ), explaining the distinction; and Androm. 430, ἄνθρωπον μὲν διόγει δυστυχέντος δὲ εὐδαιμονία.

ἡ τύχη αἰνέα On Aristotle's conception of τύχη as 'a cause', with further details, see Introd. Appendix C to Bk. 1 c. 10, p. 218—224. On this passage, p. 223.

γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρξειν 'acquisition or possession'. καὶ in this and similar cases is properly rendered by 'or'. Aristotle frequently expresses as a combination two things which are not actually, but only hypothetically, combined in the conception, which we therefore more correctly represent as an alternative.


1 καὶ γρόνος τοῦ τυχήν πελάτερ τὰ αὐτὰ ἄστω ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τύχη, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ λάμπων, τύχη, τύχη τύχη, κατηλλή. 1
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 5 § 17.

μὲν δὲν καὶ αἱ τέχναι, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἷον ὅσων ἡ φύσις· εἶνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἴσαι· ύπερείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλλους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαύτα τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπό τύχης, ἦτ' οἷς ἔστιν ὁ φύσος. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγων ἁγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἷον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοὶ, ὃ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδος τὸν ἰθανάτων, ὃ δ' εὖρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πληθυνότων ἐτυχε τὸ βέλος, τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνον αἱ φοιτών, οἱ δὲ ύπερείας· Τhese are illustrated in the text by two examples; health, which may be due to chance as well as art; and beauty and strength, to chance as well as nature.

dryχαι] 'independent of art'.

οἶνον δόσων ἡ φύσις] The contradiction between this and the statements in the scientific Physics is pointed out in the Introd., u.s., p. 223.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἴσαι] Most probably a mere occasional and parenthetical note, according to the usual practice of this author (comp. § 14), 'chance may give rise not only to things natural and independent of nature, but also things unnatural, monstrous, or abnormal,' τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τέρατα: on which see the ref. in Introd. p. 225. Compare the def. of φύσις in I 10, 13, δόξης δ' ἦν καὶ τὴν αἰτία εἴσαι τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. τῶν παρὰ φύσιν. In this case the colon should be retained after εἴσαι, the connexion being carried on from οἶνον δόσων ἡ φύσις to ύπερείας μὲν κ.τ.λ. as examples, δ' αἱ τέχναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις αἰτία, and the note parenthetical.

Bonitz, however, Aristotel. Stud. I 87, would alter the punctuation, placing a comma at εἴσαι, and connecting this clause closely with the preceding, in the sense, 'of which the cause is nature, but (which) may be also contrary to nature': regarding this as an instance of the Aristotelian custom of 'not repeating the relative in the second of two co-ordinated members', illustrated by Waitz, Organ. 25 δ 35, and certainly common enough in our author. This is further supported by Muretus, who translates, 'qua natura efficiuntur, ita tamen ut etiam praeter naturam evenire possint.'

The words quoted above from I 10, 3, seem to me to be in favour of the former interpretation: and the practice of introducing 'notes' of this kind is at least as common with Aristotle as that which is noticed by Bonitz.

ὅπτε δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγων ἁγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη] Phys. 197 a 18, καὶ τὸ φάσαν εἰσαὶ τὰ παράλογα τὴν τύχην ὀρθὰς· τὸ γὰρ λόγος ἡ τῶν δὲ δύον ἡ τῶν ἰδίων τὸν τοὺς καὶ τὸν τολύ., ἢ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γεγονόσις παρὰ τούτων· δύστ' ἐκείνη δύσμενα τὰ τοιούτα, καὶ τὸ τύχη δύσμενα. See further in Introd. p. 221.

τοῦ πληθυνόντος (τὸν πληθυνόντος), 'one's next neighbour', as ὁ σήλας. In Plat. Theaet. 174 C, it is distinguished from γείτων, ὁ πλήσιος καὶ ὁ γείτων, having a more extended and general sense, 'a fellow-creature'.

ἢ εἰ μὴ ήδει μόνος δι' φοιτῶν κ.τ.λ.] 'Or if one who was in the constant
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 6 §§ 1, 2.

άπαξ ἐλθόντες διεθάρησαν πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαύτα εὐτυχήματα δοκεῖ εἶναι.

18 ἐνὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἑπείτης ὀικείοτάτος ὁ ἐνὶ τοῖς ἑπαίνους τόπος, ὅταν ἐνὶ ἑπάινου ποιμέθα τὸν λόγον, τότε διοριστέον.

1 ὅπως μὲν οὖν δεῖ στοιχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ὡς ἐσομένων ἦν ὑπαρχόντων, καὶ ὃν ἀποτρέποντα, φανερον τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῷ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπός τὸ συμφέρον, βουλευόνται δὲ οὓς περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δὲ συμφέρον ἄγαθον, ληπτεῖν ἄν εἰς στοιχεῖα περὶ ἄγαθον καὶ συμφέροντος ἀπλῶς. ἐστω δὴ ἄγαθον p. 20.

habit of visiting a certain place ('φορτών, to go backwards and forwards, ever and anon, repeated, to frequent, haunt') was the only one that failed to go (on some particular occasion), whilst those that went only once (ἐσαξ), once for all) all perished'. It is possible that this sense of repetition in the verbal termination ἦν may be the origin of the other signification of 'disease' illustrated on the word παυσανικός, c. 2 § 18 p. 45. A too-frequently repeated action might very well be interpreted as a diseased habit.

§ 18. ἐνὶ περὶ ἑπαίνου κ.τ.λ.] i.e. in c. 9 of this book, the chapter on the topics of encomium and censure, proper to the encomiastic or epideictic branch of Rhetoric.

CHAP. VI.

On the purport of this chapter, its principal divisions, and connexion with the general plan of the work, see Introd. p. 177.

§ 1. ἐνὶ περὶ ἑπαίνου] On this addition over and above the theory, see note on c. 3 § 4; and Introd. p. 120.

βουλευόνται δὲ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος] Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 δ 12, βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν τέλων ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. (This is because the means are within our own power to attain; the ends are not. βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ’ ἑκάτεροι πρακτῶν, 1112 a 31, ὅσα γίνεται δὲ ἑκάτεροι...περὶ τούτων βουλευόμεθα, Ib. line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Οὕτω γὰρ λατρεῖβας βουλεύεσθαι εἶ ὁγισθη, οὕτω ὑπερεῖ ἐλευθερίαν, οὕτω δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὕδει περὶ τοῦ τέλους ὡς δὲ τῆς ἑκάτερος τέλος τι, πᾶς καὶ δᾶ τά τίνας ὡς κακοτοῦς, κ.τ.λ. Ib. δ 34, οὕτω δὲ πρὸς τὰ τέλη, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη.

στοιχεῖα] i.e. τόσους, the ‘Elements’, the primary topics of the subject ‘good’. See Introd. p. 127, 8.

ἀπλῶς] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which ἀπλῶς is here intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract.
reception, opposed to καθ ἔκαστον special and particular goods. Schrader's rendering extra comparisonem, if it means, as it seems to do, 'absolute good', 'good in itself', opposed to 'relative' or 'human good'—that which cannot be compared with, i.e. has no relation to, any other kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. 'Absolute good' can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the practice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in §§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the remainder of the chapter.

§ 2. ἦσω δὲ ἀγαθόν κ.τ.λ.] The 'popular' character of these definitions is marked by the introductory ἦσω, 'let it be taken for granted'; no demonstration is required, any current notion of good will serve our purpose. The same phraseology occurs again in a similar case, c. 7 § 2, ἦσω δὲ ἦσω κ.τ.λ.: c. 5 § 3, and 10 § 3.

First, 'Good is anything that is in itself and for its own sake desirable (an object of choice), and that for whose sake we choose something else (which is the ulterior end of our preference for anything); and that which is the universal aim, either of everything or (as a qualification to exclude inanimate things) 'everything that has sensation or reason, or (would be their aim) if they were to acquire the reasoning faculty' (supposing they have it not yet, as infants and beasts). Comp. c. 7 § 21, ὁ λαβότα τὰ πράγματα (anything) φρονίσεις ἔοιμι ἄν ἔκαστον.

The first of these two definitions, which represents Good as desirable in and for itself, and as that to obtain which we choose something else, is in fact identical with the second which describes it as the ultimate or aim of all action and desire, only differing from it in terms. Everything that we choose or desire, and every act that we perform, is as the means to one universal end, the Good. This view of the nature of Good is laid down and illustrated in the first chapter of the Nic. Eth. πάντα τίγη καὶ πάντα μέθοδος, ὡμοιοὶ δὲ πράξει τε καὶ προοίμιοι, ἄγαθον οὐκ ἔφεσθαι δοκεῖ; διὸ καλὸν ἐπεφάσαμε (it is a current, popular, definition of) τάγαθα, οὐ πάντα ἐφεσθαι—εἶ δὴ τὰ πάλιν ἔστι τῶν κρατῶν δὲ αύτὸ βουλομέθεα, τάλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο (the means to the universal end) καὶ μὴ πάντα δὲ ἐπεφάσαμε, (there is something, i.e. Good, which we desire only for itself),...δηλοὶ ὅτι τοῦτο...ἐπὶ τὰ ἄγαθα καὶ τὸ ἀριστον, and so on. Comp. c. 5. Similarly at the commencement of the Politics, we find that this is the end of states as well as individuals, because τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἄγαθον

The same view of the nature of Good is to be found equally in Plato, from whom Aristotle may have derived it. See, for instance, Phileb. 53 E, seq. particularly 54 C, where good is proved to be the ὕβεια, or universal end. Sympos. 205 Α, where happiness, which consists in the possession of good, is similarly represented. Gorg. 499 Ε, τίλος ἦν τὸ ἄσκοφος τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἅγαθον, καὶ ἐσειών ἔσειε διένετο πάντα τὰ πᾶλα πράγματα, ἄλλον οὐκ ἔσειε τῶν ἄλλων. Euthyd. c. 8, 270 Ε, seq.

καὶ ἄν δοὺς μαρτ.,] And all that reason in general, or universal reason, would assign to each of us, and all that the individual reason assigns to each of us, that is good to every human being. That is, that all this supreme or universal reason or the particular reason of each individual, would assign as suitable to each; the former what is good for all alike, the latter what is good for each particular individual; since these sometimes differ: or, as Schrader interprets it, the universal reason that dictates general principles or rules of action, as contrasted with ὑπό δοὺς ὑπὸ ἐκαστοῦ, mens quæ de singularibus deservit, which decides in special and individual cases. The reason as an agent is here opposed to mere nature, or to a blind natural impulse; the choice of good is a reasonable choice, good is what reason universal or individual would necessarily choose. (ὑπό δοὺς stands here in a general sense for the special faculty or part of it φιλοσοφεῖ, the practical reason, the calculating discursive and moral part of the intellect, which directs us in our choice between good and evil. In Eth. Nic. vi, δοὺς in its proper sense, the intuitive and speculative reason, is distinguished from the διάων or discursive intellect, and its special virtue φιλοσοφεῖ or practical wisdom.

Or that, by the presence of which anything (not only man in soul and body, but also things inanimate) is put in a healthy or proper condition (is made what it ought to be, what is best, for it to be) and made self-sufficing (independent of all external conditions), and self-sufficiency or independence in general. On αὐτάρκεια see note on § 3 of Chapter V, p. 74, αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς. It is thus briefly defined Pol. iv (VII) 5, init. τὸ πάντα ἅγαθον καὶ δεισίδαι μηθοῦ.

Or any thing that is productive or preservative of (tends to produce or preserve) things of that sort, or that which is attended by such, or things that have a tendency to prevent and destroy the opposites of these. These forms of good belong to a lower order, subordinate to τὰ καθ αὐτὰ ἅγαθα, as means to the end. Eth. Nic. i 4, 1096 ὃ ἀιδός τὰ καθ αὐτὰ διακόμεια καὶ ἅγαθομένα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τοῦ ἄθροι καὶ φυλακτικὰ τοις ἤ τὰς εναντίους κωπηλικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

This is actually substituted for ὑπός in the corresponding passages c. 7 § 21.
§ 3. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχώς: 'the term attending upon admits of two different senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or subsequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, but life on health simultaneously'. ἀκολουθεῖν and ἐπισκεύαζεν are both used in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a 'consequence' in the ordinary acceptance of the words, but also an invariable or necessary attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a preceding concomitant, or antecedent, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, καὶ γάρ πρῶτον καὶ ὑστερον ἔκτις, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, πρῶτον ἕτερον ἐπίτερον λέγεται τετραχως...δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μή ἀντιστρόφων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐστι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὰ ἐν τῶν δύο πρῶτον διόνει μέν γὰρ ὑστερὸν ἀκολούθει εὐθὺς τὸ ἐν ἑαυτῷ, κ.τ.λ. (2) a simultaneous concomitant, ἐμα: as health and life, Rhet. i 6, 3; 7, 5. (3) a subsequent concomitant, or 'consequent', υστερον, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. ii. cc. (4) δυνάμεν, a virtual concomitant, by implication, as sacrilege necessarily implies, includes potentially or virtually the notion of theft or fraud, by the rule omne maius continet in se minus; and (5) reciprocal contradictorys regarded as consequences, Top. Β 8, 113 b 25, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀντιφάσιαν ἀκολούθησιν, or ἀντιστροφομοιώσεις, where two terms or propositions are 'convertible', ἀντιστροφή: such are ὁ ἀνθρώπος ζῷον, and τὸ μὴ ζῷον ὁκ άνθρωπος: τὸ μή ἢδον οὐ καλόν, and τὸ καλὸν ἢδον. It seems from this as if the primary sense of ἀκολούθεων was to attend or wait upon, and that of 'following' is a special and secondary signification under the general notion of accompaniment. Hence ἀκολούθεω becomes περίσσεων, a constant attendant, footman, or 'follower'. The 'simultaneous' kind of accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, ἀκολούθει μετ' ἔμοι, Lach. 187 D, μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκολούθθαι: and similarly Demosthenes and the Orators; and Xenophon joins it with σύν. Diog. Laert. vii § 125, τὰ δ' ἀρταί λόγους ἀντακολούθουν ἄλλοις, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα πάντας ἔχειν, of the Stoics. Plutarch. de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus.

§ 2. τὰ ποιμενικὰ τριγύρω: This triple division of productive causes or conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. 'Ponis tres species rerum conficiant quae ita distinguunt possunt. Quae conficiunt, aut sunt a

1 So Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 75. Sed haec consequentia dice, ἀκολούθεω; est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas: illa sequentia, παρεκμένα, quae posita facta sunt ant futura...hoc temporis, illud naturae.
ηπειρίξαι τα δε ως σιτία ύγειαια, τα δε ως το γυμνάζοσθαι, ότι 4 ως ἐπὶ το πολύ ποιεῖ ύγειαν. τούτων δε κειμένων ανάγκη τάς τε λήψεις τῶν ἁγαθῶν ἁγαθάς εἶναι καὶ τάς τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολάς· ἀκολουθεῖ γάρ τῷ μὲν τῷ μὴ ἔχειν τῷ κακόν ἀμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τῷ ἁγαθόν 5 ύστερον. καὶ η ἀντʼ ἐλάττονον ἁγαθοῦ μείζονος λή-
ψις καὶ ἀντʼ μείζονοις κακοῦ ἐλάττονοι· ὣ γὰρ ύπερ-

nature, h. e. intrinsecus, aut extrinsecus adhibentur. A natura sunt, ut temperies humorum, et bona corporis constitutio, conficiens est bonae valetudinis. Quae extrinsecus adhibentur aut sunt tanquam instrumenta, aut sunt actiones; instrumenta, ut cibaria:...actiones, ut exercitatio corporis, et deambulatio, quae frequenter bonam valetudinem effici. This account, though correct in the main, requires a little further explanation and modification. The ground of the distinction of the first of the three classes, of which the illustration is το ύγιάιοιν, the healthy state of body, active, actual health, as produced by ύγεια, health in itself, we learn from two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, V 11, 1144 a 4, ἡ πιευτικὴ καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν (ἀντὶ αἱ ἀρτικαὶ) σίφι ἃς ἄρτι ύγιαίαν, ἀλλʼ ἂς ἡ ύγεια, ὅτι η σοφία εὑρισ-

κεμέναι μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς διῆς ἀρσενῆς τῇ ἕξεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τὰ ἐνέργεια εὑρισ-

κεμέναι. Here ύγεια itself represents the formal cause of health, which is in-

ternal and essential (μέρος, ἕξισθαι), and develops, quickens, and stimulates the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality (ἐνέργεια), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and external cause, the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, συνηπρεῖ καὶ φυλάττει, καὶ ὅπως παραμείνῃ γεγέν. The second passage, X 4, 1174 b 25, is again an illustration: οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τόπων ἢ τε ἐν τῇ τελείᾳ καὶτο τι αἰσθητὸν τε καὶ ἀιδοθεός, σπουδαῖα δοτά, ὡσπερ εὐθεῖα ἡ ύγεία καὶ ὁ ἄρος ὡς οὐσία συναίδητοι οὕσα τούτου ὑγιαίοιν: on which the Paraphrast's (Andron-

icus Rhodius) commentary is, η μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ποιεῖ μὴ οὖσα (i. e. ἐνέργεια, not 'non-existent') τῷ τούτου ύγιαίοιν ἐνέργειαν, δὲ συνήπρει κ.τ.λ. as before. The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and secondly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only produces health ἐπὶ το πολύ.

§ 4. We now proceed to the application or illustration of the general principles laid down in the three first sections, which continues to the end of the chapter; τούτων δε κειμένων κ.τ.λ. Application of the two topics of ('consequents'), ἄμα καὶ ύστερον ἀκολουθῆν: the receipt of all good things is an instance of the latter, because it is followed by the possession of good things; and the loss or riddance of evil things, which is accompanied simultaneously by the relief from what is bad, exemplifies the former. This latter conclusion rests upon the principle, here understood, but stated in § 18, ὅ το ἑναρτίον κακον, τοῦτο ἁγαθον. Comp. also Top. Γ 2, 117 b 2, on λήψει καὶ ἀποβολή.

§ 5. ὥ γάρ ἔπειρε καὶ διέκλεις κ.τ.λ.] 'for the amount of the excess of the greater
RHETOIRIKHΣ A 6 §§ 6, 7.

ἐχει τὸ μεῖζον τοῦ ἐλάττωνος, τοῦτο γίνεται τοῦ μὲν 6 ἄλγις τοῦ δ’ ἀποβολῆς. καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθῶν εἶναι κατὰ γὰρ πάντας εὖ τε διάκειται οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικά τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικά.

7 περὶ ἐκάστης δὲ, καὶ τὶς καὶ ποία, χωρὶς ῥήτευον. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι πάντα γὰρ ἐφιέται τὰ ζῶα

over the less, the same is the measure of the gain of the one (good) and the loss of the other (evil). γίνεται, ‘becomes’, i.e. ‘amounts to’. The excess of the greater over the lesser good, and the excess of the greater over the lesser evil, is the measure of the gain in the one case, and the loss in the other; the loss of the evil being a gain, by the same rule as before, φ’ τὸ ἐπιτυχίων κακῶν, τοῦτ’ ἀγαθῶν.

§ 6. ποιητικά...καὶ πρακτικά[] virtues, besides being ‘productive of good’, like many other things, have also this special peculiarity, that they are effective of good by action. The distinction is, that whereas ποιητικά tends to some ἔργον or substantial enduring result, as a picture, or statue, or other work of art, the end of πρακτικά is action itself, and there is no further result. See the commencement of the Nic. Eth., and what is there said about these two τέλη. Ethics and Rhetoric are πρακτικά τρίχως, the arts of the painter and statuary ποιητικά. Compare Introd. pp. 16—19. By the distinction here taken we find brought into view the specially ‘practical’ character of the virtues, which, like the art that describes them, end in action: though besides this, some of the virtues, at any rate, produce lasting effect, and leave results beyond the mere performance of the act, some positive benefit (as an ἔργον) to an individual or the community. But the words here distinguished are elsewhere employed indifferently to express generally the power of producing an effect or result, as appears in the comparison of § §§ 3, 16; 6 § 2. Of the two, ποιητικά is most frequently used in the expression of this conception, as may be seen in the following sections.

All moral virtues must necessarily be each a form of good: for they produce a good moral habit, or condition, or constitution in those that possess them, and are besides productive (and effective) of good in their actions and the results of these.

‘Each of them, its substance or true nature’ (the first Category, τι ἄριστον, οὕτω, substance what the thing is, really and essentially), ‘and qualities’ (the third Category), ‘must be treated separately, ἀπόρατο, apart’. This is done in c. 9. The contents of the chapter to which reference is here made shew that ἰδεαλ are here confined to the ἡδιαλ or moral virtues, the ‘virtues’ ἅπαντα, and do not include physical, or any other, ‘excellences’.

§ 7. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθῶν εἶναι[ What is here taken for granted, as universally admitted, that pleasure is good (though not necessarily the good) is in both the treatises on pleasure, in the 6th and 10th books of the Nicomachean Ethics, carefully investigated and discussed, and the opinions held upon the question by preceding philosophers, as Eudoxus
and Plato, examined, Bk. vii, c. 12, seq. and x, c. 2. Aristotle's conclusion (in Bk. x) is that though pleasure may be regarded as good it is not the good, i.e. the supreme good, good in itself, because there are some pleasures which are not proper objects of choice and therefore not good. Eudemus (if the seventh book be his), seems rather to be inclined to the contrary view; it is said at any rate, c. 14, init., ἀνάγκη οὖν τὸν ἱδρυμὸν ἀγαθὸν τι εἶναι, and three lines further, ἀριστον τ' οὐδὲν καλῶν ἤδην τινα εἶναι. And at the beginning of c. 13, in answer to Plato's objection in the Philebus, we find, ὅτι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διά τινα μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ ἀριστον, ἐκ τῶν δὲ ὅλων. This difference of view between the master and pupil (on the supposition that Eudemus is the author of Bk. vii) is in fact in exact conformity with the difference of their respective definitions of pleasure; Aristotle defining it as the perfecting (τελειωμα) of the ἐνέργεια, but not our ἐνέργεια *itself*, and therefore not the 'supreme good'; whilst Eudemus goes further and describes it as an 'unimpeded energy', ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια: and in fact this variation may be regarded as one of the principal arguments for the difference of authorship of the two treatises on pleasure in the Nic. Eth. The principle upon which the fact is here assumed in the Rhetoric, is stated in both treatises of the Ethics; the universal recognition, namely, of the principle that pleasure is desirable. See vii 14 init. and x 2, 1172 δ' 35, οἱ δ' ἐνεργούν οἱ οἷς οὐκ ἀγαθοὶ οὐ πάντες ἐδύναται, μὴ οὐδέν λέγοντι δ' ἄγαθον πάντες δοκεῖ, τούτ' εἰσὶ φαίμα.

τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἱδέα τὰ δὲ κτ.λ. This division of καλῶν brings into view the physical and moral aspects of it united in the term beauty and right. καλόν as ἱδέα, an object of pleasure, is the physical beauty that pleases in nature and art; in καθ' αὐτὰ ἀληθῶν we are referred to the moral side of it, that which is 'fair' and right, which is an end in itself, in itself desirable, and to be sought on its own account and with no ulterior object. It is defined in this latter sense, c. 9, 3, δ' αὐτ' ἀληθῶν οἰς ἐναικείοι 3, (its being the object of 'praise' confers upon it its moral character) ὅ ἐν αἰσθήθαι δὲ ἔναθλον ἐν ἱδέα 2, ότι αἰσθήθαι. Comp. ii 13, 9, τὰ μὲν γὰρ συμβάλλειν αὐτά ἄγαθον ἄντι τὰ καλὰ ἀκόλουθοι. Eth. Eudem. vii 15, 3, έπειτα δ' ὅπερ τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τῆς ἰδεάς, δ' αὐτὰ αὐτὸν δὴν καθ' ἀληθῶν τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅταν δὲ αὐτὰ δὴν καθ' ἐνεργοτομβ ἰδεάς. On the καλόν as a moral end, the ultimate object and motive of human action, to which all action should be directed and all lower interests sacrificed, see the fine passage of Eth. Nic. ix 8, 1169 a 6, seq., particularly 20–27.

§ 8. αἰτὶ ἡ καθ' ἐν εἶναι] 'to describe good things singly', in detail, by an enumeration of particular kinds of good.

εὐδαιμονία] happiness, the universal τίλος, aim and end of life and
9 καὶ ἑνεκὰ αὐτοῦ πολλὰ αἱροῦμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἄν- δρια, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ 
10 αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ τοιαῦται ἐξεῖσι· ἀρεταί γὰρ ψυχῆς. καὶ 
ψυχεῖα καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώμα-

action. See especially Eth. Nic. 1 5, where happiness is defined by its 
three principal characteristics; it must be τέλειον, ἀνάρξεις, τὸ τῶν πρακ-
tῶν τέλος. These same characteristics appear in the definition here given 
in the Rhetoric: τέλειον corresponds to τὸ καθ’ αὑτὰ αὐτοῦ, its perfection 
or completeness being chiefly shewn in its desirability for its own sake. 
Eth. N. 1 5, 1097 δ’ 31, τελεστερόν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ διακρίνει τὸ δὲ 
ἐπερον, καὶ τὸ μαθεύσοντες δὲ ἄλλο αἰτητῶν τῶν καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθα 
ἀρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλώς δὲ τέλειον τὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ αἰτητῶν δὲ καὶ μαθεύσετε δὲ ἄλλο. 
τοιαύτων δ’ ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ’ εἰσὶ δοξεῖι ταύτην γὰρ αἱροῦμεθα δὲ δ’ αὐτὴν 
καὶ οὐδεδοντες δὲ ἄλλο, τῷ πάντων ἐξει τινὸς αἰρόμεθα ἢ δὲ δ’ αὐτὰ 
καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολογί-
ζοντες εὐδαιμονίαν. τὴν δ’ εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς ἀρετά τούτων χάριν, οὐ’ 
δέως δὲ ἄλλο: note on c. 5 § 1, p. 72. On ἀνάρξεις, the second characteristic 
of happiness, see c. 5 § 3, and note there, p. 74. The sentences of Eth. Nic. 
1 5, following those already quoted, are upon this same subject. The 
concluding summary of the contents of the chapter is, τέλειον δ’ τι φα-
νεται καὶ αὐτοίτες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕτω τέλος, which gives the 
third of the conditions in the Rhetoric. A precisely similar description 
of happiness is found in Eth. Nic. X, cc. 6 and 7.

§ 9. The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and a mere 
each extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. II 7, which is itself anything 
but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list 
is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues, 
σοφία and φρόνησις, but still omits several of those which are distinct-
ished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are 
analyzed in detail in Eth. N. III, IV, V, justice being treated separately at 
great length in the fifth book.

ἐξεῖ, the genus of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed, 
confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three, 
of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to ἄδεδωκεν, as a 
settled and permanent state, opposed to a temporary and changeable dis-
position. It is developed out of the ἁθόμος by the operation of ἔθιν, habit or 
association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a con-
firmed character, which shows itself in the constant exercise of similar 
ἐργαζεῖας, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite tend-
ency to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the ἐξεῖ, 
see Eth. Nic. II 1—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, Ess. on 
Ethics, I p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [= p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. on de Anima 
p. 311, and 366. Kategorienlehre, p. 95.

§ 10. ψυχεῖα...ἀμύων δοκεῖ εἶναι] This is one of many opinio-
ns. So the ‘Delian inscription’ quoted by Aristotle, Eth. N. 9, and Eude-
mus, Eth. Eud. 1 1, 1, with a slight variation; also in Theogn. Elieg. 235 
(Bergk), κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λοφὸν δ’ ψυχεῖν | ἱδίστων δὲ πέφυκ’ οὗ
τος καὶ ποιητικά πολλῶν, οἷον ἡ υύγεια καὶ ἡδονή καὶ τοῦ ζήν, διὸ καὶ ἀριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι δύο τῶν π. 31.
τῶν πολλῶν τιμωτάτων αἰτίων ἑστιν, ἡδονή καὶ
11 τοῦ ζήν. πλοῦτος· ἄρετή γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικῶν
12 πολλῶν. φίλος καὶ φίλια· καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸν αἰρέ-
13 τος ὁ φίλος καὶ ποιητικός πολλῶν. τιμὴ, δόξα·

τὸ ἐφ᾽ τοῦ τυχεῖν, for which Bergk gives in the second line, πρόγραμα δὲ τιμωτάτων τοῦ· τὸ ἐφ᾽ τυχεῖν. Soph. Creus. Fragm. ap. Stob. CII 15
(Dind. Fr. Soph. 326), καλλιστῶν ἵστ' τούθεν πεφυκεία· λόγον δὲ τὸ ζήν ἀνοσον ἑπόντων δ' ὅτι πάροικοι λήψεις οὖν ἐπὶ καθ' ἡμερὰς. Aripheon, Dithyr. I (ap. Bergk, Fragm. Lyric. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984 Ed. 2]), ύψια, προείλλοτα μακάρων, ματά συν ταῦτα τὸ λειτουργόν βιοταsoap—σίθεν δὲ χωρίς οὖν ἐνεαίρων ὕψω. See also a fragment of Licynnius, Fr. 4, in Bergk u. s., p. 840 [p. 986 Ed. 2] (a dihybramic poet and rhetorician, mentioned by Aristotle, Rhet. III 12, 2; 13, 5, and quoted, as Bergk supposes, in III 14, 5); Plut. de virt. mor. c. 10, quoting from some poet, ἂς τὸν σώματος ύψια—δοκεί μέγιστον ἀγαθῶν οὐτὲ γὰρ πλοῦτον χάριν ἢ τέκνων, οὔτε τὰς ἱσοδαιμονίας ἀνθρώπων βασιληδὸς ἀρχαῖος—τοῦ ύψαίναι μὴ παροῦσα. de fraterno amore, c. 2, ἃς χωρὶς οὔτε πλοῦτον, φασίν, οὔτε τὰς ἱσοδαιμονίας ἀνθρώπων βασιλείως ἀρχαῖος εἶναι τῶς χάριν καὶ δόξαν. (ap. Bergk not.)

§ 11. πλοῦτος, ἄρετή κτήσεως] The ἐργον, special office or function, that which it was intended by its nature to do, determines the ἄρετή or special excellence of anything. If wealth is the object of acquisition, and acquisition fulfils its proper function, its destination, the law of its being, in the accumulation of wealth; then the ἄρετή or special excellence of the art of acquiring is manifested in the attainment of that object, or the wealth amassed. Wealth as a ‘good’ secur here to be regarded as an end; if so, this is in contradiction to the more scientific doctrine laid down in the Politics I 8, according to which wealth is only an instrument, see note on p. 79 (c. 5. 7), and note 1 on the same page. However, as some good things are only instrumental and means to an end, we are not obliged to suppose that Aristotle regards wealth here otherwise than as one of those mediate ends, subordinate and subservient to some other and higher end. On the relation of ἐργον and ἄρετη, see notes on c. 2, 12, and 5, 4, and the ref. in the former.

§ 12. καθ' αὐτῶν μισῆς ὁ φίλος] This is an application of the general principle in § 2, that good in general is in itself desirable, to the special case of friendship. That a good friend, or the friendship of the good, is desirable in itself is made to appear in the course of a long and subtle argument in Eth. N. ix 9, of which the conclusion is (at the end of the chapter) δεισον ἐνα τῷ εὐφανειότατῳ φίλῳ ἑποδαίως. The words most in point here are, εἰ δ' ὁ μακάρων τῷ εἶναι αἰρέτων εὐτίκεια καθ' αὐτό, ὁμᾶν τῇ φύσει ὁν καὶ ἡδή, παραπλησίον δὲ καὶ τῷ φίλῳ ἔστιν, καὶ εὔφαμος τῶν αἰρετῶν ὁ εὖ. [See c. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only ‘pleasant’ and therefore good in them-
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 6 §§ 14, 15.

καὶ γὰρ ἵδεα καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεὶ

14 αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ’ ὅσ τι-

μοῦνται. δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν ποιη-

15 τικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν. ἐτι εὐφύοι,

selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them
from the respect of others, and so ‘good’ in this secondary or subordinate
sense likewise.

καὶ ἀκολουθεὶ αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] ‘and they are accompanied for the most
part by the actual possession of the things’ (natural gifts, qualities, accom-
plishments, acquisitions, military distinction, rank and fortune, and
such like) ‘which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply’,
ἐφ’ ὅσ τι πιστάτον, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they
receive the honour paid, or ‘on which the honours paid them rest, are
grounded, or based’. ἐφ’ ὅσ τ. might possibly be rendered ‘for which
they (the honour and reputation) are valued’; on which their value
depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems
more direct and natural.

The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when
honour is conferred, those so honoured are generally worthy of it, is that
a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expres-
sion of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended
on as true.1 With τὸ ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς εἰσεπίμενοις, or something similar,
must be supplied.

§ 15. εὐφύοι] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or
both; εὐφύοι τὸ σώμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, Plat. Rep. III 409 E. In de Soph.
El. c. 1, 165 a 5, we have εὐφυεῖστος applied to ‘a topic’, in the sense
(apparently) of ‘naturally best adapted to a certain purpose’. And in the
spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, εὐφύοι
τόπων occurs to denote the ‘natural advantages of situation’, opportunitas
locorum. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the
mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intellec-
tual dexterity, differing very little from ἀρχών. And so, infr. § 29 and II
15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 a 25, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τελεσθηκόρῳ ἡμῶν τινὲς
dίαιναι, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσποροι εὐφύεις. Top. Γ 2, 118 a 22, φιλολόγοι ἀρχών-
μεθα ὧν εὐφύεις εἶμαι δοεῖσθαι, ‘we deny that we are industrious in order
to gain the reputation of cleverness’. In Top. Θ 14, 163 0 13, ἡ καὶ ἀλή-
θεωσ εὐφύοι is defined, for dialectical purposes, τὸ δύνασθαι καὶ λέον
τελεθεῖν καὶ φανεῖν τὸν ψεύδον ὅσπερ οἱ περικότες εἰς δυνάμει ποιεῖν. In Eth.
Nic. III 7, 1114 a 9, it is used similarly to denote, sagacity in aiming
rightly at the true end, καὶ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ καλὸν τοῦτο περικότες ὡς τελεία καὶ
ἀληθεία ἐν ὑπὸ εὐφύοι. Rhet. III 2, 10 init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for
readiness in poetical invention. ἀφοῦ, the opposite, is ‘dull’ and
‘stupid’, Plat. Phaed. 96 C. In the Platonic δρόμοι, p. 413 D, it is defined,
ταχὸς μαθητῶν γένεσιν φοίτησις ἀγαθή ἀρετὴ ἐν φύσει.

1 This principle is in fact constantly appealed to by Aristotle, and is one of the
ordinary arguments to which he has recourse in the establishment of the doctrines
of his philosophy.
μνήμαι, ευμάθεια, ἀχύρνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ποιήτικα γὰρ αὐτάς ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν. ὀμοίως δὲ 16 καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι πάσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι καὶ τὸ γιν’ εἰ γάρ μιθήν ἄλλο ἔποιητο ἄγαθον, καθ’ αὐτὸ αἱρετῶν ἑστίν· καὶ τὸ δίκαιον συμφέρον γὰρ τι κοινῇ ἑστίν.

μνήμαι] Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in Trans. of Vienna Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 195) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) that as it is the faculty of memory that is here in question the plural is inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the exceptions are abundant. Parallel to this is ἀκοήμην, 'acts of recollection', de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed προσευχήμεια and ἔκπραξεις as examples in c. 5, 9; three more occur together in c. 11, 4, ῥαθυμαὶ, ἀποκάλυψις, ἀμφοτείρα. Eth. N. I 13, 1102 b 4, ἐν τοῖς ἑπεκουρ. II 1, 1103 b 19, τὰ ἀργαῖα, 2, 1104 a 27, γενεσίες, αὐξήσεις, φθοραὶ, b 25 τὰ ἀρτοὺς ἀπεδείχθη τιμᾶν καὶ ἡμείς. Pol. II 5, 1264 a 35, ἐλπίσεια τε καὶ πνευματίκαι καὶ δοξεῖαι. The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or instances of the manifestation of them. μνήμαι therefore means here, any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 1, 980 b 39, and Anal. Post. II 19, 100 a 5. [Also, in Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 25; X 2, 1173 b 19, Index Aristotelicius. S.]

ευμάθεια] which is equivalent to εὐφυσία πρὸς μάθησιν, is a particular kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. εὐφυσία ψυχής πρὸς τάχος μαθησιν. "Οροι Platon. 413 D.

ἀχύρνοια] ‘ready wit’, ‘quickness of apprehension’, is mentioned as a kind of εὐστοχία and distinguished from εὐστοχία (right judgment), but not defined, Eth. Nic. VI 9. The defn. of ὅροι Platon. is εὐφυσία ψυχής, καθ’ ἑν τὸ ἐν ἐν ἄκτιστοκε ἑσθώ τοῦ διόντος ἐχόντας νοῦ, which agrees very well with the preceding. It is therefore an intellectual (not moral) ‘presence of mind’, the faculty of seeing the point at once, or ‘ready wit’. In Anal. Post. I 34, init. it is thus defined, εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκίστῳ χρόνῳ (intuitive, immediate) τοῦ μίσου (the middle term of the syllogism, which expresses the cause), ἵνα εἰ τις ἵδε ὅτι η ἁλαγή τοῦ λαμπρῶν ἀπεῖρον ἐχει πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον, ταχὺ ἔνοσαν διὰ τὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπό τοῦ ἥλιου· ἡ διαλεγόμενη πλούσιοι ἤγον διότι διαλεγόμενη ἢ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχόρτοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ, which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the faculty, rapidity of apprehension, ταχὺ ἄνοσον.

εἰ γὰρ μὴν ἄλλο κ.κ.λ.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last mentioned of the three, τὸ γιν’, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. Sciences and arts are avowedly ‘productive of good’, and rest their claims upon that alone.

§ 16. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κ.κ.λ.] The argument is, justice is κοινῆ συμφέρον, it promotes the public interest, it is advantageous or expedient to society, whose interest it is that the laws should be duly observed and the rights of its citizens maintained, and evildoers punished, and all this is the effect of τὸ δίκαιον: but that which is useful or expedient is good, § 1,
§ 17. So far the good things treated of are universally acknowledged to be such, and we may therefore take it for granted that they are so. We now come to cases of doubtful good things, which are or may be disputed, and which therefore require argument for their support. ὁμολογήσομεν here stands for the rhetorical enthymeme, or rather, perhaps, for any kind of regular inference or ratiocination in general. See note on c. 2, 11, and c. 4, 5.

σχέδον] 'pretty nearly', 'about'. Used in qualification of a too general expression, just like τέσσερες εἰκόνες. The author means to say that he has given a tolerably complete list, or exact account of them; he does not profess perfect accuracy.

§ 18. ὧ τὸ ἐννοιών κακῶν, τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν] If, for instance, you can shew that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle himself places it amongst the topics which are 'open to question'. So Bacon, Cuius contrarium malum bonus; cuius bonus malum. Non tenet (this does not hold) is the 'redarguo', in its rebus quarum vis in temperamento et mensura sita est. Dum visant stultitia in contraria currunt. Pref. to Colours of Good and Evil. Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, Vol. vii p. 67. According to Aristotle, Eth. ÍI 18, there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀκραὶ καὶ τῇ μείζῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐννοϊας εἰσίν, ἢ τῇ μείζῃ τοῖς ἀκραῖς. When virtue, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, the rules hold; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed to one another, it fails. Categ. c. 11, 13 6 36, ἑννοιὼν δὲ ἐστὶν εἰς ἀνάγκην ἀγαθὸν μὲν κακῶν τούτο δὲ δήλων τῇ καθ ἑννοϊαν ἐπαγωγή, οἷον ὑπερήφανος καὶ ἀνθετείς δελίας, ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ὡς μὲν ἀγαθόν ἑννοιών, ὡς δὲ κακῶν τῇ γάρ ἐνδείξει κακῷ δοτὶ ὑπερβολὴ ἑννοιών κακῶν δὲ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὡς μείζον ἐννοια ἑκατέρας, ὁμοίως ἀγαθόν. ἐπὶ ὀλίγων δὲ ἐπὶ τοιούτων ἤδη τας, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἐπὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἑννοιών ἐστιν. 14 a 19, ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γίνεται εἶναι, ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἑννοιοῖς γίνεσθαι, ἢ αὐτὰ γίνεται εἶναι...ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακῶν οὐκ ἕστιν ἐν γίνει, ἀλλ' αὐτά τυχάναι γίνεται τινι δότα. Cic. Topic. xi 47, deinceps locus est qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt (Aristotle's ἑννοια, in his ordinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different genera, not extremes of the same genus), ut sapientia et stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut natae tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumenta talia existunt: si stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur: et boni talem sì malitiam. The dialectical topics of τὰ ἑννοια, in which this is not included, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7, 8. To this head may also be referred the topic of στίθημι, privatio, criticised by Bacon, Colours of Good
οὐ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει· οἱ οί εἰ τὸ δεί-λοις εἶναι μᾶλλον συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, ἐὴν ὄτι 20 ἄνδρα μᾶλλον ωφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις. καὶ ὁλως ὦ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἡ ἐφ’ ὁ χαίροντε, τούναντίον τούτῳ ὑφέλιμον φαίνεται· διό εὖ εἰρηται ἡ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίμος.

ἐστι δ’ οὖκ ἂει τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐθέν γὰρ κυλοῦντι ἔνιστε ταύτῳ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· οὔθεν λέγεται ὡς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, P. 1363.

and Evil, No. 6, cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, bonum. στίροςε and ἔξε, one of the forms of contrariety or opposition, Met. I 4, 1055 α 33, πρῶτη δὲ ἐναντίως ἔξε καὶ στίροςε ἐστιν. And Top. B 8, 114 a 7 (though in a different application), ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐνὶ τοῖς στερηθέντων καὶ ἔξεως συνεπειέ. Στίροςε contrasted with ἔξε is one of the four (Categ. 10, 11 δ 17) or five (Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20) kinds of opposition, ἐνεκείσθαι. Comp. supr. § 4, in which this is implied.

§ 19. Victorius quotes in illustration, Cic. pro Muren. c. 39, Si L. Catilina cum suo consilio nefario hominem quintos secum eduxit hac de re posses indicare, condemnaret L. Murenann: si interficeris posses, occiderit...Iademne igitur delecti amplissimis ex ordinibus honestissimis atque sapeintissimis viri indicabatur quod ille importunnissimus gladiator hostis reipublicae indicaret?

οὗ ἐναντίο] The gen. immediately following the ordinary construction ἐναντίον, is remarkable. The genitive after the adjective is accounted for by the comparison implied in it, just as it follows ἔθνος, ἄλος, διάφορος, διαφημία, διαφημίως, ἀλόος, ἀλλόρος. See for examples Matth. Gr. Gr. 366, on ἐναντίοι, Obs. 2.


ἐστι δ’ οὖκ ἂει τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.] This last rule is liable to exceptions, as in the case where the same thing, the same course of action or policy, happens to be for the interest of two adversaries: a common misfortune has often this effect of 'bringing' enemies 'together', or uniting them, as when the Athenians were forced into alliance with the Thebans by their common dread and hatred of Philip. συνάγει γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὁ κοῦν φόβος, Polit. VIII (V) sub init. 'Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows', says Trinculo in the Tempest (Act II Sc. 2), which illustrates the proverb. However, the ordinary rule is, that it is common interests that produce sympathy, συνάχει τὸ κοῦν, Eth. Nic. 14, ult.; and the example of Athens and Thebes is only an apparent exception, because in the given case the common danger had altered their original relations and engendered common interests and common sympathies and antipathies.
ΡΙΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 6 §§ 21—23.

21 οταν ἡ ταυτὸ βλασφερών ἀμφοῖν. καὶ οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή, τούτῳ ἀγαθῶν, ὃ δὲ ἀν ἡ μεῖζον ἡ δεῖ, 22 κακὸν, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα πολλὰ πεπάνηται ἡ δεδαπάνηται·

φανόμενοι γὰρ ἀγαθῶν ἡδὲ, καὶ ὁς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθῶν. ο.herokuapp ταύτῃ εἰρηταί,

καὶ δὲ κεν ἐνυχωλῆν Πριάμῳ

καὶ

αισχρόν τοι δήρον τε μένειν—

23 καὶ ἡ παροιμία δὲ, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν υδρίαν. καὶ οὗ

§ 21. οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ὑπερβολή] ‘that which does not admit of excess’; health, life, virtue, and all that lies in a mean state, happiness, are all ends in themselves, and desirable in and for themselves. Pleasure by this rule, which does admit of being carried to excess, is properly speaking no ‘good’.

δὸ ἂν ἡ μεῖζον ἡ δεῖ, κακὸν] by the rule, μόνον ἀγαθ.

§ 22. πολλὰ πεπάνηται ἡ δεδαπάνηται] ‘much labour or expense has been incurred’.

ἡδὲ] note on c. 1, 7, p. 13 ‘already’, for that reason alone, and without looking any farther. The time, trouble, and expense which we have spent in the pursuit of an object shows already, without any further consideration, or without our knowing whether it is really good or not, that it seems at any rate good to us: it consequently becomes an end to us, and all ends are good. ἀγαθὸν, οὗ ἐφίεται πάντα, 6, 2.

τὸ τέλος ἀγαθῶν] because ‘every art, science, action, and purpose has some good in view at which it aims, and which is therefore its end in every case’. Eth. Nic. init.

The two quotations from Homer are taken from II. Β 176, and 298. Vater observes that the half line quoted of the first does not convey the intention of the quotation; the ‘boast to Priam’ is not in point. The lines applicable are these: λέγοντε Ἀργεῖν Ἐλίνει, ἢ εὖ ἕνεκα πολλοί 'Ἀχιῶν ἐς Τροίᾳ ἀρέσκοντο φίλοι ἀπὸ παρίδος αὐτής. The second line, οἰνογενεῖς τοῖς δήροις τε μένους κεκληροτε κεκελῆς, became proverbial; whence Cic. de Offic. III 2, 6 (of the result of his son’s studies at Athens), ad quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis projectus, inanem redire turpissimum est.

§ 23. καὶ ἡ παροιμία δὲ] This δὲ, introduced after καὶ—always (except in Epic poetry, II. Β 80, καὶ δὲ σοι αὕτη μοίρα, Odys. Ι. 418) with a word or more intervening—is inserted as something additional to the preceding, which it enforces or emphasizes, and has in these, as in all other cases, a reference to μὲν expressed or implied. A first implies a second, and a second a first. Of μὲν implied in δὲ, see some instances in Herm., note on Soph. Phil. 86, and the reverse case, δὲ in μὲν, Don. New Crat. § 154, where the origin and derivation of the two particles is made out. The δὲ here may
be readily explained as in correlation to a suppressed μὲν after τὰύτα, ‘these first, and secondly the proverb’; or ‘these on the one hand, on the other the proverb’. It may be rendered ‘too’, ‘also’, or from the emphasis that it conveys, ‘in fact’, or any thing similar. This special usage, like the other senses of δὲ, is derived from the primary meaning of μὲν and δὲ, ‘one’ and ‘two’; and so, as conjunctions, in the sense of ‘firstly’ and ‘secondly’. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 769, 2, where a few examples are cited. Others are given in Paley’s note on Prom. Vinc. 994 (from Aeschylus): in Arnold’s note on Thucyd. II 36, 6 (from Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon): Plat. Rep. IX 573 B (ed. Tur.), καὶ μανίας δὲ.

It is found in all Greek writers, but is more common in Aristotle than elsewhere: Rhet. I 7, 18, 19, 20; 9, 29, 30; II 11, 12; II 11. 11, καὶ ἄρθρῳ δὲ: Eth. N. V 5, 1130 b 21, καὶ τὸ δεικνύον δὲ: Polit. VI (IV), 1, 1297 b 10, καὶ ἀλάθος δὲ: and again ν 16, καὶ ἡ πρώτῃ δὲ πολεμικά, de Anim. A 4, init. καὶ δὴ δὲ: c. 5, 411 a 7, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄλφα δὲ, B 3, 415 a 6, καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὲ, et passim. [‘Maxime in Ethicorum libro quarto octavo nono decimo,’ Eucken, de Arist. dicendi ratione I p. 32. s.] The same meaning is much more frequently expressed by these particles in the inverted order, δὲ καὶ.

The proverb, τὸ ἐκθέτω τὴν ἄδικαν, ‘to drop! or break the pitcher at the door’, after you have carried it home from the distant well with much toil and trouble, expresses the general conception of ‘lost labour’, ‘labour thrown away’. Erasmus, Adagia, p. 350, in foribus urceum, mis-interprets the proverb as expressing something vile and contemptible, not worth the trouble of taking up.

Another more common corresponding proverb is πλήμνῳ πληθοῦν, laterem lavare (Terent. Phorm. I 4, 9) ‘to try to make a red brick white

1 In the endeavour to represent these English words by precisely corresponding Greek terms, no difficulty is found in the case of drop: if καταφύγω λιμαν (Pl. Phaed. 85 A) is to break a lyre, it is equally applicable to a pitcher. But when we try to render ‘to drop’ by a word exactly corresponding (Ἀνιστροφος in its primary sense), the language seems to fail us. I examined all the analogous Greek words (that I could think of), βάλλων, βίττει, ἔν (‘to let go’, but intentionally), κέφαλι, and a dozen others, with their compounds, and found them all infected with the same vice, in respect of the representation of the word ‘to drop’, viz. that they all express a voluntary and conscious action, whereas drop is applied to an accidental and unintentional relaxation of the muscles, which cannot properly be called an action at all. The notion may no doubt be expressed by a circumlocution, of which the Homeric ἄρτετος, or ἔρεψῃς, χείρις (said however of the object, not the subject), co.np. Lat. fasceo, is a frequent example. We might also say (of the subject) περιπέρα τι πτωτόν or πτίττων, or (of the object) λαθάνει τεῦθος. But these are not single words. And I am brought to the conclusion that the Greek language has no single word to express the notion exactly; which is the less surprising, inasmuch as the French language labours under the same deficiency; the periphrasis laisser tomber being made to supply the place of ‘to drop’. ἄρθρου, Soph. Phil. 13, might seem to come nearest to the literal representation of it, were it not for Arist. Ran. 855, where the word undoubtedly expresses a conscious and intentional act. δὴ λόγῳ...καθεμοί ὀλιγήτευν, Plat. Phileb. 13 π.
ῬΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 6 § 24.

γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται, τοῦτ᾽ ἀγαθόν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
24 ὀσπέρ πάντες φαίνονται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετὸν· οὐδὲις
γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν ἐπανεῖ. καὶ δ οἱ ἐχθροὶ [καὶ οἱ
φαῦλοι] ἐπαινοῦσιν ὀσπέρ γὰρ πάντες ἦδη ὀμολο-
by washing it'. Theocr. Id. xvi 62, ἢ ὅλατι νίξεω θαλερῶν λοιδοί πλύσων',
and answering to our 'washing a blackamoor white'. Compare also Eur.
Iph. Taur. 116, οὐτός μεκρῶν μὲν ἠλθομεν κατὰ πόρον, ἐκ τερμάτων δὲ
νόστων ἀρνίμεν πᾶλιν.

περιμάχον φαινόμενον] 'apparently, manifestly, conspicuously (with
φαινόμενον in this sense, comp. II 2, 1, δεί) an object of contention'.
τοῦτ᾽ ἄγαθόν ἦν] 'this is, as was said', i.e. in § 2. This use of the
imperfect, referring to a past transaction or statement referred to in
present time, is so common both in Plato and Aristotle as to require
no illustration.

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ...φαίνονται] The acts and opinions of the great body of
people, the most of those that you know or have heard of, are as con-
vincing to the popular audience to which Rhetoric is addressed, as those
of all mankind if they could be ascertained. The fact therefore that the
possession of anything is much contested and coveted, implying that
a great many people seek after it and care for it, is as sufficient a proof to
them that it is a good, as if it could be shewn, as it ought by the rules,
§ 2, that it is the universal object of human aims: the sanction of 'the
many' is as good as an universal admission.

§ 24. τὸ ἐπαινετὸν] The proper object of ἐπαινετὸν is virtue, any kind
of practical excellence; ἄρτῃ, ἐπαινετὸν λόγον ἐμφανίζων μεγεθεὶς ἀρτής,
Rhet. i 9, 33. On ἐπαινετὸν as the test of virtue and the distinction of this
from ἐγκρίμων and εὐδαιμονικός, see Introd. Appendix B to Bl. I ch. 9,
p. 212 seq. It is there said that ἐπαινετὸν and ψύχος are the equivalents
of Butler's 'moral approbation and disapprobation'. This requires some
qualification. When the 'intellectual' virtues are included as the objects
of ἐπαινετὸν, as they certainly are in the Eth. Eud. II 1. 18, the approbation
loses its exclusively moral character. In Eth. Nic. I 12, Aristotle toget-
her with the moral virtues, justice, courage, 'goodness' in general,
includes also as objects of praise all kinds of ἀρτή or excellence, such as
strength and swiftness, which are manifested in action.

καὶ δ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν] Victorius, in illustration of the
former of these two topics, quotes Virg. Aen. xi 282, Stetimus tela aspera
contra, Contulimusque manus; experto credite quantus In clypeum assurgat,
quo turbine torqueat hastam. The prowess of Aeneas could not be
more highly extolled than by the praises extorted from his enemy
Diomede.

καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι] is rejected as a subsequent insertion by Muretus, F. A.
Wolf, Bekker, Brandis, and Spengel, because it is passed over unnoticed
in the explanatory commentary that follows, ὀσπέρ γὰρ—πεπονθότες.

1 θαλερῶν νίξεων is to be interpreted here not of the colour of the brick, but
of an unbaked brick dried in the sun, which melts away and turns to mud when it is
washed.
Vater alone defends it. The explanation of it is easy, and it is perfectly consistent with the context and with good sense. If the vilest and meanest, the 'worthless and contemptible', φαλοί, who are least likely to be sensible of merit in others, being almost devoid of right moral instinct, find themselves compelled to praise some signal act of valour, disinterestedness, or virtue—we are engaged here upon actions—a fortiori it must meet with the approbation of better judges, and be emphatically good. If with this reasonable explanation we take into account Aristotle's hasty and careless habit, twice already noticed, of interrupting an explanation or an argument by the insertion of something bearing indirectly on the subject, but not immediately appropriate, I think we may without scruple retain the words objected to.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερῶς... τοῦ ἀληθοῦς [for this is now as good as, equivalent to, an universal admission]. ἤδη, 'by this time', now that we have got as far as this, have reached, that is, the level of enemies, the extreme case of those who are interested in denying the merit—if they approve, all others must necessarily do so.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερῶς... τοῦ ἀληθοῦς There is a difficulty here which has much occupied the commentators, arising from the want of connexion, as the present text stands, between the two rules laid down, διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερῶς... τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, and the example (from Simonides) which is said, διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερῶς... τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, to follow from them: the example, according to the present reading, is not an inference from either of them. The best way of meeting the difficulty seems to be to adopt, with Spengel, the reading of the best ms A. This omits the words ὅσοι φίλοι τὰ γεγονότα καὶ γνωσθοῦν, without which the sense is clear and consistent. 'For it must be owing to its being evident that they are inclined to (would) admit it, just as' (it is equally evident that, by the same rule, in the opposite case) 'those who are praised by their enemies must be worthless', (because if your enemy approves of your conduct towards him, which is assumed to be hostile, it shews that you can have done him no harm: and therefore that you have been wanting either in courage or patriotism or energy or skill). Of this the example of the Corinthians is now a real instance, and their suspicion of Simonides' intentions may be traced to the general rule. 'And this was why the Corinthians conceived the suspicion that they had been insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, 'Ilium has no fault to find with the Corinthians' (which it ought to have had if they had done their duty). The Corinthians misinterpreted Simonides' expressions; his intentions were innocent, but he failed to perceive the inference that might be derived from them. The line of Simonides is apparently misquoted by a lapse of memory. The Schol. Pind. Ol. xiii p. 78, who cites it, has μανίδης (i) for μάνιδας; and this reading appears also in another reference to it in Plut. Vit. Dion. c. i sub init. (cf. Berkeley and Gaisf.), δίκαιαν φησὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις οὐ μιαῆς τὸ Ἰλιον ἐπιστατεύοντα μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ὅτι καταχωρεῖ οἱ περὶ Παισίου ἢ ἀρχῆς Κορινθίων γεγονότα συνεχόμενος προθύμως. Homer only says, II. 2 154 seq., that Glaucus himself attributed his origin to
ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οὐς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἔπαινοὺς. διὸ λειτοίδρησθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος.

Κορίνθιος δ' οὖ μέμφεται τὸ Ἱλιον.

25 καὶ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οἴον Ὁδυσσέα Ἀθνᾶ καὶ Ἐλένην Ἐθησάν καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον αἱ θεαι καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ὀμήρου.

26 καὶ ὀλὼς τὰ προαιρέτα: προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν.

Sisyphus of Ephyr or Corinth. If this be the true explanation of the reason why Ilium was 'not wroth', or 'found no fault', with the Corinthians, and Aristotle remembered it when he used the example, it seems that the instance is very ill chosen for the purpose of illustrating the rule. In this case nothing is imputed to the Corinthians except that the aid of Glauus and his men of Corinthian race compensated the Trojans for their own hostility, and therefore that Troy had nothing to reproach them with, which could scarcely be construed by them as an insult: and the example only applies to the rule which it is supposed to exemplify in this sense; that the Trojans ought by the rule to have been represented as having directly censured the Corinthians, if Simonides had intended to pay them a compliment; by the mere omission of this they thought that he had insulted them.

§ 25. Compare the corresponding topic of II 23, 12. On this kind of 'authority' see I 15, where it is exemplified under the head of 'witnesses', §§ 13 and 15. The φρόνιμος, the man of practical wisdom, skill and judgment, the 'artist' or expert in each pursuit, is the proper standard or measure to be appealed to in every disputed question. The general judgment of such well-qualified persons is the ἁρετή λόγω, which must be applied even to the determination of the due measure of virtue, which is a μετρήτων...αἰσχυρὰς λόγω καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ φρόνιμου ὀρθῶν. Eth. N. II 6, init.

§ 26. τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν] so Eth. X 5, ult., the standard of moral judgment is said to be ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ὁ ἀγαθὸς. IX 4, 1106 a 12, μέτρον ἐκάντω ἡ ἁρετή καὶ ὁ συνοπτικός. III 6, 1113 a 32, διαφέρει πλείων ὁ συνοπτικός τῷ τιθέμεν τῷ ἐκάτω ὁ ἁρετή, ἀνεκαβεῖ καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν δὲν.

προαιρέται] 'decided, distinguished by preference'.

Ἑλένης Θησείου] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate authority, πανταλῆς τῆς ἁρετῆς κηρυκτοῦ, for Helen, is actually introduced by Isocrates as one of the topics of his eulogy of that much calumniated lady, Helen. §§ 18—22.

§ 26. τῶν προαιρετῶν] 'objects of deliberate and voluntary choice'. The προαιρετῶν seems here intended in the more general sense in which προαιρεσθαι and προαιρέσθαι are employed in the ordinary language, and even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as I 2, init. ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα γνώσει καὶ προαιρετῶν ἀγαθοὶ τὐδε ὀρθῶν. προαιρέσθαι is defined in Eth. Nic. III 5, ult. βουλευτικά ἀρχέτε τῶν ὕπ' ἕμεν, 'an impulsive faculty (implying, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed
to things within our power—no one deliberates about things beyond his power, οὐ χρεία πλήρους. And again in precise conformity with this, de Mot. Anim. c. 6, ὁ προαλητικός καθαρός διανοιάς καὶ ἀφθαρσίας, διὰ τῆς κατὰ πρῶτον (is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) τῷ ἀφθαρσίᾳ καὶ τῷ διανοιατικῷ, (it is the object of the two faculties, and not the faculties themselves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) οὐ τῶν δὲ τῷ διανοιατικῷ ἄλλα τῷ τῶν προαιρετικῶν τίκος. Thus the προαιρετικός is composed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action: the intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the proposed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong. Though the προαιρετικός in its general and wider signification of ‘deliberate, voluntary purpose’ is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet in its narrower and specially ethical usage it is moral action alone that it originates and determines, ἀλλά ἐν τῇ τῆς ὑπέρτατης καὶ μακράς τῷ ζῷῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ πράξει, Eth. N. ΙΙΙ 4, init. Comp. ΙΙΙ 2, 310 ι. 31, ou γὰρ ἐν τῇ προαιρετικῷ ἄγων ἀνθρώπος τοῦ δικαιοῦ, ἄλλα τῆς μορφής. From the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be ‘a deliberate and voluntary moral purpose’. The principal passages on the subject of προαιρετικός are Eth. Nic. ΙΙΙ 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished from ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, which are mere animal impulses, on the one hand, and from βουλή, βουλευτικός and δόξα, on the other: ib. vi 2; and de Anima ΙΙΙ 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a motive principle.

τὰ εἰρημένα] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action; such as health, pleasure, and especially the various moral virtues.

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐξερχόμενοι καθαρὰ] This was an article of the received code of popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where one class of good things are ἔκεισθησατι τοῖς ἐξερχομένοις. This is a duty, and a part of justice. In Ῥhet. Ι 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of virtue, τὸ τοῖς ἐξερχομένοις γιγαντιαίῳ μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ επιλατάσσεται τῷ ἐν γὰρ ἀντιπεριβαλλόμενοι διείσατο, καὶ διὰ τοῦ μὴ ἔγκαιναι. ΙΙ 5, 5. Ῥhet. ad Alex. 1 (2), 13. Xen. Memor. ΙV 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, διὰ τῶν τελευταίων δρασμῶν κακάς διὰ τῆς τε, οὕτως ἡ εἰρήμενη κατὰ τὸ κύριον. Μετ. 808, βαρίαν ἐξερχομένοι καὶ φιλολογοῖν εὐμνής κ. τ. λ. Cic. de Off. 1, 7, Iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis nescat, nisi laessitus iniuria.

§ 27. ταύτα, sc. τὰ δυνατά.—τὰ γενόμενα ἰν ταρ καὶ τὰ βαρύτα γεγραμμένα.] Two kinds of possibilities; ‘things which might’ (ὡς, under certain conditions, possibly difficult) ‘be brought to pass, and those which are easily attained’.

1 Accordingly, Metaph. Θ 5, 1048 a 11, δρέσθης and προαιρετικός are distinguished; δρέσθης is the general and spontaneous impulse to action, which when controlled and determined by the intellectual principle, διάνοια, becomes the compound προαιρετικός, the deliberate moral purpose.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 6 § 28.

115
tά τε γενόμενα [ἀν] καὶ τά ράδιοι γεγονόμενα. ῥάδια
dὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· τὸ γὰρ
χαλέπτων ὄριζεται ἡ λύπη ἡ πλήθει χρόνου. καὶ ἔαν
ὡς βούλονται· βούλονται δὲ ἢ μὴν ὁμοίον ἢ ἐλαττον
tοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἐσται, ἐὰν ἡ λαυθαίη ἡ τιμωρία
28 ἡ μικρὰ ἤ. καὶ τὰ ἱδία, καὶ ἢ μηδεῖς, καὶ τὰ περιττα·

The distinction is between ends or things hard and unlikely, and easy
and likely, to be attained or obtained.

The same distinction of possibilities is found in Cic. de Inv. II 56,
169. (Victorius, who refers to it, quotes only the definition of facili.)
Atque in its omnibus quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri
possit operet considerare. Facile id dicimus, quod sine magno aut sine
ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest;
poste autem fieri quod quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longinquitatis
indiget, atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet
difficultatis, tamen, his suscepit difficultatibus, compieri atque ad exitum
persuoc potest: an excellent commentary on Aristotle's topic.

τῷ γὰρ χαλέπτῳ κ.τ.λ.] 'facility' is defined by the absence of pain or
laborious effort, or by the shortness of the time occupied in doing anything
or getting anything done, because difficulty is defined by the opposites.

ὁρίζεται ἡ λύπη ἡ πλήθει χρόνου] A various reading in several of
the earlier Editions is λύπη ἡ πλῆθος. In this case ὀρίζεται is the middle voice,
as it usually is in the sense of 'defining'. ὀρίζεται however, as a passive,
is found, though rarely, elsewhere, as Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 b 23,
ὁρίζεται ἔκαστον τῷ τῆλε, ib. IX 8, 1168 b 5, πῶθος ὲς ὁ φιλος ὀρίζεται, Pol.
VII (VI) 2, 1317 δ 39, ἀλγαρίχα γένει καὶ πλοῦτῳ καὶ ποιεῖν ὄριζεται, Theophr.
Pharm. Hist. Plant. 1 1, 6, ἢ μὲν ἀναμονῆς ὀρίζεται σχέσιμα χρόματα κ.τ.λ.
It is not to be included in the class of irregular passives formed from
neuter verbs, the act of ὀρίζειν being transitive.

καὶ ἔως ὡς βούλονται] sc. γενόμενα τί (οἷς τὰ πράγματα) ἔγαθον ἐσται, 'anything
that turns out as they desire'; any result, either of their own acts, or
of the course of events, such as they like; [Gaisford says, 'nescio an in ὡς
ὡς βούλονται' (a various reading) 'lative vestigia melioris scripturae, ὡς'
ὡς βούλονται.' This is not so suitable to what follows.] 'but what they
do like is either no evil at all, or less than the good (ensuing)'; and this
(the latter of the two preceding) will be the case, when (for instance) the
penalty (which is attached to some illicit gain or advantage) is either
unfelt (λαυθαίνει, escapes your notice, not the notice of others,) or trifling.'
In both of these cases the profit, or good, is greater than the loss, or evil.

§ 28. καὶ τὰ θεία] Things or qualities, special and peculiar, not
shared by the rest of the world in general, such as personal gifts, graces,
or accomplishments: anything that distinguishes a man from the mass.
Of the three kinds of θεία distinguished in Top. A 5, 102 a 18—30 (θειὸν
proper, the fourth predicabile, proprium), these are θεία ἄνδρος; the second,
are not absolutely and at all times θεία, but only at particular times, under
particular circumstances of time, χρόνοι; the third class, to which those

8—2
τιμή γάρ οὖν τῶν μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαύτα δὲ τὰ τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμις here spoken of belong, are ‘relative’ ίδια, ίδια πρὸς τα, special and peculiar, i. e., in this case, to a few men as compared with the rest.

ἀ μὴ δην (Ἀλλος Ἐχει) This is only a particular case of the preceding: in that the advantage is shared by few, in this the possessor stands alone. Anything excessively rare or unique, as a coin, a tulip, a piece of china, a book, may acquire a special value from this circumstance. Comp. Magn. Mor. B 7, 1205 b 29, τὸ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκείνῳ καὶ πᾶσι κατὰ σεὶς ἐγένετο. This feeling is characteristic of ambition, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἐκλειφθείσας μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμεῖας ολείον ἐστιν ὧν φιλοτιμεῖας ἐστιν ὧν μόνος βουλήμενος ἰχθὺς καὶ τὰ τοιούτα τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερήφανος.

περιττα] ‘things that are singular, preeminent, specially distinguished’ amongst their fellows or congeners, or among things of the same sort, ‘for by this they obtain greater credit’. περιττός is ‘odd’, singular, striking, remarkable’. From περί, ‘over and above’, ‘exceeding’, (Homer, περί δ' ἄλλως φορεί γενέσθαι, περί μὲν δαμαίων) the derivative περιττός passes into the metaphorical sense of surpassing, preeminent, standing out from the rest, out of the common way, extraordinary. This significatio of the word will be found illustrated in the Lexicons. Add to these, as marked examples of some of its various significations, Eur. Hippol. 437, 445, 948. Ar. Pol. II 6, 1265 a 10, in the well-known passage on Plato’s style, Ib VIII (9) 10, 1312 a 27, πρέξων περιττα (extraordinary, signal) καὶ δὲ ἦν ὁμορροός γίγνονται καὶ γεώργιος τοῖς ἄλλοις, ib. II 8 init. of Hippodamus of Miletus, that he became περιττόντως ‘rather odd, eccentric, extravagant’, in his dress and habits. Top. Z 4, 141 b 13, ἄρρεθε καὶ περιττῆ διδόσα. Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 3, of Protagoras’ dictum, (καὶν μέρος ἀθροιστος), οὐδὲν δὲ λέγει περιττόν φαινεται τι λέγειν, Rhet. II 15, 3, Probl. XXX I init. περιττοῦ (‘distinguished’ in any art or science) φαινεται μελαγχολείς ἄρσε. (Waitz, on Top. Γ 2, 118 a 6, illustrates other senses of the word in Aristotle.) Of excellence of style, Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 3, διδή, sub init. et sub fin. From περί again, in the sense of ‘over and above, exceeding’, comes περιττός as applied to an ‘odd’ number; the supposition on which the name is based being, that the ἄρρεθος ἀθροιστος, or even number, was the primary number—was in fact considered as the first arithmetical number, i being the principle of unity—the odd number is an addition to or excess over the other, the next step in advance.

The three kinds of good just enumerated are all repeated in c. 9. 25, 26, under the head of καλόν. As ‘goods’ they are in fact all of them of the specially ‘questionable’ sort, ἀμφιβαστήσαμα; supr. § 17.

τὰ ἀρμόττοντα] ‘suitable, appropriate’, specially applicable or belonging to them.

τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν] ‘things that naturally belong to them, or are due to them in respect of birth and power’.

1 ‘Odd’ in early English is sometimes employed by a similar metaphorical application to denote superiority to others, striking excellence. ‘For our tyme the odd man to perfoarme all three perfitlie,...is in my poor opinion Joannes Sturmius’. Ascham, Scholemaster, p. 113 (Mayor’s ed.). Richardson has omitted to notice this use of ‘odd’ in his Dictionary.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ A 6 § 29.

μν, καὶ ὃν ἐλλείπειν οἶονται, καὶ μικρὰ ἕν ὑδέν γὰρ
29 ἔττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατ-
έργαστα· δυνάτα γὰρ ὃς ῥάδια· εὐκατέργαστα δὲ ἄ
πάντες ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ὁμοίοι ἢ οἱ ἔττους καταφέω-
σαν. καὶ ὁ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἢ ἄπεχθησάνται
tοῖς ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οὖν θαυμάξουσι προαιροῦνται

ἀλλαίους ὀλεθρί̔ν] ἀλλάξεως with genitive, 'to come short of, be
deficient in'. 'And anything men think wanting to them, as appropriate,
or suitable to their condition' (a second case of ὅμως ἐρέστοντα, 'however
triffing'; they regard as a good, and eagerly pursue it): 'for none the less
for that (ὅτι ὃς μικρὰ ἐδεῖ) do they choose (deliberately purpose) to do
it'; i. e. to do things, to act, so as to attain their end. So Victorius,
who illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. 11 6, 8, O si angulis illē prosimus
accedat qui nunc denormat agellum. If this is right, as I suppose it is,
προαιροῦσθαι πρᾶττειν is carelessly written for ζητοῦσιν or ὕσπιμοιούν, or
ἐπιμενεῖ, or some verb that would imply the object of action, and not the
mere action itself.

§ 29. The things mentioned in this and the following section all of
them designate what is considered good because men like to do it.

τὰ εὐκατέργαστα] 'things easily effected, or easy achievements',
are considered as good, because they are possible, by the rule §§ 26, 27; they
belong to the second class of things 'possible', such as are 'easy'.

καταφέωσαν] sgr. 'ever succeeded in'; or indicating the notion of 'habit'
which the verb ἐρέων and its-compounds acquire. The secondary and
metaphorical significations of safety and success, from the notion of going
through a career, as a race, erect and in an upright position, without
stumble or fall, is well illustrated by the following passages of Sophocles,
Electr. 741, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἥλιον πάντες ἔφθασεν ἐρίστωμεν ἐρέων ἐν ἑλμῷ
ἐν ἑρώου ἐφθασον. Od. 21. 394, Τιτίκης, νῦν γὰρ ὅποι ο ἐρέων, ἀπορεῖ σα μέλους.
Ὅτα γέροντα ἐν ὑγνοῖσιν ὑπὲρ ἤποι πόλην.

ἄραρνται τοῖς φίλοις] 'anything by which one will oblige one's
friends'. ἀ cognate accus. for ἀνέφερα. In obliging a friend you may be
said to obligé yourself, a true friend being ἔργον αὐτός: Eth. N. 19, 9,
sub init. 1b. 1170 ὁ 7. 1b. c. 4, 1166 a 31, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔσσει ἄντι
πρὸς ταύτον, ἐστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἢλλος αὐτός.

ἄραρνται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς] 'or by which one may shew one's hostility
to (offend or annoy) one's enemy'. As before, ἄρα ἐχθεῖαι ἢαρεῖς ἐχθροῖς.
ἀπείθᾶτος πρὸς τοὺς, or τοῖς, is 'to make oneself odious or hostile to',
'to quarrel with', or 'to disoblige, offend, annoy'. Compare διαβεβλήθως
πρὸς, in Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristotle, to have a hostile feeling
between one, to be set against him, to quarrel with him (from διαβεβλή-
θεν, to set two people at variance, to engender animosity and ill feeling
between them, and hence to give one an ill opinion of the other, and so,
finally, to calumniate). Both of these, men think good and right, and
proper objects of pursuit.

θαυμάζειν, 'to look up to, respect, reverence, admire'. Valck. ad
ΠΡΟΤΟΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 1.

πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἀ εὐφημεῖται εἰσὶ καὶ ἐμπειροῦ. ῥῶν γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἴνοται, καὶ ἡ μὴ ὑποθέτως ἐπαυγετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὡν ἐπιθυμοῦτες τυγχάνοντες εὖ οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἤδυ ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται. καὶ μᾶλλον ἔκαστοι πρὸς ἁ τοιοῦτοι, οἴνοι ὁ θεόνοις P. 1363 ἐι νική ἔσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐι τιμῆ, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὑπαύνοι.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἕκ τούτων ἡ ληπτέον ταῖς πίστεις. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὑμολογοῦν—CHAP. VII.


εὐφήμεια 'clever', § 15, note on p. 105. Comp. c. II 28, Probl. XVIII 6, there quoted.

ἐμπειρομένοι[ those who have acquired skill by practice and experience, distinguished from the naturally clever and dexterous. Success, the attainment of one's object, in any practice or occupation for which any one has either a natural talent or an acquired aptitude, is regarded as a good, because it is more easily attained, § 27; 'more easily', either than by others who are not so skillful, or than in other pursuits and practices.

ἀ μηδεῖσα (μηδεῖσα, no definite particular person; μηδεῖς, no indefinite person, no man whatever); sub. πραξίζω δὲ. 'Hinc ducto argumento, apud Euripidem quidam divittias non se movere dixit, quas etiam saepè improbissimi homines facillime consecuti sunt: Fragm. Acol. 14 (5, Dind.) μὲ πλούσιον εἴσην' οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεῶν δὲ καὶ πάντως μὴ διηνυσθήσομαι'. Victorius.

ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον] All objects of desire are supposed to be good, all alpero, and ὑπαύνει, § 2. The desire of a thing therefore implies not only that the satisfaction of it will give you pleasure, but that you suppose it (φαίνεται) to be good.

§ 30. καὶ μᾶλλον ἐκαστον (ἀγαθόν γενόμεται ταῦτα) πρὸς τοιοῦτοι 'to which they are so and so', disposed in such and such a way. In the parallel passages of the Ethics this is expressed by φιλοτιμοῦσα. Eth. N. I 9, 1099 a 8, ἐκαστὸν δ' ἄντων ἢδυ πρὸς δ' ἔλεγεν φιλοτιμοῦσα, οἷον ἠπόσι μὲν τῇ φιλοτιμίᾳ, θεία τε τῇ φιλοθεώρῃ τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ τρόπῳ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῆς φιλοθεώρει καὶ δίκα τα καταφέτη τῇ φιλαρετίᾳ. Ιb. ΙΙΙ 13, 1118 δ 22, τῶν φιλοτιμοῦσαν λεγομένων. Ιb. IV 10, 1125 δ 15, πλεονακά τὸν φιλοτιμοῦσαν λεγομένων.

CHAP. VII.

The κοινὸς τόπος of μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον or degree applied to τὰ συμφέρον, expediency. Most of the special topics of this chapter are derived from, or at all events coincide with, those of the third book of the Dialectical Topics.' Brandis, über Ar. Rhet. ap. Schneidewin's Philologus, IV 1. pp. 14, 15, infers from certain slight differences of the mode of treatment, in the case of two or three of these topics in the two works, the later composition of the
Rhetoric; but in this latter work the references, tacit or acknowledged, to the Topics, are so numerous and so precise, that we do not need this indirect evidence to establish the point. The passages to be compared are, Top. Γ 2, 117 Β 11, with Rhet. I 6.3, and 7.5; Top. Γ 3, 118 Β 20, with Rhet. I 7.36; Top. Γ 1, 116 Α 29, and 6.8, with Rhet. I 7.8. Cicero, Topic. xviii 68—70, in a passage too long to quote here, enumerates the topics of Comparatio, following Aristotle very closely: most of Aristotle's topics of this chapter are found in Cicero's list. The topics of comparison fall under four general heads. Comparantur igitur ex quae aut maior aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectis; which are there severally illustrated at length. First, some general principles are laid down; then we are referred back to c. 6.2, for the various definitions of good; and then, (from § 3 to the end of the chapter), these general principles and definitions are applied to the determination of cases, special ὑπόθεσιν or ἡθις, of comparison of two good things, so as to show which of them in each case is the greater.

§ 1. ἀμφώsuch things, left to be understood.
§ 2. ἐτέρωSee note on c. 5.3, 6.2, 10.3.

ἐπιρέχω—ἐπιρέχομαιHae definitiones possunt declarari duabus lineis parallelsis, quarum una ultra alteram protenditur: item numeris, e.g. 6 et 9. Maior enim sive linea sive numerus et aequat minorem et excurrit: minor vero inest in maiori." Schrader. On the passive form ἐπιρέχομαι, see Appendix (B) On the irregualar passive (at the end of the notes to this Book).

toσοῦτον καὶ ἕντι so much and something over.

νῦν ἐπιρέχομαι' that which is contained or included in the other'.

καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἐκ της τ.κ.λ.] That all 'quantity', and all terms that express it, μέγα μικρόν, πολλό διλγον, are relative, πρὸς τι, we learn from the Categories, c. 6, 5 Β 15—29, of which this passage is a summary repetition. The same thing, as a mountain or a grain of millet, when compared with two different things, is called great or little, greater or less—and so of 'many' and 'few'. None of them is absolute αὐτό καθαυτό: all of them are relative to something else, with which they are compared, πρὸς τι, πρὸς ἄλλον.

"And 'greater' and 'more' have always reference to a 'less', and 'much' and 'little' to the average, magnitude (τῷ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, the object to which the term is applied being thereby compared with

1 If πολλόκαὶ διλγον are here intended to include 'many' and 'few', πολλόι καὶ διλγον, as they most probably are, since they occur in the Categories and are wanted to complete the list, we must extend the τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος to number, πλῆθος, as well as magnitude.
καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχουν μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπον 3 μικρὸν, καὶ πολὺ καὶ ὀλίγον ὑσιαῦτως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἁγαθὸν λέγομεν τὸ τε αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἰρετῶν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφιέται, καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἀν καὶ φρονήσων λαβαντα ἐλειτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικὸν, ἢ δὲ ἐπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ δ' οὐ ἕνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ, τέλος δ' ἑστὶν οὐ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἁγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ταύτα πεποιθός, ἀνάγκη τὰ τε πλεῖω τοῦ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττῶνων,

its congeners, as a mountain or man with the average, τοῖς πολλοῖς, of mountains and men, in order to estimate its size: and that which is called 'great' exceeds (this average ordinary size), whilst that which falls short of it is called 'small', and 'much' and 'little' in like manner. 1

§ 3. The following definitions of good are repeated from c. 6. 2, with a few trifling alterations. This section is translated, and the illogical character of the construction explained, in Introd. pp. 177—8.

ἀὑρὶ δὲ ἄγαθον τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ταύτα πεποιθός] This clause contrasts the notion of good in itself, καὶ ἁυρὶ, here expressed by the dative ἁυρὶ 'to', or, 'for and by itself', with good as the universal τὸ ἀλλο, the object of all men's aims and aspirations. Schrader, Vater, Bühle, and Bonitz (Arístotelische Studien, I p. 89), are in favour of ἁυρὶ and αὑρὶ, which would thus contrast 'good to the individual with good in general'. Eth. N. vii 13, init. ἁγαθοὶ δικαίοι, τὸ μὲν ἀλλος, τὸ δὲ τιμ. Top. Γ 1, 116 δ 8, τὸ ἀλλότριον ἁγαθοῦ τοῦ ἀλητικοῦ. This use of the pronoun is quite in conformity with ordinary Aristotelian usage, as infra § 35, τὸ αὑρὶ καὶ ἀλλος, and frequently elsewhere. Vater says that the Greek Scholiast gives αὑρὶ as well as αὑρὶ: and Bonitz adds that Muretus' rendering, cuique autem hominis id quod sit est affectum ad ipsum, shews that he followed this reading. Nevertheless it appears that there is no manuscript authority for the change, and Bekker and Spengel have retained ἁυρὶ and αὑρὶ.

ἀνάγκη ...μείζων ἁγαθόν εἰμι] Top. Γ 2, 117 a 16, ἐν τοῖς πλεῖον ἄγαθα τῶν οἰκτικῶν (ἀπεριτέρων), ἡ ἀπάθει, ἡ δ' ἐν τῷ ἔντερο τοῖς ἀντίστροφον ἐνυπαρχεῖ, τὰ ἐλάττων ἐν τοῖς πλεῖστοις. Two enstasis ('reprehensions of the fallax 1 Bacon calls them, Colours of Good and Evil'), objections, or instances opposed to the universal validity of this rule, are next given: (1) when one thing is done for the sake of another, to attain a certain end, as getting well, healthy practices for the sake of health; in this case the two together are in no way preferable to health alone: (2) and things not good accom-

1 Gaisford refers to Harris, Philosophical Arrangements ('arrangements' mean collections of notions under general heads; and the 'arrangements' that he treats of are Aristotle's summa genera, or Categories), ch. 9 p. 191. Harris merely repeats what Aristotle had already said in his Categories to which Gaisford does not refer.
συναρμομένου του ένος ἢ τῶν ἐλαττώνων, μείζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ ἑδε ἐνναύρχου ὑπερέχῃ. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχη, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου. οἷον εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἀνήρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζων: καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζων, καὶ ἀνήρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων. ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αἱ ὑπερέχαι

panied by a single good (so Waitz), may be preferable to several good things, as happiness, in conjunction with something not good, to justice and courage together, and ταῦτα μὲν ἡσυχία μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνω ἡσυχία (ἁρπαγωγὰς ἄνω) καὶ ταῦτα μετ’ ἀληθείας ἢ μετὰ λύπης.

ὑπερέχει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] On υπερέχει as a test of excellence, besides other topics of this chapter, comp. c. 9, 25, 39, Eth. N. IV 8 init. there quoted. The opposition of the active and passive, superiority and inferiority, occurs Eth. N. ib. 1124 ὅ 10, τὸ μὲν γὰρ υπερέχοντος, τὸ δὲ υπερεχομένου.

§ 4. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου υπερέχῃ κ.τ.λ.] Top. Γ 2, 117 δ 33, ἐπὶ εἰ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τοῦτο βέλτιστον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τούτῳ βελτίων τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἄγγοι βελτίωτον, οἷον εἰ βελτίως ἄνθρωπος ἦσαν, καὶ ὁ βελτίωτερος ἄνθρω·

A practical application of this rule occurs in Pol. IV (vii) 1, 1323 δ 13, ὅπως τι δεῖλαν εἰς ἀκολουθεῖν φιλοσοφὴν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἁρίστην ἑκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπερέχει, ἐνεργοῦ ἀπόκριται ἐκ διάθεσιν αὐτὴς ἐξαραθείαν τοῦτον. ἀνετ’ εἶναι ἐστὶν ἡ ἴσχυς καὶ τῆς κτίσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμητέρων καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἴμιν ἀνεκχαίρητο καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἁρίστην ἑκάστου ἀνάλογον τοὺς ἔχειν.

ἀνάλογον ἔχουσιν ‘are proportional to one another’.

In Bacon’s Colours of Good and Evil’, (‘a table of colours or appearances of things, as places of persuasion and dissuasion, and their several fallaxes, and the elenches of them’) this topic is given in the form, cuius excellens vel exuberantia melior id lato et genere melius. ‘This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax; and he proceeds accordingly to ‘reprehend’ it. Bacon’s works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, vol. vii. p. 78. He certainly proves the non-universality of the rule; but by the theory of Rhetoric all these positions are alike open to question, and can always be argued on either side.

1 Some of the topics selected for ‘reprehension’ are identical with those of Aristotle, and probably borrowed from him. The meaning of the word ‘Colours’ in this application is thus explained by Erasmus, Adagia, s. v. fuscus, p. 1915, “Qui ad exornationes atque figuras se conferunt apud Gallos proverbio dicuntur ‘rhetoricis coloribus’ uti: hoc est, fucatis pigmentis, quibus nihil ineptius si bonis sententia non fuerint conjuncta”. And by Bacon himself in his preface.
§ 5. καὶ ὅταν τὸ δὲ μὲν τὸ δὲ ἐπηται, ἕκειν δὲ τούτῳ μὴ ἐπεται
dὲ ἡ τῷ ἁμα ἡ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἡ τῇ δυναμεῖ ένυπάρχει
gὰρ ἡ χρήσις ἡ τού ἐπομένου ἐν τῇ θατέρου. ἐπεται
dὲ ἁμα μὲν τῷ ὑγιαίνει τὸ ζῆν, τούτῳ δὲ ἕκειν οὐ,
ὕστερον δὲ τῷ μαυβάνει τὸ ἐπισταθαι, δυναμεῖ δὲ
tῷ ιεροσυλέιν τὸ ἀποστερεῦν' ὁ γὰρ ιεροσυλήσας κἀν

§ 5. καὶ ὅταν τὸ δὲ μὲν τὸ δὲ ἐπηται κτ.λ.[ 'and whenever one thing
'follows' (i.e. attends upon, always accompanies it, in one of its five
senses) 'another, but not reciprocally (or conversely, the other does not
always follow it')]. Any good A, which is necessarily accompanied by
another good B, where the converse does not hold, must be the greater of
the two; because the one (A) always implies the presence of B, and
includes the use of it, whereas this is not always true of the converse;
and when there is no such reciprocal consequence A must be superior to
B. Let A and B be health and life; life invariably accompanies health,
but health by no means invariably accompanies life: and therefore from
this point of view health may be regarded as superior to life.

ἐπηταὶ δὲ ἡ τῷ ἁμα κτ.λ.] On the various senses of ἐνσυλία
and ἀποστερεύει see note on c. 6, 3.

δυναμεῖ ένυπάρχει γὰρ κτ.λ.] 'Potential concomitance or accompani-
ment', is explained as 'the inheritance, (i.e. the virtual existence,
which may be developed into actual, active, existence, or realized, ἐνφηνεια,) of
the use or practice of the consequent or concomitant in the other',
that namely which it accompanies. The higher crime of sacrilege or temple
robbing, for instance, necessarily implies, virtually contains, the lower
crime of simple theft or fraud ('cheating'), the lower habit always accom-
panies, but not necessarily in a state of activity, the higher, and is
included in it: omne minus continet in se minus. Or thus, the use of
cheating, fraud, resides, is included in, sacrilege, not actually, in a
fully developed realized state, ἐνφηνεια, but in a dormant state, latent;
it is a faculty or capacity, always ready and liable to be developed into actual
sacrilege.

The use of the general topic of 'consequence' is explained, Top Γ 2,
117 α 5, ἤτι ὅταν δύο τινα ἡ σφόδρα αὐτοίς παραλέλισα καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα ἐνυ-
πάρχει μηδεμίῳ συνιδεῖν τοῦ ἐτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἐτέρον, ὅπως ἀπὸ τῶν παρερχόμενων'
γὰρ ἐπηταὶ μείζων αὐθάντων τοῦθ' αλμετώτερον. ἢ δ' ἂ τὸ ἐπόμενα κακά, ἢ τὸ
ἐπταυτὸν ἀδισαφεῖ κακόν, τοῦθ' αλμετώτερον. ὅταν γὰρ ἀμφότεροι αλμετών
όδην εἰσέπεσε τι παρέπεσα. δικαίω δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπηταί ἢ σκέψει
cτ.λ. See note, c. 6, 3.

1 ἀποστερεύει is properly 'to defraud or cheat', and especially applied to
quotes Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 373, ἀποστερεύεται ὅτι ἦν παραλαθήκεν παραλαθή
εἰς διάδοχον χρήσεων καὶ οὐκ ἔθελον διαλύειν αὐτῷ τὰ ἔθνοι. [See Shilleto's note
on Thuc. ι 69, 1. 5.]
§ 6. *καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχουσα τοῦ αὐτοῦ *κ.κ.λ.*) 'anything which (all that, plural) exceeds the same thing by a greater amount (than a third thing) is the greater of the two; because it must exceed the greater also (i.e. as well as the less)'. This with the mere substitution of *μεῖζον* for *ἀληθέστερον* is taken from Top. Γ 3, 118 δ 3, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἶδο τινὰ τυχὸς ἐν τῇ ἀληθέστερᾳ, τὸ μέλλον ἀληθέστερον τῶν ἡττων ἀληθέστερου ἀληθέστερον. Let A be 9, B 6, and C 3. A (9) exceeds C (3) by a greater amount than that by which B (6) exceeds it, A therefore must be greater than B—*must* be (ἀνάγκη), because, by the hypothesis, it is greater than the greater of the other two. This is certainly not a good *argument*, though the fact is true, and the application easy: and yet I think it is what Aristotle must have meant. There is no various reading, and no suspicion of corruption. The interpretation is that of Schrader, the most logical of the Commentators on the Rhetoric. And it seems, as the text stands, the only possible explanation. The fact at all events is true; and the only objection to the explanation is that the *γὰρ*, which professes to give the reason, does in fact merely repeat in other words the substance of the preceding proposition. I believe that Aristotle, in framing his topic, *meant* by the first clause to state the fact, and by the second to give, as he thought, the reason: and that the expression actually adopted is one of the very numerous evidences of haste and carelessness in his writings. On the application of the topic, see Introd. p. 180.

§ 7. *καὶ τὰ μεῖζονα ἑγαθὸν ποιητικά κ.κ.λ.*) 'Eundem hunc locum commutatas verbis exposit in IIII Topicorum c. I (116 δ 26), οὐ διὸ ποιητικών έστιν, οὐ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ αὐτό βέλτιον. Ad haec verba Alex. Aphrod. p. 125, δεικνύει διὰ βεβαιώσεως τῆς τούτου διapproisis τοῦ τούτου: οὲ ἔτι τοιούτου. οὖ διὸ εἴ τινα διὸ τόλμω ποιητικά, οὐ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον καὶ αληθέστερον καὶ αὐτό βέλτιον. οὕτως πωδεία γιαγορῶν δειπνόντι 'δ' ἀκριβῶς, οὐ γε γιαγορά μὴ ύψεις ἐπι ποιητικά, πωδείς δὲ φρονήσεως, καὶ οὐκ ή φρονήσει τῆς ύψεις αληθέστερον πάντως τὸ γυμνάζωντοι τοῦ χρηματίζωθαι αληθέστερον τοῦ μόνῃ γάρ πλούσιον, τὸ δὲ ύψεις ποιητικόν, βέλτιον δ' ή ύψεις πλούσιον.' Victorius. τοῦτο γάρ ἢ] 'this is what was meant by'; this *is what was* (said to be) good; *viz.* in § 3.

τό...ποιητεία ἐστιν] On this Aristotelian formula which denotes the abstract conception of a thing by the mind, as opposed to its actual existence as an object of sense, see Trendel. *de Anima*, p. 471 seq. and on I 1, 2; II 1, 8, also in *Rheinisches Museum* 1828, Vol. II 457 seq., *Kategorienlehre*, p. 35 with ref. in note, and Waits, *Organ*. Vol. II p. 386. The distinction, which is nowhere expressly stated, is, as may be gathered from numerous passages, the following: *τὸ μεγάλον εἶναι univrsam esse notionem, qua res constituitur, a materia avocatam, universa cogitatione conceptam—the λόγος of the thing—*τὸ μεγάλον vero ad singula quaque pertinere quae sub sensus cadant.* Metaph. Ζ 15, 1039 δ 25, οὖ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ
οὐσαύτως· εἰ γὰρ τὸ υγιεῖνον αἰρετῶτερον τοῦ ἵδεος καὶ μείζον ἁγαθόν, καὶ ἡ υγεία τῆς ἱδονῆς μείζων. 8 καὶ τὸ αἰρετῶτερον καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ’ αὐτό, οἷον ὀλεία εἰναι ἄλλα τὸ τῆς τῇ ὀλείᾳ. Anal. Post. II 4, 91 b 5, ἀληθῶς γὰρ πάντως τὸ ἀνθρώπου ἐναι ὡσεὶ εἰναι, ὡσπερ καὶ πάντα ἀνθρώπων ζῶν, ἀλλ’ οὕς οὓς ὀστά ὡστά εἴναι. Phys. I 3, 4, οὕτω γὰρ τὴν συνεχείαν ἐν τοῖς τὸ λιγαῖον οὕτω τῷ λόγῳ ἐπλοῦ τὸ εὕπτω κ.τ.λ. It abounds in the de Anima. Why and when Aristotle employs it, and whether the distinction is always necessary and appropriate, are questions that I will not undertake to answer. [Index Aristotelicus, p. 221 a 34—40; p. 764 a 50—p. 765 a 6. S.]

The Syntax of the phrase, which only Trendelenburg, as far as I know, has attempted to explain, seems to be this:—The dative is in apposition with a supposed νοῦ, τὸ τούτῳ μεγάλιτέρῳ, and the construction is analogous to ὡστάν συνελάβοντες εἰς τοῖς, I 10, 18. Other instances of a similar use of the dative, which lead up to the explanation of this, are such as Thuc. I 24, ἐν δεξίᾳ οὐκ οὐκεῖται τοῖς τόποις κόλασιν: and others are to be found in Math. C. G. C. § 388. καὶ οὗ τὸ συνομίκουν μείζον ὀσυάτως] ‘and that of which the productive agent or producing cause is of a higher order, (superior), follows the same rule’: that the product or result of the superior cause or agent is superior in a comparison between two. If wholesome food and exercise which produce health are more desirable and therefore superior to things which are merely pleasant, then the result of the former, health, is superior to the result of the latter, pleasure.

§ 8. καὶ τὸ αἰρετῶτερον καθ’ αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ’ αὐτῷ] Top. II I, 116 a 29 καὶ τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ αἰρετῶν τούτῳ δι’ ἐτερον αἰτρῶτερον, ὡστάν τὸ υγιεῖνον τὸ γεγομένον τὸ μὲν γὰρ δ’ αὐτῷ αἰρετών, τὸ δ’ δὲ ἐτερον. And again, Ib. 8, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρᾶκε ἀγαθῶν τούτῳ αἰρετῶτερον, ὡστάν τὸ γεγομένον τὸ πεισμοῦν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρᾶκε ἀγαθῶν, τὸ δ’ δὲ τὸ δεῖκνυμι τῆς τομῆς. These two though differing in expression seem to be reducible to the same head, and, from the examples given, applicable to the same cases: for the absolute good is that which is in itself desirable, and conversely; and τοῖς—

1 Trendel. in Rhein. Mit. 1828, Vol. II p. 481—3. The author, who has discussed with great learning and ingenuity the meaning of this Aristotelian technicality, and its relation to τὸ τῷ ἐδρα, is, it seems to me, less successful in his grammatical explanation. I think that from the analogy of similar constructions of this dative in the ordinary language, the use of it here must needs be a case of attraction, as I have explained it in the note. Trendelenburg, who takes nothing into account but the possible meanings of the dative (or, as he rightly prefers to call it, the ‘accepive’) case, locative, instrumental, accepetive, selects the last of the three as that which belongs to the dative in this phrase. τὸ μεγάλα ἐδρα express, according to him, ‘the abstract conception (τὸ ἐδρα) belonging to (given to and received by) magnitude’: making this dative depend solely upon ἐδρα, and leaving out the attraction to a word in the dative, actually or hypothetically preceding, as in any way concerned in the ‘government’ of it. This is all that I have to object to in Trendelenburg’s paper: in the rest he has shewn the same ability and intimate knowledge of his author which characterizes all his other writings upon Aristotle.
ΠΡΟΤΟΚΙΚΗΣ Α 7 §§ 9—11.

ισχύς ὑγιεινοῦ, τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὐτοῦ ἐνεκα, τὸ δὲ τ. 1364. ἐκτὸς, διότι ἦν τὸ ἀγαθόν. κἂν ἦ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ

9 αὐτοῦ, διὸ ἦ τὸ ἀγαθόν. κἂν ἦ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ

δὲ μὴ τέλος. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον ἐνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ,

10 ὁτὸν τὸ γυμνόκεσθαι τοῦ εὖ ἑχειν τὸ σῶμα. κἂν τὸ

ἤττον προσδέμενον θατέρου ἡ ἑτέρων αὐτράκεστε-

ροὺν γὰρ. ἦττον δὲ προσδείται τὸ ἐλαττόνον ἡ ῥαῖνον

11 προσδέμενον. κἂν ὅταν τοῦτο μὲν ἄνευ τοῦτε μὴ ἦ

ἡ ἡ μὴ δυνατόν ἢ γενέσθαι, θατέρον δὲ ἄνευ τούτου αὐ-

σθαν ἡ example in the second case of particular good, is only good as

the means to an end, δὲ ἐποίησαν.

ἰσχύς ὑγιεινοῦ] strength is more desirable in itself; the 'wholesome' only as

the means to an end, health. Strength is considered by Aristotle not as

absolutely desirable ἀπετέλον καθαύτα, but only relatively to other things—

'more desirable in itself than many others.' Brandis, Philologus, iv, i, p. 44.

ἐπέρ ἐν τὸ ἀγαθόν] ἦν, § 7. The reference is to 6 § 2 p. 97.

§ 9. καὶ ἦν τὸ μὲν τέλος κ.τ.λ.] Top. I 1, 116 b 22, καὶ τὸ τέλος τῶν

πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀπετέλον δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ δυοὶ τὸ δέσμον τοῦ τέλους. The

end, the ultimate object of your aims, must always be more desirable

than the means which are only serviceable for the attainment of that end,

as health and exercise.

§ 10. τὸ ἠττον προσδέμενον θατέρου ἡ ἑτέρων] 'that which less stands in

need of any subsidiary aid' (to make it a good), 'either of the other' (when

two things are brought into comparison, as wealth and health), 'or of

other things (in general).' A topic, which may be brought under this of

the Rhetoric, but is not identical with it, occurs in Top. I 2, 117 a 37,

where justice is preferred to courage on the ground of its comparative

ἀνάρεσις, though this word is not there employed. Victorius quotes in

illustration Virgil's comparison of the 'olive' and 'vine.' Georg. II 421, 2

and 428. (Victorius has here quoted from memory, and forgotten the

original. It is not the 'vine' but 'poma', of which is said, υι propría

ninatur opisque hand indigis nostrae; and the example is hardly in

point. The note is cited by Gaisford without remark).

ἀνταρκέστερον] 'it makes a nearer approach to independence, self-

sufficiency': appealing to the definitions of good in c. 6, 2, of which τὸ

ἀνταρκέσεις is one. On ἀναρεσία, note on c. 5, 3, ἡ δ' ἀνάρεσις τέλος καὶ


ῥαῖνον] 'easier' to do or to get, to effect or procure, πρὸς τοὺς ἤ ποιεῖν

ἐκτοποθεῖν.

§ 11. καὶ ἦττον κ.τ.λ.] 'and any case in which one thing cannot exist

or be obtained (by acquisition or production) without some other, but the

other can without it.' As agriculture, compared with the other arts, Xen.

Εκον. v. 17 (Victorius). Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 13, Ptolomæon nello mutin

Thrasivulus sinea Alcibiadse gessit, ille n ullam rem sine hoc. Schrader.

He also quotes from Plutarch, Apothegm. Reg. § 84, a saying of Age-

silaus about the superiority of justice to virtue; it is the same example as

occurs in the Topics (quoted on § 10) Γ 2, 117 a 39.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 12.

ταρκέστερον δὲ τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ἀστεὶ φαινεῖται μείζον
12 ἀγάθων. κἂν ἦ ἄρχη, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἄρχη. κἂν ἦ αἴτιον,

§ 12. κἂν ἦ ἄρχη] supply τὸ μὲν, and with αἴτιον in the following topic.

On the omission, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 288, Obs. 4.

ἄρχη] in this topic, is used in its most general and popular sense, an
‘origin’, or ‘beginning’, or ‘source’. In this sense it may be regarded as
the fountain of all good. Εἰς δὲ οὗτοι ἔξων (ἡ εὐδαιμονία) καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι
ἄρχη: ταύτης γὰρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἄρχην δὲ καὶ τὰ
αἴτια τῶν ἀγαθῶν τίμων τι καὶ θείον οὐδεμία (Eth. N. 1. 13 ult.). God him-
self is an ἄρχη (Metaph. Α 2, 983 a 8, ὁ γὰρ θεός ἄρχη τις). The free will,
one of the ὀργίες or impulsive faculties, the origin of motion in the
human subject, and of moral action, the ἄρχη πράσεως, is an ἄρχη: the
importance of this, as the origin of human action and the ground of
moral responsibility, in moral philosophy and practical life, may be
estimated by the perusal of the first seven chapters of the third book of
the Nicom. Ethics. It is more comprehensive than αἴτιον; ἄρχη are not
all causes, (see in the following note), and therefore the two may be
distinguished, as they are in these two topics. An origin or beginning
necessarily implies that something follows, a consequence; it leads to
something: in this respect it is 'greater', more important, superior to
anything that is not a beginning or origin, which leads to nothing. Plat.
Rep. Π 377 Α, σύνεσιν οἷον ὅτι ἄρχη παντὸς ἔργον μέγιστον; μεγάλη γὰρ ἡ
ἐκ σοφοῦ (αἱ ἄρχαι) ἁπειρὸν πρὸς τὰ ἐπόμενα, Eth. Nic. 17, sub fin. And
the same applies to αἴτιον in the following topic. These two topics are well
illustrated in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), 10, 11.

The importance of an ἄρχη for good or for evil is recognized by several
proverbs. On the one side we have ἄρχη ἡμῶν παντός, (quoted in Demetr.
περὶ ἠρμηνείας § 122, ἄρχη δὲ τοι ἡμῶν παντός,) Arist. Eth. N. 1 7 ult.
δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ κίνειν ἢ ἡμῶν παντός εἰναι ἢ ἄρχη, Pol. VIII (v) 4, 1303 b 29,
ἢ ἄρχη λέγεται ἡμῶν εἰναι παντός, de Soph. El. c. 34, 183 b 22, μέγατον
γὰρ οὐκ ἄρχη παντὸς ἄσπορο λέγεται. Erasm., Adag. 29, quotes Soph. Fr.
Inc. (715, Dind.) ap. Plut. Mor. p. 16 Α, ἔργον δὲ παντὸς ἢ τις ἄρχη
καλῶς, καὶ τὰ τελεστὰ εἰς οὐδὲν ἄσπορο ἔργον ἐξίσου ἄρχην, Angleīc 'Well begun is half
done'. Dimidium facti qui coepit habet, Hor. Ep. 1 2, 40. The first
step: Ce n'est que le premier pas qui compte, see Rhet. Π 19, 5, and note.
On the other side, the importance of ἄρχη in respect of the tendency
to evil, we have Ovid's well-known line, become proverbial, Rem. Am. 91,
Principis obsta, sero medicina paratur. Fast. I 178, Omina principis,
inquitus (Phoebus), inesse solent. (This is indifferent as to the issue.)
Herodotus, after mention of the twenty ships which the Athenians on
the solicitation of Aristagoras sent in aid of the Ionians, concludes the
chapter, ν 97, with the emphatic words, αὖτε δὲ αὐτῶν ἄρχη κακῶν εὐφύστο
ἔλλησι τι καὶ βαρβάρωσι. This phrase became proverbial, see Rhet. ΠΙ
11, 7 bis, and Isocr. Paneg. § 119, there quoted.

On the different senses of ἄρχη in the Aristotelian philosophy consult
Metaph. Α 1, where they are enumerated and distinguished; and Bonitz's
Commentary. They are thus summed up: παντὸν μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὰς
ἄρχον τὸ πρῶτον εἰναι δὲν ἢ ἐστὶν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γεγονόσκεται τούτων δὲ αὐτὸν

The Datas
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 12.

τό δ’ οὐκ αἰτίον, διὰ τό αὐτόν ἀνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ἑπαφάρχωσι εἶσιν αἱ διῆς, 1013 α 17. 'Ἀρχαὶ' are 'origins', heads or starting-points, of a series, of three kinds; (1) of being, οὐσία, (2) of generation or growth, γένεσις, and (3) of knowledge, γνώσις. οὖν γὰρ αἰτίον καὶ ἀρχή ἑξάγωντο εἶναι ἡ γενεσθαι, Rhet. 1 7, 12. The six senses in which ἀρχή may be employed are all reducible to these three. Of these some are inherent (as the στοιχεῖον, the mathematical point, the origin of the line, or the starting-point of anything, that out of which it grows and is developed); the keel of a vessel, the foundation of a house; in animals the heart or the brain, or any other part which has been assumed to be the original seat of life; some external, the origin of motion or change, (as father and mother, of child; abusive language, of a fight; or again the human will or deliberate purpose, and intellect, προαιρεσία and δίδωμι, in the case of 'governments' (ἀρχαί) and arts, all of which set things in motion and produce change). The origin or starting-point of knowledge is illustrated by the ὅπωσιν, the assumed first principles of a demonstration, as the major premise of a syllogism. Another 'external origin' is the ὁδεγητός, or τότε, the final cause, πολλῶν γὰρ καὶ τοῦ γνώσεως καὶ τῆς κούστους ἀρχή τῶν θεῶν καὶ τὸ καλόν, α 21. Comp. de Anima 1 10, 433 α 15, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἑνεκτό πάντα ὁ γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ, αὕτη ἀρχή τοῦ πρακτικοῦ τοῦ τὸ δ’ ἐκκαθάριστον ἀρχὴ τῆς πράξεως.

ἀρχή is not identical with ἀρτίον, though, as all ἀρτία (all the four causes) are ἀρχαί, the two terms are frequently identified (Bonitz, Comm. p. 219; Waitz, Org. p. 158): but the converse is not true; as is shown by some of the examples given above: the assertion therefore that ἰσοχρός (τούτο ἀρχαί) καὶ τό ἀρτία λέγεται πάντα γὰρ τό ἀρτία ἀρχαί (α 16) must be limited to what is directly stated, the converse is not included. On the point of difference between the two, and also the identification with στοιχείον, see Waitz, Organ. p. 158.

Another definition of ἀρχή occurs in de Gen. Anim. 7 7, 23, 788 a 14, τότε γὰρ ἐστι τό ἀρχήν εἶναι, τό αὑτόν μὲν ἀρτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, τούτης τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀρχήν μεθέλει. See also Trendel. de Anima p. 187.

On scientific and logical ἀρχαὶ or first principles, ultimate axioms, συμβαλλ καὶ διὰ, see note in Introd. p. 73. In the Eudemon Ethics, 11 6, three kinds of ἀρχαί, general, moral, and mathematical, are distinguished, and some account given of them. [See also Index Aristotelicus, s. v. s.]

§ 12. ἐὰν γ’ ἀρτίον καὶ τὰλ. Τοπ. Γ, 116 δ 1, καὶ τό ἀρτίον ἀγαθὸν καθ’ αὐτόν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἰτίαν, καθάπερ ἡ ἀρτητή τῆς τύχης’ ἢ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὐτήν ἢ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εἰ τί ἄλλο τοιούτων. ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐμανσίν (τοῦ κακοῦ) κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δ’ οὐκ ἀρτίον] On οὐκ after ἀρτίον, understood from the preceding clause, see Appendix (C) on el οὐ, c. 15, 23.

1 The ἀρχή as essence, origin of being, οὐσία, is the primal cause, τό τι ᾗ εἶναι. Bonitz.

2 στοιχεῖον ... κατὰ τινά πρεσβευτὸν rei alicuius partem, in qua primum continetur et destinata est ipsa rei natura, ex exemplis allatis facile cognoscas." Bon. Comm. p. 168.

3 This is an ἀρχή κακοῦ.

4 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διὰνοι κυρί, ότι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἦστι τὸ ἄρχον. de Anima 1 10, 433 a 19.
It is plain therefore from what has been said (§ 11, eis ἀρχὴν, τῷ δὲ μὲν ἀρχῇ), that in both (the following) ways it may be said to be greater: for whether it be an origin (or beginning), and the other not a beginning, it may be shewn to be made to appear greater; or if it be not itself a beginning, but the other be a beginning (it may be equally shewn to be so), because the ‘end’ is greater (superior), and yet no beginning. ‘The end is greater’, because τότε ὅτι ἐν τῶν ἱεραῖς τὰ ἄλλα: and if ‘everything else’ is but a mean to an end, the beginning must be included with the rest, and is therefore subordinate and inferior. μείζων is here ‘greater’, ‘more important’, superior in respect of influence or effective power; not necessarily ‘better’. In the examples, first, the ‘adviser’ is the ἀρχὴ, the origin or originator of the plot; so in Metaph. A 2, 1013 a 31, διδασκαλίας is an αἰτία, namely the efficient cause, or origin of motion and change, ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς. The adviser of a scheme is therefore according to this view the ‘cause’ of all that resulted from his advice, which is made to appear (δεικνύει) by the argument more important than the result or actual crime (which is not ‘the beginning’); and, secondly, the converse (ἀνάπλωσις) is proved, that the crime, the ‘end’ of the advice or deliberation, is the more important thing of the two, because it was for that, as a mean to attain that, that the whole scheme was undertaken. It appears from the expressions of this text that Callistratus devised the scheme and Chabrias carried it into execution.

Leodamas of Acharnæ was a famous orator, an earlier contemporary of Demosthenes and Aeschines. The latter mentions him, c. Ctesiph. § 138, as having been sent as ambassador to Thebes, and as a speaker the rival of Demosthenes; indeed in his opinion even pleasanter to listen to. Πετ. is mentioned again in 11 23, 25 (comp. the note there); in Dem. adv. Lept. 501 and 502, who also speaks of him as a distinguished orator, where allusion is made to a certain proposition of his to cancel the ‘grant’, especially the ἀριθμός, made to Chabrias for his public services —οὖν ἔργαντο τὴν Χαμπλοῦ διορύσατο, a proposition which he failed to

1 This cannot be the same accusation as that which Aristotle here refers to;
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 13. 129
eἰρημένων ὃτι ἀμφιτέρως μείζον ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δοξεὶ μείζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχὴ· τὸ γὰρ τέλος μείζον καὶ οὐκ ἀρχή, ὡσπερ ο Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βουλευόμαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν πραξῆναι μὴ βουλευόμενον πάλιν δὲ καὶ
carry; and in other places of Aeschines. See Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. ii 216; Fr. xvi, and p. 244; Fr. xxvi; Clinton, F. H. Vol. ii p. 111, sub an. 372, 3.

Callistratus, son of Callicrates, of Aphidna, a distinguished Athenian orator and politician, of the earlier half of the 4th cent. B.C. His name first appears in history in the year 379 B.C. Aristotle refers to two speeches of his, Rhet. i 14. 1, and iii 17. 14. Leodamas' accusation of him, here mentioned, seems to have been directed against his conduct in the affairs of Oropus, in 366, Grote, Hist. Gr. x p. 392; Smith's Dict. Biogr. Art. Callistratus; Clinton, Fast. Hell. ii 396, note su. He was associated with Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, in the transactions with respect to Oropus, and with him was brought to trial; and it is most probable that both of the speeches referred to in the text were made by Leodamas on this occasion.

On Callistratus and Chabrias Mr Elder's articles in Smith's Biogr. Dict. may be consulted. Callistratus' name occurs very frequently in the Attic orators. See Baiter and Sauppe, Orat. Att. Vol. iii; Ind. Nom. p. 73.

βουλευόμαντα, βουλευόμενον, βουλευόμαντος, ἐπιβουλευέω are all applied to the same transaction, viz. Callistratus' 'advice' or 'device'. They express precisely the same thing, each from a somewhat different point of view. Βουλευόμαν ἐνιαίω to give oneself advice, to deliberate; or secondly, of a number of people deliberating together, and giving one another advice, 'consulting in common'. So μὴ βουλευόμενον here is, 'if he had not deliberated upon it'

ἐγράφατο διαρκῶν ἀν ἐν τῷ πράξαι, 'the man that carried into execution a nefarious scheme', are quite inapplicable to the same offence. Again Demosthenes, c. Mid. 555, tells us that Philostratus was the accuser of Chabrias, ἄρτι κατά τὴν περὶ θρασυνότο τὴν έσχην θανάτου. Were there two accusers of Chabrias on his trial? Or two separate trials? (this seems improbable): or has Aristotle made a slip of memory in assigning the accusation of Chabrias to Leodamas? None of these suppositions is necessary to reconcile the, at first sight, conflicting statements. The accusation of Leodamas is directed against both parties; he takes the case of Callistratus first, and then secondly (πάλιν δὲ) applies the converse of the argument which he had issued against the other to the offence of Chabrias. Philostratus, who took part in the same proceedings, was another and independent accuser. Mr Grote, p. 393, note 3, who does not refer to the passage of Aristotle, assigns the trial or trials of Callistratus and Chabrias to this period, 366 n. c., and the alleged misconduct about Oropus. The other speech of Leodamas against Chabrias, referred to by Dem. adv. Lept. l. c. was earlier, and had nothing to do with the affair of Oropus. [Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit i p. 96. s.]

ΛΡ. I.
χαιρείν, τόν πράξαντα τοῦ βουλεύσαντος· οὐ γὰρ ἀν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἢν ὁ πράξας τοῦτο τοῦ γὰρ ἕνεκα ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξασιν. καὶ τὸ σπανώτερον τοῦ ἀφθονον, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου ἀξιοπότερος ἂν μείζον γὰρ ἡ κτήσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέραν εἶναι. ἀλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἀφθονον τοῦ σπανίον, ὅτι ἡ χρησις

preparatory to 'suggesting' or 'advising' it. ἐπιβουλεύειν retains its proper sense of a hostile design (ex 'against'); the advice, or scheme which resulted from it, and the deliberation which suggested it, are now represented as 'a plot', a hostile, aggressive, design. It appears therefore that there is no occasion to have recourse to the explanation of Victorius and Buhle, that ἐπιβουλεύειν is (or can be) put for βουλεύειν or βουλεύοντα. Gaisford prints these two notes of V. and B. without comment.

εἰ μὴ ἤν τὸ πράξαν. On this use of the definite article, indicating a member of a class or γίνον, which we express by our indefinite article, see Buttman, Gr. Gr. § 124, Obs. 2. Eng. Tr. p. 319. The two senses of the Greek definite article are, according to Schneider, on Pl. Rep. VIII 356 a, that it marks quod praesens et in conspectu positum cognitatur, and (2) the genus. 'Articulus definit indefinita, idque duobus modis: aut designando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis' (the second describes the generic use). Herm. Praef. ad Iph. Aul. p. xv. Several examples of this usage of the def. art. are collected from the N. T. by Dean Alford, in a pamphlet in reply to Bishop Ellicott, p. 45 seq. I will only quote Matth. xiii. 3, ὁ σπείρων: xcv. 32, ὁ πομήρ. In a subsequent passage of this work, II 4, 31, Aristotle has quite unconsciously and unintentionally stated this grammatical distinction, τὸ δὲ μίσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γίνεται τὸν γάρ κλείσσει καὶ τ. καὶ τ. We render ὁ πράξας 'anyone to do it', carry it out, put it in execution.

§ 14. τὸ σπανώτερον τοῦ ἀφθονον. 'The rarer, scarcer, is greater, more valuable or important, than the abundant'. This, as is implied in ἀρχοντερος ἀν in the example, is only true in a sense; it is in fact a paradox, which may however be asserted in argument, since there is something to be said for it, and examples may be found in which it is true; as in the case of gold and iron. In the true and proper sense, in utility and real value, iron is greater and better than gold. Isocrates, ἀπολ. § 80, 81, on this ground of comparative rarity, ἄμφω τὸς εἰς σπανώτερον καὶ χαλεπώτερον, thinks that, in his time at least, great orators and politicians 'who can speak worthily on behalf of their country's interests' are more valuable and to be more highly prized than legislators. A similar topic occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 δ 28, τὸ ἐνδιαφέρον τοῦ ἦτορον τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον μᾶλλον γὰρ ἄγαμως ἔχοντες ἢ μὴ ἔστε ἤδειας λαβών καὶ τὸ ἰδιαίτερον τοῦ κοινότερου.

Ἀλλὸν δὲ τρόπον. This gives the true side of the alternative, that the value of a thing is in proportion to its usefulness. Estimated by this standard, 'water', as Pindar says, at the opening of his first Olympian ode, 'is the best of all things.' Böckh, who cites this passage of Aristotle
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 §§ 15, 16.

υπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις υπερέχει· ὅθεν λέγεται

ἀριστον μὲν ύδωρ.

15 καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπῶτερον τοῦ βάσων· σπανίωτερον γὰρ. Ἀλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ βάσον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου. π. 25.

16 ἔχει γὰρ ὅσ βουλόμεθα. καὶ ὁ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον,

καὶ οὖ ἡ στέρησις μεῖζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μη ἀρετής καὶ

in his note, evidently agrees with him in interpreting Pindar’s ἀριστον as ‘best’ because most useful, or necessary to the support of human life. Dissern thinks that Pindar had in his mind the great ‘wholesomeness’ of water, ἀριστον δικιοῦ τὸ ὕδωρ γιὰ σαλμηρισμοῦ est. A dry and hot climate and a parched soil would also readily suggest the notion that water is the best of all things. But I agree nevertheless with Böckh in his interpretation of Pindar’s thought.

These two opposite topics represent two prevailing modes of estimating ‘value’, by use and price: Political Economy teaches us that the former is the true, the latter the false standard. In the one view air and water are the most valuable, in the other the least valuable, of all things. Plato, Euthyd. 304, 3, gives both sides: τὸ γὰρ σπάσων, Ἡ Εὐθύδημε, τίμων’ τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐπνότατον. ἀριστον δὲ, ὡς ἑφι Πινδαρος.

§ 15. ὅλως τὸ χαλεπωτέρον] See the passage of the Topics quoted in § 14. Anything harder to do or to attain may be said to have a higher value, when the value is estimated by the price. On the other hand measured by the standard of our own nature, of our own love of ease and comfort, and also of the extent of usefulness, that which is easier to do or to make or to obtain is more valuable.

§ 16. ὁ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον] ‘And one thing is greater than another when the opposite of the former is greater than that of the latter’. Exemplum accommodatum erit valetudo ac divitiæ; quae ambo sunt bona: contraria eorum morbus et paupertas: maius autem malum corporis morbus quam paupertas; praestat igitur valetudo divitiis. Victorius. On this, and the next topic, στέρησις, comp. supra. c. 6, 4, and § 18; and the passages of the Topics (τ' 2, 117 b 2), and the Categorias there referred to.

οὖ ἡ στέρησις μεῖζων] On the various applications of στέρησις in Aristotle’s philosophy, see Met. Δ c. 22, and Bonitz’s Commentary: Categ. c. 10, p. 12 a 26, and Waitz, ad loc. Trendel. Kategorienlehr, p. 103 seq.

The following illustration of the topic is given by Schrader. ‘Peius est caecum esse quam surdum: ergo visus auditu praestantior est.

1 Pindar’s own view of the meaning may be readily seen by comparing the first three lines of the 10th Olympian Ode: note the word χρῆσις. In a speech, quoted by Spedding (Letters and Life of Fr. Bacon, Vol. III. p. 18), Bacon says: I liken this bill to that sentence of the poet (Pindar), who sets this as a paradox in the fore-front of his book, first water, then gold, preferring necessity before pleasure; and I am of opinion, that things necessary in use are better than those things that are glorious in estimation.

9—2
Gravius malum est fama quam pecunia privari; ergo bona existimatio praestat divitiis. ‘Things of which the privation is greater’ or more deeply felt, are those which are most necessary, essential to our existence or comfort; as air and water again, in this point of view.

καὶ ἄριστα καλλίω ἢ αἰσχίω, μείζων αὐτά.

Bonitz, _Arist. Stud._ 1. p. 87, proposes an ingenious alteration, which no one who is satisfied with the preceding explanation will consider necessary. It is to substitute for the existing text, καὶ ἄριστα ὑπὲρ κακίας καὶ κακία ὑπὲρ ἄριστος μείζων, ‘positive, downright, virtue is greater (better or worse) than mere absence of vice, and downright vice than mere absence of virtue’: which he neither translates nor explains; but, it is to be presumed, it means that the superiority of the one to the other still rests upon its _positive_ character. The _morality_ remains constant; for vice is still represented as the object of men’s aims: it is therefore no improvement in that respect. His reason for the change is, ‘that it never could occur to any one to institute a comparison in respect of magnitude (Grösse) between ἄριστα and ὑπὲρ, and κακία and ὑπὲρ κακία.’ Not perhaps if μειζων implied nothing but mere magnitude or quantity; but when it is extended to the general notion of superiority the comparison may very well be made between them. And besides, Bonitz’s altered comparison appears to rest upon the very same distinction of the positive and negative; for in what other sense can vice be regarded as superior to non-virtue?

§ 17. The two topics of this section are founded upon the relation of the ἄριστα of anything to its proper ἐργα or function, the work that it has to do, described by Plato, _Rep._ I 352 Ε and foll., and taken up by Aristotle as the foundation of his theory of virtue, _Eth. Nic._ II 5, init. The virtue or excellence of everything, horse, dog, knife, axe, eye, ear, mind, is shown in and depends upon the due performance of its proper function (ἐνεργεία 2. 12; 5. 4; 6. 11). ἀριστεία therefore, though they extend beyond the moral virtues from which Victorius draws his illustration—the comparison of ἀθλητική and σωφροσύνη and their opposites in respect of their results good or bad, the kinds of actions that they give rise to—and include the functions of all things that can be applied to any purpose, and everything which has a τέλος, to which the ἐργα must be subservient, and in the approach to which the ἄριστα is shown; yet the epithets

1 Victorius, perhaps rightly, explains μείζων ἄριστα and μικαλία as states of growth and development, which have not yet reached their ‘end’, the formed _μέκιος_, but are mere καθλόιοι, transient dispositions, and so far inferior.
καὶ ὡν ἀι κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀφεται μεῖζον, καὶ τὰ ἐργα μεῖζον, ἐπείτερ ὡς τὰ αἰτία καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ, καὶ τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἰτία καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ. καὶ ὡν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἱρετῶτερα ἡ καλλίων, οἰον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὀρᾶν αἱρετῶτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνοντα· καὶ γὰρ ὅτις ὀσφρήσεως· καὶ τὸ φιλεταῖρον εἶναι Ρ. 1364 א. τοῦ φιλοχρήματον μᾶλλον κάλλιον, ὡστε καὶ φιλεταρία φιλοχρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτίωνοι αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίων καὶ καλλιόνων καλλίων. καὶ ὡν ἂν ἐπιθυμέαι καλλίων ἡ βελτίων· αἱ καλλίω and αἰσχίω shew that Aristotle had the moral virtues uppermost in his mind.

καὶ ὡν ἂν κακίαι κ.τ.λ.] the converse of the preceding, the argument from the virtue or vice, excellence or defect, of anything, back again to its function or proper work. Virtues and vices, excellences and defects stand to ‘works’ in the relation of cause and origin to consequence and effect or result. Now as of the greater cause and origin, the one produces a greater effect, the other leads to a greater end, (§ 12,) and the less to a less, so in the case of excellence and defect the greater produces a greater work, the less a less, both in human action or comparative virtues, and in instruments of all kinds; in men and things.

§ 18. This topic is analogous to, not identical with, that in § 4. When anything in excess is preferable to, or finer and nobler than, the excess of something else, then the former in its ordinary state is preferable to the other. See the passage of Polit. iv (vii) 1, quoted in § 4. Tor. Γ 3, 118 δ 4, ὅτι ὡς ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς οἰκετεύων, καὶ αὐτὸ οἰκετεύον, οἰον φιλία χρήματος οἰκετεύων γὰρ ὧν ἡ φιλία ὑπερβολὴ τῆς τῶν χρημάτων. Οὕτω maxes continet in se minus.

τὸ φιλεταίρον...μᾶλλον κάλλιον] Victorius, followed by Buhle, and Waitz, Orig. 116 δ 24, understand μᾶλλον κάλλιον as a double comparative, a form of expression not unfamiliar to Aristotle (see Vict. on this place, and Waitz, Orig. 116 δ 24, 11 p. 465), but certainly not employed by him here. The μᾶλλον denoting the ‘excess’ of the two qualities, which is absolutely essential to the illustration of the topic, is added for that reason to φιλεταίρον and φιλοχρήματον, the comparison being conveyed by κάλλιον: and thus the topic is exemplified. ‘Excess in love of friends being fairer, and nobler than that in love of money, friendship in its average degree is to be preferred to a similar average of love of money.’ See also note on 11 β, 3.

§ 19. καὶ ὡν ἂν ἐπιθυμίας κ.τ.λ.] The objects of the nobler and better desires are themselves nobler and better: because all ‘impulses’ (ὁρίζεις, which include ἐπιθυμίας, all natural desires and appetites, as well as ὁμοίας κ.τ.λ. Eth. Eud. 11 7, 2, de An. B 3, 414 δ 2; see note on Rhet. 11 2.1), in proportion as they are higher or stronger, have for their objects
γὰρ μείζον ὅρεξείς μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλλιόνων δὲ ἡ καὶ βελτίων ἄι ἐπιθυμιά βελτίως καὶ 20 καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ. καὶ ὢν αἱ ἐπιστήμαι καλλίους ἡ σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότεραι. ὥς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές κελεύει δὲ τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιότερων δὲ καὶ καλλίουν ἃ ἐπιστήμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ ταύτα. 21 καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν ἃν ἡ κεκρικασίαν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἡ πάντες

things 'greater', i.e. either better and higher in themselves, or more important. The stronger impulse is always towards the greater object—in some sense. And the converse: 'the nobler and better the objects, the nobler and better the desires, for the same reason'.

§ 20. καὶ ὃ συγγείματα κ.τ.λ.] The same rule is now applied to sciences or departments of knowledge, and their objects; τὰ πράγματα, 'their subjects'1, ἡ ὑποκείμενη ἐν, τὰ ὑποκείμενα. Τοῦρ. Γ 1, 116 a 21, ὅστις δὲ ἀπλῶς μὲν βελτίω καὶ σπουδαιότερον τό κατὰ τὴν βελτίω ἐπιστήμην, τινὶ δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ὁλιγίαν. The higher and nobler sciences deal with higher and nobler materials; and in proportion to the dignity and value of the objects that it treats, so is the dignity and value of the corresponding science: ἀνάλογον, 'proportionally'; greater to greater, and less to less. 'For as is the science, so is the (particular kind of) truth at which it aims: and each of them is authoritative (lays down the law, prescribes what is to be done, dictates, κηλέουσα) in its own special province'. On the order in invention and dignity of arts and sciences, see the instructive chapter, Metaph. A 1. ἐπιστήμαι includes here all arts as well as sciences, the two terms being constantly interchanged. The word αἰσθήσεις, from its strict and proper sense (when the two provinces of philosophy are distinguished, 

1 The terms 'subject' and 'object' from different points of view may be applied to express the same thing. The object of sense or of thought, material or mental, quod sensibus vel menti obiectur, is when looked at from the logical side the subject of all that is or can be predicated of it.

2 So printed in Bekker's texts.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 21.

η οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ πλείοις ἢ οἱ κράτιστοι ἁγαθοὶ ἢ μείζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἢ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν ἐκρίναν. ἐστὶ δὲ τούτῳ κοινῷ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ γὰρ τί καὶ ποσόν καὶ ποιῶν οὕτως ἔχει ὃς ἄν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἶποι. ἀλλ' ἐπ’ ἁγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν· ὄρισται γὰρ ἁγαθὸν εἶναι ὁ λα-puted question, of...’ Top. Γ ι, 116 a 14, καὶ ὁ μάλλον ἢ πλούς ὁ φρόνιμος ἢ ὁ ἁγαθὸς ἢ ὁ νόμος ὁ ὀρθός, ἢ οἱ σπουδαιοὶ περὶ ἑκατάλοιποι. σπουδαιοὶ τοιούτοι (σπουδαιοὶ) εἰσίν, ἢ οἱ ἐν ἑκατό τε ἐπιστήμονες, ἢ σὺ ὁ πλείους ὁ πάντες, οἱ οὕτως ἕνεκα ἐπιστήμονες, ἢ σὺ ὁ πλείους τῶν ἑκατῶν ἡ πάντες, ἢ ἄλλος ὁ πλείους ἡ πάντες ἡ πάντα, οὐκ ἔστασιν ἄρα τάχα ἄρα ἐφέσται. This passage will serve as a commentary on the topic of the Rhetoric. It describes the authority of φρόνησις (practical wisdom), the intellectual virtue which selects the proper means and directs them to the end, Ethn. Ν. 61, and the impersonation of it in the φρόνιμος. In the definition of ἀρετή, Ethn. Ν. 11 6, init. the φρόνιμος is the measure or standard, which fixes the variable mean, in which virtue resides, for each individual character. In all arts and sciences it is the professional man, the expert, who has to decide, each in his own department. The ἁγαθὸς decides in moral questions, which is his special province. Comp. note on 6. 25.

ἡ πάντα—οἱ κράτιστοι] a descending scale of the φρόνιμοι, those who are competent to decide; all, or most (the many, the great mass of them, or the (bare) majority, or the best and ablest amongst them (in point of judgment, and professional skill).

ἁγαθὸς ἢ μείζον] So the MSS and Edd., with the exception of one MS and Buhle's Ed., which omits it, as does Muretus in his Transl. The omission certainly improves the sense; but Vater has some reason objects to this order of the two words, which he says should have been inverted, μείζον ἁγαθὸς. ἁγαθὸς, which Vater proposes to omit, is certainly wanted to explain κατά τῶν ἄλλων in the following clause.

ἡ ἑπίσκ. ἢ κατά τὴν φρόνησιν] 'either absolutely, universally, or in respect of their practical wisdom', specially and alone. κατά τὴν φρόνησιν corresponds to ἐπισκόποι in the passage of the Topics, 'in so far as they are such' (φρόνιμοι), and in no other respect.

καὶ κατά τῶν ἄλλων] 'of everything else as well', as good. κατά with the genit. is very common in Arist. in the sense of 'of', 'in the case of'; derived from its proper and primary sense 'down upon', and hence, 'applying to', 'of'. This use of it seems to come through the intermediate sense of 'predication', κατηγορομένου· κατηγοροεῖθαι τινος, 'to predicate, be predicated, of something'—ἐπι, 'upon', 'applying to', 'in the case of', so and so, is similarly used (ἐπι ἁγαθῶν) in the same section.

τι, ποσόν, ποιῶν] are the first three categories; (1) the substance or true nature of a thing, (2) quantity and (3) quality. These, though properly falling under the domain of science or exact knowledge, may yet be dealt with by the 'practical judgment' which may convey a popular and practical acquaintance with them, sufficient for the purposes of the Rhetorician.

εἰρήκαμεν ὄρισται γὰρ] supr. § 3.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 22.

βούντα τα πράγματα φρόνησιν ἔλοιτ' ἀν ἐκαστὸν
δήλων οὐν ὅτι καὶ μείζον, ὥ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει.
22 καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίσσων ὑπάρχον, ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἡ βελτὶσσω, ὥ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἡ βελτίσσω, ὥ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ

ὅ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει] If that is good in genera' which is pronounced to be so by the man of practical sagacity, then that must be a greater good which is pronounced by the same authority to be more so, to be so in a higher degree.

§ 22. καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίσσων ὑπάρχον] 'Animi bona bonis corporis prævalent quia animus est corpore praestantior'. Schrader. Courage and strength is Aristotle's illustration; for the reason assigned by Schrader.

ἡ ἀπλῶς] 'ut viri' (man as the nobler animal) 'virtutes praestant multibiuribus simpliciter'. Schrader.

ἡ ἡ βελτίσσω] 'aut quatenus meliores sunt: viri effeminati actiones detriores sunt actionibus virilis animi feminæ'. Id. I prefer the other explanation, as more direct and natural, 'either generally, in respect of the entire character and qualities, or in respect of some special excellence'.

καὶ ὅποιον ἐν ὅ βελτὶσσῳ] The better man will make the better choice in general, ἐπισκόπος by virtue of his whole character; or 'in so far as he is better, in respect of that particular kind of excellence, as some special virtue, in which his superiority is shewn, ἡ βελτίσσω ἐστὶ. So Victorius; who proceeds (after Alexander) to distinguish between this and the preceding topic, § 21; in that the φρόνησις as a class choose between different kinds of good; here the comparison is between two different kinds of choosers, and the one who makes the better selection is the better in moral character.

ὀλοκληρωτικοὶ] (sc. ἔλειθοι, or ἐν τε ἔλειθοι). The higher and nobler choice is illustrated by the preference of being wronged to doing wrong. This, though cited here as a popular sentiment, was by no means the current and prevailing opinion at Athens. Plato, Rep. τ1 358 C, makes Glaucon say, speaking of the opposite view, ἀπορρέον θεραπεύον καὶ μυρίων ἄλων: and again, at the commencement of Glaucon's exposition of the disadvantages of justice and the superiority of injustice successful and unpunished, he uses the word φωτι, which seems to imply that this was the general opinion. In fact one of the main objects of the Republic is to prove that the reverse of this is true; and the long and laborious process which he is obliged to go through in the establishment of his position is quite sufficient to shew how strong must have been the prejudices in favour of the adverse doctrine which must be surmounted before he could hope to make his own views acceptable. The Gorgias also is occupied with the solution of this same question, in the comparison namely of doing and receiving injury and wrong, on which side the advantage, when rightly estimated, really lies. The Sophists, as represented by Thrasymachus in the Republic, and Callias in the Gorgias, appear to have held the lower, and as we now hold it to be, immoral doctrine. Ast, in his Comment. on Pl,
23 ἀδικεῖν: τότε γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἄν ἔλοιπο. καὶ τὸ ἱδίον τοῦ ἱττον ἱδέος: τὴν γὰρ ἱδονὴν πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνεκα τοῦ ἱδεόθαι ὁρέγονται, ὁρίσται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος. ἱδίον δὲ τὸ τε p. 35. τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ἱδύ. καὶ τὸ κάλλιον τοῦ ἱττον καλοῦ: τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐστὶν ἦτοι 25 τὸ ἱδύ ἢ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἡ φίλοι βούλονται αἰτίοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταύτα μείζων ἡ ἡκιστα, ὅσων ἡ ἡκιστα, μείζων κακᾶ. καὶ τὰ πολυ- 26 ἀγαθά, ὅσων ἡ ἡκιστα, μείζων κακᾶ. καὶ τὰ πολυ- χρονιώτερα τῶν ὅλογχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα

Rep. p. 391, has collected a number of references to authors who sided on this point with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

§ 23. ὁρίσται δὲ] in § 3. ἡθον δὲ τὸ ἀδικεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Pleasure is subject to two drawbacks to its enjoyment, which vary in different kinds of pleasure. Some pleasures are accompanied, preceded, or followed by pain (Plato held that this is the case with all bodily pleasures), and most of them are of a very transient character and very brief duration. This may in many cases afford a measure for the comparison of pleasure: those which are marked by the entire absence or lower degree of these qualifying circumstances are superior.

§ 24. τὸ γὰρ καλὸν κ.τ.λ.] This distinction of the two different kinds of καλὸν, arises from its twofold aspect, physical and moral: in the former of the two senses it is the beautiful, in the latter the morally right and noble. The beautiful, to the sight and sense, is the ‘pleasant’ form or aspect of τὸ καλὸν; the right is καλὸν τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν, that which is desirable in and for itself and for no ulterior object, and therefore an end in itself. In this latter sense the τὸ καλὸν may be regarded as the end of all moral action, Eth. N. III 7, 1113 b 8, c. 10, 1115 b 24, 12 b 8, 1168 a 34, 1169 a 6, seq. 21 to the end. In Rhet. I 9.3, two definitions of it are given and the distinction of its moral and physical aspects again suggested: and again II 13.9 it is contrasted with the expedient or profitable, the one being a relative the other an absolute form of good.

§ 25. καὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.] Things are shewn to be good by our desire of them, because all things universally desirable are good: and the more we desire anything for ourselves or our friends (the friend is the ‘second self’, the alter ego, and therefore his interest is our own,) and therefore to be the causes of it, to procure it for ourselves or our friends; the more we shew that we think it good: and the things we desire least to bring upon ourselves or our friends are by the same rule the worst and most mischievous things. The topics of Top. Γ 2, 118 a 1, are akin to this, not identical with it.

§ 26. τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα] Top. Γ 1, 116 a 13, ‘more lasting and more secure, stable, safer’. One measure of the use or value
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 27.

τῶν μὴ βεβαιοτέρων· υπερέχει γάρ ἡ κρήσις τῶν
μὲν τῶν χρόνων τῶν δὲ τῇ βουλήσει· οὖταν γὰρ βού-
λανταί, ὕπαρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βεβαιοῦ. καὶ ὡς ἂν

of a thing is the length of time during which it remains in our possession; another, the security or stability of it, immunity from decay or corruption and the fear of losing it. The absence of these very much diminishes the value of any possession. The superiority in the value of a thing is shewn in, or measured by, either the duration or the amount of desire or wishing for it (βουλήσει) because our wishing for it shews that we consider it a secure possession, one of which we are little likely to be deprived, or which itself is not likely to be impaired, and so lose its value. A safe investment, which every one desires who has spare cash, is an example of this kind of security, and of the superiority in value that it carries with it.

§ 27. καὶ ὡς ἂν (ἀκολουθοῦν) ἐκ τῶν συστοιχίων] as the consequences would follow (if, whenever the topic were applied) in general, so here 'in all the rest', in the particular case of the rhetorical application of them, the same consequences do actually follow. Perhaps the general application of this topic, which seems to be understood in the protasis, may have a tacit reference to the more general treatment of the same in the dialectical Topics. I think that only one topic is here intended; so far as σύ-
στοιχε are distinguished from πτώσεις, the former includes the latter as the genus the species.

With this topic compare Rhet. II 23, 2, Top. Γ 3, 118 a 34—39. The instances of πτώσεις there given are the substantive and corresponding adverb, δικαίωσις δικαίως, ἀδρία ἀδρίως. σύστοιχε and πτώσεις are explained, distinguished, (quite unintelligibly, however, were our information derived solely from this place,) and the use of them illustrated, in Top. B 9, 114 a 26—5. σύστοιχε are coordinate logical notions, as δίκαιον and δίκαιως with δικαίωσις, ἀδριών and ἀδρίως with ἀδρία; and άκατά πάντα, δικαίωσις δίκαιον δικαίως δίκαιως are coordinates. Also, a 29, τὰ φωνήματα and τὰ φωνητικά are coordinate with the things which they produce and preserve, as τὰ ρήματα with ρήμα, τὰ εὐθεῖα with εὐθεία. πτώσεις are these same coordinates in their grammatical aspects—terms that can be similarly predicated, and applicable to the same things—and they are therefore sometimes identified with the others. The πτώσεις 'inflections' of the same word are not confined to the mere 'declension' of nouns, substantive or adjective, (the nominative is the casus rectus, or πτώσεις ὑπῆ, improperly so called, the noun in its upright or normal state or position, the casus or πτώσεις are fallings away, declensions, from that standard typical form by a change of termination1) but include adverbs,

1 Περὶ εἰρημεναι 2,16 a 32, τὸ δὲ Φίλωνος ἢ Φίλων καὶ δοκεῖ τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ἁπά-

ματα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ὑπῆρχομεν. Ρομ. 20,10, 1457 a 18, πτώσεις δὲ ὑπ' ἐστιν ὑπῆρχομεν ἢ

ρήματος ἢ μὲν τὰ κατὰ τόσον ἢ τὸν καθεῶν σημαίνουσα καὶ δοκεῖ τοιαῦτα (casus), ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἑν ἢ πολλαί (numbers) οἷον ἁπάντων ἢ ἀπροκεταίρων, ἢ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἰσορρημεῖα, οἷον κατ' ἀρχαῖας ἢ ἐκτάσει (moods of verbs). Illustrated by ἐβάσιμον and βαθὺς, indicative and imperative. πτώσεις are referred to the general head of παράσιμον.
the generic and numerical terminations, masc. and femin., singular, dual, and plural, and the inflexions of verbs; in fact, as it appears, any change of termination which a root undergoes in passing into different parts of speech, and the inflexions of these: in Aristotle πτώσεις is a ‘declension’ from a root. This logical signification of στοιχεῖα and στοιχία is ‘transferred’ by metaphor, from the ranks of an army or of a chorus in the theatre (like ἀνιχνευτής), to logic or grammar: but in either of the two senses, they always denote things on the same level, coordinates. Trendel. El. Log. Arist. 75, Bonitz ad Metaph. A 5, 986 α 23. Xenophon, Conv. 2, 20, has ἀντανακλῶν in the sense of ‘to be one’s opposite, or partner in a dance’. Anab. V 4, 12, ἀπηγον διὰ ἐκατόν μᾶλλον, ὀπερ ὁ χορός, ἀντανακλῶσθεν ἀλλῇς, ‘in opposite, corresponding ranks’. In Met. I c, and Eth. N. I 4, 1085 β 7, it is applied to the ten parallel rows or columns of the opposite ἀρχαί of the Pythagoreans, the two opposite members of the ten being in each case a στοιχία, or pair of coordinate conceptions. Hence στοιχεῖα are notions of the same order: as the four elements, which have the same rank, belong to the same row, i.e. order in nature, de Caelo 302 a 29; and hence, notions which fall under the same genus, as black and white, sweet and bitter; and even such as are under different genera, so long as they have something in common, de Sens. c. 7, 447 β 30, 448 a 14 and 16.

In Aristotle therefore στοιχεῖα and πτώσεις, though occasionally identified, are, when strictly and properly applied, distinguished thus: στοιχεῖα are logical notions or conceptions corresponding to things of the same rank or order in nature, having a wider and more comprehensive sphere of application than the πτώσεις, which are grammatical like the ‘declensions’, from which the name is derived, and include the various deflexions or inflexions, expressed by changes of termination, from a root.

Cicero’s coniugata, which are defined Top. I 12, correspond to Aristotle’s πτώσεις. Coniugata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem. Eisdem autem generis verba sunt, quae orta ab uno varie commutantur; ut saepius verba saepius. Haec verborum coniugatio στοιχία dicitur, ex qua hucusmodi est argumentum: si conspescimus ager est, ins est conspascere.

Besides the authorities already referred to, see on this subject Waitz on peri ἐρου. c. 2, 16 β 1; Anal. Post. II 15, 79 β 6; Trendel. Kategorienlehre, p. 27 seq.; Donaldson, New Crat. § 227. § 28. τοῦ μη (ὄνομα) δ’ πάντες (ἀλλοτριαί). The negative of the preceding: ‘than which that is not what all prefer’.

Top. Ζ 10, 149 a 10, ὑθλίματος, ἕθλίματος, ὑθλίματος are πτώσεις. Ib. H 1, 151 b 30, 153 b 25—34, where several examples are given.
§ 29. This topic also is best exemplified in personal advantages, accomplishments, or possession. It can be applied either way. Sometimes (ὁδὲ μὲν, τόσιν ὅτε, ἱπτότε), in some cases, the superior value of a possession of this kind is in proportion to its universality, because the greater the number of those who have the advantage, the greater the disgrace of being without it (a case of στέρησις, § 16): in other cases the reverse may be maintained on the principle that the scarcity of a thing lends it a superior value, § 14.

§ 30. καλλίω γὰρ § 24. Virtue is the only true object of 'praise', ἀληθεύομαι. Introd. Appendix Bk. 1, c. 9, p. 212 seq.

ἄν αἱ τιμαὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'and things (especially actions) may be regarded as
'greater', or superior in respect of their power or effect, of which the honours or rewards are greater; because honours and rewards are as it were (may be considered) a kind of valuation, estimate of the value, of a thing, δέσια, which will afford a comparison, or measure of the comparative value of two things; and the opposite acts which involve a higher penalty, are superior in a sense, more important and effective. ενιαίοις, not 'losses', ἀποβολαι, as it has been understood, but 'penalties', directly opposed to τυμαί 'rewards'. So Victorius.

§ 31. Things which are, at first sight, or can be shewn to be, greater than others which are universally acknowledged to be great or are manifestly so, are seen to be so at once and without reflexion, present themselves at once as such, φανόμενα. A conspicuous instance of this common sense of φανόμενος, apparent, manifest to the eye, occurs Rhet. ιη 2, 1 (see note) in the definition of ἀπράξια. Comp. ι 9. 32, 8. 6; ιι 2. 9.

καὶ διαφορούμενα π.τ.λ. This and the following are purely rhetorical topics, and belong rather to the third book, On style. One mode of exaggerating the importance of anything, of making it assume a magnitude which it does not really possess, is in the way of description, to break up into parts or describe in detail what might be stated summarily as a whole. 'The same facts or events', when thus individually represented, will 'seem greater' than if they were all summed up together in one statement; because in the former case the excess or superiority, in point of importance and interest, of the facts exhibited in detail over the summary statement, will seem to be shewn 'in more points', which are all brought severally into view. ἕξις τῶν ἄνευ-ρήχων is 'to exceed in a greater number of points', whether we understand the genitive as one of quantity 'in more things', which is probably right, or as the comparative genitive after ἀπέρτημα, 'to surpass more things', by which the meaning is not so distinctly expressed: in either case it is the number of things detailed that makes the superior impression. The use of this topic is well illustrated by Quintilian, Inst. Or. viii 3. 61 sq., who however refers the strong impression produced by this detail to the ἐπιρρύων or vividness of the picture. § 67, sic urbium capitum crescit miserratio. Sine duplo enim qui dicit expugnatam esse civilem commotissim omnia quae cuncte talis fortuna recipis; sed in affectus minus penetrat brevis hic vult nuncius. At si aperias haece, et cet. [then follows the description]. Majoriarii refers to Cicero's description of Pompey's military experience in the speech pro lego Manilia, and Gaitsford to Harris, Philol. Inquiries, p. 58 [on p. 62, this passage of the Rhet. is quoted]. He assigns this to 'accumulation' and 'concatenation'. Shakespeare, in the Tempest, will supply us with a brilliant example: The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, &c. [iv. i. 152]. Comp. Acts of the Apostles, ii. 9 seq., where the wonder of the gift of tongues is heightened by the enumeration in detail of all the different nations whose language was spoken; 'Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites.' Bacon's Colours of Good and Evil (Vol. vii p. 81, Ellis and Sped. ed.), No. 5, is a good commentary on this topic in its most general application.
eis tα μέρη τα αυτά μείζω φαίνεται· πλειόνων γάρ υπερέχειν φαίνεται. οθεν καί ο ποιητής φησι πείσαι λέγουσαν τόν Μελέαγρον ἀναστήναι ὁσια κακ' ἀνθρώποις πέλει τῶν ἀστυ ἀλώη· λαοὶ μὲν φυσικοῦς, πόλιν δὲ τε πύρ ἀμαθεῖνε, τέκνα δὲ τ' ἀλλοι ἁγούσιν.
καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἑποικοδομεῖν, ὠσπερ Ἑπίχαρ-


ὁ ποιητής φησι] Homer to wit, II xix 592. The reading of the Vulg. is καὶ δὲ ἀνθρώποις πέλει τῶν ἀστυ ἀλώη· ἀδρας μὲν κτίσισας, and the text 23 quoted by Ar. This example is the same as that given by Quintilian. Victorius thinks that he borrowed it from Aristotle. Spalding, ad Quint. viii 3. 67, quotes the following Schol. on II. xiv 495, referring to the other passage of Homer: ἰποτοκεῖσ τὸ ἐν πράγμα, τῆν πάρθενοι, εἰς πολλὰ κατεμίραν.

τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἑποικοδομεῖν] are added to the preceding topic of 'detail' as closely akin to it. That the first at all events is so, may be inferred from the identification of 'detail' with 'accumulation' by Harris, p. 58, above quoted. The two figures are 'accumulation' and 'climax'. ἑποικοδομήσαι is the building up of one phrase upon (ἐνι) another, one rising above another step by step, like the rounds of a ladder (ἐλιμαχ), or the stages of a building. Rhet. ad Alex. 3 (4). 9, ἑποικοδομοῦσα τὸ ἐτερον ἐς ἐπὶ τὸ ἑτερον ὑφιστὶ τρόπῳ τουθέ, which is then illustrated. Arist. de Gen. An. i 18, 34, 724 a 28, ἐς εἰς θα νατα τως Ἐπίχαροις ποιεὶς τὴν ἑποικο-

δομήσειν, ἐκ τῆς διαβολῆς ἡ λαοδία, ἐκ δὲ τατης ἢ μάχης, τατης δὲ πανα ἐκ των ἡ ἁρχή τῆς κυψεως. Eustath. ad Hom. ii 2. p. 181, τὸ δὲ σχήμα τοῦ ῥήματος χωρίου (verse 101) κλίμακα καὶ κλιμακωτὸν λέγοσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ, ἐτερο δὲ ἑποικοδομῶν. γίνεται δὲ σχήμα κλιμακωτὸν ὅταν τὸ λόγον τῆς φθοράς ἐνοικε ἡ ἁρχὴ γένηται τῆς ἐφισεί, οὐν ὡς τε τε ἐκεῖ, ἡ βασιλικὸς ἁγάθος, ἡ ἁγάθος ἁγάθῳ ποιεῖ, ἡ ἁγάθος ποιον ἑυεργετεῖ, ὁ ἑυεργετῶν τεθαμβισᾶται, κ.τ.λ. Demetrius peri ἐρμηνείας 270 (111 320, Rhet. Gr. Spengel) λαμβάνον τ' ἐν καὶ ἡ κλίμακα (sic) καλομένη, ὡς παρὰ Δημοσθένει, τ σ (de Cor. § 170, p. 288) οὐκ ἐστιν μὲν ταύτα, οὐκ ἔγγαθα δὲ οὕτω ἔγγαθα μὲν, οὐκ ἐπηθεμένα δὲ οὕτω ἐπηθεμένα μὲν, οὐκ ἔτεισα δὲ τὰς Θεσπείους σχέδων γάρ ἐπανδιάλοντο (mounting a staircase or a hill, from higher to higher) ἡ λόγος δουκέω εἰς μείζων.

This figure by the Latin Rhetoricians is called gradatio, Cic. de Or. iii 54, 207, Quint. ix 3. 54—7, where it is explained and illustrated by the same passage of Demosth. and from Latin authors. In Auct. ad Heren. iv 25, it is thus defined: Gradatio est, in qua non ante ad consequens verbum descenditur quam ad superioris consensus est, and then illustrated. See Aquila Romanus, cited by Ernesti, Læx. Tech. Gr. et Lat. sub vv. κλίμακα, et gradatio, and at length by Schäfer, App. Crit. ad Demosth. p. 288, 8, Vol. ii p. 250. Aquila calls it ascensus.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 32.

μος, διὰ τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαίρέσει (ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ύπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλὴν) καὶ οἱ ἄρχη φαίνεται 32 μεγάλων καὶ αἰτίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ

ἀσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος]. Besides the illustration of the figure climax from Epicharmus quoted above from the de Gen. Anim., there is another and a more complete one in Athen. 11 36 C. D, indicated by Schrader, ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θυσίας, ἐκ δὲ θυσίας πόσες ἐγένετο, ἐκ δὲ πόσισι κόμῳς, ἐκ κόμου δὲ ἐγένετο θυσίας, ἐκ δὲ θυσίας δίκης, ἐκ δίκης δὲ καταδίκης, ἐκ δὲ καταδίκης πέδας τε καὶ σφάλεις καὶ ζημιὰς.

διὰ τὸ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ διαίρεσει] Two reasons are now given for the impression that these two figures make upon the hearer: the first, the same as that which accounts for it in the case of διαίρεσις; the accumulation of particulars, and the rising by steps to a climax, have the same effect as the division or detail, in increasing the number of effective strokes, and so producing the impression of superiority, ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ύπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλὴν: and secondly, you make that which you are endeavoring to magnifyходить to be the cause and origin of a number of important effects, which you seem to multiply by detailing them. The following passage of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), §§ 10, 11, will serve as a commentary on this the entire section: συλλείβθην δὲ, ἐὰν πολλάν αἰτίων ἀποφαίνηται, ἐὰν τε ἔγαθαν τὰ κεκώμα τοίνυν, μεγάλα φαινέται. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ τὸ πρόγραμμα ὅποιον φαινέται κατὰ μίρη διαίρεσιν ἢ καθόλου λεγόμενον, καὶ ἐπιστέρω ἢ μείζων τε, τὸν πρόγονον αὐτὸ λέγεται. τὰς μὲν οὖν αὐξήσεις οὕτω μεταξὶ πλείστας ποιεῖσθαι καὶ μεγίστας, τακτικότερα δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὰ ὅγια καὶ τὰ κακὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ τρόπους μεταξῷ, ὡς εἰρήκαμεν ἐπὶ τῶν μεγάλων, καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἄν μηδενὸς αἰτίων ἐπιδεικνύοντο, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἢς ελαχίστων καὶ σμικρότατων.

§ 32. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανίωτερον μείζων] supr. § 14. An exemplification of this topic is found in Eth. Nic. VIII 115, 1163 a 12, οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλότερα τοιαύτα φασὶν λαβίσαν παρὰ τῶν ἐνεχειρημένων μὲν ἐνεχειρημένων καὶ ἐξαναπαύεται καταμεικρίσοντες' οἱ δὲ ἀνάκαμφτα τὰ μείζοντα πάν παρὰ γενόμενοι, καὶ δὲ πάρα ἄλλων ὅντος δὲ, καὶ ἐν κινήσει δὲ τοιούτως χρείας. The additional value or importance for good or for evil that things, especially actions, acquire at particular ages or times of life (illustrated in the Topics), in particular places, at particular times, at particular critical seasons and occasions (αιμοι), or from the special nature of the powers or faculties that are called into exercise (δοκῳμεια), is derived from the scarcity of such things and actions, and the difficulty of obtaining or performing them. The aιμοι in two aspects is exemplified in the Topics, Γ 2, 117

1 Müllach, Fragn. Philos. Gr. p. 143. gives these lines as corrected by Meineke, Dindorf, and Bochart.

Δ. ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θυσίας, ἐκ δὲ θυσίας πόσες ἐγένετο. Β. χαρές, ὥστ' ἦν δοκαί.

Δ. ἐκ δὲ πόσισι κόμῳς, ἐκ κόμου δὲ ἐγένετο δίκης, ἐκ δὲ δίκης δὲ καταδίκης, ἐκ δὲ καταδίκης πέδαι τε καὶ σφάλεις (the stocks) καὶ ζημιᾷ.

The other passage, in the de Gen. An., Müllach attempts to correct himself, and produces this melodious verse, p. 144,

ἐκ διαβολάς μέρως ἐγένετο, πολλῶν δὲ ἐκ μόρου μάχα.
Add Prov. xv. 23, a word spoken in due season, how good is it. \textit{χρόνος} is illustrated by the case, already quoted, of Sir Phil. Sidney, and the cup of cold water at the battle of Zutphen [p. 84]: \textit{δωρεῖς}, as Aristotle himself tells us, applies to cases in which any one does something 'beyond his powers', above his ordinary level, and more than you would expect from him; and \textit{φαρὰ τῶν ὁμοίων} is exemplified by the epigram and the saying of Iphocrates.

καὶ εἰ \textit{οὗτος} κ.λ. τὰ \textit{διάφορα} τὰ \textit{παραλλαγαὶ} at particular places or times, they will acquire a magnitude and importance in things (i.e. actions) right, and good, and just, and their opposites. \textit{οὗτος} may however mean under particular circumstances.


This epigram is expressly attributed to Simonides by Eustath. ad Hom. p. 1701, 24 (Buhle). It is found in the Anthol. i 80 (ed. Jacobs), No. 107 of the Epigrams attributed to Simonides. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. p. 793 (p. 921, 2nd ed.), Simonidis Fragm. 166.

Eustathius l. c. explains ἀγγέλλα, αἰτείς τι ἱεροτριτί. It is described by Hemsterhuis ad Hesychium s.v. ὀπανολέι, as a \textit{τυγχαῖν}, a sort of wooden yoke, which was carried over the two shoulders to support the flat-baskets.

\footnote{1 καρῆς: 'due season', 'the right time', 'occasion', 'opportunity', the time suitable, appropriate, to the performance of anything, is that form of good which comes under the Category of time, \textit{χρόνος}; Eth. Nic. i 4, 1096 a 56. On this the Paraphrast (Andronicus Rhodium) notes, διὰ τῆς γὰρ καρᾶς ἐκτιθέντος ἐκείνης \textit{χρόνος}. Pind. Pyth. ix 82, ὁ καρῆς παρέτει ἐκεῖνος καρᾶτο. Ib. iv 266 (508). Soph. Electr. 75, καρῆς ἀνεπάνω μέγας ἔργων παρὰ σιαμί τινος ἐκείνης. Philoct. 827.}
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 §§ 33, 34.

πρόσθε μεν ἀμφε ὁμοιοι έχων τραχείαν ἀσιλλαν ἵχθος ε' Ἀργον εἰς Τεγέαν ἔφεσον. καὶ ο Ιφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκεμιαζε λέγων ε' ὡν 33 υπήρξε ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ ἀυτοφύες τοῦ ἐπικτήτου χαλεπώτερον γάρ. οθὲν καὶ ο οἰκητής φησιν ἀυτοδίδακτος ὁ εἰμί.

34 καὶ τὸ μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οἶον Περικλῆς τὸν

Alciphron 1, 1. p. 6, ἑώς ὡν ὁφάνει πλήσωσι, καὶ τὰς ἀνθρώπους ἑκατέρας ἀνελέοντο, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνους συνήθεις ἐξερήσεται (quoted in Anthol.). Otherwise called τῆς. Arist. Ach. 860, 934. Diog. Laert. ix 53, of Protagoras, who κρατοὺ τῆς καλούμενας τύχης, δ' ἐφ' ὡν τὰ φύσι ταυτότροπα, εἰπεν, ὡς φησιν Ἀριστοτέλει ἐν τῷ περὶ παιδείας φορμόφορος λέξις δ', εἰπε καὶ Ἐπικούρειον τοῦ φρεν. So that Protagoras may be added to the examples of ε' ὡν ἐν αὐτά, i 9. 31, ὡν ἐν ὑπήρξε ταῦτα.

The exclamation of Iphocrates from what I rose to this (from what an origin my fortune was made) is repeated in a more correct form (Buhle) in c. 9. 31, ὡν ἐν αὐτά, as is also part of the Epigram. Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. et Imp., under the head of Iphocrates, Nos. 1 and 5, has these notices of him. Ιφικράτης δοκεῖ πάντως ὡς εἶναι συνεμάχον καταφυσικοί' δόξων δὲ νῦν πρώτον ἔχει δια τραχειαν πολέμου διδασκαλίας μέχρι τοῦ διὰ ζωντα συναρτόν ὥς τάς τών τρόπους μετέπειραν. Νο. 5, πρὸς τ' Ἀριστοτέλειον τῶν παιδικῶν Ἀριστοτέλειον ἐν τῷ παιδείας τοῦ παιδιοῦ τοῦ παιδείας τοῦ παιδίου τриторον, τὸ μὲν ἐμφανῶς ἐμφανῶς προέρχεται, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ ἐν σοι προέρχεται.

§ 33. τὸ αὐτοφύες τοῦ ἐπικτήτου] 'native superior to acquired talents and advantages (of person, mind or character), because they are harder to come by'; nature being rather chary of such gifts, and the acquisition of them comparatively easy. Top. Ι. 1, 116 δ' ὡν, καὶ τὸ φυσικὸ τὸ μη βίου, ὡν ἐκ Γαλατίου τοῦ Παλαιοῦ τὸ μὲν γὰρ φυσικό τὸ δ' ἐπικτήτου. This topic has a wider scope than the rhetorical, and again, c. 4, 119 a 7–10. Comp. Pind. Ol. Ιx 152, τὸ δ' φυσί κράτους ἔχων. ΙΙ 155, συνθέο ὡς ποιέω εἰσα σφιν' μαθούντες δὲ λαβοῦν παγγελοντο τῷ παῖδι ἄριστα θεών. Νεμ. ΙΙΙ 69, συνήθεις δὲ τις δραττε μέγα βραδείς δ' ὡς διδασκ. ἐξει παράλληλα. Species autem comparantur ut antepondenat quae propter se expetenda sunt ut quae propter aliud: ut innata atque insita assumptis et adventitis et seq. Cic. Topic. ΧVIII 69.

ὁ νομισμένος Homer. Odyssey Χ (XXIII) 347.

§ 34. οἶον Περικλῆς τὸν ἐπικτήτον κ. τ. λ.] This celebrated simile does not occur, as is well known, in the funeral oration put into Pericles' mouth by Thucydides in his second book. Thucydides, who merely gives the general meaning of his speakers and never their actual words, may have omitted it intentionally, if Pericles really made use of it. But as Herodotus, VII 162, attributes nearly the same identical words to Gelo, it seems more probable that it was erroneously ascribed to the other: at all events it is quite clear that it could not have been original in his mouth. It appears, likewise, in a somewhat altered form, in Euripides (Suppl. 447, πάντ' ὡς δ' ἐν γένεσιν ἐν ἐρχομένῳ πάλιν, ἢ τις ὡς λεγόμενον ἐρμοῦ στάχυν AR. I. 10.
§ 35. τὰ ἐν χρήσι...μείζον χρήσιμα (μείζον ἑστὶ) A friend in need is a friend indeed. 1 Augus manifesto vim beneficiorum tempus, angustiaque eorum qui beneficium accipient, quod etiam Demosthenes in Leptinum significavit (p. 471, 1), πάντες μὲν γὰρ εἰσάγων λεγον ἄξιον ἃνυψαλαμβάνοι ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ὑπάρχει, μάλιστα δὲ ὁ παρὰ τὰ χρήσις. Victorius. Comp. Eth. N. VIII 15, 1163 a 16, in estimating the value of services to a friend, when you wish to make the most of them you say that they are τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ᾿ αὐτῶν (the best you have to give), καὶ ἄρα ἄλλων τύχη, καὶ ἐν κυμάνισι τοιούτως χρήσις.

δύοιν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους] This topic is distinguishable from those in §§ 9 and 16. There the comparison is between end and not-end: here it is between different degrees or orders of means to an end. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 22, quoted on § 9. Alexander, in his Comm. on that passage, illustrates this by the comparison of shaving and exercise as means to the end, health; the active exercise of ἄστρη (this is the definition of ἐκατομμυρία in the Eth. Nic.) to the more ἔξω of it, as nearer to the end, happiness; in practical arts, the higher and more comprehensive are superior to the narrower and subordinate in each department, the latter being mere means to some higher end; so horsemanship is superior to the saddler's art, both being subordinate, but the former nearer, to the end, the military art; the woodman's and carpenter's arts as means to shipbuilding; medicine and gymnastics as both tending to a healthy habit of body.

τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλώς] The comparison in the expression of this topic is left to be understood, and the two terms are merely placed in juxtaposition by καὶ, one and the other are laid before us, in order that we may choose between them. The topic is a comparison of absolute good, or good in general, and relative good. That which is absolutely good, or good in itself, καθ᾿ αὐτῷ, or good in general, need not be the best for us ("to a man's own self"), any particular individual, αὐτῷ, though theoretically, from the higher point of view, it is superior to the other. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 8, τὸ ἀπλώς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τιν ἀνθρώπου. Alexander, in his Comm. on Top. p. 125 (Top. 116 b 26, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀπλώς), illustrates this by the contrast of immortality and long life, which will apply as

1 The comparison of these two topics well illustrates the difference of treatment in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. In the former that which is generally and theoretically true is put forward: in the latter, looking at this same question from the practical side, we see that there are many exceptions, and that this other side is equally capable of being maintained.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 7 § 36.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ οὖ. καὶ τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ
36 βιοῦν τέλη γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει. καὶ τὰ
πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν. ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς Ρ. 1365 δ.

well to the ἁλὸς and αὐτῷ as to that for which it is immediately in-
tended: immortality may perhaps be absolutely the best, most desirable
in itself, but it is out of our reach; for us therefore a long life, which
may possibly be attained, is better: it is of no use to choose or prefer
immortality. Another example is supplied by Heraclitus' dictum, quoted
in Eth. Níc. X 5, 1176 a 7, that an ass would prefer any rubbish or refuse
(σκόμματο) to gold; because it is pleasanter to him. Comp. I 15. 12, τὸ
ἀπάλω ἄγαθον αἰρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ.

αὐτῷ (αἱ αὐτῶ) [on p. 146] is the reading of Vict., Buhe, Gaisf., Bekker,
Spengel, and Bonitz, Arist. Stud. I p. 88. It is the equivalent of τωι in
the familiar antithesis of general and particular good, as in the passage of the
Topics above quoted; comp. I 9. 17 αὐτῷ, I 15. 20, II 13. 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ
συμφέρων αὐτῷ ἄγαθον ἔτη, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁλὸς: and as in the repetition
of the antithesis, I 15. 12, it assumes the form of αὐτῷ, 'good to a man's own
self', i.e. each particular individual, it is quite plain that the one form
can in many cases be substituted for the other. On αὐτῷ for αὐτῷ and
the rest, see Waitz, Orig. p. 486, 54 a 14. Rhet. I 1. 12, ἀνάγει δὲ αὐτῶν
ὁτάσιοι. Also, Buttm. Ex. cur. x ad Dem. c. Mid. p. 140, de formis αὐτῶν
et αὐτῶν. ἦ for καί, which is adopted by Vict. and Gaisf., and suggested
by Bonitz, L. C., is, as I have above endeavoured to shew, unnecessary.

τὸ δυνάμαι τοῦ ἄνωθεν] Top. Γ 1, 116 δ 26. See Alexander's example
in the last note but one. Another occurs in II 2. 2, on anger, ἰδὲ μὲν γὰρ
τὸ ὀλοκληροῦσα τοῦτο οὖν ἐφίέτα, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἄνωθεν ἐφίέτα
αὐτῷ, δ’ ἄργων ἐφίέτα αὐτῷ. We deliberate, with a view to action,
and that which is to be preferred of two courses of action, only about
things which we believe to be possible, and possible to us; κἂν μὲν ἄνωθεν
ἐντύχως, ἐφίέταμεν...ἐὰν δυνάμαι φαίνεται ἐγχειροῦσι πράττειν. Eth.
Níc. III 5, 1112 δ 25.

This topic is stated as a consequence from the preceding; the possible
is to be preferred to the impossible, because the attainable good is the
only good for us, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, τὸ δ’ οὖ.

τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βιοῦ] The end in question is not the temporal end, but
the final cause. The τέλει is in itself good, 7. 8, 9; 6. 2; the higher or
nearer to the end (τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλει) are any of the means employed for
the attainment of it, the more they approximate in their character to the
end itself; hence τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βιοῦ, the means included in, or those
which subserv, the end of life—happiness, or whatever else the end of
life may be—are in so far superior, being nearer to that great and final
end, than other means to other and lower ends. Top. Γ 1, 116 δ 23, τὸ
πρὸς τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλεω αἰρετάντερον μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ πρὸς ἄλλο τι, οἷον τὸ πρὸς
εὐδαιμονίαν συντίκνοιν ἢ τὸ πρὸς φύσιν. 10—2

§ 36. τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν] the real and the apparent or
sham; τὸ εὖν and τὸ δοκοῦν, τὸ δὲ and τὸ φαίνομαι; the solid, genuine, sub-
stantial reality contrasted with the mere outside show and 'appearance';
or truth as absolute certainty, and probable opinion. Top. Γ 3, 118 δ 20,
PHILOKLES A 7 § 37.

δόξαι, ὁ λαυθαίνεις μέλλων οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιτο. διὸ καὶ τὸ εὐ πάσχειν τού ἐν ποιεῖν δόξαιν ἂν αἰρετώτερον εἶναι τὸ μὲν γὰρ κἂν λαυθαίνη αἰρήσεται, ποιεῖν δὲ 37 εὖ λαυθάων οὐ δοκεῖ ἂν ἔλεσθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖς βούλονται. πρὸς ἀλῆθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον.

ὅτι τὸ μὲν δὲν αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἰρητών (αἰρετώτερον ἄρτιν), οἷον ὑγίεια κάλλος. (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν δὲ αὐτὴν αἰρημένην ἂν μὴ δὴ προσθῆκα μᾶλλον, τὸ δὲ κάλλος διὰ τὴν ἐν' αὐτῷ δόξαιν μάταιον γονὸν δοκεῖ τὸ κάλλος ἐτειμανίζεσθαι. Alex. Aphrod. ad loc.) Aesch. Sept. c. Th. 592, of Amphiarraus the just, om γὰρ δοκεῖν δίκαιον ἀλλ᾽ ἔστω θεῖος. This topic is No. 3, in Bacon’s Colours of Good and Evil (Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, VII 79). It is shown to fail in the case of virtue; the virtuous man ‘will be virtuous in solitude, and not only in theatre’.

ἐρωτευμεν δὲ τοῦ πρῶτον δόξαιν κ.τ.λ.] Ἱερομ. λ. c. 21, ὡς ἔτι τοῦ πρῶτον δόξαιν τὸ μακάμην συνεδρίας μὴ ἂν συνυπάρχοι ὑπάρχει. ‘The distinguishing mark or characteristic of that which is directed to mere opinion (is found in) anything that a man would not choose if he were sure that it would not be known or recognised by others’. And the same thing is expressed in the Topics, ‘anything which a man would not be anxious to possess if no one else was to be privy to it’. It is the credit of possessing the thing, in the eyes of others, and not the mere possession for its own sake, that gives it its value and superiority. Compare with this ἂ μὴ λαυθαίνει κ.τ.λ. § 40, which gives the other side of the question.

In the example, the superiority of receiving to conferring a benefit, the words δόξαιν ἂν suggest that we need not take this for granted; it can be ‘made to appear’ that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other side of the question; from a higher point of view, to confer is better than to receive a benefit.

§ 37. ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] The difference between this and the preceding topic seems to lie in this. That lays down the general rule, and refers to ‘every thing’ that comes under it; and is therefore appealed to, πρὸς ἀλῆθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον, as the warrant and foundation of this. The second is a special variety of the first, ‘what men wish to be’; the qualities, such as virtues, which they desire to possess, or seem to possess. Here again the reality is preferable to the mere credit and external appearance of the virtue. ‘And, therefore, it is a vulgar and popular opinion (φασὶ, Plat. Rep. II 358 A; and not merely the doctrine of the vulgar, οἱ πόλεμοι, but maintained also by would-be philosophers, as Thrasymachus and Callicles) that justice is a thing of small value (mean and contemptible), because the appearance of it is preferable to the reality, whereas in the case of health it is the reverse’. Victorius quotes, in exemplification of φασὶ, two iambic lines from Plutarch de Aud. Poet. p. 18 δ, τοῦ μὲν δικαιον τὴν δόξαιν ἄρεσκε, τὸ δ' ἐργα τῶν πάν ἄρετον ἐνδεικνύει. Eur. Ixion. Fr. 1. Dind. Quoted also in Stobaeus p. 30, 8. Another fragment to the same effect is ascribed by Valckenaer (Diatr. in Fragm. Eur. p. 166) to Euripides’ Ixion.
διό καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην φατὶ μικρὸν εἶναι, ὅτι δοκεῖν 38 ἢ εἶναι αἱρετῶτερον· τὸ δὲ ύπναίειν οὐ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμωτέρον, οἷον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἔκν καὶ εὐ ἔκν καὶ τὴν ἠδονήν καὶ τὸ πρᾶττειν τὰ καλά. διὸ καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος καὶ ἡ ύπνεια μέγιστα δοκεῖ εἶναι· ἀπαντά 39 γὰρ ἔχει ταύτα. καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύτηρον καὶ ἡ ἡδονή· πλεῖον γὰρ ἔνος, ὡστε ὑπάρχει καὶ ἡ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἀληθινα. καὶ δυσὶν ὁ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον 40 μεῖζον τὸ ὁλον ποιεῖ. καὶ ἂ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντα ἢ λανθάνει: πρὸς ἀληθεύειν γὰρ τεῖνε ταύτα. διὸ τὸ

§ 38. τὸ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμωτέρον] Τοπ. Γ 3, 118 b 27, ὡς καλεῖται ποιοχαῖρ τὸ αἰρετὸν λέγεται καὶ τῶν χρών οἷον τοῦ συμφόρουτος ἢ τοῦ κάλου ἢ τοῦ ἱδρος· τὸ γὰρ πρὸς δικαιο ἢ πρὸς τὰ πλεῖον χρήσιμον αἰρετῶτερον διὸ ὑπάρχει τοῦ μὲ ἅμως. Wealth and health are supposed to be of the highest value because they are serviceable in so many ways; for the support and preservation of mere life, and of a virtuous and happy life (for which they supply the means), also for pleasure and for good and noble actions.

§ 39. καὶ τὸ ἀληθεύτηρον καὶ τὸ μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς] Τοπ. Γ 2, 117 a 23, καὶ ταύτα μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς μᾶλλον ἢ ἄνω ἡδονῆς. καὶ ταύτα μετ᾽ ἀληθεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ λύσις. The desirability of anything even which is desirable in itself or on other grounds, as things useful, is increased by the addition of any pleasure that accompanies such things; so the ένώργευσι are completed and perfected by the accompanying ηδονῆ in each case, Ειθ. Ν. X 3, 4, 5. And likewise the absence of pain, as compared with its presence, may be regarded as a positive good. The topic in the Rhetoric combines the two, positive pleasure and negative relief from pain; these together being 'more than one' are superior to either of the two separately. καὶ is therefore 'together with'; and ὡστε ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. 'and so (in the case supposed) we have (there are there, ὑπάρχει) the positive pleasure and the absence of pain, which may both be regarded as a good'.

καὶ δυσὶ...τὸ διὸν ποιεῖ] Α + B is greater than A + C, therefore B is greater than C. Τοπ. Γ 5, 119 a 22, ὡς καὶ τῆς προσθέσιμης, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθήμενον τὸ διὸν μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τουθεν, ἢ εἰ τῷ ἄνω τοιώντων προστιθήμενον τὸ διὸν μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τουθεν. In the second of these two cases, if the addition of a quantity to the less of two other quantities makes the sum total of the two greater than the sum total arising from the addition of another different quantity to the other, we may infer that the former of the two added quantities is greater than or preferable to the latter. 4 is less than 6: if the addition of 8 to 4 produces a total 12, which is greater than the total resulting from the addition of an unknown quantity x, to 6, and therefore less than 12, we may infer (by calculation) that x is less than 8.

§ 40. ϛ λανθάνει] δ has been omitted, either by the author or a tran-
41 πλούτειν φανεῖν ἄν μείζον ἀγαθόν τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ p. 28. τὸ ἀγαπητόν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἀλλῶν.

scriber. A similar omission occurs in Plat. Phaedr. 275 Α, τῶν παθῶν ἐν ὑδώρινοι. Similar examples quoted from Plato by Stallbaum (note ad loc.) make it probable that the oversight is due to the author. 'Things that do shew themselves, and are conspicuous, have a greater air of reality about them than those that do not (that lurk out of sight), and may therefore lay claim to the preference'.

διὸ τὸ πλούτειν φανεῖν ἄν μείζον ἀγαθόν τοῦ δοκεῖν] This, the vulgar reading, which Victorius found in all his MSS, is no inference or exemplification of the preceding rule, though it is supported by Schrader, who however does not explain the connexion. If it be applied to the rule, the show or appearance, τὸ δοκεῖν, of wealth is said λαθόν, not to be seen; which is absurd. It does follow from the topic in § 37, and may possibly have been thence transferred to this place. Some MSS and the Greek Scholiast give πλούτειν...καὶ δοκεῖν, but it seems unlikely that the two verbs, if the combination of the two was intended, should be so widely separated: also καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν would be required. This was corrected by Muretus, τὸ πλούτειν καὶ δοκεῖν φανεῖν ἄν μείζον ἀγαθόν τοῦ πλούτειν, which seems rather too violent an alteration. Brandis would adopt the reading of his anonymous commentator, διὸ τὸ πλούτειν καὶ δοκεῖν φανεῖν ἄν μείζον ἀγαθόν τοῦ μη δοκεῖν (Schneidewin's Philologus IV i p. 42), also conjectured by Vater, and confirmed by the Greek Schol., who explains it, καὶ τὸ πλούτειν καὶ φαίνειν μείζον τοῦ πλούτειν καὶ μὴ φαίνειν. Another mode of correction had occurred to me, the interchange, viz. of τὸ and τοῦ, τοῦ πλούτειν...τοῦ δοκεῖν. The meaning of this would be, that the appearance or outward show of wealth, together with the wealth itself which it manifested, might upon this principle be made to appear superior to the wealth without the show, because the possessor would lose all the credit of it—but this involves perhaps rather a non-natural interpretation of πρὸς ἀλλήλων τιμῶν. I am indebted to Mr Munro for a suggestion that deserves attention: the substitution of τῷ, for τοῦ, δοκεῖν: the alteration is very slight, and gives an excellent sense; the value of wealth by this rule may be considered to be augmented by the addition of the prominent and conscious display of it. Beckler and Spengel retain the vulgate.

§ 41. τὸ ἀγαπητόν καὶ λ. not here ' to be acquiesced in', ' that which one may be content with', (as in Eth. Nic. i 1094 δ 19) ; nor in the reputed Homeric sense of 'unique', ' only', but 'highly valued', 'deeply prized'.

1 Of the four places in which ἄγαπητόν occurs in Homer, and is interpreted μικρὸς, unicus, one, Od. β 365, has the addition of μικρὸς, which seems to show that there, at any rate, ἄγαπητόν cannot mean μικρὸς or μικρογεγένη; and in the others the translation 'dearer beloved' is just as suitable and probable. It is similarly explained (in the supposed Homeric sense) by many of the Interp. of Matt. iii. 17, Mark i. 11, Luc. iii. 23, and other places where Christ is called ὁ ἀγαπητός ἡς ὑμῖν. Dr Lightfoot, in Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philol. Vol. iii. p. 92, No. 7, thinks that from the primary notion of ἄγαπητόν ' to welcome'—which is undoubtedly its original and Homeric sense—it expresses rather the external act than the inward feeling, and should be translated.
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 8 § 1. 151

diō kai ouk istora, an tis ton ἐτερόφθαλμον
tυφλόση καὶ τὸν δὲ ἔχοντα· ἄγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφὴ-
ρηται.

I  ek tìmow men ouv dei tae πίστεις φέρειν ἐν τῷ προ-
τρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἰρηταὶ· μέγιστον

('beloved', something which one is very fond of. Comp. unicus, as in
Catullus, Carmen 64, 213). So it is used in Eth. Nic. ix 12 init. ὅπερ τοῖς ἔρωτι τὸ ἄνθρωπον. In Pol. ii 4, 1262 b 23, the meaning is more
doubtful, and the sense of 'unique' possible. Here it cannot have this
meaning, because in some cases it is μετ' ἄλλων, and it is only by the
addition of μόνων that the 'great rarity' which gives it its high value
becomes the 'solitary specimen'. Comp. Buttm. ad Mid. p. 567, note 398.

[ετερόφθαλμον] Gaisford refers to a very pertinent passage of Dem. c.
Timocr. p. 744, in which the orator tells with admirable conciseness a story
of a one-eyed man of Locri, who under a law framed on the retaliatory
principle ('an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth') was threatened by
an enemy with the loss of his solitary visual organ. 'Vexed at this, and
thinking life intolerable at the price, he is said to have ventured to pro-
pose a law, that if any one deprived a one-eyed man of an eye, he should
lose both his own in return, that the loss of each might be equalized'.
This is a case of enmexia, the spirit of the law rectifying the imperfection of

This concludes the treatment of the general principles and topics from
which arguments may be derived by the political rhetorician in the deli-
berative kind of Rhetoric: there remains one special subject under this
head, which is indispensable to the orator who takes part in public busi-
ness, and is sketched very briefly in outline in the next chapter, with
a reference to the Politics for complete details.

CHAP. VIII.

§ 1. On the general connexion of this chapter with its context, on the
two rhetorical uses of the study of Politics, and the various classifica-
tions of Constitutions by Aristotle in other works, by Plato and Polybius, see

'The subject, which is most important and effectual (is of the highest

in Homer rather by 'fondled or caressed', than 'beloved'. Fritzschhe, on Eth.
Eod. III. 6, 1333 b 3, renders τοῦ ἄγαυροῦ, filii unice dilisci. See the references
in his note. Heinsius, Exercit. Sacr. in Marc. i. 11 (quoted by Gaisford),
pronounces very decidedly in favour of this interp. unicus, unigenitus, prater
quem alius non datur: referring to this passage (which is decisive against him), to
Homer, and to Hesychius ἄγαυρον, moysocē. Victorius more in accordance with
facts says, "carum valet, ut puto, idque significare voluit Catullus cum inquit 'si
quid carius est osculi' quo uno se aliquid consolatur, in quo omnem spem
superum gaudium collocatum habet, quo impetrato ac retento contentus vivere
potest:" which exactly defines it. The use of the Latin unicus is precisely
similar.
de kai kuriōtaton ἀπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν, τὰς πολιτείας ἀπάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἑκάστης έθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα διελεῖν. πείθονται γὰρ ἀπάντες τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σώζον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κυρία μὲν ἦστιν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφασις, τὰ δὲ κύρια

authority, carries most weight, κυριώτατον) of all in conferring the power and cultivating the faculty of persuasion and good counsel, includes the exact (analytical διελείων) knowledge of all the existing varieties of constitutions, together with the habits (i.e. the habits and manners which they severally engender in those who live under them), institutions, and interests (συμφέροντα) which respectively belong to them'. *Ad consilium autem de republica dandum caput est nosse renum publicam; ad dicendum vero probabiliter nosse mores civilitatis, qui quia cæro mutantur, genus quoque orationis est saepe mutandum.* Cic. de Orat. 11 § 2. 337. § 2. ἢ δὲ κυρία κ.τ.λ.] Not only must the public speaker be acquainted with the manners and customs, institutions, and all that is expedient to or for the interest of these various forms of government, but also with the nature of the governing body (τὰ κύρια) in each; it is by the declarations or proclamations (ἀπόφασις) of this supreme authority that the law is given to the citizens and their conduct prescribed to them, and as these are various under the several constitutions (τὰ δὲ κύρια διεγέρθη—κυρία ἦστιν), so he must be thoroughly acquainted with all the existing varieties.

ἀπόφασις] so the Vulg., retained by Bekker and Spengel: ἀπόφασις is found in two MSS: ἀπόφασις also occurs, with a varia lectio ἀπόφασις in two MSS, in the sense of 'a declaration or utterance' (as here) in 11 21. 2. ἀπόφασις is no doubt used in the common language in two different senses, (1) 'denial, contradiction', as usually in Aristotle, from ἀπόφασις, and (2) 'a declaration', from ἀποφαίνεσθαι, as in Demosthenes and Polybius, VI 3. 1, τὴν ἐπί τοῦ μέλλοντος ἀπόφασιν, 9. 11; 12. 10. But Aristotle most expressly distinguishes the two words again and again in the νοημα, as C. 1. 16 a 1, δεῖ διερρέα...τὰ ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις (negative and affirmative) καὶ ἀπόφασις (an enunciation) καὶ λόγος, c. 5, 17 a 8, λόγος ἀποφαίνεσθαι κατάφασις, ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις' c. 6, 17 a 25, κατάφασις δὲ ἦστιν ἀπόφασις τῶν ἐστὶν τῶν: and in very many other places. Is it possible that the author of this treatise could use the one word for the other? On the other side it may be said that Aristotle is extremely hasty and careless in writing, and that the inconsistency is in this case justified and explained by his having for the nonce conformed to the ordinary usage of the language: and the evidence on either side seems so nicely balanced, manuscript authority included, that the question cannot be positively determined. Buhle is very emphatic on the point, 'equidem iure meo ἀπόφασις reponsoi.'

1 As φαίνεται is derived from φαίνει, so of course may ἀπόφασις be formed from ἀποφαίνεσθαι.
§ 3. On the classifications of forms of government, see Appendix A, Introd. p. 208. On this ordinary, popular, fourfold division, see Pol. vi (iv) 7, init.

τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρίνον κτλ.] ‘the sovereign power, the highest authority’, τὸ κύριον; or the ‘power’ which ‘decides’, τὸ κρίνον, with which rests the ultimate decision, to which lies the ultimate appeal—this sovereign power ‘is always either a part of one of these four or the whole of it’; the ‘part’ in the three latter cases of the forms named: the ‘whole’ in the democratic form alone.

§ 4. The distinctions of the four forms of government are determined, like everything else, by the object or end proposed to itself by each of them; this is the ὅρος, the characteristic mark, or determining principle, of each, that which severally ‘characterizes’ them; and this is in each case a special conception of political justice, τὸ δικαίωμα. Pol. iii 9, init.

Democracy is a form of government that is distinguished from the rest, (is characterised), by the distribution of offices amongst the people by themselves (διαίκουσι, mtd.) and by lot, each member of the entire body of citizens having an equal chance of obtaining them: this is equivalent to saying that the ὅρος of a democracy, its determining principle, that which gives its special character is ‘equality’, ἴσος, which is the foundation of the ἀλεξιβρα (usually assigned as its ὅρος), and therefore its proper τίτλος. This is laid down in Pol. vi (iv) 4, 1291 b 30 seq. ‘Liberty’ and ‘equality’ are the catchwords of a democracy. δὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν οἷς ἡ δημοκρατία δοκεῖ πρόλειψιν, τὸ τὸ πλεῖον εἶναι κύριον καὶ τῇ ἀλεξιβρα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικαίωμα ἵσος δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἵσος δ’ ὅ τι ἂν δέξῃ τῇ πληθύνσι τοῦτ’ εἶναι κύριον, ἀλεξιβρα δὲ καὶ ἰσός τὸ δ’ ὅ τι ἂν βούληται τις ποιῆσαι (Pol. viii (v) 9, sub fin.). Liberty alone is not sufficient in the way of a distinction, (ib. 1290 b 7 seq.), though it is commonly assigned as such, ib. c. 8, 1294 a 10, δικαίωμα μὲν γὰρ ὅρος δριτῆ, ἀλεξιβρα δὲ πλεῖον, δίσοιο δ’ ἀλεξιβρα. Another current ὅρος of democracy is the will of the majority: where that is sovereign the state is democratic. Ib. vii (vi) 3, 1316 a 18, φαιν ὅτι ἐν δημοτικῷ τοῦτο δικαίωμα ὅτι ἂν δέξῃ τῶν πλεῖστῶν. But this again rests upon the notion of equality, because it implies that as all the citizens are individually equal, and have equal rights, the greater number has the higher right, and therefore prevails over the minority. The theory of democracy is, that all citizens are equal; not that all men are born equal, because all barbarians are naturally inferior to Greeks. The use of the ‘lot’.

1 This however is common to all three, democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy; in all of them alike, ὅτι ἂν δέξῃ τῇ πλείον μέρος τῶν μεταχεῖται τῷ πολιτείᾳ, τοῦτ’ ἔστι κύριον. Pol. vi (iv) 8, 1294 a 13.
which leaves the choice of the candidate to chance, is an exemplification of this, because it assumes the equality of the claims of all citizens to office. On the different kinds of democracy, see Pol. vi (iv) 4, 1291 b 14 seq.

The ἀριστοκρατία is πλούσιος: and therefore property, a census, τίμημα (estimated value of property), is necessary as a qualification for office, for that which confers authority or sovereignty, ἐν ἡ ὑλῇ ἄριστομέτρῳ (dianéomontai τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλι-...

The πολιτεία ἐν ἡ κλήρῳ διανέομονται τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἀλλι-

The ἀριστοκρατία is in the Politics ἀριστεῖν and not ὀδεῖλα. The two following observations are added in the way of notes to explain the apparent discrepancy. 'Aristocracy is a kind of polity in which education is the qualification for a share in the government. By education, I mean that which is established by the law of the land: for it is those who have lived in constant obedience to the state institutions that bear rule in the aristocracy'. The virtue of a citizen is not one and the same; it varies under different forms of government. The system of education must therefore be fixed and controlled by the government and conformed to its established institutions. This is the 'education established by the law' of the text. On the absolute necessity of this kind of training in virtue under state direction for grown men as well as children, see Eth. N. X 10, 1179 b 32 seq., and the unfinished treatise on education in Bk. v (viii) of the Politics. "Such men as these must necessarily appear 'best', and it is from them that this (form of constitution) has derived its name". Since ὀδεῖλα therefore is the necessary preparation for ἀριστεῖν, either of them may be represented as the object of the state. Definitions of ἀριστοκρατία are to be found, Pol. III 7, 1279 a 34, where two explanations of the ἀριστεῖν in the name are given: either δᾶ τῶν ἀριστείων ἀρχῶν (which is adopted here), or δᾶ τῷ πρῶτῳ τῷ ἀριστεῖν τῷ πολεί καὶ τῶν κοινωνίας πάθεσι. In 13, 1286 b 4, τῶν πλείους ἀρχὰς ἐγάδων δ' αὐτῶν, 1b. VI (iv) 8, 1294 a 9, δοκεῖ δὲ ἀριστοκρατία μὲν ἐνὶς ἀμύλατα τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐμφαι-
RHETORIKHΣ A 8 § 5.

γαρχία δὲ ἐν ἣ ὁι ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ ἐν ἥ ὁι κατὰ παιδείαν. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω τὴν υπὸ τοῦ νόμου κειμένην ὁι γὰρ ἐμμεμεμνηκότες ἐν τοῖς νομίμωσιν ἐν τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ἀρχονσιν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων φαίνεσθαι ἀριστους· ὅθεν καὶ τούνομα εἴληφε τοῦτο. μοναρχία δὲ ἐστὶ κατὰ τούνομα ἐν ἥ ἔτει Π. 1366 ἀπάντων κυρίως ἐστίν· τούτων δὲ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τάξεων 5 τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δ' ἀριστος τυραννίς. τὸ δὴ τέλος μὴδεν καλ’ ἀρετὴν ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν γὰρ ὄρει ἀρετήν. Βυτ. θ., 15, 1299 β 25, ἐν ταῖς ἀριστοκράτειαις (οἱ ἄρχοντε) ἐκ παναιδεύμενων.

μοναρχία] the sole government of one, includes βασιλεία κατὰ τάξεως τινὰ, a monarchy under certain fixed regulations or conditions, a limited, constitutional monarchy, ἡ δ’ ἤτοι γέρας πατρικί βασιλεία, θυκ. 1 13, and the ‘indefinite’, unrestricted, unlimited tyranny. The distinction between the two here rests upon the limitation of the sovereign power or the absence of it. So in Pol. III 14, 1285 a 27, οἱ μὲν γὰρ (βασιλείας) κατὰ νόμον καὶ ἐκόστων, οἱ δ’ ἐκόστων ἀρχονσιν. The second of these two distinctions of the voluntary and involuntary obedience is repeated 1285 β 2 (Βασιλείας) διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαὶ εἶλαι διετοιχικα, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ ἐκόστων βασιλεία. ‘Usurpation’, as the distinctive difference of tyranny as opposed to monarchy (Eth. N. VIII 12), is insufficient. The government of the hereditary monarchs of Persia is ‘tyrannous’ in respect of the nature and mode of exercise of their power, though these and other barbarian monarchies are κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικά, Pol. III 14, 1285 a 18 and 22, δὲ μο- χθήρος βασιλεῖς τυραννος γίνεται, Eth. N. VIII 12. Lastly, the tyrant has a mercenary ‘body-guard’, φυλακὴ (this is distinctive of ‘tyranny’; see Rhet. I 2 19). The regular constitutional sovereign is protected, if at all, by a national guard of citizens, III 14, 1285 a 24. But the true distinction between them is determined by the end of the government of each: with the one it is his own interest, τὸ αὐτοῦ συμφέρον: with the other it is the interest of the governed, πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον, III 7, 1279 a 27—31, VIII (v) 10, 1311 a 3, ἢ τὰ τυραννικαὶ...πρὸς οὖν ἀποβάλλει κοινὼν, εἰ μὲν τῆς ἴδιας ἀρετῆς χάριν. ἦσι δὲ σχετεῖ τυραννικὸ τὸ ἥδι, βασιλεῖς δὲ τὸ καλὸν.

§ 5. The ‘end’ of each form of government may be identified with its ὄρος, because ‘everything being determined by its end’, the end does determine (ἀπερίτα) or characterise the special form which each kind of government assumes. These ὄροι or τέλη have already been considered in the preceding note. All choice is directed to some end: the end of the state, or its governing and guiding principle, must control and give a direction to all the choice and the consequent action of its citizens; and hence the necessity that the statesman and public speaker should be acquainted with it. ‘Plainly therefore it is with a view to the end of each form of government that our analysis of its habits, institutions, and interests should be conducted, because it is to this that the motives and actions of the body of men that we have to address are ultimately directed’.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 8 § 6.

ήκαστής πολιτείας οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν· αἱροῦνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἐστὶ δὲ δημοκρατίας μὲν τέλος ἑλευθερία, ὀλυμπραχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τυραννίδος δὲ φιλακή. δὴλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης ἐθν καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα διαριστέοι, εἰπερ δὲ αἱροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἑπαναφέροντες. ἐτεῖ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι’ ἀποδεκτικοῦ λόγου

τυραννίδος δὲ φιλακή] φιλακή is here ‘precaution’, ‘self-defence’—a form of self-interest. τὸ δ’ άνω συμφέρων, characteristic of ‘tyranny’—and hence, as a means to this end, the φιλακή in its other sense, the mercenary body-guard, becomes a necessity, and distinctive of a tyranny. But as a φιλακή, in some sense, is equally required by any sole ruler or monarch, who is always in danger from the attempts of rivals, or rebels, or revolutionists,—the sole ruler has only one life to lose, and hence the personal danger; in governments of many, where the members are numerous, the attempt to get rid of them all would be difficult or impossible, and consequently it is not made—so here βασιλεία or μοναρχία is included under the general head of τυραννίς: so Schrader. Failing to see this, some transcriber, whose reading appears in the Greek Scholiast 1, had inserted the clause βασιλείας δὲ τὸ εὐρύτερον ένιστατίν, which being wanting in all the MSS, and not rendered by the Latin Translators, was deservedly rejected by Victorius. Vater, who does not agree with Victorius’ and Schrader’s view, thinks that some words descriptive of the τέλος of the βασιλεία have dropped out; and Spengel, by ‘indicating a lacuna’ (Rhet. Gr. Praef. vi), appears to be of the same opinion.

Upon the whole I think that Brandis’ view of the question is to be preferred (Philologus iv i p. 43). It certainly is not likely, though possible, that Aristotle would have identified monarchy and tyranny, considering the treatment of them which he adopts in the Politics, and that he has already subdivided μοναρχία into βασιλεία and τυραννίς in § 4. Consequently, it appears that this division was adhered to in § 5, and something to represent the τέλος of βασιλεία has been lost.

§ 6. On this kind of Ἰδιον, one of the three by which an ethical character is conveyed to the speech, and which is employed as an indirect argument or means of persuasion, see Introduction on this passage, p. 182, and on the Ἰδιον in general, p. 110 seq.

The spirit and tone of the speech, and the expressions employed, must be in conformity with the national character of the audience, as determined by the end of their special form of government; a democratical tone and language must not be adopted in addressing an oligarchical audience, and vice versa.

1 It is Brandis’ ‘Anonymus.’ See his paper in Schneidewin’s Philologus, iv i p. 43.
ΠΡΟΣΟΙΚΗΣ Α 8 § 7.

ἀλλὰ καὶ δι’ ἢθυκοῦ (τῷ γὰρ ποιῶν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύωμεν, τούτῳ δὲ ἐστὶν ἀν ἀγαθὸς φαί-
νηται ἢ εὐθὺς ἢ ἀμφω), δέοι ἂν τὰ ἢθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστης ὢδος πιθα-
νώτατον ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι. ταύτα δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

7 ὡς μὲν οὖν δεῖ ἀρέσθαι προτρέποντας ὡς ἐσομέ-
νων ἢ δυνῶν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεῖ τὰς περὶ τοῦ συμφέ-
ροτος πίστεις λαμβάνειν, ἐτί δὲ περὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς 
πολιτείας ὢδον καὶ νομίμων διὰ τίνων τε καὶ πῶς 
ἐπιπορήσουμεν, ἐφ’ ἀυτὸν ἢ τῷ παρόντι καρδίᾳ σύμμε-
τρον, εἰρηντικόν διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς 
περὶ τούτων.

ταύτα δὲ ληφθήσονται κ.τ.λ.] These ‘political characters’, he says, ‘will be found by the same means’, by the same kind of observation and study, as the other ἢθη, the individual characters: ‘in both, the characters are manifested in the choice or purpose’, which is always directed to the end (which we desire to attain). As the individual character is shown by the purpose or intention of every act, so the national character of the people, as a body, is manifested in their choice and purpose, which is directed to the general end, aim, and object, or the general prevailing principle, of the state and its institutions: it is this common view and purpose which gives them their national character; and to this the speech must conform in order to be acceptable.

§ 7 gives a summary of the contents of the first division of the analysis of the three kinds of Rhetoric, the deliberative. ‘We have treated of the general objects of the public speaker’s aims and efforts, viz. of what is good or expedient in itself, and in relation to something else; and the topics from which arguments may be drawn on these subjects (in cc. 4—7); and we have further pointed out the channels and modes (ὅταν τίνων καὶ πῶς) by which we may supply ourselves with materials for the treatment of the characters and institutions of the various forms of government; but only so far as was (commensurate with) suitable to the present occasion, because (γὰρ) exact detail (is not required here, and) is to be found (if required) in the Politics’.

1 ἢθη φανερὰ κατὰ τήν προσώπειάν. Rhet. ii 21. 16, ἢθος δ’ ἔχουσιν οἱ 
λόγοι, ὥστε εἰς ἄλλης ἡ προσώπεια. Poet. vi. 24, ὥστε δὲ ἢθος μὲν τὸ τοῦ ὅπου 
δόθη τὴν προσώπεια ὅσα τε τίς ἑξήκοντα ἢθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μεθ’ 
ἄλλως ἔστω δ’ τι προσφέρεται ἢ φεύγει ἐν λόγων. Schrader.
The following passage of Cicero, de Or. II 84, 342, will serve as a commentary on the treatment of 'good' and 'virtue' in this chapter and c. 6; and also on the distinction of virtues in respect of their utility, § 6:

Perspicuum est igitur alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda. Genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiae, ceteraque quae fortuna dat aut extrinsecus aut corpori, non habent in se veram laudem, quae debere virtutibus sit putatur; sed tamen quod ipsa virtus in earum verum usum ac moderatione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam haec sunt naturae et fortunae bona: [this is illustrated.] Virtus autem, quae per se ipsa laudabiles et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habeat plurès partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes quae videntur in moribus hominum et quadem comitatae ac beneficentia positas; aliae quae in ingenii aliqua facultate aut animi magnitudine et robore. Nam clementia, iustitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communi bus successa est auditus in laudationibus; omnes enim haec virtutes non tam ipsis qui eas habent quam generi hominum fructuosae phuluntur.

§ 1. The subject of this chapter is the analysis of virtue and vice, the noble and disgraceful, moral right and wrong, as the objects of praise and blame, and therefore furnishing materials for the epideictic or encomiastic branch of Rhetoric, of which praise and blame are the characteristic functions.

We may also derive from this analysis topics of the ἡθος, characters or dispositions which serve to give the speech an ethical colour. This is to be effected by producing by the speech (artistically, not by any evidence of character previously acquired, 'authority') the impression upon the audience of our truthfulness and probity; of our practical wisdom which will enable us to give them useful advice, and finally of our goodwill towards themselves; this being 'the second mode of persuading' (ὥς was said', cf. c. 2 §§ 3, 4): because the same materials can be employed in representing ourselves as well as others as 'trustworthy in respect of virtue'; as men of such a character as can be depended upon.

§ 2 marks a division of panegyrics, the ordinary subjects of the ἐπιθετικόν γένος of Rhetoric. A panegyric may be written and delivered 'with or without a serious purpose (σοφόν)'; the latter are burlesques. On these, and the subjects of encomiastic speeches in general, see Introd. p. 121—123. In the burlesque kind, anything
χωρὶς σπουδῆς καὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς ἔπαινειν πολλάκις
οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἦ θεοῦ ἄλλα καὶ ἄνυχα καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ζῴων τὸ υπόκον, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ περὶ
τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, ὡστε ὅσον παρα-
δειγματος χάριν ἐπιμεν καὶ περὶ τούτων.

3 καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ ἀν ὄ γει τοῦ αἵρετον ὃν
ἐπαινετον ὑ, ἢ ὁ ἀν ἄγαθον ὅν ἢ δὲ, ὅτι ἄγαθον.
ei δὲ τούτο ἐστι τὸ καλὸν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀἵρετην καλὸν
ἐίναι: ἄγαθον γὰρ ὃν ἐπαινετον ἔστιν. ἀἵρετη δ’ ἐστι

however mean and trifling, ‘inanimate things, or any insignificant animal’, may be made the object of the panegyric. But as the materials, the topics which furnish the arguments, are the same in both, we may include the burlesque with the serious in our treatment of them in the way of examples or illustrations.

Ἄξυργα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ξημέρας τὸ τυχόν] Thus Polycrates, the Sophist, wrote in praise of pots, and pebbles, and mice (see note on II 24. 2); and others on humble-bees and salt (Isocr. Hel. § 12). As an extant specimen of these trifling productions we have the μυλαὶ ἔκειμον of Lucian (cf. note on Isocr. Paneg. § 189). [S.]

ἀγαθὸν πᾶσιν τῆς ἔστιν, ἄλλα αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἀἵρετα. τούτων δὲ καλὸν
ἐστιν δὲ αὐτὰ δύο πάντα ἐπαινετᾶ ἔστιν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστιν ἢς’ ὅι’ ἂν αὐτὰ πάραξεν ἐνόω ἐπαινετᾶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετᾶ, διευκονίζεται καὶ αὐτῇ καὶ αὐτῷ πράξεις κ.τ.λ.
It has either a moral aspect (marked by the characteristic ἐπαινετᾶς; on praise and blame, approbation and disapprobation, as characteristic of virtue and vice, see Introd. on ἔπαινος, Append. B, p. 212, seq.), what is right and noble, an end in itself, δ’ αἰτό; or is physical and sensual, what is beautiful, in which pleasure always accompanies that which is otherwise good. The ugly may be good in the sense of useful, but gives no pleasure.

Virtue therefore must of necessity be καλὸν, because it comes under the first definition of it, it is good in itself, beneficial to the individual and to society, and also has the stamp and seal of general ‘approbation’.

§ 4. ἀἵρετη] The definition of virtue here given compared with the celebrated one of Eth. Nic. II 6, init., and the detailed treatment of the list of virtues and the meagre and incomplete account here given of them, contrasted with the elaborate and ingenious analysis of them in the third and fourth books of the same work, is a most striking illustration of the difference between the point of view and method of treatment in the popular Rhetoric and comparatively scientific Ethics. For example, the definition here given coincides in no single point with that of the Ethics. It regards virtue solely on the side of its usefulness, probably because this feature of it is likely to produce the greatest effect upon the popular mind. Instead of a ἔξος it is a mere δύναμις, an undeveloped faculty or power—this is most expressly denied in Eth. N. II 4, 1106 a 5,
μὴν δύναμις, ὥστε δοκεῖ, ποριστικὴ ἁγαθων καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετικὴ πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, 5 καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα. μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοφυσια, 6 ἑλευθερία, πράσινη, φρονήσις, σοφία, ἀνάγκη

—the προσεχείσα, the special moral element is omitted, as is also the doctrine of the mean in its application to virtue, and the standard by which this relative mean is to be determined.

Regarded as a δύναμις, virtue is a practical faculty, employed in ‘providing and securing or keeping good things’—for oneself, apparently, by the exercise of any ἀρετή, excellence or accomplishment bodily or mental—and secondly, a power of conferring benefits, or doing services, many and great, in fact all in everything (on all occasions). ἡ πάνω περὶ πάντα is doubtless, as Victorius intimates, a proverbial expression, more especially as it is found in a letter of Cicero to Cassius (ad Div. xvi. 17. 1, sed expecta pater pereat paterom). This is the moral side of virtue so far as it appears in its usefulness to society.

§ 5. μὴ δέ αρετῆς] Comp. 5 § 9. The list of virtues here given differs from that in the Nic. Ethics II 7, and III 9—IV 15, in the following particulars. All the moral virtues from δικαιοσύνη to πράσινη inclusive appear in the Ethics, δικαιοσύνη being treated separately in Bk. v, and the two intellectual virtues of the speculative and practical parts of the intellect, φρονήσις practical wisdom, and σοφία speculative wisdom or philosophy, in Bk. vi. σοφία is omitted in the detailed explanation of the virtues, most likely because it has very little in common with Rhetoric, and would be useless to the rhetorician. πράσινῆς, which in the Ethics is ranked, as well as here, amongst the virtues, which are there ἀξίες, here δυνάμεις, in the second book of the Rhetoric becomes a ψίζης, so that it belongs to all the three divisions of our moral nature distinguished in Eth. Nic. II 4. The anonymous mean between φιλοσοφία and φιλοσοφία is omitted in our list, as well as the three social virtues of an accomplished gentleman, viz. ἀδελφία, παρευρήσις, and φιλία, and also the two virtues of the ψάθος, viz. αἰσχρὸς and τιμῆς. No notice is taken here of ἐγκατάστασις, the examination of which occupies the earlier part of Bk. vii, but this perhaps may be considered as an additional argument in favour of ascribing that book to Eudemus, which on all grounds is most probable.

§ 6. The most useful virtues are the highest and greatest, by the foregoing definition. Of these, justice and courage, the one most serviceable in peace, the other in war, are for this reason most held in honour amongst mankind: and in the next degree liberality, because it is lavish, and does not enter into competition with others (ἀμεροῦσις) for money, which everybody else covets more than anything besides.

1 Cicero has altered the form and the application of the proverb. In the text it means ‘all kinds on all occasions’, in Cicero it is ‘all the news about everything’.
§ 7. Justice is the virtue which assigns to every one his due, and in this shows obedience to the law. This virtue and the two following, which are all specially characterised by ‘obedience to the law’, are thereby invested with a political and objective character, and distinguished from the remainder, which are rather subjective and individual. The end and object of the true statesman is to make the citizens good, and this must be effected by training them in obedience to the laws of that form of government under which they live; the type of the perfect citizen varying under various constitutions.ockey δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ τούτων (τὴν ἁρετὴν) μᾶλλον ἰπποκρατῶς βοήθεια γιὰ τὸ τεπόλιτα ἄγαθαν ποιεῖ καὶ τῶν νόμων θεράπευς. Eth. N. i. 13, sub init.

ὅτε ο νόμος ὁ λόγος, καλεῖς, προστάτης; i.e. the law settles the legal rights of the citizens of a state, the observance of which is justice. Injustice is the cause of unfair distribution, to injustice it is owing that men take what does not belong to them, τὰ ἀλλότρια, and thus it acts as operates in disobedience to the law. Of the three kinds of justice distinguished in Eth. N. vi, this takes in only the first, δικαιοσύνη δυσαρεστητική, c. 6; the other two are (1) διορθωτική or ἐπανορθωτική ‘corrective’ justice, which ratifies and corrects wrong, and restores plaintiff and defendant to an equality, c. 7; and (2) reciprocal justice, τὸ ἀντικτενοῦσα τὸ ἔκταλλον, the law of retaliation or reciprocity transferred to commercial justice, which regulates exchanges and contracts of all kinds, c. 8.

§ 8. ἁρετὴ] In the chapter on this virtue of ‘gratitude’ in the Nic. Ethics, III 11, ἁρετὴ (as it is there written) is first defined in general terms as a virtue residing in a mean state in things that inspire confidence, or encouragement, or boldness, τὰ θαρραλεῖα, on the one hand, and fear on the other: its sole object and aim in choosing a course of action and encountering danger being τὸ καλὸν, the right and noble as an ultimate end, because it is so, and for no other reason; which implies also the opposite, the spurning of what is base and disgraceful. This is the general notion of fortitude, the endurance of pain, labour, danger, in the pursuit of an unselfish, honourable, high and noble object, when the opposite course would be base, mean, disgraceful. From this are

1 Acts of fortitude must likewise be deliberate and voluntary, δὲ δ’ οὐ δὲ ἀρετὴν ἀνακαταλείπῃ αὐτοί, ἀλλ’ ὃς καλὸν (1116 b 2).
then distinguished five popular notions of 'courage', ἀθροια in a narrower sense, none of which can be properly called 'fortitude'. The first of these is political courage, the courage of a citizen, as a member of a state, and living under and directed by its laws, described as ἰδιὰν νόμον ἑαυτία ὄντως εὐθιαυτών (this restricts the virtue to facing danger and gives it a narrower sense than 'fortitude') or πολέμων διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπίτημα καὶ τὰ ἀνίκητα καὶ διὰ τὰ τιμᾶς, ἀ 18. δὲ αὐτὸ (it is due to a sense of honour) καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ἄρετον, τιμᾶς γὰρ, καὶ φυσικῶν ἀνίκητον, αἰτήματι διὸν, ἀ 28. Further, one of the characteristics of this form of ἀθροια reappears in Eth. Eudem. 111. 13, as belonging to political courage, μεῖν πολιτικής ἀφθονία ἡ ὀνειρίν ἢ δὲ αὐτῶν ὀσθον, and another § 10, διὰ νόμων δὲ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἀθροια. The prominence of the military character of this virtue is likewise marked in the description both of the Ethics and Rhetoric by уπομονήν τοῖς καυδίνων in the one, and by ἐργαν ἐν καυδίνως § 8, and ἦν πολέμῳ § 6, in the other; so that it seems that there is sufficient warrant for the identification of the two; the duty to the state and obedience to its laws being again made the ground of the obligation to practise this virtue.

§ 9. The third virtue, σωφροσύνη, temperantia, is likewise represented under a political aspect. It is a virtue by which men's bodily appetites are regulated according to the dictates of the laws of the state, 'are so disposed towards bodily pleasures as the law enjoins'. In Eth. Nic. 111. cc. 13, 14, there is no regular definition of it; but we gather from the contents of the two chapters that it is a virtue of self-control, which consists in a mean state with regard to the indulgence in bodily pleasures, (pains having less to do with the virtue); and in a due measure or estimate of the value of them. It is thus a 'mean' between ἀκολούθια, 'excessive indulgence in them', and ἀνευμαθεία, total 'insensibility'. 117, 1107 ὅ 4.

§ 10. Εὐθυδιάτης] The principal difference between the views taken of the virtues in the Ethics and Rhetoric respectively, is that in the latter they are regarded solely on the side of their utility to society—a political view—in the Ethics they are confirmed habits or states resulting from a due regulation of the elementary ἔκθη out of which they are formed and developed. They are 'relative means', μεσόστησι πρὸς ἑαυτὸ, mean states varying in individuals according to the special character of each, lying at a variable distance between two extremes of the ἔκθη out of which they grow, the proper mean in any given case being determined by the φρονίμος or practical wisdom, the objective standard being the collective judgment of those who are specially endowed with this faculty, the φρόνιμος. Consequently here 'liberality' in expense is represented as a dis-
ΠΡΩΤΟΚΗΣ Α 9 §§ 11—13.

11 τικῆ, ἀνελευθερία δὲ τούναντίον. μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικῆς ἐνεργετημάτων, μικροψυχία δὲ τούναντίον. μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετὴ ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητικῆ, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικροπρέπεια τάναντία. φρονήσεις δ’ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ διανοιας, position or habit inclined to do good, to make oneself useful in dealing with money.

§ 11. μεγαλοψυχία[α] ‘high-mindedness’ is represented in the same way as the preceding, as a virtue which is ‘productive of benefits’, shews its utility, ‘on a large scale’; to which ‘little-mindedness’, meanness of spirit, is the opposite. This is a very different and much narrower view of the virtue than that which is conveyed by the description of it in Nic. Eth. IV 7—9, which is summed up in the brief phrase at the end of c. 9, δὲ μὲν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμῆς ὀτι μεγάλων, and defined c. 7, 1123 δ 2, δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλοψυχίας εἶναι δ’ μεγάλων αὐτῶν ἀξίων ἀξίων ἄξιον ὡς. The μεγαλοψυχία of the Ethics is a man of high aims and lofty spirit, full of scorn and contempt for all that is beneath him, men and things, and with a pride which is justified by his deserts: pride without merits to support it is no longer proper pride, a virtue; but degenerates into vanity καυκότης, an undue sense of one’s own merits.

μικροψυχία[α] δὲ τούναντίον] is put in brackets by the recent Edd. as a gloss. It certainly seems to be superfluous, as it is repeated in the following sentence; and also if it be retained, μικροπρέπεια and μικροψυχία are both contrasted as opposites with μεγαλοπρέπεια, which in the latter case is certainly incorrect. At the same time if the words are omitted the repetition of ἀρετῆς is quite equally objectionable.

§ 12. μεγαλοπρέπεια[α] ‘magnificence’ in expenditure, is distinguished from ‘liberality’ merely by this, that whereas the one is ἐν πᾶσι ταῖς ἐν ἄλλην πρόεις (every kind of money transactions), magnificence is ἐν διαμερίσματι μικρῶν, ‘those alone in which a large cost is involved’. Eth. N. IV 4, sub init. It is only to men distinguished either by birth or reputation, or anything else that confers distinction, that this virtue is suitable—in others it is no virtue at all, 1122 δ 30. Plato and his dramatic personae sometimes add μεγαλοπρέπεια to the four cardinal virtues, the classification which he usually adopts. Meno 74 A, 88 A. Rep. II 402 C, VI 490 E, 494 B, VII 535 A, VIII 560 E. It does not, however, exactly correspond with Aristotle’s interpretation, but has a wider and more general signification. See Rep. VI 486 a, where it is applied to the διάνοια. It seems from the definition, (δροι, 412 E, δίμωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὅρθω τὸν συμμότατον), to be a nearer approach to Aristotle’s μεγαλοψυχία.

§ 13. φρονήσεις] appears much in the same character here as in Eth. Nic. VI 5—9, where it is analysed at length. It is ‘practical wisdom which shews itself in the discrimination between good and evil, and particularly moral good and evil, in general, δοκεὶ δὴ φρονίμων εἶναι τὸ διάνοια καὶ βουλήσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συνφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μόρος, οὐν ποιά πρὸς μή, ὡς ἤνεχθ, ἀλλὰ ποιά πρὸς τὸ εὖ ὄν, 1140 a 25. ἦ δὲ τότε Περικλῆς καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ φρονίμου οἴομεθά εἶναι, ὡς τὰ αὐτὸς ἄγαθα II—2
καθ’ ἐν εὐ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἁγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἁρέτης καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἰκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπόν ἰδεῖν. φανερὸν γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀθρόοποις δύνανται ἑπεράσθ' εἶναι δὲ τουτοῦς ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς, ὅπ. 1140 ὁ 7. ἁρετὴ τῆς ἑτος καὶ οὐ τῆς τέχνης, ὁ 24. διὸ δὲ εὐτυχῆς τῆς προηγμένης, καθότι δὲ εἰ ἁρέτῃ, τοῦ δοξιστικοῦ (οὔτος λογισμικός, i.e. the dialectic or reasoning faculty, the discursive reason, as opposed to the νοῦς, the speculative, intuitive reason, the organ of the other intellectual virtue ἐφίλεια: ὅ τι γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνεστῶτι ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ φρονίμης, ὁ 25. ὁ δὲ φρονίμης πρακτική, c. 8, 1141 ὁ 31. τῶν καθ’ ἐνεστῆτα ἑτος ἡ φρονίμης, δὲ γίνεται γνώμη ἣν ἐπεράσθ' , c. 9, 1142 α 14.

§ 14. τῶν ἐνεστάτων καρπῶν 'the present (instant) time'. ἐνεστάτως, 'to place in' a position: ἐνεστάτως, ἐνεστάτως, ἐνεστάτως, ἐνεστάτως, 'to be placed, set in, stand in', a position. Hence (2) (I think) of things 'standing in the way', and so either (a) close by, 'present', 'instant', 'instans' (tempus, belli, &c.), 'impending', 'threatening': (for instans, 'present', Quint. v 10. 42, praetereitum, instans, futurum). In grammar, ἴστατως κρότος, 'the present tense', ἐνεστάτωσι μετα' ἐς, 'the present participle', instans tempus (Facc. Lex. s. v.); or (β) 'to stand in the way' as an obstacle, impediment, or 'objection'; as the logical ἐνεστής and ἐνεστῶς, of an objection, or contrary instance, to a supposed conclusion; and hence also 'instance', something which stands in your way and so possibly attracts your attention, or as a generalisation of the logical 'instance' or objection. See Intro. p. 269, and note.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων 'The rest are easily discerned'—'the rest' are what follows, the causes namely and consequences of virtue—'anything that is productive of, because it tends to or promotes (πρός), virtue, or that is the effect or result of it (τὰ ἰν' ὁρυῖς γνῶμῃ), is estimable and an object of praise (καλὸν). Such things are (the first) the 'signs', (the second) the works of virtue (and therefore praiseworthy). The σημείον (Intro. p. 161—165) is the probable—or, in the case of the τιμημένος, certain—indication of the existence of the thing which it accompanies; from the 'signs' of virtue in a man we infer, with more or less probability, its actual existence. Schrader quotes the little tract περὶ ὁρυῶν καὶ καλῶν printed as an appendix to the three Ethical treatises in Bekker's 4to ed. Vol II p. 1249. It is an abridgment or epitome of Aristotle's account of the virtues in the third and fourth books of the Ethics, with a slight admixture of Platonism and other occasional alterations. ἐνεστᾶτα μὲν ἔστι τὰ καλὰ, ταῦτα δὲ τὰ αἰκαῖα. καὶ τῶν μὲν καλάν ἡγούμεθα τὰ ὁρυῖα, τῶν δὲ αἰκαίων ὁπ' εἰκαία. ἐπεπραγμένα δὲ ἔστι καὶ τὰ αἰτία τῶν ὁρυῶν καὶ τὰ παραγόμενα τοῖς ὁρυῖοι (these are the τὰ παροικιῶν τῆς ὁρυῖας and 'signs'), καὶ τὰ γνῶμαι ἀν' αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ἐνεστᾶτα, 1249 a 25.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων... ἰδίου] for the more usual τὰ ἄλλα ἰδεῖν. This substitution of a preposition with its case for the direct government of the
utely anágyk tā te poítw:á tìs ārē̂tēs éinai kalá (πρῶς ārē̂tēn γάρ) kai tā ap' ārē̂tēs gynómeva, toiautē de tā te smēia tìs ārē̂tēs kai tā ērga.

15 ēpeī de tā smēia kai tā toiautē ē ēstwv anagwv verb, has been noticed by Heindorf in the case of εἰς, on Plat. Lys. § 16, and in that of περί and ἀμφί, on Phaedo § 65, p. 250 C (in which place περί κάλλους takes the place of the nominative); likewise of περί and ὑπὲρ by Bremi on Dem. Olynth. I p. 14. 18 (ap. Schäfer Aphor. Crit. ad Demosth. I 208); and a similar use of the Latin, &c. by Heusinger, ad Cic. de Off. I 15. 3. Comp. Epist. ad Div. II 17. 1; III 12. 2 (Schäfer). But what has not been observed of this usage is, that it is almost exclusively characteristic of a middle or later period of the Greek language, viz. the fourth century B.C.

The earliest instances I have noted of it are Soph. Oed. Col. 422, εν δὲ μας τῆς αἰθῶν γένοστο τῆς μάχης πέρα, and Aj. 684, ἀμφί τοῦτοι τινες ὑπὲρ. In Plato it is not uncommon, Phaedo 231 D, βοῦλεσθαι περί τινος, Rep. IV 427 A, εἴδος πρῶτον περί καὶ πολλατέρα (a good example), ib. 436 B, καθ' ἑκατόν αἰθῶν πρῶτον, Phaedo 249 C (this use of καθ' ἑκατόν for the simple accusative is found in various writers; see Stallbaum on Rep. II, cc.), ib. 553 B, περί παρθένων λαμβάνειν, Theaet. 177 B, Gorg. 487 A. But in Demosthenes and Aristotle it becomes quite a usual mode of expression. In the de Fals. Leg. alone it occurs in §§ 6, 7, 64, 167, 239, and probably elsewhere in the same speech.

From Aristotle, with whom it is still more familiar, I will content myself with referring to Rhet. I 15. 1, περί τῶν ἀντίχων...ἀντιδραμεῖν, ib. § 27, περί ἀρχῶν...διάλειν. II 4. 30; 5. 21, τοιοῦτος περί δὲ (i.e. ὑπὲρ) φοβοῖται, a good example. 18. 4, περί μεγάλου (i.e. μεγέθους) κοινοῦ (ὅτι), ib. 21, init., in both of which it stands for the nominative, as it does also in Pol. VI (IV) 2, 1289 a 11, and III 3, init. Pol. I 1 ult. 1 9, 1257 a 5, 11 init., ib. c. 4, 1262 b 25, περί τοῦ μεταφέρειν—πολλὴν ἥν τεταρτηγ. Eth. N. IV 4 init., περί μεγάλουτερα διαλέκτου, X 1 sub init., 1172 a 26, ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιοῦτων—πως τεταρτε ἐναν, where it stands for the accusative. de Insomniis c. 2, 459 a 29, ἕν τῶν φαινομένων—κινεῖται, would be more regularly τα φαινομένα.

§ 15. ἐνεί ἑν τὰ σημεῖα η.π.λ.] An exemplification of the preceding rule, and application of it to the special virtues. ‘Seeing that the signs of virtue, and all such things as are works (results, effects), or affections’ (properties, qualities, attributes—on πάθη and its various senses see Introd. pp. 113—118; on the special sense here, p. 114) ‘of it are καλά, the same rule will apply to each special manifestation of it, as ἄδοξα. The πάθη of virtue are illustrated in the examples by ἄδοξα, ἄδοξα, ἄδοξα: these are πάθη, ‘affections’, of courage, justice, and injustice, in the sense of ‘what happens to them’, some change they have undergone, consisting in a modification of them in form and signification; as ἄδοξα ‘justly’, denotes a certain mode of action, viz. just acting. An exception occurs to the general application of the rule to the special virtues in the case of ἄδοξῶτα: in this alone, though it is true of the ἔργα, it is not true of the πάθη: in other words, in the rest of the virtues the πάθης are
ΡΗΤΟŘΙΚΗΣ Α 9 § 16.

έργα ἡ πάθη, καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρίας ἔργα ἡ σημεία ἀνδρίας ἢ ἀνδρεῖως πέπτρακται καλά εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δικαία καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ ὅσ' ἐν μονῇ γάρ ταυτή τῶν ἄρετῶν οὐκ ἄει τὸ δικαίως καλὸν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχρόν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικοῦ), καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἄρετάς ὄσαυτις.

16 καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἄδλα τιμῆ, καλά. καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις

σφοδρά, the changes of terms referable to the same notion or class, viz. that of virtue, as ἀνδρία, ἀνδρεῖαι, ἀνδρεῖως: all are equally καλόν and praiseworthy (see note on c. 7. 27); but in the single case of justice this does not universally apply, for τὸ δικαίως ζημιοῦσθαι just (deserved) punishment, is not equally praiseworthy with a just act, τὸ δικαίως πράττειν, but the contrary: since it is more disgraceful than an ἁμαρτία punishment. (This seems to be a mere fallacy of ὑπομονή, ambiguity, εὐμνώμως, δικαίως not standing in the same relation to ζημιοῦσθαι and πράττειν: in the one case the 'justice' of the act lies in the intention of the actor: in the other it belongs not to the actor, but to the law and the judge who inflicts the punishment. A similar equivocal meaning lies in the word πάθη: in the rule and the general application of it, it stands for properties or attributes: in the special exception it denotes an 'affection' in the sense of suffering or punishment.)

§ 16. ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἄδλα τιμῆ, καλά] The καλὸν is an end in itself; it is independent of all ulterior considerations and aims: therefore any act of which honour alone, and not profit (ἐφ' ὅσοις τιμῆ μᾶλλον § χρῆμα) is the prize, is καλὸν: the prize aimed at, or the end of the exertions and efforts, determines the character of the efforts or actions, which are therefore fair and noble like the end at which they aim. τιμῆ is an end of this kind. Ech. N. 1. 4, 1096 b 16, καθ' αὕτα (ἀγαθά) δὲ ποίησις τιμῆς τις ἂν; (are they not?) δόσα καὶ μισοῦμεν διαφέρεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἠθοποιοῖσθαι καὶ τιμᾶται; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δὲ ἄλλο τὸ δικαίωμα, ὅσα τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν, τιμῆ τις ἂν. c. 3, 1095 b 22, τιμῆ is the end of the πολιτικὸς βίος, pursued by the χαράντες καὶ πρᾶκτοι, v. 30, δῆλον οὐν κατὰ γε τούτου ἢ ἀρετῆς κρῖτων. In IV 7—10, τιμῆ is represented as the end of the μεγαλόψυχοι and φιλάρμοι, the sphere in which these two virtues are exercised. c. 7, 1123 b 18, μέγατον δὲ τοὺς ἄνθρωπος τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποικόμενοι, καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἐφεξῆς δὲ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἀδικοῖ. τοιοῦτον δ' ἢ τιμῆ.

καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτῶν ἄνεκο κ.τ.λ.] The general characteristic of all the following topics (to § 19) is disinterestedness; ἀνεχεῖσθαι acts, of which the object is the good of some one else, and not one's own. Any act of this kind, where there is no ulterior end of profit or advantage to oneself, which is done therefore for its own sake, and 'because it is in itself desirable', conforms to the definition, § 3, and is καλὸν. So the highest and purest form of friendship or love is distinguished from the two lower forms, those whose end is profit and pleasure. Both of these are selfish; true
friendship is disinterested, οἱ θευλόμενοι ταῦτα τοῖς φίλοις ἡμῶν ἐνεκα μέλιστα φίλοι, Eth. N. VIII 4 init.; and the true friend is ἄφρος αὐτὸς, IX 9 init. and Ib. 1170 b 6, or Ἀλός αὐτός, c. 4, 1165 a 31, 'a second self' (not one's own self) alter ego. And on the other hand, ἐνυμένα τῶν ταυτών μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰχμῇ φιλότιμοι ἀκαλούσι, διότι τῷ μὲν φιλόσοφῳ ταυτῷ χῶρῳ πόστα πράττειν, καὶ διὸν μορφότεροι τῷ τοσούτῳ μάλλον ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνος διὰ τὸ καλόν, κ.τ.λ. IX 8, init. And in the Politics, III 7, the distinction of the two classes of government, normal and abnormal, ὅσιος and παρενθέσεως (deviations from the true standard), is determined by the end of each, according as it is τῷ κοινῷ or τῷ διὸς συμφέρον: the public interest of others, or the private interest of the governors themselves, one or several; in other words, it is determined by the selfishness or disinterestedness of the governing powers of the state.

§ 17. δειν υπὲρ το—τὸ αὐτοῦ This clause seems certainly out of place here, though Schrader defends it as an example of τὰ διάλειψις φιλιά. 'Quin enim ut patriam iuvet commoda sua negligit, is bonum simpliciter praefert illi quod huic bonum foret': that is, he prefers general to special or particular good, (his own). But this does not account for the το, which if the words are retained in the received order is as superfluous as it is inexplicable. The sense would be improved and the particle accounted for by transferring the clause so as to follow τῷ τοιόντα (§ 17 ad fin.) The passage will then run thus: 'and all absolute (or general, see note on διάλειψις, c. 2 § 4) goods: and all natural goods (things which are naturally good, in themselves, and so good for all) and (therefore, or καὶ, 'that is') things which are not (specially and particularly) good to oneself (αὑρίσκεται), appropriated to particular individuals, because such things (things that are thus special and particular, and not common to others) carry with them the notion of selfishness or self-interest'. Here the clause comes in as the first example—'anything, namely, which a man does either (τοι) for his country, to the neglect of his own interest, or (καὶ) anything that a dead man may have the benefit of, rather than one who is living (such as posthumous fame, funeral orations, monuments to his memory); because such honours paid (or advantages accruing) to a man while he is alive, involve or imply more self-interest', and are therefore less καλά.


καὶ τῇ φύσει φιλιά Comp. 7. 33, τὸ αὐτοφοιν. 'Sunt profecto laudationibus minime incongruentes materiae, genus, parentes, patria, pul-
18 γὰρ ἑνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ὅσα τεθνεώτι εὐδέχεται π. 31. ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἡ ζωτία. τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἑνεκα 19 μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζωτία. καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων ἑνεκα. ἠττον γὰρ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους, ἄλλα μὴ περὶ αὐτών. καὶ περὶ τοὺς εὗ ποιήσαντας δίκαιον γὰρ. καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα οὐ γὰρ 20 εἰς αὐτών. καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἡ ἐφι' οίς αἰσχύνεται τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦντες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὀσπερ καὶ Σαπρόν πεποίηκεν, εἰστὸντο τοῦ Ἀλκαίου

critudo, ingenii acumen, solertia, docilitas, tenax memoria, ingenita animi magnitudo, et quae a natura proveniunt bona alia.' Schrader.

αὐτῷ σὺναθὰ 'good for him'; that is, for this or that individual. See note on c. 7: 35, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀλλα, and Schrader (quoted above on τὰ ἀλλας σὺναθὰ).

§ 19. τὰ εὐεργετήματα] 'any benefits conferred', because they are necessarily conferred on others, and therefore, so far, more praiseworthy than acquisitions. These are distinguished from εὐπραγίαι περὶ ἄλλους(ante), which are 'any good and noble deeds done in the service of others, and not for oneself', for the same reason as the preceding. Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1163 a 1, καλὰν δὲ τὸ εὗ ποιῶν μὴ ἢν αἰτιάθη, αἰσθάμην δὲ τὸ εὐεργετήσασα.

§ 20. τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρὰ κ.κ.λ. '] 'for shameful things we are all ashamed of, when we say, do, or are intending to do them'. Sappho's verses, for instance, in answer to Alcaeus,—'something I would say, but shame prevents me'—she infers from this that it was something to be ashamed of, αἰσχρῶν, and replies, 'Hadst thou yearned after things good or fair, and had not thy tongue stirred up mischief to utter it, shame had not possessed thine eyes, but thou wouldst have spoken of the thing that is right'. The third line in particular of this Alcaic stanza requires correction, and there is not much help to be derived from the Aristotelian MSS. In the first, Blomfield, Mus. Crit. I p. 17, reads λεὶ τὰ ἑλάνων: and Hermann (much better), El. Metr. Gr. III 16, de strophe. min. λεὶ σο' ('reached thee', the Homeric λειε), from the reading λειε of one of MS. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. p. 607, follows MS Λ in reading ἤχε and the Aeolic ἐλάνων. The third line, which in the MSS appears as αἰδώς κέν σε ὁκ ἔχειν ἔμμαθ, without variæ lectionis, is written by Blomfield, u. s., αἰδώς καὶ οὐκ εἴχειν ἔμμαθ: by Hermann, αἰδώς κέν τε τε καὶ οὐκ εἴχειν ἔμμαθ; and by Bergk, αἰδώς κέν σο' οὐκ ἤκεν ἔμμαθ (surely κέν and ἤκεν thus repeated in different forms and almost immediate juxtaposition is indefensible): none of these seems to be satisfactory, but I have nothing better to suggest. [In Bergk's 2nd ed. p. 674 the fragment is printed as follows: αἰ δὲ ἦχεν ἑλάνων ἦν κάλος, καὶ μὴ τι Εὔσσυν γλασα' εἶκα ἑκάσων, αἰδὼς κέν σο' οὐ κίρανεν ὄμματι, ἄλλα ἔμαθεν περὶ τὰ δίκαια. S]}

The fact that the eye is the principal organ of the manifestation of
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 9 §§ 21—24.

θέλω τι φειτὴν, ἀλλὰ μὲ καλὺει αἰδῶς,
aὶ δ᾽ εἶχες ἐσθλῶν ἵμερον ἡ καλῶν
καὶ μὴ τι φειτὴν γλῶσσα ἐκύκα κακῶν,
αἰδῶς κέ σ᾽ οὐκ ἂν εἰχὲν ὃμματ' ἀλλ᾽ ἔλεγες περὶ τῶ δικαίω.

21 καὶ περὶ ὅν άγανισθεί μὴ φοβούμενοι. περὶ γὰρ τῶν
22 πρὸς δὸξαν φεροῦντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. καὶ
αἰ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιότερων ἀρεται καλλίουσ καὶ
23 τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἡ γυναικός. καὶ αἰ ἀπολαυ-
στικαὶ ἄλλως μᾶλλον ἡ αὐτοῦς· διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ
24 ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλῶν. καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐχθρῶν τιμω-

some of the feelings or emotions, as love, shame, fear, is here, as often elsewhere, expressed poetically by the phrase that 'shame has its seat in the eye'. Compare the proverb in Π 6. 18, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμὶ εἶναι αἰδῶ, where see note.

§ 21. καὶ περὶ ὅν άγανισθεὶ μὴ φοβούμενο] 'and things about which we are excessively anxious or distress ourselves, without fear': the acquisition of which causes us a violent mental struggle (ἀγωνία), distress, or anxiety, 'agony' in our exertions to attain, or in the fear of losing, it. The addition of μὴ φοβούμενοι is made here, because fear is the usual concomitant of the emotion, and generally included in the notion. Probl. Π 31, § 31. ἀγωνία φόβος τὸ ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀρχὴν ἔργου (Vicl.). ἀγωνία belongs to that class of verbs which imply a diseased state or condition of the mind or body; see note on ἐπιστάμην, Π 2. 18.

The anxious feeling is usually excited about the kind of good things that 'tend to our reputation'; and this is why they are praiseworthy.

§ 22. 'The virtues (excellences) and functions of men and things naturally worthier, are nobler and more praiseworthy, as in man than in woman'.

§ 23. αἱ ἀπολαυστικαὶ (ἀρεταῖ) 'those which contribute to the gratification or enjoyment of others rather than of ourselves, of which justice is an instance'. ἀπολαύσις is not here confined to sensual gratification, its proper meaning. In Εθ. Ν. Ι. 3, Sardanapalus, the type of sensuality, is taken as the representative of the βίος ἀπολαυστικός: note on Π 5. 7. Here again it is the unselfishness that is laudable.

§ 24. καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἐχθρῶν τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον] 'and the heavier vengeance on, punishment of, one's enemies' (μᾶλλον may be either to punish them in a higher degree, the more the better; or as contrasted with καταλατταῦ, 'rather than the reverse'), and 'refusing to be reconciled, come to terms, with them'. The reason being, that 'retaliatory' or 'reciprocal justice' (note on § 7) requires this, and therefore it is right, and of course laudable; and also because 'not to be beaten' (an unyielding resolution)
ῥεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι: τὸ τε γὰρ ἀνταποδίδοναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλὸν, καὶ ἄν-25 δρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττάσθαι. καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν: αἱρετὰ τε γὰρ ἀκαρπα δύνα, καὶ ύπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ μημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. καὶ ἅ μὴ ζωτὶ ἑπτεῖ. καὶ οἷς τιμὴ ἀκο- λουθεῖ. καὶ τὰ περιττά. καὶ τὰ μόνα ὑπάρχουνα

is a sign of a 'manly character'. Comp. I 6. 26 (ἀγαθά) τὰ τοῖς ἐχθρῶν καλά, and § 29. This was a constant article of the popular morality, and is cited as such here: see, for instance, Xen. Mem. IV 2, 14 seq. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13, 14. Again in Aristotle's Rhet. II 5. 5, Eur. Ion 1045—7, Med. 808, Cic. de Off. I 7. 2.

§ 25. 'Victory and honour are noble and praiseworthy things; for they are desirable though unproductive (see c. 5, 7, note infra § 26), and manifest (are signs of) an excess, superiority, higher degree, of virtue', i.e. a higher degree than the virtues which they crown would attain without them: a man may be good without them; with them he must be better. Comp. Eth. N. IV 8 init. οἱ γὰρ εὐγενείας ἀξιωταί τιμᾶς καὶ οἱ δυ- νατεύονται ἢ οἱ πλούτωνες ζῶν υπεροχῆ γὰρ, τὰ δ’ ἀγαθὰ υπερέχουσι τῶν ἄνθρωπον. Comp. infra § 39.

μημονευτα] things to be, capable of being, or that deserve to be, remembered; as εὐμημονευτα (infra) is 'easy to be remembered'. μημο- νεύτα, which Victorius adopts upon the superior authority of MSS, is mo- numenta, memorials, elogia, et quae memoriam alicuius ornant. He does not seem to have observed, what Bekker, who prefers the former, doubtless did, though he does not say so, that μᾶλλον can be construed with the adjective μημονευτα, but hardly, or not so well, with the substantive μημονεύτα.

ἀ μὴ ζωτὶ ἑπτεῖ] things that outlast life, that follow a man beyond the grave', as posthumous fame.

οἷς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ] Honour itself, especially as contrasted with profit (infra § 16), imparts a praiseworthy character as the prize of action, and is itself καλὸν and a thing to be praised (§ 25, supra). It must therefore convey this in some measure to everything, particularly actions, by which it is attended upon or accompanied.

τὰ περιττά] (see note on 6. 28) are καλὰ as well as ἀγαθά. They are thus illustrated by Schrader. 'Quae aliis sui generis praestant. Gallius I X111 P. Crassus Mucianus traditur quingue habuisse rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua, quod esset dilissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iuris consultissimum, quod Pontifex Maximus. Velleius (de Pompeio), II 53, Vir in id evertus super quod ascendi non potest.'

τὰ μόνα ὑπάρχουνα] τὰ ἰδα καὶ μοῖδες, 6. 28. The difference between the two lies in this, that the topic of 6. 28 denotes positive good, as excellences, accomplishments, personal or intellectual advantages, which are peculiar to a man, and shared by no one else; here they rather refer to
peculiar actions, or qualities that can be manifested in action, which are more easily remembered, and therefore more the objects of praise, and in this sense καλλίω: ἐκ προξενίω οὐ ἔτυχον, § 32.

'In bibliotheca, quae prima in urbe ab Asinio Pollione publicata est, unius M. Varronis viventis posita imago est, Plin. vii. 50. L. Metello tribuit populus Romanus quod nuncquam ulli aliī ab condito avae earque in senatum irem currum vehere tur ad curiam. Plin. vii. 43.' Schrader. I have quoted these instances because from Schrader’s point of view they very well illustrate the topic. But I believe they are not exactly what Aristotle had in his mind when he wrote the words. These are not exactly subjects of ‘praise’, which the topics of this chapter deal with, exclusively or more immediately. τὰ περιττά and τὰ μόνον ὑπάρχουσα are to be taken together, the latter being a step higher in degree than the former. τὰ περιττά are distinguished and exceptional (as Schrader puts it) excellences, qualities, achievements. τὰ μόνον ὑπάρχουσα are a step beyond, 'unique'.

§ 26. αἰσχρὰ δὲπαρα[ ] note on 5. 7, ἄντε δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον. A pleasure-garden on this principle is a finer thing and more deserving of approbation than a market-garden from which you make a profit. The reason here given for this preference is different to that assigned in Eth. N. iv. 9 (quoted in the note referred to). There it is accounted for by the self-sufficiency or independence (ἀνάρεσις) that it implies; here by its being more in accordance with the gentleman’s character, in contrast with the vulgarity of trade and money-making.

τὰ παρ’ ἐκείνου ίδια] These are special pursuits, modes of action, manners, and customs cultivated in particular countries, ‘national’ and ‘peculiar to them’. In England, for instance, special skill in cricket and other athletic exercises gains a man applause; in Greece, running, boxing, wrestling, chariot-racing, are the great games. In Europe a man is applauded for his skill in dancing, which the Chinese utterly contempt, and regard as a useless waste of labour. Quint. Inst. Or. iii. 7. 24, Minus Lacedaemonis studia literarum quam Athenis honoris mercuntur; plus patientia, fortitudo.

δόμα σημεία ἔστι τῶν παρ’ ἐκείνου ἐπανομένων] ‘all signs, or distinctive marks, of habits (characters, actions), that are approved in particular countries, as the habit of wearing long hair in Lacedaemon. This is a ‘sign’ of a gentleman, a character very much approved in that country. It is a sign of this, because with long hair it is difficult to perform any menial task, and therefore the wearing it shews that menial occupations are alien from that character. Gaisford quotes, Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. xi. 3, ἑβδέκα δὲ (Lycurgus sc.) καὶ κομὴν τις ὑπὸ τὴν ὑδατικὴν ἡλίκιαν, νομίζον ὅτι καὶ μείζον δὲ καὶ λευκομεράτως καὶ γοργοτέρως φανερονται. [Xenoph. Ances, 1232, διακωμισθεὶς ἄρα τοῖς ἄνθρωποι τούς, ἐκόμων κτλ. S.]

[1 οἶ γὰρ οὐδεν ἐντυπώσει τὰ τῆς ἄρτητι ἡσύχα βλάβας εἰς τὴν ἀκραίαν, ἂς καὶ σωφροσύνη, Pol. iii. 5, 1278 a. 30.]
§ 27. ρητορικής Α 9 § 27.

έπαινουμένων, οίνον ἐν Λακεδαιμονὶ κομὰν καλόν ἐλευ-θέρου γὰρ σημείου ὡς γὰρ ἐστὶ κομιόντα μέριον 27 οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἐργόν θητικόν· καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργά-ζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μη ἐπρὸς

θητικόν] θῆτα, θητεῖα, denote hired service in agriculture, but not slavery: the βάναυσος is no δουλος. In this sense both words are used by Homer. The θῆτα formed the fourth and lowest class under the Solonian constitution. At Athens, in Aristotle's time, the θῆτα, τὸ θητεῖον (πλῆθος), still denotes the class of paid agricultural labourers, as an order of the state or population; and is expressly distinguished from the βάναυσος or τεχνόν, artisans and petty manufacturers, who are still hired labourers, but work at mechanical employments, and in towns, forming with the others the lowest order of the population of the state. In Pol. 111 5, βάναυσος and θῆτα are several times thus distinguished. It is there said that in some constitutions (such as monarchies and aristocracies) neither of these classes is admitted into the governing body; in oligarchies the θῆτα cannot, the βάναυσος can, be a citizen. In the account given, vi (iv) 4, 1291 b 14 seq., of the various kinds of population which form the bases of so many different varieties of democracy, we have in line 25 the term χερστικῶν, of precisely the same import, substituted for βητείων: the other had been already mentioned. In Pol. vii (vi) 4, 1319 a 27, three classes of these lower orders are distinguished, τὸ πλῆθος τὸ τῶν βαναυσῶν (artisans) καὶ τὸ τῶν αγοραίων ἄνθρωπων (small tradesmen or retailers, buyers and sellers in the market, vi (iv) 4, 1291 b 4, λέγω δὲ αγοραῖον τὸ περὶ τὰ πρᾶξει καὶ τὰ χώρα καὶ τὰ ἐμπόρια καὶ καταρτίας διατριβῶν), καὶ τὸ θητεῖων. Of all these it is said just before, ὁ γὰρ Βίος φαινότα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐργα μετὰ ἀρτης. θητεῖων μεθαρ. = δουλείων, 'servile, menial', occurs again Eth. Nic. iv 8, 1125 1.

§ 27. μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην] This again applies to Lacedaemon: Gaisford quotes Aelian, V. H. vi 6, βάναυσον δὲ εἶδον τέχνην ἄνθρωπον Ἀλεξανδριάνον οὐκ ἔβγιν. Xen. Oecoc. iv 2, καὶ γὰρ αἱ βαναυσικαὶ καλοὶ-μέναι καὶ εὐπρόσωποί εἰσι καὶ εὐκόσις μεῦτο πᾶν ἀδοξαίη πρὸς τῶν πόλεων (add vi 5).

βάναυσον] Of the various kinds of population of a state, enumerated in Pol. vi (iv) 4, the first is the περὶ τῆς τροφῆς πλῆθος, τὸ γεωργικόν: the second, τὸ βάναυσον· ἦνι δὲ τούτῳ τὸ περὶ τῆς τέχνης αὐτὸν ποιόν ἀναμίους οἰκείους τοῖς τοῖς τῶν τρεῖς τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀναγωγής ὑπάρχει διὰ τὰς εἰς τροφήν ἀναλόγους έξ τοῦ, 1291 a 1. So that here the fine arts, as the necessary, indispensable, or mechanical arts, are all included in the class βάναυσος. See on this subject Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. (Cab. Cycl. 2nd. ed.) c. 18, Vol. III p. 64, note. Pol. v (viii) 2, 1337 b 8 seq., βάναυσον δὲ ἐργὸν εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο νομίζει καὶ τέχνην παραστῆσαι καὶ μάθεις, διὰ πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρτης ἐργασίας ἐπηρεάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων, δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἂν τὴν διάνοιαν. ἦν δὲ τὰ ταῦτα τέχνης ήτοι τὰ σῶμα παρατηροῦσι καὶ ταῖς μεσοκράτεις ἐργασίαις ἄσκολον γὰρ ποιοῦν τὴν βάναυσον καὶ ταΐμην. I 11, 1258 b 37, (τῶν ἐργατικῶν) βαναύσοταται ἐν αὐτὰ τὰ σῶμα ταῦτα παράνοια μᾶλλον. Eth. Eudem. i 4, 1215 a 30, λέγω δὲ
§ 28. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρ-
βαμάνους (γέγονε) τὰς ἰδραίας καὶ μισθοφορίας (arts sedentary and mercenary). The ἰδραία in this last passage explains the bodily degradation and injury of the preceding. Comp. Plato, Rep. vii 522 B, IX 590 B, Phileb. 55 C, Theaet. 176 (Heind. note § 85), (Legg. viii 4, 846 D No native must learn or practise any handicraft. One art is enough for any man; and the natives or citizens must occupy themselves exclusively in statecraft or public duties). Arts are inferior in dignity in proportion to their necessity or utility, Arist. Metaph. A 1. Cic. de Off. I 42. 5.

Ἀλευθήρως...τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν 'to live with reference to, dependent upon, at the beck and call of, another'. Independence, συνάρτησις, is a characteristic of the ἀλευθήρος, the 'free and independent' citizen. Aristotle is writing at Athens, and for Athenians. So it is said of the μεγα-
λόχιος, Eth. N. iv 8, 1124 b 32, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἄλλ' ἡ πρὸς φίλων δουλεία γὰρ. Metaph. A 2, 982 b 25, (Vic.) of ἡ πρὸς φίλους φιλοσοφία, ἔλθνα πά γε ὑπάρχουσα αὐτῆς σχετών χρείαν εὑρίσκει, ἄλλ' ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπων, φιλίων, ἀλευθερῶν ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐξελκετόμεν τοῖς πάσι καὶ μὴ ἄλλον διό, οὖν καὶ αὐτὴ μόνα ἄλευθερά ὁσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὐτὴ αὐτῆς ἑνεκά οὖσα. Victorius also quotes, in illustration of πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν, Dem. (pro Ctesiphonte, as he calls it) de F. Legg. p. 411, τοις δὲ πρὸς ὑπάναι διεύρη καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑπάναι τιμῆς γραμμοτόμως. The import of the phrase is, to look to another in all that you say and do, to direct your life and conduct by the will and pleasure of another; in the relation (πρὸς) of servant or dependent to master.

It is to be observed that the reason here assigned for avoiding all mechanical occupations as disreputable, viz. that it destroys a man's independence, so that he cannot subsist without looking to others, places the objection to it upon a different ground to that assigned in the Politics (quoted in the last note), where it is that they disqualify a man for doing his duty to the state.

§ 28. ληπτέον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] 'and we may assume (or represent, substitute one for the other, on occasion) things (qualities, and the terms expressing them) that are very nearly related to the identical, both in commendation and censure, as that the cautious is cold and designing, the simple (simpleton) worthy and amiable, and the sensible mild and calm'. This lays down the general rule, of which the next topic is a special variety, ὐποκορισμός.

Quint. Inst. Orat. III 7. 25. Idem praepcit (Aristotle in this place) illud quoque, quia sit quaedam virtutibus ac vitiiis vicinitas, utendum proxima derivatione verborum ut pro tenerario fortem, pro prodigio liberalem, pro avaro parcum vocemus: quae eadem etiam contra valent. Quod quidem orator, id est vir bonus, nuncquam factet, nisi forte communi utilitate ducatur. To the same effect, Cic. Orat. Part xxiii 81 (Schrader). [Liv. xxii 12, (Fabius) pro cunctatoris sequam, pro caulo timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabatur. s.]

§ 29. καὶ ἕκαστον κ.τ.λ. "and in every case from the accompanying, attendant, qualities (the qualities that come next, but always on the higher and better side; on ἀδικίαν and its various senses, see note on c. 6, 3) derive (ἐστι) a term or expression always in the best direction (with the most favourable tendency, interpretatio in melius, putting the most favourable construction on the actual facts of the case); call, for instance, the irascible and insane, 'simple and straightforward', and self-will (hearty, stubborn, obstinate temper; αἰθάργη, one who pleases himself, αἰθάργη, 'self-pleaser', and will have his own way), 'magnificence', or proper pride, and a due sense of dignity (σεμνός)".

On ὅργανος Victorius compares Hor. Sat. 1. 3. 51, at est trunculentior atque fuit aequo liber: simplex fortisque habebatur, with Cic. de Legg. I 7, solent enim, id quod virorum bonorum est, admodum irasci, and therefore an angry temper may be attributed to a virtuous disposition.

μανιὰs represents an excitable, violent, furious temper, which sometimes almost assumes the appearance of raving madness. In Plato it is applied to Chaerephon, Socrates' intimate (in the Charmides, init.), and to Apollodorus, Symp. 173 D, where it expresses a very impetuous, excitable temperament, inclined to extravagant and violent manifestations in feeling and utterance; which is illustrated by the conduct ascribed to him at Socrates' death, Phaedo 117 D.

On ἀδικία, as expressive of character, see note I 2, 4.

αἰθάργηs. In Eth. Eud. II 3, 1221 a 8, III 7, 1235 b 34, συμφόρης, proper pride, the due measure of personal dignity in one's bearing and behaviour to others, πρὸς ἄνθρωπον ὅμως, is a mean between the two extremes, ἀφρικεῖα the defect (over-complacency and obsequiousness), and αἰθάργηs the excess (undue contemptuousness καταφρῶθει, and disregard of their feelings and wishes). In the Magn. Mor. I 29, it is likewise the excess of συμφόρης, as ἀφρικεῖα is the defect. It is exercised περὶ τὰς ἐννεύεις, in the ordinary

It seems to me nearly certain that μεγαλουργεῖs is a mistake, either of the author himself or one of his transcribers, for μεγαλόφρονος. The two have already been distinguished in this very chapter, §§ 11, 12, and μεγαλουργεῖς, when it is distinguished from the other as by Aristotle, and not made to include it as by Plato (see the note on § 13), is altogether unsuitable to express the character of the αἰθάργηs, being confused as it is to liberality in bestowing money on a large scale; whereas the virtue of μεγαλουργεῖα is precisely what αἰθάργηs might be represented to be by the figure ὑψωκομομέο, by bestowing on it a 'flattering' designation. I refer for the proof of this to the Nic. Eth. I v. 7. 8: it will be found that σεμνός, another false interpretation which is here put upon αἰθάργηs, is also characteristic of the μεγαλόφρονος. Plato points out the true ὑψωκομομέο in the case of μεγαλουργεῖς, Rep. VI 560 E, ὑψωκομομόν...ἀπόλλων ἐν μεγαλουργεῖς.
ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὥς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὑπνας, οἴον τὸν ἥρασιν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τὸν ἀσωτὸν ἑλευθερίαν δόξει τε γὰρ τὸς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἀμα παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς

intercourse of society, and manifests itself in the character ὁς μὲν ἄνευ ἄνευ ἦν ἀκριβῶς ἴδων, in a wilful and stubborn reserve which repels all social converse. The character is represented in the name itself; which is αὐτῷ ἁδέῃ, 'self-pleasing'. So that when we give the name of μεγαλόφυσιος and σομικός to one state for which is really αὐθάνη, we are substituting a virtue for a vice, a mean state for an excess. αὐθάνη is one of Theophrastus' 'Characters' defined by him as ἀνθρώπος ἡμίλαι, 'social brutality'.

The special form of this misapplication of names in praise and censure is called ὑπεροχαίος, when it takes the favourable side, and ἱεροτριτουργία. On this figure, the name of which is derived from the endearing terms used by nurses to children (πρὸς κόρην ἢ κόρων ἵμναν ἱεροτριτουργία, Tim. Lex., lisping in imitation of them), compare Asch. c. Timarch. p. 17 § 126, ταῦτα ἐν ὑποκρίσεις τετύχθη ἑρωείας ἐκα, Theophr. περὶ ἀθλήματος ὑποκρίσεως τοπικῶν (Ast ad loc.), or by lovers, Plat. Rep. v 474 Ε, ἢ βραστοῦ ὑποκρίσιμον, Arist. Plut. 1012, μητρίαν ἐν και φάτνων ὑποκρίσιμον (whence it stands for a 'diminutive', Rhet. III 2. 15); hence it is transferred to flattering or endearing expressions in general, and especially such as, in describing the moral character of anything, substitute some nearly associated virtue for a vice; to palliate, extenuate, gloss over. Examples occur in Plat. Rep. VIII 560 Ε (already referred to), III 400 Ε, ἄνω ὑποκρισίμων καλοῖς ἢς ἑφθας. Alexis, Tarantini Fr. 3, Meineke, Fragn. Comm. III 484, ἡ ὁμός οἰκή χαίρε ἀναθεμάτων ἐκ τοῦ καλοίμην ἢ τοῦ διαθεμάτη χάρος ὑπαγε ὑποκρίσιμα τῆς ἐνδιάθεσις μορφας: Ovid, Ar. Am. II 657, nomenibus molillre licet male, followed by a long string of examples. Lucr. IV 1154 seq. Horat. Sat. I 3, 44—54. Thucydides, III 82, in a well-known passage, mentions this perversion of moral terms amongst the signs of demoralization prevalent in Greece at the period of the Corcyrean sedition, καὶ τὴν ἐνθ συνεχισμενῶν τῶν ἐνδιάθεσις ὑποκρίσεως ἐκ τοῦ διαθέματων τῆς δυνάμεως κ.τ.λ. See Ruhnken, ad Tim. p. 266, 6; Ernste, Lex. Techn. Gr. α. v.; Shilleto, ad Dem. de F. L. Σ 293; Stallbaum, Plat. Rep. VI 1 c.—Quintilian calls it derivatio verborum in the passage above quoted; and v 13, 25, describes it, si acer et vehemens fuerit usus orationis, tandem rerum nostris verbis militariis preferre; which he then illustrates from Cicero's speeches. The opposite practice is described II 12, 4, est praetera quaedam virtutum vitiorumque vicinias, quae maledicere pro libero, temerarii pro forti, effusus pro copioso accipitur. [Farrai's Chapters on Language, p. 281 sqq. s.]

καὶ τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς κ.τ.λ.] The only difference between this and the preceding form of ὑποκρίσεως is, that this is a special variety of the other, which substitutes the mean for the excess, but still according to the favourable interpretation of it. ἐνδιάθεσις is the ἐντελος ἦν ἠρεμία, Eth. N. II 7, 1107 b 3, 8, 1108 b 20, 1109 a 3, and ἰσότης, prodigality, the spend-thrift's habit, c. 7, 1107 b 10, c. 8, 1108 b 24.

παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς αἰρετῆς 'liable to lead to a false inference', Rhet. II 24. quae subjicit fiducia manans ex causa', Portus. 'The mis-reasoning
(παραλογισμός), or false reasoning, proceeding from the cause; is the identification of two different causes which must necessarily produce dissimilar effects or actions; these latter are confounded by the fallacy, and ascribed to the same cause. The cause of an action is the προοίμιον, the voluntary and deliberate purpose of it, otherwise represented as the ‘motive’ (the efficient cause). Now this cause or motive is different in the case of an act of wanton rashness, where there is no necessity (obligation) to incur the danger (οὔ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδύνευτικός), and of an act of virtue, true courage, which has a noble end, τὸ καλόν, in view: they are prompted by different motives, one belonging to the class ‘bad’, the other that of the ‘good’. This identification of the causes of the two actions leads to the ‘false inference’, that as the same cause produces the same effect, and the cause of both actions is the same, the effects are likewise the same, and both of them are acts of virtue. And then the further inference is drawn, that whatever a man will do from a less powerful motive, he will do a fortiori from one which is higher and more prevailing: the higher the motive or cause, the more powerful the impulse or effect. Similarly it is inferred that if a man is lavish to everybody, this must include his friends; by the rule, omne maius continet in se minus.

ὑπερβολή διατηρεῖ] Cic. Tusc. Q. v 26.105, exsuperantia virtutis. ὑπερβολή and ὑπεροχή are frequently employed to express an excess above a given standard, average, or mean; the general conception of ‘excess’, of mere ‘superiority’; without the additional notion of a ‘vicious’ excess, a deprivation or deviation from a true standard, which usually accompanies the word, and more especially in Aristotle’s theory of virtue, where it stands for a class of moral vices. ‘Non significat hic niniim sed praestantia.’ Victorius. With the notion here expressed, comp. Eth. N. II 2, sub fin. 1105 a 9, περὶ δὲ τὰ χαλεπώτερα δει καὶ τίμη γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀρετή καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βιώνειν ἐν τούτῳ. The average standard of excellence is surpassed, ‘good becomes better’, in proportion to the degree of difficulty surmounted in accomplishing any task. Pol. IV (vii) 1, 1323 δ 3, ἐκσυγμεμένος εἰς ὑπερβολήν, lines 8 and 14, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν, c. 4, 1326 a 21, Ib. δ 12, τῆς ὑπερβολῆς δρος, 6 24. Pol. VI (iv) 12, 1296 δ 19, ποιοῦν δὲ (by ‘quantity’ I mean) τὴν τοῦ πλῆθους ὑπεροχὴν. This sense of the word is also common in Demosthenes, as de Cor. 291. 24, ἕως δὲ τοσοῦτων ὑπερβολής ποιοῦμαι, and the same phrase de F. L. p. 447. 25. c. Mid. 519. 24, ἵστι δὲ ὑπερβολή τῶν μετὰ τοῦτο. ὑπερβολή συμφασίας, κακίας, δυρεχῶν, ἀναιδείας, ἀφόροτος, ὁρμῶν, &c., in all which ὑπερβολή denotes not the vice, but merely the ‘measure’ of it.

§ 30. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ’ οἷς ὁ ἔσαιος] Compare III 14.11. The same illustration of the topic, from Plato’s Menexenus, is there repeated, with the addition of ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, ‘in the funeral oration’, meaning the Platonic dialogue. Socrates, Plato’s principal character, or hero, or
RHTORIKHΣ A 9 § 31.

Although I am here taken more Aristotelio as a substitute for Plato himself, whose opinions and sentiments he is supposed exactly to represent. 1

The passage of the Menex. 235 δ runs thus, ei μει γάρ δότοι 'Αθηναίους εν Πελοποννήσῳ εὐλογεῖ τόλμη τόπου εὐτυχοῦς εὐλογεῖ τοὺς πολίτας καὶ κυρίας τῷ φύσιν τούτῳ εὐπροσδοκηστά ὅταν δὲ τις ἐν τούτους ἀρχέταις ὁμοθέτης καὶ ἐκατεροῦντος "δεξιόν γάρ" τον δότον εἰς λέγειν.

On this passage, Quintilian, Inst. Or. III 7. 23, Interesse tamen Aristotelis putat ubi quique laudetur aut vituperetur. Nam plurimum refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio; ut illa maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabilis credant, aut in eo contra quem diximus ea quae odorem. Illa non dubium est ille judicium quod orationem praecesserit.

τὸ παρ' ἐκάθεν τιμοῦ κ.τ.λ.] These are appeals to national and class prejudices and preferences. We should attribute to the object of our encomium the possession of any gift, quality, accomplishment which happens to be esteemed by the particular audience that we are addressing; as in a company of Scythians it would be advisable to address ourselves to their national habits and modes of thinking, and to praise our hero for his skill in hunting or strength or bravery; at Sparta for patience and fortitude (Quint. u. c.); at Athens for literary accomplishments.

'And in a word, (or, as a general rule), to refer (in praising any one before an audience of this kind) what they highly value to the καλόν, since they appear to border closely upon one another'. 'To refer τιμᾶ to τὸ καλὸν', is to invest them with a moral character, τὸ καλὸν being the moral end, the right, the end of action. This is as much as to say that these things, which are so precious in their eyes, are not only valuable, but right in themselves, and therefore they do well to hold them in high esteem.

§ 31. δεις κατὰ τὸ προσήκον κ.τ.λ.] 'all that seems naturally to belong to a man in virtue of his birth or antecedents', qualities, actions, achievements; 'such things as were to be expected from him'.

1 Bp. Fitzgerald (ap. Grant, ad Eth. N. vi 13. 3) remarks, on Eth. N. III 8. 6, that Aristotle in referring to Socrates prefixes the article when he speaks of him as Plato's interlocutor and representative, and omits it when he has the real historical Socrates in his mind. This is no doubt the general (Grant says, invariable) rule; but I have noted one exception in Pol. v (VIII) 7, 134 δ 23, where we find Σωφρόνιον without the article in a reference to Plato's Republic, 111 398 ε. The rule is extended to other Platonic characters borrowed from history, as τῶν Αριστοφάνου (the Aristophanes of the Symposium), Pol. II 4. 156 δ 11, and τῶν Τιμαῦ (Plato's Timæus, not the real personage), de Anima A 3. 406 b 16.

AR. I.
ΠΡΩΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 9 §§ 31, 32.

προσπηργμένων ἐυδαιμονικόν γὰρ καὶ καλὸν τὸ προσκυκτάσθαι τιμήν. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσήκον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἶον εἰ εὐνυχῶν μὲν μέτριοι εὐνυχῶν δὲ μεγαλόψυχοι, ἡ μεῖζον γυγόμενος βελτίων καὶ καταλακτικότεροι. τούτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἰπικράτους, ἐξ οἷῶν εἰς οἷα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονικού

πρόσθε μὲν ἀμφὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἔχων πραξεῖαν, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμώνιδου

ἡ πατρὸς τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἐπαινος, ἵδιον δὲ τοῦ προσπηργμένων] 'res antea virtute admiratus studioque possessas, laudes quas sibi quispam laborare suo comparaverit.' Victorius. 'his own previous acquisitions or possessions'; such as a stock of previous good, noble, great deeds, with which his new achievement, now the object of the encomium, is in accordance; as it ought to be. It is praiseworthy because it is the addition of a new honour, which, since honour itself is καλός, must also have a tendency to happiness (ἐυδαιμονίαν) and be right itself, and all that is right is praiseworthy.

But not only conformity with a man's antecedents may be adduced in praise of an action, but also the opposite, 'if he surpass them, namely, and improve upon' his own early condition and actions, or those of his ancestors, not acting in accordance with the past and what he was born to, but contrary to it, i.e. beyond it.

καταλακτικότερο] This does not necessarily contradict the topic of § 24.; the irreconcilable temper there is only to be fostered against enemies, here it probably refers exclusively to friends; or if not, in Rhetoric either side may be taken as a subject of commendation, each suitable to a different kind or disposition of audience.

τὸ τοῦ Ἰπικράτους—τὸ τοῦ ὀλυμπιονικοῦ] Both of them already quoted, 1 7.32, q.v.


§ 32. ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἐπαινος] 'praise is derived from actions'; i.e. it is only (moral) actions that can furnish topics of ἐπαινος, in its proper application. Praise and blame, moral approbation and disapprobation (Butler), are the tests of virtue and vice. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς, Eth. N. 1 12, 1101 δ 32.

See on this subject, and upon what follows, the distinction of ἐπαινος, ἄγιανος, and ἐυδαιμονεῖος and μακάρεσμος, Introdc. App. B to c. 9 §§ 33, 34, p. 212 seq.
ΠΗΓΩΡΙΚΗΣ Α 9 § 32.

σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαιρέσειν, πειρατέον δεικνύον πράττοντα κατὰ προαιρέσειν. χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα. διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώ

τὸν τὸν σπουδαίον τὸ κατὰ προαιρέσειν] On προαιρέσεις, see note, c. 6. 26.
The προαιρέσεις, the deliberate moral purpose, is the distinctive characteristic of moral action. ‘Acting in accordance’ with this is consequently said to be ‘peculiar to’, the proprium, characteristic of ‘the man of worth’, or good man. In ‘praising’ any one, therefore, praise being, strictly speaking, confined to moral action, ‘we must endeavour to shew that his actions are directed by a deliberate moral purpose’.

φαίνεσθαι] ‘that he should be shown to have’... ‘that it should be made clear that he has’... Note on I. 7. 31, p. 141.

καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα κ.κ.λ.] To establish a character for virtue in the object of your praise it is desirable to shew that his virtuous acts have been often repeated; and therefore, for the same purpose, to make an apparent addition to this number, we should assume as acts done with a moral purpose, ὡς ἐν προαίρεσι, any ‘accidental coincidences’ and ‘pieces of luck’ (which may have happened to him); ‘for if a number of them can be brought forward “resembling” the virtue or excellence that you wish to praise in him, they will be taken for “a sign” of it and of the moral purpose or intention’ (which constitutes virtue). The mere repetition of the actions, τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα, is serviceable in producing this impression, because it seems to shew an inclination or fondness for them, and thence a certain direction of the προαιρέσεις or choice, and a certain ἔξις or moral state, which are indications of a virtuous habit. συμπτώμα is a ‘concurrency’ or ‘accidental coincidence’ of one thing or act with another, between which there is no necessary connection, and, like τὰ κατὰ τίχες, purely accidental. ‘συμπτώμα est, cum quopiam aliquid agente, et quod nihil ad rem quae intervenit faciat, extraneous quippe excitatum contingent; e.g. desambulante illo solem desicere: τὰ τίχες vero, cum quopiam aliquid agente aliquis rei gratia, aliquid ex eo actu praeter propositum evenerit; ut scrobem facientem, ut arborem serat, thesaurum deosos invenire.’ Victorius. On τίχα as an agent or supposed cause, see Introd. p. 218—224, Append. C to Bk. I. Both of Victorius’s instances came from Aristotle [de div. per somn. insomniis, and Met. A 39, 1025 a 16. 8.]

On συμπτώμα (rare in ordinary Greek) Phrynichus, χρὴ οὖν συντυχίαν λέγω, ἢ λόγους οὖν, συνίκαι οὔτε τόδε γενέσθαι. ἀποσταθήσεις μένων ἐν τῇ κατὰ Διονυσοδόρου (p. 1295, 21) ἄπαξ ἐξηκέ τοῦμαι. The only other example of it, referred to by Lobeck, note ad loc. p. 248, in any writer earlier than Aristotle, is Thuc. iv 36, where it stands, like συμφορά, for an ‘unfortunate accident’. In Dem. it is equivalent to τὸ συμπτώμα, which occurs in the same sentence. It occurs also in the Platonic Axiochus, 364 c, in the sense of ‘a disease’ (morbú, Ast), apparently as a special kind of ‘calamity’. In Aristotle I have noted the following instances: Pol. VIII (V) 4, 1304 a 1 (where it means ‘an accident’, as in Dem. and Phryn.) [ib. 6, 1306 b 6; 11 12, 1274 a 12]; Top. A 5, 126 b 36, 39, de div. per somn. c. 1, 462 b 27, 31, συμπτώμα δὲ τὰ βαδίζουσιν ἠλείποτον τὰν

12—2
ματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον·
ἄν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὁμοία προφέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς
33 εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἥστι δ᾽ ἐπαινοῦ λόγος
ἐμφανίζοις μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δει οὖν τὰς πράξεις
ἐπιδιδυκόνυ αὐτὸς τοιαύται. τὸ δ᾽ ἔγκαμον τῶν ἐργῶν
ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν, ὅλον εὐγένεια καὶ
φιλος (an accidental coincidence), 463 a 2, τῶν συμμετάδον οἰκεῖν οὐδὲν ἄδι
γάντα όρθ᾽ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πόλι (it is a mere occasional, unaccountable ac-
dent), de respir. 5, 472 b 26; de Gen. Anim. IV 4 § 10, 770 b 6 [and 777 b 8];
Hist. An. VII 6, 4, 585 b 25, συμμετάδο (accident), IX 37, 6, 620 b 35, 40a, 41,
626 a 29. Categ. 8, 9 b 15; p. 199 a 1; p. 1093 b 17. The medical sense of
the word 'symptom' seems to be derived immediately from the Aristotle-
tian 'accidental coincidence'. It is an attendant sign of the disease,
though a mere external indication, and not of the essence of it; like a
symptomatic or 'accident'.

§§ 33, 34. See the Introd. p. 212 seq. Eth. Eud. I 11, 12, ἢν δ᾽ οὐ ἐπαινοῦ
τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἔγκαμα τῶν ἐργῶν... ἢν διὰ τὲ ἐκ εὐθείας
οὐκ ἐπαινοῖται; ὡς δὲ τὰ τινὰ τόλμα, ἢ τὰ εἰς τινὰν ἀνορθωθά (Eth. N.
I 12) ἢ τὰ μόρια εἰναι αὐτής. διὰ τὸν εὐθείας τὸν τὰς ἀκανθὰνν ἐργά,
ἤραν καὶ ἐγκαμάς τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκαμῶν λόγον τοῦ καθ ἐκατόν ἐργά, ἢ δ᾽ ἐπαινοῦ
τοιαύτων εἰς καθάλουν δ᾽ ἐκ εὐθείας τὸς τέλος.

τὰ δὲ κύκλῳ εἰς πίστιν τὰ 'the encomium or panegyric is directed to deeds
done' (ἐγκαμάζομεν πράξανα, after they are done, the results of actions;
ἐπαίνοι being of the actions themselves) and the surrounding circumstances
(such as noble birth and cultivation) serve for confirmation'. These
'surrounding circumstances' are a sort of setting the picture, a frame for
the picture, of which the real subject is the 'deeds' of the hero of the
panegyric; what he has done himself—nam genus et praeos et quaer non
factus ipsi, vix ex nostra voco. The 'confirmation' consists in this,—
'for it is natural and probable that the offspring of the good should be
good, and that one reared in such and such a way should turn out of
such and such a character (fortes creantur fortibus et bonis: σοὶ ἀθάντες ἵπτο
ἐκ τοῦ ἐκατόν ἄρτι διότι ἐκατόν ἐγκαμαντία τεκνα, εἰκὼν δ᾽ ἔρωμεν τῷ φύσει τῷ
τεκνῷ πάρτε, Eur. Alcm. Fragm. VII Dind.). But still the real object of our
praise is the ἔξιος, the confirmed habit of virtue, the character and not the
mere act; 'because we should praise a man even if he had not done the
(praiseworthy) act, if we supposed that his character was such as to incline
him to do it'.

τὰ κύκλῳ occurs in the same sense, of 'surrounding' (or accompanying)
'circumstances', Eth. Nic. IV 11, 1117 b 2, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δείξητε εἰς τὸν
tοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους τάξον ὅσοι ἄρτι πάντα καὶ εἰς τὸν κύκλῳ ἔφειραν τόν
tέρατον, where τὸ κύκλῳ are τοῖς λατρείοις καὶ τοῖς, 'the pains and dangers by which courage is sur-

1 The topic of genealogy is put first of all and treated at length by the author
of the Rhet. ad Alex., c. 35 (36). 4, seq. in his chapter on the encomiastic and
vituperative kind of Rhetoric. This stands in marked contrast to the secondary
and subordinate place here assigned to it by Aristotle, who seems rather to have
agreed with Ovid I. c. as to its comparative value.
rounded, while it looks through them to the pleasant end'; again, Rhet. III 14.19, oि διόλοις οὐ τὰ ἡμεράλματα λέγοντων ἀλλὰ τὰ ἐκεῖθεν.

§ 34. μακάρισμός καὶ εὐδαιμονίας αὐτοῖς μεν ταῦτα, τούτοις δὲ οὐ ταῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἀσφερὴ η ἐυδαιμονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ο ἐυδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα. 35 ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἴδος ὁ ἐπαινοὺς καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί: ἡ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθεον ἄν, ταῦτα μετατε- Π. 1368.

36 θέντα τῇ λέξει εὐγέμια γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν

§ 35. ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἴδος κ.α.λ.] ‘There is a community of kind’ (the two may be referred to one species, one of the three kinds (εἴδη) of Rhetoric, c. 3.1, either the συμβουλευτικόν or the εὐθδιακόν, as the occasion requires) ‘between praise and counsel or advice; for anything that you would suggest in advising may, by a mere change in the language, be converted into panegyric’. Quintilian has borrowed this, Inst. Or. III 7.28, toto autem habet (laudativum genus) aliquid simile suauioris; quia plerumque eadem illic suaderi hic laudari solent.

§ 36. ‘And so, when we know what we ought to do in any given case, or to be in respect of character, we must then use the acquired knowledge (of the right course of action, and the right character) as suggestions, by changing and converting the language’ (twisting so as to adapt it to our purpose; lit. turning them by the language). The example, and probably the topic itself, is taken from Isocrates, who in Panath. § 32 employs it as a suggestion or piece of advice, and in Evag. § 45 converts it into a topic of laudation—‘Now when thus expressed, it amounts to (has the value of, may serve for,) a suggestion, but when thus, it becomes laudation, “Proud, not of the accidents of fortune, but of the distinctions due to himself alone”’.—The example in the laudatory form from the Evagoras runs thus in the original, οἷς ἔρι τοῖς δε’ τοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἔρι τοῖς δε'


RHTORIKH Α 9 §§ 36—38.

α δει πράττειν καὶ ποίον τινα είναι, δει ταύτα ως υποθήκας λέγοντας τη λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν, οίων ότι ου δει μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπί τοις διὰ τιχὴν ἄλλα τοῖς δι' αὐτόν. οὕτω μὲν οὐν λεγένθειν υποθήκην δύναται, ὡδ' ἐπαινοῦν "μέγα φρονῶν ου τοῖς διὰ τιχὴν υπάρχουσιν ἄλλα τοῖς δι' αὐτόν," ὡστε ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν βουλήν, ὥρα τι ἃν υπόθεοι, καὶ ὅταν υποθέσθαι,

37 ὥρα τι ἃν ἐπαινεῖσθαι. ἡ δε λέξεις ἐσται αἰνηκείμενη ἐξ αἰανίγης, ὅταν τὸ μὲν κωλύον τὸ δὲ μὴ κωλύον μετατεθῇ.

38 χρηστεύον δ' καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οίων εἰ αὐτῶν γγογμένως. Aristotel was probably quoting from memory, as seems to have been his common practice.

With the passages of Isocrates comp. Ovid. Met. xiii 140, Nam genus et proas et quae non fecimus tibi, vis ea nostra voce.

δύνασθαι Rhet. ii 5.1. δύνασθαι is often used in the sense of 'having the value of, amounting to, equivalent to,' and is construed with the accusative. Herod. iii 89, τὸ δὲ Βαβυλὼν τὴν δύνασθαι Σύριθας ἔβδομη σταυρὸν. Xen. Anab. i 5.6, ὁ οὐγκός δύνασθαι ἐκτο ἰβάλλει, Thuc. vi 40, λόγοι έργα δυνάμοι καὶ Ευρ. Med. 128, τὰ δ' ὑφερβάλλουσ' οὐδένα καρδίας δύνασθαι θυελλοῖ (where Elmsley and Plügk understand καρδίας as used adverbially); also of the power, force, import, 'meaning,' of a word, Ar. Met. i 6, 1011 a 7, δύνασθαι β' οἱ ἀρχαιοὶ αὐτοῖς πώς τὸ υἱόν. Thuc. i 141, τὴν αὐτήν δύνασθαι (is equivalent to) δουλεύειν. Id. vi 36, τούτο δύνασθαι (mean) αὐτῷ θείαν, vii 58, δύνασθαι δὲ τὸ Νεοδαμήδης ἀλεθέρων ἢ ἐνα. Ast's Lex. Plat. s. v., δύναμις, δύναμε. The power or force which is contained in the primary sense of δύνασθαι is expressed in the secondary sense in which it appears in the above passages as a particular kind of force, the value of anything, and hence the amount, (of which equality or equivalence is a species), or the import, or meaning (which again is a kind of equivalence) of it. And the accusative is nothing but a cognate accusative. That power or force is the original notion from which the secondary meanings are derived, is proved, if proof were needed, by the parallel use of λογίσω to express precisely the same notion; Eth. Nic. ii 3, 1105 b 2, τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ή οὐδέν λογίσω, τὰ δ' ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἄλλα τὰ τῶν δύνασται. As we say δύνασθαι τι for τινα δύνασται, this construction is merely extended to the new kind of power which constitutes the secondary sense of the verb.

§ 37. ἡ δὲ λέξις κ.λ.α. 'The expression must be contradictory' (the opposition of ἀντίφασις, κατάφασις and ἀναφάσις, positive and negative, Categ. c. 10, p. 11 ὃ 19, the fourth kind of 'opposites' τὰ διαφικμένα), i.e. it must be positive in one, and negative in the other, 'when the prohibitive and the non-prohibitive are interchanged'. This is the case in the two examples; the one forbids pride, the other recommends or praises it—in a sense, provided it be directed to proper objects: by 'not forbidding' it contradicts the other.

§ 38. τῶν αὐξητικῶν quae valent ad amplificandum. These are the
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 9 § 38. 183

μόνος ἐπρώτος ἐπὶ μετ’ ὀλίγων ἐπὶ καὶ μᾶλλον πεποίηκεν ἀπαντα γὰρ ταύτα καλά. καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν ταύτα δὲ παρὰ τὸ προσήκον. καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατάρθωκεν μέγα γάρ, καὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτὸν ἄν δῷξειν. καὶ εἰ τὰ

1 +8 infra, cum libris. 'Racte Wolfius apud Vatianum p. 309. 8 delet.' Spengel.

various modes of *αὐτής*, which with the opposite, *μελῶν*, constitutes the fourth of the *κοσμολόγος*. See Intro. p. 129, and (on i 26) p. 276.

Some of the special topics which follow as instances of *αὐτής* have been already mentioned in § 25, and appear again as giving a special importance or prominence to crimes in c. 14. 4, with the omission of the last. They, and others of the like kind, are included in the *Rhet. ad Alex. 35* (36), 12, 13, under the general head of 'Comparison' with others for the purpose of laudation, to which they are all reducible. Comp. Cic. de Orat. ii 85. 347–8, and Quint. Inst. Or. iii 7. 16. With καὶ δὲ μᾶλλα τεποίηκεν, εἰ περὶδέξατο must be supplied for the sense after καὶ.

τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν 'circumstances of time and opportunity' give a praiseworthy character to particular actions at special times and seasons. This topic, equally applicable to comparative goods, has already occurred, c. 7. 32: and with παρὰ τὸ προσήκον, comp. c. 9. 31. If, for instance, a man performs an act of liberality, at a time of great pecuniary pressure, or in a case of emergency, or at a crisis of especial difficulty, he is then doing something παρὰ τὸ προσήκον, beyond what could naturally be expected from him, or any one else, and is entitled to especial credit for it. Similarly Victorius.

καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατάρθωκεν] This topic is not to be confounded with τὰ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχόντα of § 32. *That* is a 'repetition of the act', *this* denotes the 'repeated success' in any attempt, the constant success is an indication—not infallible, or certain as a *proof*—of special skill: as if a man were to throw sixes several times running, even if it were by mere accident, the inference would be that he had a special knack or skill in throwing dice. 'The constancy of the success gives it importance, and it will seem not accidental but due to the agent himself'.

καὶ εἰ τὰ προπρίσσοντα κ.κ.λ. 'And any one' (on whose account, in consequence of his actions and distinctions) 'to commemorate whom incentives, stimulants, to virtue ('encouragements' to do the like), or marks of respect for it, have been invented or were ever 'instituted', must be a praiseworthy character'. This is the general case of the invention or establishment of any public mark of honour in commemoration of the great deeds or distinctions of any signal public benefactor, and as an incentive or encouragement to others to follow his example.

The next clause, *εἰς τὸ πρῶτον*, is a particular example of the former of the two preceding cases, the 'invention', the first appropriation, of something in a person's honour. Victorius thinks that *κατασκευήσθη* is especially applied to the *permanent* establishment of an enduring monument, as a temple.

This topic again is afterwards applied to crimes, in c. 14. 4.
protréponta kai tímonta diá toúton eýrntai kai katheskevásth. kai eis Ín prówon égkúmmou époush, eýrntai...katheskevásth] We may note here the juxtaposition of the perf. and aor., apparently with no distinction of time intended. I have elsewhere noticed (Pref. to Transl. of Gorgias, pp. xv. xvi.) the difference of idiom between the Greek and English languages which obliges us sometimes to translate the Greek aorist by the English perfect. Other examples of the same inadvertence, confusion of tenses, or whatever else it is to be called, occur, i 3.8, where προχέεμα in the same sense and in the same opposition is repeated in the form προχέεμα, Top. ix sub fn. p. 184 a 8, βεβοηθήκε μέν...γέγρατο & ενωπαγείκεν. Many instances are found in Sophocles, which in a writer so subtle in the distinctions of language might lead one to think that he at any rate distinguishes them with a meaning. I leave the reader to judge. Philoct. 664, 666, (Herm. 670), λόγος μὲν εὐξίουνδα ἤκουσα θ' ὧν μέλα, 927—8, ἀδ' μὲ εὑρίσκω, οἱ ἡπάρκης. 1172, τι μὲ ἠλέασα; τι μὲ ἀργοῦσι; Antig. 406 (Dind.), present and aorist, καὶ πᾶσα ἡράντα καὶ πηγαίνειν ὑμῖν; 1228—9, Aj. 31, Trach. 364, 5; Arist. Ran. 1010—11 (Dind.), πειθοῦσε...ἀνάφερεν, Plat. Phaedr. 231 A, δ' εἶναι διήθετο, καὶ δ' πειθοῦσεν οὖς. Dem. de F. L. § 228, οὐ' ἡμῶν ἐσθραίνον οὐκ...εὐθλιάδοι. εἰς δ' πρώτων...] The novelty of the distinction, invented expressly for the occasion, marks a still higher sense entertained of the value of the service or the virtue of the act which it is intended to commemorate.

έγκυμων τοιοῦτον] ποιεῖν is here loosely used, by the so-called figure-σεντήματα (on c. 4. 6, note 1), in connection with έγκυμων and the statue of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in two different senses—as to Hippolochus, until we know who he was, and in what way commemorated, the application must remain uncertain—of writing the panegyric, and 'setting up the statue in the market-place'.

Of Hippolochus nothing is known. It seems that Aristotle intended the έγκύμων to refer to him. We should therefore insert a semicolon, or at least a comma after ἱππόπλοχοι, in order to connect the panegyric and the statue with those that they severally concern: εἰς is to be repeated after καὶ. 'And one (is especially praiseworthy) in whose honour a panegyric was first composed, as it was for Hippolochus; and as the setting up of their statue in the market was 'done' first, ἡτοίμασθη, i.e., and as the privilege of having their statue erected in the market was granted for the first time to Harmodius and Aristogeiton'. Thucydides in his episdical account of the assassination and the circumstances that led to it, vi 54—59, makes no mention of the statue; nor Aristotle Pol. viii (v) 10, where the attack on Hipparchus is spoken of. Pausanias, i 8. 5, says, ὁ πόλεως δὲ ἰσόταν 'ἱππόπλοχοι καὶ ἁριστογείτων οἱ κτισάντες ἱππορροχον αὐτίκα δὲ ἦσεν ἐγένετο κ.τ.λ. He is describing the ἰσότα, though he does not expressly name it. (See Smith's Dict. of Geogr. Art. Athens, p. 293 b.)

εἰς τῶν ἐνδιατείχαν] 'in the opposite cases', of men to whom any reproach or stigma, mark of disapprobation (the test of vice) was first attached. 'cum nempe quempiam aut solum aut primum aut cum paucis flagitiis admisisse ostendemus, turpitudinem ipsius valde augebimus.' Victorius. On the topics of vituperation, Quintilian, Inst. Or. iii 7. 19—22.
§ 38.

ὅν εἰς Ἰππόλοχον, καὶ δι' Ἀρμόδιον καὶ Ἄριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν θυρήμα σταθῆναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντιῶν. ἂν μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐτυρπῆ, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν· ὀπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἔποιει διὰ τὴν

καὶ μὴ καθ' αὐτὸν εὐτυρπῆ κ.τ.λ.] 'and if you have not enough to say about your hero himself, and in his own person, then institute a comparison between him and others... only the comparison must be with men of distinction, (reputation); because the amplifying power of the comparison and the impression of nobility which it creates, arise from the superiority which is attributed to him over those who are themselves worthy and good'. The same topic is recommended in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4) 6. ὁπερ Ἰσοκράτης—δικαλογίην 'which was Isocrates' custom, owing to his want of practice in forensic pleading'. Read διονυσίαν [with A'] for two reasons. First, what is meant is that Isocrates cultivated the habit of comparing his hero with others in consequence of his want of actual practice in the law-courts. There the pleading is always direct, and the arguments pointed at an adversary; comparisons with others are altogether out of place, or only occasionally serviceable. If Isocrates had had this practice, he would not have fallen into the habit of comparing, into which he had been led by confining himself to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric where they tell and are in point. Secondly, this is what Isocrates himself tells us of his own habits and pursuits, Antid. §§ 2, 3, ἐγὼ γὰρ εἰδὼς ἐν τοῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν βλασφημοῦντας περὶ τῆς ἐρήμης διαμεθάβει καὶ λέγοντας ὅτι δεν περί δικαγραφίας... αὐτὸς δὲ πάντα τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι φανερῶν δι' προήμια καὶ λέγειν καὶ γράφειν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἱδίων συμβολαίων, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς κολουσίας κ.τ.λ. Panath. § 11, ἀλλ' ἐπιτεθ' τοῦ πολιτεύοντος δημοκρατίας ἐπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν (i.e. literary labour, speech writing) καὶ ποιῶν καὶ γράφειν, οὐ περὶ μικρῶν τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενον οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἱδίων συμβολαίων οὐδὲ περὶ ἅν οἱ τῶν τινῶν λεύκως, ἀλλ' περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν κ.τ.λ. Ib. § 39 seq. ἡγομαι δὲ χρὴν γενεσθαι ὅτι συνεργοῦμεν ἐπικαλοῦμαι τινι τῶν πολέμων ἀκριβῶς καὶ δικαίως μὴ μόνον περὶ αὐτῆς ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους ἢ προηρμῖσεις τυχάνοντας, ἀλλ' ὑπερ' (here follows a simile) οὕτω καὶ τοῖς πολέμοις παρουσιάζει μὴ τὰς μικρὰς ταύτης μεγάλας, κ.τ.λ. [Cf. note on Paneg. § 11. 5.]

Here we find, first, that he failed in public life; secondly, that he withdrew from the law-courts and their ἱδία συμβολαία, the cases arising out of the 'private dealings' of the citizens with one another in their ordinary business, in order to devote himself to philosophy and the study of public affairs; and thirdly, that his ordinary practice in his Panegyrics was, just as Aristotle describes it, to compare, παρουσιάζω, the object of his laudation with others, whether men or cities, as great and distinguished as themselves, πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγγράφουσι. The two first of these statements seem to put the reading δευνοθίαν beyond question, συνισθάνειν being contrary alike to the known facts and the probabilities of the case. It is nevertheless supported by Max Schmidt, in his tract on the date of the Rhetoric, pp. 17, 18. With this reading, δικαλογία must be confined to speech writing for the use of parties in a legal process.

This is one of the passages of the Rhetoric on which Victorius founds
his charge against Aristotle of jealousy and illwill towards Isocrates, whom he supposes the other to have lost no opportunity of assailing with open or covert censure and ridicule in his Rhetoric. See his commentary, pp. 154, 507, 586, 605, and elsewhere. Here at least, (with the reading ἀνωθεσίων), there is neither one nor the other. I have already entered into this question in the Introd. p. 40—1, where I have given the opinions of later writers on the subject.

συγκρίνειν] Pol. vi (IV) 11, sub init. 12, 1296 b 24, Metaph. A 4, 985 a 24, 26, Top. A 5, 102 b 15, H 3, 154 a 5, 9, Θ 5, 159 b 25. "σύγκριναι εἰς, ἀδόκιμον φανή; ἀμολος δὲ καὶ τὰ συγκρίνειν τῶν τρὶς τεῦχων ἀναθηματιζόντων αὐτοῦ ἀλλὰ τοὺς παραβάλλειν, ἀπεισάναι ὑπορεφόμενοι τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν."

Phrynicus. See Lobeck's note ad loc. p. 278. In all the passages quoted, except the two of the Metaph., συγκρίνειν and σύγκρισις denote comparison: in the other two it is a term of the early Physical Philosophy, meaning a composition of elements, opposed to διάκρισις.

Victorius quotes in illustration of πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν, Catullus, Carmen 64, 344, non illi quisquam hullo te conferet heros, seq. Cic. de Or. ii 85, 348, est etiam cum ceteris praestantibus viris comparatio in laude praesciera.

§ 39. The notion τῶν τότων of αἰτίας or amplification naturally falls under the general head or class of laudatory speeches, is especially applicable to all forms of 'praise': because its object is to establish a certain 'superiority' of the person panegyrized over others, and this 'superiority' is an honourable end to aim at. And therefore if we do not compare our hero with the distinguished, it is at all events better to do it with the rest of the world (the average of mankind) because superiority in general, in itself, is thought to be an indication of 'virtue'. Eth. Nic. iv 8, sub init. οἱ γὰρ ἐννοεῖσκεν ἀξιώτητι τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυσανωτώτες ἢ οἱ πλουτούς ἔν ὑπεροχῇ γαρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὴ ὑπερέχει πάν ἐννοιεροῖς.

§ 40. It follows from this that of the three universal kinds of persuasion αἰτίας, or amplificatio, is most appropriate to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric (and the opposite melior, vituperatio, to the censorious critical extenuatory kind of it\(^1\)): for in this the actions are taken for granted (as admitted), and therefore all that remains to be done is to invest them with magnitude (importance) and honour (dignity, glory). To the deliberative orator examples are most serviceable; because people

\(^1\) ἀμελέως γὰρ τούτων (when these are held fast by us, when we have mastered these) τὰ ἀκανθλητικὰ τοῦτον φανερών ἢ γὰρ ψύχος ἐκ τῶν ἐκκεννικῶν δεσμῶν, § 41 ἐνθα. 
are apt to draw inferences, to form a judgment or decision upon the future from the past by a sort of presentiment or anticipation. The enthymeme, direct logical argument, is most to the purpose in judicial oratory: in that there is most room for the application of direct proof, the tracing of cause and effect, and demonstration by deductive process, in clearing up the obscenity of 'past facts', which are the objects of forensic oratory, c. 3. 2. The substance of this is repeated in III 17. 3—5. 

καταμαθαίνομενοι μαθητεύσου καὶ ἀπαντάσεως, both of them not unusual in Plato and Aristotle, are the usual terms by which this kind of 'divination', the foreboding presentiment, dark undefined anticipation of the future is expressed. It occurs again (in the simple form) I 13. 2, III 17. 10, Eth. N. 1 3, 1095 b 26, of a suspicion, or hypothesis, Ib. VI 13, 1144 b 25. Examples are to be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. 1 349 A, and many more in Ast's Lex. sub νν.—καταμαθαίνομεν, besides this place [the only passage where it is used by Aristotle], is found in pseudo-Dem. ἐπιτάφ. p. 1400. 2, Polyb. II 22. 5, in Longinus and Athenaeus.
§ 2, 3.

The first subject of inquiry in this branch is the number and nature (quantity and quality) of the materials or propositions (the premises) of which our 'syllogisms' are to be constructed, in accusation and defence, the two functions of the dicastic branch of Rhetoric.

Schrader draws attention to the term 'syllogisms' as marking the especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this branch as compared with the other two. On syllogism for enthymeme, see note on 1.1.11, p. 19.

§ 2. There are three subjects to be considered and analysed in order to furnish topics for the pleader's use; first, the number and nature of the motives and causes of injustice; secondly, the dispositions of the wrong-doers themselves; and thirdly, what characters and dispositions render men most liable to wrong and injustice.

§ 3. The first thing is to define justice, then to proceed with the rest in order. For, of a popular or merely provisional definition; comp. 5.3; 6.2; 7.2.

'Wrong' or 'injustice' is defined 'a voluntary injury contrary to law'. The two leading characteristics of a crime or punishable offence, which are here brought into view are, that it is an act in violation of the law of the land—this is the political view of injustice—and that to be a crime the act must be intentional, done with malice prepense, and with full knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the probable effect of the action. It is thus distinguished from a merely accidental injury or harm done, which can hardly be considered voluntary at all, and again from a mere mistake or error of judgment arising from ignorance, not of universals, or general moral principles, but of the particular circumstances of the case (as of the absence of the button of the coat where there is no evil or malicious purpose, no bad σχολής, which constitutes the immorality of the act. See Eth. N. III 2, v 10. Rhet. I 13. 16.

 médec ἐστὶν δ μέν ὅσον δ ἐκ κοινὸς] Comp. 13. 2, 11, 12, and Introd. p. 230, Append. E. to Bk. L.

λέγω δὲ ὅσον κ.τ.λ.] 'by special' law I mean the written law under

1 This application of the term ὅσον to médec is to be distinguished from the ordinary meaning of it in this combination, as, for instance, Dem. de Cor. § 211,
κοινὸν δὲ ὁσα ἀγραφά παρὰ πᾶσι όμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες, οἱ πάντα προαιροῦμενοι, ὅσα δὲ προαιροῦμενοι, εἰδότες ἀπανταὶ οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ. δὲ ὁ δὲ προαιροῦνται

which the government is conducted and the citizens live, the laws and institutions—which direct the policy of the government and the conduct of the citizens—the positive, written, law of the particular state: this is human, as opposed to divine and natural, law: 'by common (universal) law (I mean) all the unwritten principles that are supposed to be universally admitted.' This is the usual distinction taken between the two: these σωφρ., ἀγραφ., are described, Introd. p. 239 seq.; for the further subdivision adopted in c. 13. 2, see Ib. p. 242.

ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα κ.τ.λ.] 'a voluntary act is characterised by knowledge, and the absence of all external force and compulsion'. Eth. N. III 3, init. ἄντος δ' ἐκοινοῦν τοῦ βίου καὶ δ' ἀγνωστον, ὁσ' ἐκοινοῦν δοκεῖν ἐν εἴναι οὐ ἢ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότα τὰ καλὰ δικαστα (i.e. with special knowledge of the particular circumstances) ἐν αὐτῇ ἢ πράξει. οὐκ γὰρ οὗ καλῶς λέγεις ἀκοινοῦν εἴναι τὰ διὰ θημὸν ἢ δὲ ἐπεθυμίαν. Ι 13. 6, τὰ ἐκοινούν, δι' ὅτι οὐτὶ δοκεῖ εἰδότες.

ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες κ.τ.λ.] 'now all voluntary actions are not done with (do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he purports'. Eth. N. III 4, 1111 6 7, ὁ προαιρεῖται δὲ ἐκοινοῦν μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτα δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πάνω τοῦ ἐκοινοῦν τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκοινοῦν καὶ πάθει καὶ τάλα ἐκοινοῦν, προαιρεῖται δ' οὗ, καὶ τὰ ἐξελεύσει ἐκοινοῦν μὲν λέγεμεν, κατὰ προαιρεῖται δ' οὗ. Actions, for example, done under the impulse of violent excitement or passion, δι' ὅτι οὐκ οἷον, οὐδὲ παθητικὰ, δι' ἐπεθυμίαν, are voluntary, but not κατὰ προαιρεῖται.

§ 4. δὲ δὲ προαιροῦνται κ.τ.λ.] 'The impelling motive, cause, of this purpose to do mischievous and vicious acts in violation of the law, is vice and want of self-control. This general vicious habit takes various forms in particular cases, and shews itself in different special vices according to the circumstances which call it forth at the time, and give it its special direction. Thus vice and wrong (μοχερήτρα καὶ εὖθεσ) may take the form of illiberality in money matters, licentiousness in pleasure, effeminacy in respect of ease and comfort (μαθηματικοτελές), cowardice in danger (when, for instance, the coward leaves his comrades in the lurch, and runs away out of mere terror); similarly the vice of ambition is shewn in the undue pursuit of honour, the passionate irascible temper in the over indulgence of angry feeling; victory is the motive to wrong in one that is over eager for victory, revenge with the vindictive; folly (the want of φρόνημα, practical wisdom, the special moral faculty) shews itself in the inability to distinguish (the liability to be deceived in distinctions of) right and wrong,

where it stands simply for ius privatum, relating to private (as opposed to public) affairs.
the vice of the shameless man appears in his reckless disregard of the opinion of others'—δέθμωμε 'quick-tempered', 'hasty'.

περί δέ τούτο] Wolf, and with him Brandis, in Schneidewin's Philology, 14, i, p. 42, object to δέ, which is omitted by Brandis' 'anonymus' and one MS. See the note on δήλω δέ, 1 11, p. 20.

τά βίδουμα] are things and circumstances which tend to promote and encourage an easy, careless state of mind, 'things comfortable', which incline us to self-indulgence and inactivity. So βραστή in Plat. Gorg. 560 C, οδηγον πολλή βραστή γίγνεται, 'isn't it a great comfort...?' Crit. 45 C, τά βραχομάτα αλλοτριοθά, of 'careless, easy-going, indifference'.

ἐγκαταλελμένως, 'to leave behind in the lurch', desert a comrade in danger [Col. 4, 26, 5, 7; III 16, 5, 7] τον δε τον κυνήγη. Eupolis Δήμου Fragm. vi (Meineke, Fragm. Com. Gr. 14, 458), of Pericles' eloquence, μόνος τών ῥήτωρός τώ κίνητο πολλάτερον εἰκαστείν τοῖς αφερομένως, 'to leave the sting behind in the wound'; (ἐς τῇ διαλέγ). Plat. Phaedo, 91 C, ὀσπερ μελετα τό εἰκον το εἰκαστείν αἰχμήσαιμ. πικρός] 'Translatio a tristi sapore nomine, πικρὸς Graeci appellant qui accepta injuria non facile placantur sed diu simultatem gerunt, de quibus accuratius egit noster, Eth. Nic. iv (11, 1126 a 20), οἱ δὲ πικρὲς υδώδαλτοι, καὶ πολλὲς χρόνον ωργίζονται κατέχοντες γὰρ τῶν θυμών. παθαὶ δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδίδῃ ἡ γὰρ τιμία παίει τῆς ὀργῆς, ἢδυναι ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης ἀμφοτέρου.' [Vic.] τούτου δὲ μή γιαμανέντω τὸ βάρος ὑγείαν ἔδρα γάρ τὸ μή ἑπίθλος εὖν εὐθεῖα νυμφίαινε αὐτοῦ, καὶ δὲ τις τῆς ὀργῆς χρόνον δεῖν οὖσι δ τοῦ τοῦτο εὐτοίς ὀχλήσεσθαι καὶ τοῖς μάλλοντα φίλοις. The Latin amarus, as Victorius points out, is used in much the same sense. The distinguishing characteristic of the Aristotelian πικρός, in which the particular 'bitterness' of this form of ὀργῆ is shewn, is its lasting and enduring quality—the wrath is nursed 'to keep it warm' (πέφασι τῆς ὀργῆς)—and this gives it a malignant, spiteful, implacable character, exactly opposite to that of Horace, the irascible temper, ὀργίλος, irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis esset.

ἀνεγάρθη] Ignorance of moral distinctions, and consequent wrong action, may be regarded as a kind of 'deception' or 'delusion'; when a man is too foolish (unwise) to be able to distinguish right from wrong,
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 10 §§ 5, 6.

απατάσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδικον, ὁ δὲ ἀναι-
σχυντος δι’ ὀλυνθρίαν δόξης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἐκαστὸς περὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

5 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ
tὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη
ῥηθησομένων· λοιπὸν δὲ εἰπέτε τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πῶς
ἐχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ τίνας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελά-

when; e does not know and cannot perceive the difference between them (has no φρόνησις). Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 a 6), τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον ἑπεξερήμην οὐ δοκεῖ φρονεῖ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ δυσπιστήμον. Ignorance is not a mere στίχος, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shown by our not applying the term 'ignorant' to inanimate objects and young children; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking one thing for another.

περὶ ἐκαστὸν τῶν ὑποκειμένων] τὰ ὑποκειμένα, τὰς συμβεβηκότας, τὰς υποκειμένα, τις τοιούτα ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν,"all that fall under the choice," as its objects, or matter to operate upon. These are the six things previously mentioned, πάλιν, συμβεβηκότα, ἤδη, and their opposites.

And so for the rest, the same rule holds in the case of every vice, 'each in the things which are specially subjected to it', which come under that particular head, as money is the 'subject-matter' of illiberality, dangers of cowardice, anger of quick, irascible temper, and so on. Victorius understands it as the 'object' of the aim or desire of each.

§ 5. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων] sc. in c. 9; ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη
ῥηθησομένων] sc. in II cc. 2—11. 'It remains now to describe the motives and dispositions or characters of wrong doers, and the dispositions and characters of their objects or victims'. In Polit. vi (tv) 11, 1255 b 9, there is a division of crimes based upon their respective magnitude or degree, into great and little, crimes on a great scale, acts of oppression, outrage, insolence, and crimes on a small scale, mean and paltry, which appear in fraud, cheating, and any paltry knavery or trickery. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἔθερεται καὶ μεγαλοπίπτως μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοφρεῖν καὶ κακοπῷ ἄθροι τῶν δὲ δικαιομένων τὰ μὲν γίγνονται δι’ ἔθερες, τὰ δὲ δᾶκ κακογγαλει.

§ 6. First we have to distinguish or analyse the various motives and incentives, whether in the way of pursuit or avoidance which lead men to attempt (to undertake, take in hand, ἐγχυροῦτο) wrong doing; for it is plainly the accuser's business to inquire (how many and which kinds,) the number and the kinds of these universal incentives to wrong doing to which the adversary, whom he charges with a crime, is liable: and of the defendant, how many and what sorts of them are not applicable to his case. 'Hunc locum copiose persecutus est Cicero pro Milone et in criminando Clodio et in Milone purgando: cuncta enim in Clodio fuisset ostendit quae persuadere ipsi potuerint ut insidias faceret Miloni; eademque a persona Milonis a fuisset.' Victorius.
§ 7. This inquiry naturally leads to a classification of the sources or causes of human action, which are found to fall under seven heads; some of these have their origin in ourselves and are under our own control, others are external to us and independent of us, and exercise upon us and our actions the force of necessity and compulsion. To the causes whose origin is without us belong (1) chance or accident, (2) nature, and (3) external force or compulsion; over these we have no control: the causes which spring from within us, and are therefore more or less in our power to master and overrule, are (4) habit, (5) reasoning or calculation, (6) passion, (7) appetite or desire. These seven incentives to action have been carefully examined, and compared with other doctrines and opinions elsewhere expressed by Aristotle on the same subjects, in Appendix C to Bk. I, Introd. p. 218 seq., to which I refer for further illustration of them.

This same classification of the causes or sources of actions is indicated or alluded to elsewhere, but nowhere else so completely made out. See, for instance, Eth. Nic. III 5, 1112 a 32, ἄσια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν ἦνα φόνα καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἦν δὲ νοεῖ καὶ τῶν τῷ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ, and VI 4, in the definition of art, 1140 a 14, ὅστις γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δυνῆν ἡ γεγομένων ἡ τύχη ἐστὶν, ὅστις τῶν ἑαυτῷ φῶν: ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσιν τὰ τὰ ἀνθρώπων. And in I 10, 1099 b 20 seq. the same division is hinted at.

§ 8. ὡς δ' ἂν μὲν βούλησι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Eth. N. III 4, 1111 b 26, ἢ δὲ ἂν μὲν βούλησι τῶν τῆς ἐν ταύτης μᾶλλον, ἢ δὲ προορίσθη τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅς ὄγγαλε καὶ ποιμένα, καὶ προορίζεται δὲ δὲ ἂν ψυχοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονίας μὲν βούλησι καὶ φαίνει, προορίζεται δὲ λέγεισιν αὐτῶν ἄμεση: ὅπως γὰρ ἡ ὄνειρος προορίζεται περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἑαυτός ἦνα. This is a qualification of the too unlimited statement of the unscientific Rhetoric. 'In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the nisus or contus—the tendency towards the realisation of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire
μὲν βούλησις, <βούλησις δ’> ἀγαθῷ ὑρέξεις (οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται ἄλλῳ ἢ ὅταν ὁπιθῇ εἶναι ἀγαθόν), ἀλογοὶ δ’ ὑρέξεις ὑγὶς καὶ ἐπίθυμια, ἀστεὶ πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ἀνάγκη πράττειν δι’ αἰτίας ἔπτα, διὰ τύχην, διὰ φύσιν, διὰ βιαν, δι’ ἔθος, διὰ λογισμὸν, διὰ θυμὸν, ἐπίθυμιαν. τὸ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ ἠλλικία ἢ ἔξεις ἢ ἄλλ’ ἀπτὰ τὰ πραττόμενα περίεργον ἐι γὰρ συμβέβηκε τοῖς νεοῖς ὑγίλοις εἶναι ἢ ἐπιθυμητικὸς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τα τοιαῦτα ἄλλα δι’ ὑγίν καὶ ἐπίθυμιαν. οὐδὲ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν, ἄλλα συμβέβηκε τοῖς μὲν πένησι διὰ τὴν ἐνδειαν ἐπιθυμεῖν χρημάτων, τοῖς δὲ πλουσίοις διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἐπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαῖων ἡδονῶν. ἄλλα πράξομει a blind and fatal, tendency to action'. Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph. XI Vol. i. p. 184—5. On this, the Editor refers in a note to this passage. But βουλήσις here means not 'will', but 'wish', as appears from the definition ὑρέξεις— the 'will' is not always directed to good—and from the analysis of it in Eth. N. 1114. The term by which Sir W. H. proposes to designate the common quality of this family of faculties, and so separate them from the rest, is Conative. Impulsive means much the same thing, and has the advantage of being an English word.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] This question of the end and object of 'the wish' is discussed in Eth. Nic. III 6 (Bekk.), and the conclusion, 1113 σ 23, is as follows: εἰ δὲ δὴ ταύτα μὴ ἀρέσκει (the two opposite views that it is γάθων and τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν), ὅσα φασίν ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ καὶ ἀλλὰ βουλήμαι εἶναι γάθων, ἠκέμνῃ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τὸ μὲν οὖν σχολαί τὸ καὶ ἀλλὰς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ φαίλει τὸ γυέων.

§ 9. τὸ δ’ ἐπιθυμεῖν (κ.τ.λ.) What he says is superfluous (εξεργαζομαι) here, is actually done in the six ethical chapters, 12—17, of Bk. 11, and this apparent contradiction has raised a su. ición that some error has crept into the text. There is however in reality no inconsistency between the theory here laid down and the actual practice in Book 11. The treatment of these ἔξεις is appropriate, as supplementary to that of the ἡθος: here it would be out of place, because the present subject of inquiry is about the causes of human action; and though these states and conditions, youth, age, wealth, poverty and the rest, are as a general rule attended and characterised by certain tendencies or ἔξεις, yet these latter can be by no means regarded as effects of causes, but are mere συμβεβηκότα, separable accidents, which do not invariably accompany the states that they characterise. Youth and age, wealth and poverty, are not the causes of any particular classes of actions; in so far as they do accompany them they are accidental, not essential.
RHETORIKHΣ A 10 § 10.

καὶ οὕτως οὐ διὰ πλοῦτον καὶ πενίαν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ ἄδικοι, καὶ οὶ ἄλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις πράττεν, διὰ τοῦτο πράξοντων ἡ γὰρ διὰ λογισμὸν ἡ διὰ πάθος ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν οἱ ἡπὶ καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τάναντιοτια. συμβαίνει μέντοι ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἔξεσι τὰ τοιαύτα ἀκολουθεῖν, ταῖς δὲ τοιαίσθε τὰ τούμιθ᾽ εὑθὺς γὰρ ἰσος τῷ μὲν σώφρων διὰ τὸ σώφρων εἶναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρηστάται ἐπακολουθοῦσιν περὶ οἶκου τοῦ τοῦλον. τί εἰς ἀναγγέλει ἀναγγέλει ἕως ἐπηγαίνει καλοῦντο, καὶ διὰ ἀναγγέλει οὐκ ἐπηγαίνει ημᾶς; τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφανῶς ἐφιέναι ημῶν τῇ φύσει ψυχή, comp. Phileb. 72 ε. They are therefore pleasures that are forced upon us by nature, and therefore ‘necessary’ or ‘indispensable’ to us. Of these the ‘bodily pleasures’, the gratification of the appetites, are the most necessary, and sometimes the latter are confined to them; for in Eth. N. VII 14, 1154 a the pleasures which are first called συμμακην, in lines 7 and 9, afterwards, in line 11, receive the name of ἀναγγαία, which is repeated in line 17. The Scholiast and Paraphrast both explain ἀναγγαία by συμμακην. Plato more frequently speaks of the ἀναγγαία ἐπηγαίνει in the same sense.

§ 10. Not however that I mean to deny—it does happen, συμβαίνει—that there is a connexion of certain particular results or qualities with particular moral states (but these classes and conditions of life are not ‘states’ in this sense): any virtue, I dare say, (i.e. self-control, does generate a particular kind of opinions and desires about things pleasant, good ones namely; and the opposite vice of licentiousness the contrary in the same sphere.

This is a parenthetical note to avoid misunderstanding. εὐθὺς...ἐπακολουθοῦσιν 'there is at once, from the very first, an immediate and close connexion (or consequence) between the σώφρων in virtue of his self-control, and certain good opinions and desires in respect of pleasure'. εὐθὺς in the sense of 'at once', 'straight off', and corresponding sometimes to the Latin statim and ulter, passes into a variety of significations which take their colour from the context. Eth. N. v 14, 1137 b 19, ἀναγγαία πρόκειται ὑπὸ σχέσης; see Bonitz on Metaph. G 3, 1004 a 5, who cites Categ. 12, 14 a 32, Anal. Pr. I 16, 36 a 6, Eth. N. vi 5, 1140 b 18, εὐθὺς οὐ γὰρ ἀναγγαία, ὁμοίῳ non apparet. Polit. III 4, 1277 a 15, τίν πρῶτον εὐθὺς (from the very first) ἐπηγαίνω. Ibl. VI (iv) 11, 1295 b 16, καὶ τούτη εὐθὺς ἀπελευθερώθην πῶς οὖν (from their very earliest home associations). Ibl. VIII (iv) 10, 1310 b 8, εὐθὺς εἰς ἑαυτός (at once, from direct opposites). Ibl. c. 19, ult. μὴ βουλομένως γὰρ εὐθὺς οὐκ ἔτοιμοι βουλεύεσθαι (he won't be king at all, ὁμοίῳ). Eth. Eudem. II 5, 1222 a 37, διότι ἡ φύσις εὐθὺς οὐ πρὸς ἄκακην ἀξίωμα ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου. See Fritzsche, note ad loc. Phys. VII 4, 2, b17, 248 a 21, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη, and 17. 7, εἰδέναι ὅτι τὸ διάφορα εὐθὺς, statim, at once, immediately under. V 17. 5,
tων ἡδεῶν, τῷ δ’ ἀκολάστῳ αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ τῶν
I I αὐτῶν τούτων. διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐα-
tέον, σκεπτέον δὲ ποιὰ ποίοις εἰσέχει ἐπεσθαίν· εἰ μὲν
γὰρ λευκὸς ἢ μέλας ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται
tῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης ἢ
δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἢ δὴ διαιρέει. καὶ ἄλως ὅσα τῶν
συμβαίνοντων ποιεῖ διαιρέειν τὰ ἡθν τῶν ἀνθρώπων,
οίον πλούτειν δοκῶν ἐαυτῷ ἢ πένευσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ
eὔποχεῖν ἢ ἀποχεῖν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑστερον ἔροιμεν,
νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.

I 2 ἔστι δ’ ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τα τοιαύτα γνῶνομεν,

de Gen. et Corr. I I 11. 2, de part. Anim. IV 5. 1. Like ἡθ, its connotation is
transferred from time, its natural and proper signification, to place.
§ 11. 'And therefore', (because they are inappropriate as not assigning
causes of human action,) such distinctions as these may be dismissed for
the present; but still we are bound to inquire into the connexion which
subsists between particular qualities and particular persons or classes';
(the general subject deserves investigation ;) 'for though in respect of the
qualities black and white or tall and short there is no fixed succession or
accompaniment (between them and any particular persons or classes), 'yet
when we come to the connexion of young or old men with justice or
injustice, then (by this time) there is a difference'. That is to say, that
although in certain connexions of particular qualities with particular
classes the establishment of such would be worthless or impossible, yet
there are other cases, as in that of moral qualities, where it would be
worth while to establish such a connexion, if it were possible. 'And in
general, any accidental circumstance that makes a real difference in the
characters of men; as the opinion a man has of his own wealth or
poverty, or good or bad fortune, will make such a difference. So after
all it seems that it is possible to trace some such connexions between
qualities and classes; but as this is not the proper place for such an
inquiry—the reason being already given—'we will postpone it for the pres-
ent', and wait till we come to the ἡθη, where it will be in its proper
place: 'And now let us proceed to what remains' of the subject on which
we are at present engaged.

πλουτεῖν δοκῶν εαυτῷ is a reading of some MSS, followed by the old
Latin Translation, and adopted by the recent Edd. The vulgate has
πλουτεῖν δοκεῖ, which Buhle retains. δοκεῖ τῷ, a conjecture of Victorius,
is also found in some MSS.

§ 12. On τύχη see Appendix C to Bk. I. Introd.; on alvra δώρων see
ib. p. 221 seq. 'Ilios eventus qui a causa quam nemo facile definiat orientur
ad fortunam referimus. Arist. Phys. II 4, 156 b 6, εἰσὶ δὲ times oie δοκεὶ
eiδοι αἵτινες μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἀδόξας δὲ αἴσθησιν διανοίᾳ τοῖς τοῖς καὶ διαμο-
νοέροις.' Schrader. (Schrader quotes this as Aristotle's own definition.)
196 ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 10 §§ 13—17.

δειν δ' τε αίτια ἀόριστος καὶ μὴ ἔνεκα τοῦ γίγνεται καὶ μῆτε δεῖ μῆτε ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μῆτε τεταγμένως· δήλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ ὀρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περὶ τοῦτων.

13 φύσει δὲ, ὡσαν ἢ τ' αίτια ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένης· π. 1369 ε. ἢ γὰρ δεῖ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡς τῶν ἀποβαίνει. τὰ γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, πότερα κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ ἢ ἀλλὰν αἰτίαν γίγνεται. δοξεὶ δ' 14 ἃν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιοῦτων. βία δὲ, ὡσαν παρ' ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἢ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δι' 15 αὐτῶν τῶν πράττοντων. ἐθεὶ δὲ, ὡσαν δ' ὅτι διὰ τὸ πολ- 16 λάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν. διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δο- κοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττεται ἐνα γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλουθοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι' ἱδονήν. 17 διὰ θυμὸν δὲ καὶ ὀργὴν τὰ τιμωρητικά. διαφέρει δὲ

καὶ (ὅσον μὴ ἔνεκα τοῦ...μῆτε τεταγμένως) 'in any fixed, regular, prescribed order'.

§ 13. φύσει] Introd. p. 224.—δεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, 'either constantly, or as a general rule': the latter alternative allows for the possible objection of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν to the perfect regularity of the operations of Nature.

καὶ τῆς τύχης ἀλητία] The καὶ admits that chance as well as Nature may be the cause of these unaccountable monstros, these deviations from the ordinary laws of nature; but leaves the question unsettled.

§ 14. βία] Introd. p. 225, anything that is done by our own instrumentality, but in opposition to our desires and calculations, may be said to be done βίᾳ, by compulsion.


§ 16. λογισμῶ] 1b. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good under the aspect of utility: the other two forms of good are τὰ καλὰ the moral end, 'the right', and τὰ ἧδος: see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 δ 30, τριῶν γὰρ ἰσων τῶν ὥς τὰ αἰρετικά...καλὸν συμφέροντος ἧδον,) in the form of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, good is the object of the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only not for that reason, but for mere pleasure.

§ 17. θυμὸς and ὀργή. 1b. p. 231.—τὰ τιμωρητικά, 'acts and feelings of
revenge, are prompted by passion and anger. I have translated θυμός ‘passion’ and ὀργή ‘anger’ to express the distinction that the one is a more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, θυμός being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a difference of meaning which had no real existence. ὀργή, if Damm’s Lexicon is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be found in Mr G. L. Freyberger’s (unpublished) Concordance to the Iliad. 8.] Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and limitations of more general notions—θυμός the life or soul (Hom.) is limited to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the expression of passion: ὀργή ‘anger’ is one, the most striking, of a class of animal impulses, ὀργή. In Aristotle’s psychology, the θυμός is one of the impulsive faculties (ὁρίζεις), together with the appetites and the (deliberate) wish, de Anima B. 3, 414 b 2, and in the Platonic scheme the θυμός or θυμοειδές represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt ὀργή is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul.

On the difference of τιμωρία and κόλασις, see Introd. p. 232. Compare I 14. 2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 B. Comp. also Eth. N. II 2, 1104 b 16, αἱ κόλασις...λαρείαι γὰρ τῶν ἀκαυ, ἀλ λαρείαι δὲ τῶν ἐναγίων περισσότερον γίνεται.

§ 18. For further particulars about ὀργή we are referred to the treatment of the ὀργή in Bk. II: the chapter on anger is the second.

ἐνθύμησις. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to include the latter we have ὅσα φαίνεται and not ὅσιν.

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of ἐνθύμησις it has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and familiarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course some good, real or supposed, for its object.

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he draws between σώματι and ἐνθύμησις. The former represents a natural familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, as I have pointed out on 1 1. 2, the derivation, σώμα, ‘the haunting, herding together’, the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accordance; so σώματι, of a man’s ‘familiar associates, habitual companions’ I II. 16;
-φαίνεται ἡδέα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστὸν ἐν τοῖς ἡδέων πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ἡδέων, ὡτε ἐκσφάδοσιν, ἡδέως ποιώσιν. ὡστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα δὲ αὐτοῦ πράττοντι, ἀπαιτεῖ ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἡδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ἡδέα. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὅσα δὲ αὐτοῦ, ἐκόντες πράττοντι, οὐχ ἐκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ δὲ αὐτοῦ, πάντ' ἂν εἶν, ὅσα the other is an acquired habit, a practice to which you habituate yourself by study and attention; of which virtue the settled ἔξω is formed by ἔσω is the best example. 'In priore vero,' says Victorius, 'nulla industria aut cura, sed potius una cum actate crevisse, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.'

Spengel has adopted ἀνευθεύνων from ἀνευθεύνων, the reading of MS A¹. ['ἀνευθεύνων ceteri ut p. 1370, 13' (c. II. 4). 'Restituit passivum.' Spengel.]

πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] 'Perelegans est locus Agatharchiae p. 61 fragm. ed. H. Steph. οὕτως ἔχει τι περί παντόσα συνήθεια καὶ μείζω τῆν ἀπὸ τοῦ περίχορτος δουλείας ἡ χρόνος (it isn't the time, it is the association) ἡ τῆν πρώτην δεόμενον εἰς τῶν βίων ἡμιαίαν.' Gaisford.

Ἀπεὶ συλλαβοῦσι εἰσίν.] The dative is explained by supplying an imaginary τοι, 'as for one summing up to say'. An analogous phrase is ὅποι συνελώσω εἰσίν, Xen. Mem. III 8, 10, IV 3, 7. See note on I 7, 7, τὸ μνημείῳ ἑσεῖ, and Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. Add Eth. N. I 5, 1097 b 13, ἑπετείησαν ἐπὶ τὸν γονία...ἔς ἐκεῖνου προέκυψαν. In this and similar examples the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case.

οὐχ ἐκόντες] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle's well-known distinction, Eth. N. III 2, init., between οὐχ ἐκόντες and ἐκόντες. Acts due to ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called ἐκόσισα, involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or repentance; neither are they strictly speaking ἐκόσισα, intentional, because no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take the name of οὐχ ἐκόσισα, 'not-intentional'; neither intentional nor 'unintentional'. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external compulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do what he did—but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done by chance, nature, or external compulsion.

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or
ékóntes práttooun, ἡ ἁγαθὰ ἡ φαινόμενα ἁγαθὰ ἡ ἴδεα ἡ φαινόμενα ἴδεα· τίθημι γάρ καὶ τὴν τῶν κακῶν ἡ φαινομένων κακῶν ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἡ ἀντὶ μείζων ἐλαττῶνοι μετάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς (airēṭa γάρ πως), καὶ τὴν τῶν λυπηρῶν ἡ φαινομένων ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴν ἡ μετάληψιν ἀντὶ μείζων ἐλαττῶνοι ἐν τοῖς ἴδεαις ὑσταύτως. Ἀνεπεύρ ἀρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ἴδεα, 19 πόσα καὶ ποῖα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἶρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἴδειος εἴπωμεν νῦν. δεὶ δὲ νομίζειν ἵκανον εἶναι τοῦ ὄρους, εὰν ὁσὶ περὶ ἐκάστου μῆτε ἄσαφεις μὴτε ἀκριβεῖς.

apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater good for a less, because all these are alethe (desirable), objects of choice; and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitution of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (φαντασμα) desirable in the sense of pleasurable.

§ 19. It is therefore (from the preceding considerations) the rhetorician’s business to discover the number and kinds (so Aristotle, but the number of kinds will be sufficient,) of good in the form of utility or expediency, and of pleasure. And as the first has been already examined and analysed under the head of deliberative Rhetoric (cc. 6, 7, good, absolute, and comparative), it remains for us to bestow a similar treatment on pleasure. Meanwhile we are not to forget that definitions for rhetorical purposes are sufficient, provided they are neither obscure nor over-exact: in the one case they are not understood, in the other they are also apt to be unintelligible by the popular apprehension, but besides this they trespass upon an alien province and method of reasoning, the scientiē, namely, or philosophical, 1 4. 4—6, &c. Accordingly,

CHAP. XI

gives the analysis of pleasure, so far as it is of service to the rhetorician.

The general plan of this chapter, and the connexion of its contents, are as follows. First we have a definition of pleasure and a general description of its nature in §§ 1, 2. From this we learn that all that is in accordance with our nature is pleasurable, all that runs counter to it painful, §§ 3, 4. Consequently all natural desires and appetites produce pleasure by their gratification; and these fall into two classes, bodily appetites and mental desires, the former irrational and connected with the pleasures of sense, the latter rational, in so far as they are of an intellectual character, suggested and acquired by some kind of intellectual process of the nature of persuasion, § 5, and conveyed by a faculty, φαντασία, intermediate between sense and intellect. The analysis
1 ὑποκείσθω δ' ἡμῖν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν κίνητιν τινα Ch. 11
τῆς θυρίδας καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητὴν εἰσ
2 τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον, εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδονὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον, δὴλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδὺ ἐστὶ τὸ Ῥ. 1310.
pοιητικὸν τῆς εἰρήμενης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν ἢ τῆς ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρὸν.
3 ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τὸ τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι

of these intellectual pleasures (which include the pleasures of imagination, memory and anticipation, of love and friendship, and its counterfeit, flattery) occupies §§ 6—20. In the remainder of the chapter other kinds of intellectual pleasures are distinguished, and referred to the principles implied in the definition.

§ 1. The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding observations of the last: ὑποκείσθω, 'let us assume', as a definition, 'take it for granted': there is no occasion to enter into details, or attempt to prove that it is what I am about to describe. Similarly ἐπιτ. 5. 3, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3.

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject, see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. 1, p. 234 seq.

κατάστασιν...τῆς ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν] This characteristic of pleasure, 'the resettlement of the soul', i.e. the vital and sensitive system, 'into its normal state' after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is pain, reappears in one of the special forms of pleasure, § 21, ἐν τῷ μαθητῇ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν καθιστάσθαι. So that learning, as a pleasure, like pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This is the Platonic conception of pleasure; not, so far as I remember, of learning in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same view of pleasure, de Rer. Nat. 11 563 (there quoted).

§ 2. καὶ ἡδὺ ἐστὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν] by the ordinary rule, 1 6. 2, and note: as all is good that is conducive to good; if the end, then the means; so all is pleasant that is productive of, or conducive to, pleasure. Comp. Eth. N. 1 4, 1066 b 10, quoted on the above passage.

τῆς εἰρήμενης διαθέσεως] pleasure is here properly called a διάθεσις, 'a temporary and passing disposition', as opposed to the 'confirmed, complete, and permanent state' which constitutes the ἴλος. On the distinction of the two, see Categ. c. 8, p. 8 b 27, διαθέσις δὲ τῆς διαθέσεως τῷ πολυπρονότερον εἶναι καὶ μονομέτερον. τοιοῦτα δὲ τὰ τε ἐνεπιθέματα καὶ τὰ ὀρθαί...διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ἐκτιθὲν εὐλογία καὶ ταύτῃ μεταβάλλοντα. οἷον...οὐρὼν καὶ ψυχρότερα καὶ θυσία καὶ ὄψις καὶ ὅσια ἄλλα τοιοῦτα διάκειται γὰρ πᾶι καὶ τὰ ταύτα ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ταύτῃ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐν τῷ ἦλιον ψυχρότερον γενόμενον κ.κ.

§ 3. If pleasure is what it has been described to be, a return from a temporary disturbance or unnatural state into a state of nature (φύσι
being here understood in one of the ordinary Aristotelian significations, the normal nature, nature in its best and completest condition), then all ‘passing into a natural state’ must be pleasant, ‘and especially whenever what takes place in accordance with it has reached its own proper nature’, i.e. its acme or maximum, the highest attainable point of its development, for instance, drinking, quenching the thirst is a pleasure, learning is a pleasure, but the acme or highest point they reach is still more pleasant in both. Schrader, who suggests these examples, expresses the later of the two stages in each, by sitim restinxisse, didicisse, which not only does not give Aristotle’s meaning correctly, but also, as I think, is not true as a matter of fact.

ἀνεπιφέροντα [?] has attained to, acquired as its εἶτι, the opp. of ἀνεπιφέρον, see note on I 1. 7. Gaisford cites in exemplification of this application of ἀνεπιφέρον, Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate, II 130 Σ, τὸ γὰρ οἷον οὐ φύσις ἄνεπιφέρον (Nature has recovered, regained her own).

καὶ τὰ ἐδώ κ.λ. [? ‘and all habits, for in fact that which has become habitual now (by this time, now that it has reached this point) takes the form (νόμος) of something just like what is natural: for habit is a thing (νόμος) closely resembling nature; because frequent repetition makes a near approach to the constant and uniform, and nature belongs to the constant and uniform, and habit is a case of frequent repetition’. With this statement about habit, comp. de Memoria 2. 16, p. 453 a 27, ὁσερ γὰρ φύσις ἐδώ τὸ ἔθος, and line 30, τὸ δὲ πολλὰκις φύσις ποιεῖ. Gaisford refers to Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate. 132 Α, τὸ ἔθος τρόπον τοῦ ἐκεῖ φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσις γέγονεν.


§ 4. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαων] ‘and freedom from constraint, freedom of action’ by the same rule; because all external force, compulsion or violence, is unnatural. ‘And therefore all necessity (of every kind) is painful’. This marks the distinction of ἀναγκαίον and ἔνδομον. Fate, for example, is ἀναγκαίον, and Necessity (Ἀνάγκη herself).

There is a chapter on ἀναγκαίον which includes ἔνδομον as a species, in Metaph. Α 5. There are four kinds of ‘necessary’ things’. The first is physical necessity, as breath and food are necessary to life: the second class consists of things necessary as means to an end, as taking medicine to get well, to take a voyage to Αἴγινα to recover a sum of money: under this head comes βίος (and τὸ βίαων), an external force that controls us,
φύσιν γὰρ ἢ βία. διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς εἰρηται

πάν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πράγμα· ἀναρόν ἐφι.

τὰς δὲ ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας π. 38.

λυπηρὰς ἀναγκαία γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ ἔταξασίν ὀύτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδὺ. τὰ δὲ ἐναντία ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὑπὸ ὁμοίων τῶν

something independent of ourselves and our own will, (here the external compulsion or violence is the necessary means to the attainment of its end, control). βίαιον is thus described, 1015 a 26, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τὸν ὄμην καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐμποδίζει καὶ κατακειμένον. τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, διό καὶ λυπηρόν. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπικρίθη φησὶ, 'κῶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πράγμα ἀναρόν ἐφι.' καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκη τε, ὅπερ καὶ συντονίζει λέγει ἀλλ' ἡ βία μὲ τοῦτο ἀναγκαία ποιεῖ· (this is incorrectly quoted; memoriter, as Bonitz thinks; the line runs, ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ ταῦτα ἀναγκαία μὲ δρὰς, Electr. 256). The third species of ἀναγκαίων includes τὰ μὴ ἀναφερόμενα ἄλλας ἔκς; and the fourth, which is somewhat unnecessarily distinguished from this, is the necessity of demonstration, ἀποδεικνύει, of which the conclusion 'can only be in one way'—which shews that it ought to be included in the preceding. See also Waits, ad Organ. 83 b 38, Comm. II p. 358.


'And all acts of attention or study, serious effort, vigorous exertion are painful' (supply ἀνάγκη ἢδει λυπηράς), 'for all these imply necessity and constraint, unless they become habitual; but then the habit makes them pleasant. The opposites are of course pleasant; all states of ease and comfort, and idleness and inattention, carelessness and indifference, and sports, and recreations, and sleep, belong to the family (or class) of things pleasant; for none of these is related to (or has a tendency to, ὁρῶς) necessity'.

τῶν ἱδίων (τὰ)] Comp. I. 9 25, καὶ καὶ τιμὸν τῶν καλῶν, I 11 16 and 17. These are examples of a mode of expression, not unknown to earlier and contemporary writers, but more familiar to Aristotle. It is the substitution of a genitive case with τὰ omitted, for the direct predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject. In Aristotle τὰ or ὑπὸ τὰ is sometimes expressed. I have not noted it in any writer earlier than Plato, but have no reason to suppose that he was the first to use it. Protag. 319 c, τῶν γενεσίων. Theaet. 164 b, τῶν αἰδήλων τῶν ψυχῆς θεοῖς φανεῖται. Phaed. 68 D, Rep. II 376 E (Stallbaum's note), I. 4 424 C, ὅτε τῶν πεπειρώμενων, 437 B, IX 577 B, ἡμεῖς ἢδει τῶν δυνάτων ἢ κρίνει. Ἀσκ. c. Tim. § 143, ἢν τὰ τούτα
5 ἡδεῖς ουδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων. καὶ οὐ ᾠν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνή, ἀπὰν ἡδύ. ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδεός

§ 5. καὶ οὐ ᾠν ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐνή] Anything is pleasant of which the desire is innate in us, 'the object of any of our natural desires or appetites', the definition of desire being 'an impulse towards pleasure'. de Anima B 3. 2, 414 b 2, δρένιον μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμός καὶ βουλής, β 5, τὸ γὰρ ἡδύς δρένιον εὖ ἀυτῇ (ἡ ἐπιθυμία). Ib. Γ 10. 4, 433 a 25, ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία δρένιον τις ἐστὶ; and compare the following sections on ἐπιθυμία and its congeners. Eth. N. III 15, 1119 b 6, καὶ ἐπιθυμία γὰρ ἥσσος καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τούτοις ἡ τῶν ἡδεός δρένιος. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, ἡ ἐμφάνους οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἱδίων.

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual nature, the λόγος ἔξω and the ἔλογος—the latter division is attributed to Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, 1 1. 7, 1182 a 23.

The irrational appetites, the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν (Republic), are those which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or by a physical necessity, δυσὶ λέγουσα φύσει, (these are Plato's ἄνθρωπων ἐπιθυμίαι: Rep. VIII 534 A, 558 D, 559 A, B, see the whole passage, IX 572 C, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἄναγκους, ἀλλὰ παιδία τα τα καλλουσιμοῦ ἦνα γέγο- μενα; and have corresponding ἤξοναι, Rep. VIII 558 D, Philcb. 72 E), and are not prompted by any 'supposition', ἐν τούτῳ ὑπολαμβάνεται τῇ, any suggestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites (those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or medium of (ἐν) the body, sensual, αἱ σωματικαί, Eth. N. VI 6, sub init. ἄναγκαι τα σώματα, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special tastes leading to particular kinds of pleasure); and those connected with taste in general, and with sex, and universally with touch (which includes τασκ,’ gustus,’with feeling in general, τὸ δὲ γενετὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ, de Anima B 10 init.), and with smell (of fragrance), and hearing and sight. The rational, those which are accompanied with reason, are such as owe their origin to
'persuasion' of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as opposed to the natural and inborn τὰ ἔνοστα, φύσια—because the hearing (things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct persuasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things.

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary, (2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes.

ὅσα ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] sc. ἐπιθυμίας, is a cognate accusative; ἐπιθυμῶ is construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood.

§ 6. The received text followed by Bekker and Spengel puts a full stop at ὄνειζε [p. 306, line 3]. (The latter editor has also adopted the reading of MS A* del ἐν for ἐν). With this punctuation, ἐν τῇ ἑρμήνευσι—ὄνειζε must be the apodosis, and the argument runs thus: 'If pleasure consists in sensation, and φαντασία is a kind of sensation, then (assuming that there is pleasure in memory and anticipation) memory and anticipation must be always accompanied by a mental impression of what is remembered or anticipated'—pleasure being the middle term, without which the supposed apodosis will not follow from the premisses. But this is not what Aristotle undertakes to shew; and also it assumes first what is proved in the next sentence, viz. that pleasure does accompany memory and anticipation. Surely Victorius and Vater are right in supposing the apodosis of the entire sentence, ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ. to be δῆλον δὲ—καὶ αἰσθήσεως, which is in fact what Aristotle here wishes to establish. Substitute a colon for the full stop: retain ἐν (for καὶ ἐν) instead of del ἐν; and understand the first three clauses ἐπεὶ—ὄνειζε, as three distinct and independent propositions, the basis of the conclusion which follows; ἐν δὲ τοῖς is a repetition in sum of the foregoing, 'if all this, I say, be so', (ὅδε is appropriate in a resumption of what has been just said, note on 1 1.11); if pleasure is a mode of sensation, if φαντασία is a feeble kind of sensation, and if memory and hope are attended by a φαντασία or mental impression of that which is remembered or hoped (some phenomenon past or future, the former a fact, the latter an imagination), it follows that pleasure, which is sensation, accompanies the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future because φαντασία
does, which is a form of sensation, ἀείσερν καὶ ἀλεθης. In this case ἔστ
is to be retained in preference to ἔστι. The latter necessarily makes
the clause that it introduces, the apodosis; καὶ ἐστι merely couples this with
the preceding premisses. The mood ἀεικελοποι ἐστ, which might seem
objectionable in the mere statement of a proposition, must be considered
as a qualified statement of the fact, 'will be likely to attend'; only so much can be affirmed.

τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινος πάθους, ἢ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν

which is here called a 'sort of feeble sensation', is described
otherwise in the psychology of the de Anima. It is defined Γ 3, 439 a 1,
fαντασία ἐν τῆς ἐκτοποίησιν τοῦ τῆς ἀλθήςεως τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀναπτύγματι (τοῦ
ἐνεργείας, Trendelenburg and Torsik, not, therefore, a mode of sen-
sation as here, but a motion generated by sensation in active exercise:
and again 428 a 1, φαντασία καθ ἡν λέγομεν φαντασία τι ἡμιν γένεσθαι:
'the presentative faculty' (Sir W. Hamilton). It is a faculty intermediate
between sensation and memory, and thus becomes connected with the
intellect; the seat of memory is το πρῶτον ἀλθήςεως, viz. the heart, where
the results of sensation are all collected in a focus, and thence transmitted
to the mind. The memory is defined, de memoria, c. 1, ult. 451 a 15,
φαντάσματος, ὁ δείκτως εἰς φαντασμα, ἐπιλεί; which represents it as a state
(in the heart, or the appropriate organ) of the impression φαντάσμα, trans-
ferred by the faculty of φαντασία from the sensation itself, which (the
impression) is the representation (the δείκτος) of the real object of sense, that
of which it is the φαντασμα. The office of the φαντασία is therefore
to convey the impressions of the actual objects of sense delivered to it by
sensation, and to impress or print them on the organ fitted for their
reception; when thus impressed or 'represented' they become memory,
and are passed on to the intellect. To compare with what is said in
the Rhetoric, of this φαντασία being a sort of feeble sensation, we have in
the de Anima, Γ 3, 428 b 11, what almost (not quite) justifies it, ἐνεργῄς...
δὲ φαντασίας κίνησις τοῦ δοκεί εἶναι καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἀλθήςεις γένεσθαι ἄλλα
ἀληθημένα καὶ ὅπερ αἰσθήσεις ἔστι, ὡς ἐν ἐνεργείας τῆς ἀλθήςεως, καὶ ταύτης ἐν οἷον ἐνέχθη ἑοὶ, ἐν ἡμείς ἡ κίνησις ὅπερ ἂν ἀλθήσεις ἐνέχθη ὅπερ μὴ ἀληθημένας ἐνάθη,
καὶ ἐν ὅπερ καὶ καθ' ἐναθ. Though thus closely allied with sensation,
and dependent upon it, the φαντασία is not a faculty of mere sensation, but
belongs equally to the intellect, φαντασία ἐνοείς ἐν λογιστικῇ καὶ ἀλθήηςει,
de Anima Γ 10 ult. 433 b 29, (being apparently intermediate between them
and partaking of the nature of both); of which (intellect), when we take
the whole of it, the διάνοια as well as the νοῦς, into account, the φαντασία

1 That pleasure is attendant upon every act of sensation is stated in Eth. Nic.

x 4, 1174 b 11, ἤστα δείκτως τῆς ἀλθήςεως ἢ ἕθος ἢ ἥστα, and again, line 27, καθ'
ἐνεργείας τῆς ἀλθήςεως ἢ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἕθος ἢ ἥστα. But this is not the same thing as
the statement of the Rhetoric which identifies the two, just as Eudemus in the 7th
book of the Nic. Eth. identifies pleasure with the ἐνεργεια, of which in Aristotle's
book it is only the concomitant. And there is a precisely similar overstate-
ment here of the nature of the φαντασία, as compared with the description of it
in the de Anima, where it is said to be a kind of sensation, instead of closely
connected with it. See the following note, on φαντασία.
aισθησις τις ασθενης, καν τω μεμνημενο και τω ελπι-
ζουτι ακολουθοι εν φαντασια τις ου μεμνηται η ελπι-
ζει. ει δε τουτο, δηλουν οτι και ηδονα άμα μεμνη-
7 μενοι και ελπιζοντυ, επεισερ και αισθησις. ουστ' 
αναγκη παντα τα ηδεα η εν τω αισθανομαι ειναι 
παροντα η εν τω μεμνησαι γεγονημενα η εν τω 
ελπιζειν μελλοντα' αισθανομαι μεν γαρ τα παροντα, 
μεμνηται δε τα γεγονημενα, ελπιζοντα δε τα μελ-
λοντα. τα μεν ουν μυμνομενα ηδεα εστιν ου μονον Ρ. 1370 ι.

1 Αναγκη: (see note on p. 304).

actually forms a part; c. 3, 427 b 28, τουτου δε (του νοειν) το μεν φαντασια 
doxai eisw το δε ουσια. 'Imaginatio inter sensum perceptiones et 
mentis cogitationes media intericitur, ut imaginatio sensibus, mens imaginatio 
neget.' Trendelenburg ad de Anima III 3, 4, p. 453. On the 
various relations of the phantasia, see the notes of the same Comm. ad de 
Anima, pp. 166, 462, 538, also Bonitz on Metaph. A I, 980 b 26, p. 35,
Waltz ad Org. 100 b 27, Vol. II, p. 440. [Ueber den Begriff des Wortes fan-
tasia bei Aristoteles. J. Freudenthal (Göttingen) 1863, pp. 59. 8]

§ 7. Consequently all pleasures may be reduced to three classes, 
according as they are referred to things present, past, or future. The 
pleasures of the present are the immediate pleasures of direct sensation; 
those of the past are the 'pleasures of memory', the pleasures that accom-
pany, or are revived by, association, in the way of recollection, of past 
facts; and those of the future are derived by a similar association from 
the anticipation of future pleasure. ηδεα δ' εστι τοι μεν παροντα η ονυ-
γεια, τοι δε μελλοντο η διως, τοι δε γεγονομενον η μημη 
ξυστον δε το κατα την εφευρων [Eth. N. IX 7, 1168 a 13]. Of memory, Ov. 
Heroid. XVIII 55, (Hero to Leander) Nux erat incipiens; namque est memini 
isse volebatur; cum foribus patris egrediebar amans.

§ 8. Therefore everything that can be remembered is capable of 
giving pleasure; not only things that were pleasant at the time they hap-
pened, but some that were not, provided the after consequence of them 
was something right or good (right, morally; good, as tending to profit or 
advantage); whence the saying, 'nay truly, pleasant it is to remember 
past troubles after deliverance (escape) from them'. Fragm. Eur. 

1 When there has been no compensation of this kind, the remembrance of past 
suffering is painful. Ovid, Metam. IX 390, quin nunc quaeque frigidus arte 
incendat, dum laqueus, horribi habet; pars est memini dolore. XIII 283, (Ulysses) me 
miserum, quando cogor memini dolore temporis illius, quo Graum murus Achilles 
procubuit. Virg. Aen. II 10, sed si tantus amor caussa cognoscere nostrans...quamquam 
amnis memini horret luctue refugiat, incipiam. Dante, Inferno, c. V 121, 
Nessun maggior dolore, che ricordarsi del tempo felice nella miseria. Shaksp. 
Richard II. Act. I Sc. 3, 300, Oh no! the apprehension of the good gives but the 
greater feeling to the worse.
ῬΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 11 §§ 8, 9.

όσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὡτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ’ ἔνα καὶ ὧν ἡδέα, ἢν ἦν ὑστέρον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τὸῦτο. ὁθεν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἰρηται,

ἀλλ’ ἦδυ τοι σωθέντα μεμνημαται πόνων, καὶ

μετὰ γὰρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνήρ

μνήμενος, ὅσ τις πολλά πάθη καὶ πολλά ἐόργη.

9 τοῦτον δ’ αἰτιον ὅτι ἦδυ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακῶν. τὰ
cited by Plut. Symp. II 1, p. 630 B, and translated by Cicero, de Fin. II 32. 105, suavis laborum est præteritorum memoria. Cic. Ep. ad Fam. v 12. 2 habet enim præteriti doloris secundum recordatim delectionem. Wagner adds, 'ex hoc loco et altero Archippi Comici apud Stobaeum LIX 7, proficisse Epicetum ap. Schweig. T. III, p. 104, scribentem, ὃς ἦδυ τὴν ἑλάνταν ἀπὸ γῆς ὅρων, ὀφεῖν ἦδυ τῷ σωθέντι μεμνημένῳ πόνῳ, monuit Mei- neke. ad Menandrum p. 86.' Stobaeus quotes a second verse of Archippos, ἥ—ὁρω, ὃ μὴν ἦτο, μὴ πλάνατα μηδεμιοῦ, which supplies the link of association from which the pleasure is derived. It is from a contrast of past trouble with present immunity, and the feeling of security which it engenders; and it has for its foundation the same feeling as is suggested by the celebrated lines of the opening of the second book of Lucretius' poem, the famous suave mari magna. The same association, the sense of comfort and security derived from an uncomfortable contrast, is the foundation of the pleasure expressed in the exquisite lines of Sophocles, Fragm. Tymp. 563 (Dind.) apud Stobaeum LIX 12, φεῦ φεῦ, τι τοῦτον χάρμα μείζον ἄν λάβος τοῦ γῆς ἑπιφώσκοντα καθ’ ὑπὸ στόμης πυκνῆς ἀκούσα νεκάδος εὐδούσῃ φρει —to make the land, and then, the fatigues and perils past, to sit safe and snug under shelter, listening in dreamy and drowsy mood to the fast-falling drops of rain overhead—sign of the storm still raging, reminiscence of the past, and contrast with the comfort within. Comp. Cic. ad Atticum II 7, cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri; cupio, ut ait tuis amicus Sophocles, καὶ ὑπὸ στόμης et cet.

Another illustration of this source of pleasure is taken from Homer Odys. o' (xv) 399, which Aristotle, as usual, has misquoted. With this compare Virg. Aen. I 202, revocate animos maestumque timorem mittere. Forsan et haec altam meminisse vultus. Comp. again Cic. ad Fam. I c. Nihil est optius ad delectionem lectoris quam temporum varietas fortunae vicissitudines: quae etsi nobis optatiles in experiendo non fuerunt, in legendo tamen erunt lucundae.

τοῦτον δ’ αἰτίου εἰς ταύτη (ἡδέα ἐστὶν) εἰς ταύτης] ‘and the reason of this is that there is pleasure even in the absence of evil'; that is, in the way of contrast with our former condition, from which we are now relieved; all relief, the removal of oppression and constraint, is pleasurable.

§ 9. τα δ’ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ (ἡδέα ἐστὶν) εἰς ταύτης] ‘everything is pleasant in anticipation which appears to confer great delight or profit when present; and to do this without any accompanying pain', 'and in general, all that
delights when present, delights for the most part in anticipation and recollection. Therefore even anger is pleasant— the prospect of vengeance lends a solace and a charm even to anger; comp. II. 2. 2, πάση οργή ἐπιδιώκει τὸν ἢδονα τῆς ἀδικίας τοῦ τιμῶρους κ.τ.λ. and the same line of Homer, II. 2. 100, is quoted in illustration, 'for no one is angry with one who is plainly beyond the reach of his vengeance', (see the above passage of Book II.) 'or with those who are far above him in power; either not at all, or less'. ἀδυνατόν γε, ὦ δοκεῖ, οἱ δυνάμεις μᾶλλον ὑμῖν οργίζονται ἢ βιαζόμενοι' τὸ μέρος ἢδονῆς ἐν τῷ ῥώσει πλεονεκτοῦσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀνυπηρέτως καταγγέλουσθαι, Thuc. I 77. 5. Ον φαινεῖται

= favore, see note on II. 2. 1.

§ 10. Most appetites and desires are accompanied by a certain pleasure: which is felt either in the recollection of the past, or in the anticipation of the future, enjoyment; for instance, those who are suffering under (literally, held, possessed by) fevers feel a pleasure in the thirst (that attends them), either from the remembrance of former draughts, or the expectation of future; and lovers in talking of their beloved (in his absence), or painting his portrait, or drawing his likeness, from memory, and composing verses in his honour (so Victorius and Vater; else, γράφοντες 'writing of him', and ύπονοιεῖ τι σκέψι 'in anything that they ever do which has any connexion with him', περὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος 'so as to recall him to their recollection'); for in all such cases the recollection appears to their fancy (οἴοντα) to be like the (present) perception (by any of the senses) of the beloved.

All these last are pleasures of memory, agreeably reminiscences. The pleasures of memory are further exemplified in this, that when the love which has already arisen from the delight found in the actual presence of the beloved is retained by the memory in his absence, this is a sure sign of the commencement of a genuine and lasting passion. Bekker, ed. 3, followed by Spengel, has put ἐρωτοκύματα in brackets: F. A. Wolf had previously objected to it. It may be retained and explained as I have translated it, but the text and the general meaning would not suffer by its omission. ἐρωτοκύματα if retained implies that the passion is already conceived. Gaisford, after Victorius, quotes Eth. Nic. IX 5, 1167 a 4, ἐν τῷ ἐφιάλει (ἡ φάσιν) ἐρωτοκύματα οὖσα, ἀπεικόνισε τοῦ ἔρωτος ἢδονῆς μὲ γὰρ προφθολεῖ τῷ ἑδήν ὀνείρει ἔρξε, ὅ ἐν χαίρειν τῷ ἐφιάλει οὖσα ἡμῶν μᾶλλον ἔρξε, ἀλλ' ἔννοια καὶ ἐφιάλον πόθε καὶ τῇ παρούσῃ ἐκδημη.

11 ἐπιθυμίαις αἰκολουθεῖ τις ἡδονή· ἢ γὰρ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἔτυχον ἢ ἐπιτίθεντες ὡς τεῦξονται χαίρουσί τινα ἡδονήν, οἴον οὐ τ' ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς ἔχομενοι ταῖς δί-ψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ὡς ἐπιοῦν καὶ ἐπιτίθεντες πιέσθαι

12 χαίρουσιν, καὶ οἱ ἔρωτες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γρά-φοντες καὶ ποιοῦντές τι ἀεί περί τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαί-ρουσιν· ἐν ἀπασί γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἴον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου. καὶ ἀρχή δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὐτή γίνεται πάσιν, ὅταν μὴ μένοι παρόντος

13 καὶ αὐτὸς μεμνημένοι. διὸ καὶ ὅταν λυπηρὸς γένεται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐγγίνεται τις ἡδονή· ἢ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονή δ' ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ ὅραν πως ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἄ ἐπραττε, καὶ οἶος ἦν. διὸ καὶ τούτῳ εἰκότως εἴρηται,

ὡς φάτο, τοίοι δὲ πάσιν ψ' ἑμέρον ὄρος γόνιο.

[Victorius inquires here whether ἐχόμενοι should be construed with ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς, as Plat. Phileb. 45 B, ἐν ταὐτόν χαίρομαι ἐχόμενοι, or with ταῖς δίψαις: the case is doubtful, either will do.

ταῖς δίψαις] their thirst, that which naturally belongs to them: the possessive use of the definite article.

§ 12. 'And this again is the reason why, even when (the beloved) (becomes painful) causes pain (to his admirer) by his absence, there is still some pleasure that finds its way into (grows up, is engendered, in) his lamentations and wailings; for the pain that he feels is at the want of him, but with that, there is a pleasure in the recollection and, in a sense, sight of himself, and what he used to do, and how to look and behave, (οἷος what sort of person he was, in external appearance, and character, i.e. conduct)'. The very absence, and the pain that it causes, and the expression of grief, have a charm in them which affords some compensation by the recollection of all that he is and does. 'Hence the appropriateness of the saying',—meaning especially the use of the word ἑμέρος, which implies eager desire, in relation to γόνιος—'thus spake he, and in them all aroused longing desire for wailing'. This is a familiar phrase in Homer, and occurs several times both in the Iliad and Odyssey. See in Damm's Lexicon, s. v. ἑμέρος. Andromache looking back at Hector as she was taking leave of him, διαμέλεια γελάσασθαι, is a picture of the mixture of pleasure and pain (II. 2 454).

§ 13. 'And revenge is sweet', by the logical theory of convertible
§ 14. And victory is a source of pleasure—not only to those who have a special and peculiar ‘fondness’ for it (τοῖς φιλονίκοις), but universally, to everybody; because it gives rise to (γίγνεται, there arises) an impression (fancy or notion) of superiority, of which all feel the desire either in a slight degree or more strongly. Comp. I 9, 39, ἡ ὑπεροχή τῶν καλῶν... ἐπιτηρήσῃ ὑπεροχή δοκεῖ μηνύσαι ἄρετήν. Superiority is a noble or right aim, or end of action; and indicative of ‘virtue’. This is one of the modes in which the ‘love of power’ manifests itself, to which, as a purely selfish instinct, Hobbes sought to trace all our feelings and springs of action. The Emotion of Power is, in Mr Bain’s Classification of the Emotions as sources of action, one of the most important of a family of eleven which together compose our moral constitution. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 59, and the admirable analysis, 145—162. See also Dugald Stewart on this subject, there quoted p. 145. ‘The objects of the sense of power may be described as the effects or consequences of our own agency surveyed under such a comparison as to set forth some kind of superiority.’ This is the ὑπεροχή in question.

§ 15. This love of victory, as an evidence of superiority, is the foundation of the amusement derived from all sports and games into which competition enters; all, namely, that involve a contest either of bodily strength and skill (as cricket, athletic exercises, and all encounters of a combative character, μαχητικὰ, cock-fights, bear-baiting, pugilistic encounters, tournaments and sham-fights of all kinds), or ‘wit-combats’, intellectual and dialectical encounters (διαστικὰ); games of knuckle-bones, of ball, of dice, and draughts.

Three MSS Q, V, Ζ here add αὐλητικὰ, (τὰς μαχητικὰ καὶ τὰς αὐλητικὰς καὶ ἑρωτικὰς), to represent ‘musical’ contests, which spoils the antithesis, and introduces a vicious classification.

On the zeal and eagerness and love of victory manifested by children in their sports, comp. Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61. On χαίρειν ἑρωτικαί, Probl. xviii 2 (referred to by Gaisford)."
ènai tás maçhítikás kai tás èristikás (pollákes γάρ P. 1371. én tautáis gíngetai to àvkaí) kai àstrogýlísés kai σφαίρίσεις kai κυβέλια kai πεττείας. kai pérì tás

meroú òi ékamakhýmenov. kai oí òi ékoi àllai ángwí teawòi dòl kai mazhýmenov kai éntov òi òi pollákes ào òi boulántai diakóntai.

èristikèi here in the Rhetoric means nothing more than the practice of dialectics, arguing against an opponent, and for victory. It has, however, almost always in Plato, and not unfrequently in Aristotle, the additional connotation of captious reasoning, quibbling and sophistry. In Top. IV (de Soph. El.) 11, 171 b 24, the ëristikèi are defined as oí kàposis mikè proseorómenov, and again 25, oí mèn òn tìs vnikèi aútìs hìsìa tòu siw tòu ëristikì òóðromov kai phylèves boîounov èinaí. Here there is already the imputation of an over-disputatious habit implied by the word, but by and by, in lines 30, 32, it is associated with sophistry and sophists; but with this distinction—they both argue unscrupulously, ‘but the eristics do this to gain an aphantí victory, the sophists to make a show of wisdom’; the definition of the sophist being, c. 1, 165 a 22, χρυσαυτής ἀπὸ φασμότατες ψφλασ

of b. od. Again, c. 2, 165 b 7, they are distinguished from the genuine dialecticians, who deal with τά ἐποδότις real probabilities, by this sophistical habit and mode of arguing, ëristikì δι οί ἐκ τῶν φαινόμενων ἐποδότις μή ὅτις δι συλλογικοῦ δι φασμότατος συλλογικοῦ. ψφίδει λόγον καλεῖς τετραχεῖον δι μὲν τρόπον ἂν φαίνεται συγκεκριμένον μὲ συγκεκριμένον, δ καλεῖς ëristikèi συλλογικοῦ. Top. Θ 12, 162 b 3. In Rhet. II 24, 10, τά ëristikà stands for the sophistical practice of unfair reasoning, γίνεται φασμότατα συλλογικὰ ‘lead to an apparent, or fallacious, conclusion’.

ἀστραγάλιοι] The game of ἀστραγάλων, 'knucklebones', cut into rough dice with only four flat sides (tales), and so distinguished from the κύβοι (tesserae), which (as the name imports) had all six sides flat, is described in Rich, Dict. of Gr. and Rom. Antiq. p. 64, Smith, Dict. Antiq. s. v. talius, p. 1095 (ed. 2), Becker, Gallus, Exc. II, p. 499 (Engl. Tr.), Charicles, Exc. III, p. 354. And for an account of the other games mentioned see the same authorities (ref. in Index); [also K. F. Hermann’s Lehrbuch der Griechischen Privatallerthümer, ed. 2, § 55. 8.]


κυβέλια καὶ πεττείας] often go together, Plat. Phaedr. 274 D, Rep. II 374 C, (on the difficulty of these two games); Soph. Naupl. Fragm. 4, πνεύμων κύβου τε. Fragm. 380, 381 (Dindorf.). Plut. (Cap. Descr.) Qu. Rom. p. 272 Β, Ζάκουρός τι...ἀπελεύν κείνες ἐθέν εἰλην ἐν πεττεία καὶ κύβοι τα πολλά διαβεβρέσσαντ' The pente in particular was an old and favourite game, which appears from the constant allusions to it in Greek literature. The earliest mention of it occurs in Homer, Od. α' 107. The corresponding Latin game, laetunculi, is described by Ovid, Ars Am. II 208, III 357.

The same is the case with ‘serious’ games (games that require study and attention, such as chess, and πεττεία and κυβέλια, according to Plato, I c.)—the only difference between serious games and games of mere amusement, in respect of the pleasures they afford, is that the pleasure in

14—2
The case must be acquired, and arise from habit and cultivation, whereas others are naturally agreeable, lit. at once (ειςδος, from the very first); to this latter class belong hunting with dogs, and every kind of chase.

Various 'kinds of chase' are enumerated in the Politics, I 8, in the description of the 'hunting stage', the second, according to Aristotle, in the development of human civilization. He takes occasion from this to distinguish the several kinds of hunting. οι δ' ἄδει ἑθηκας ἔσω, καὶ ἑθηκας ἑσπερα ἑράς, οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀληθίνοις, οι δ' ἐν' ἀληθίνοις, δυσκολύνει καὶ ἁγιά καὶ πνευματικὰ ἀποδεικτοῦ τοιάδιοι (i.e. of the same kind as the lakes, marshes and rivers, namely, fish-producing) προσωπικοίοις, οἱ δ' ἐν' ἀριθμόν ἡ ἑρίαν ἀγρίλεων ἄρτιον, piracy, man-hunting, fishing, fowling, and hunting wild animals, hunting proper.

Wherever there is rivalry or competition, there is also victory, the opportunity of shewing one's superiority. And this is what makes practice at the bar and in the law courts (where there is a perpetual struggle and contest for the victory going on between the two rival pleaders), and that of dialectics (what is avowedly and technically a contest between two opposites), pleasant occupations.

§ 16. This quasi-sensation, the θεωρεῖα, is again employed to explain the pleasure we derive from honour and fair fame, the favourable opinion of others. These are pleasant because every one who possesses them always acquires an impression or fancy that he must be such an one as is the good (such as θεωρεῖαι, to whom alone such things are really due), and a θεωρεῖα, being a form of sensation, always carries pleasure with it, § 6; and this pleasure is still greater (the θεωρεῖα becomes still more vivid, and its effect greater) when he believes that those who say so (ὅσιν τοιεύτω ἐστιν οἷον δ' θεωρεῖαι) are likely to be right in what they say. Such (οἱ δοσκόντες διήθειν) are near neighbours who know a man better, and are therefore better judges, than those (friends) that live at a distance; intimates (familiar, habitual associates, συνεργεῖα, note on 1 1 2, 10, 18), and fellow-citizens rather than strangers afar off, (who only know him by report); contemporaries rather than posterity (to whom the same reason applies); wise men rather than fools; many rather than few. This is because (γράφ• i.e. the preference, expressed by the μᾶλλον in each case, is due to the fact that) those (first) mentioned are more likely to arrive at the truth than the opposite; for when a man has a great contempt for any one, as children and beasts, he cares not at all for their respect and good opinion, at least on account of the opinion itself, but, if at all, for something else.

τῶν ἱδίων] Note on § 4, supra.
The fact that words (substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns, διόθεν, ὁποιον, ὁς, οἷος, ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ μᾶλλον ὃ ταύτῃ φῶς, ὁς, ὁ ὑποτεθεῖται, ἡ τοῦτο ἐξετασθεῖται, πρὸς ὃν, εἰς ὃν, ἐν ἑάν, ἐν ὃν) with the old genitive termination -θεν, are often substituted for the primitive forms, particularly with the definite article as ὁ αὐτόθεν (see many instances of this idiom in Index to Arnold’s Thucyd. v. v.), ὁ ἐξετασθεῖται, ὁ ἐπίσκεψις, ὁ ἐξετασθεῖται, ὁ ἐπήκοος, and such like, in phrases where the termination seems to have entirely lost its force, has been long known and noticed: see examples in Wunder’s note, Antig. 519, and Lobec, Phryn. p. 128: but the explanation of this usage, so far as I know, is still wanting. It is to be found in an observation of Hermann, in Soph. Elect. 888, ἐσκάθευ ὁ πολίτης ἐν τοῖς βιοῦσιν διὰ τοῦ ἐνθυγάτου, and 882, ὁ πολίτης ἐν τοῖς βιοῦσιν πόλει γέλατος, ‘solent Graeci spatia non a vidente et audiente ad id quod ille videt et audit, sed ab isto ad hunc metiri’: they reverse our order of proceeding; we measure from ourselves to the object, the Greeks from the object to themselves. The application of this simple fact to all the cases resembling those above given solves the whole mystery of the idiom, which, as Lobec says, οἷος vel barbatos magistros obstituasact. (Lobeck is speaking merely of the knowledge of the fact; he himself assigns no reason.) Rhet. I 15. 396, οἷος ἔρωθεν, II 6. 23, τοῖς ἐρωθεῖται. In Eurip. Ion 385—6 (Dind.) both points of view are taken, οὖ ταύτῳ εἴδος φαινεῖται τῶν πραγμάτων πρόσωπον εἴσοδον ἐγγύθει οἷον ἐφαμένον, unless, as is at least equally probable, the interpretation of ἐγγύθει οἷον is, ‘seen’ not ‘from a near point’ where we are, but ‘seen’, the sight of them proceeding, from a near point, where they are. Arist. Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 a 8, gives an excellent illustration of this difference between the Greek and our point of view: Aristotle is speaking of some restrictions on the occupation of land: ἔτοι μὲν ἔρωθεν κεκάθαι πλεύρα μὲν μέτρον τοῦτο ἡ ἀποτινός τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἄδυτο καὶ τὴν πόλιν—or, as we say, ‘within a certain distance from the city’. Plut. Theaet. 165 B, ἐγγύθει οἷον ἀναπλάσθη πόθῳ ὃς (not, as in English, at a distance, but from a distance, as seen from a distance), Rep. VII 523 B, τὸ πόθῳ φανερόν, ἦ ποθείν χωρίζειν ἢ τὸ πόθῳ. I. 514 B, εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον, φαίνει ποθείν. ἐρωθεῖ τοῖς πολίταις καὶ πόθῳ ὅπου ὅποιος ὑποτεθεῖται. Soph. Oed. Col. 305, τοῖς σκείδοις Λύσατε, Philoct. 27, δεξιὰ γὰρ οἷον εἰναὶ ἄντρον εὐρωπαίον. ‘Οθον ἐρωθεῖ, ἢ καταθήκεν; οὐ γὰρ εὐνοῦ. Eur. Iph. T. 41, οὐ φαίνη πάλιν ἐπήκοος. ἐρωθεῖ τοῖς ἀναπλάθοις δεῖσαι. Tyrtaeus, Fragm. 8. 38, 9. 12 (Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr.), ἐγγύθει τοῖς νομίμοις. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

As regards ἐρωθεῖ and ἐρωθεῖ, the former is condemned as formed on a false analogy from an imaginary ἐρωθεῖ by Gotthling on Ar. Pol. II 1, p. 311.—See Lobeck on Phryn. p. 18—10, who shews that both forms are good. The MSS vary in the prose form, but ἐρωθεῖ is found in verse (Eurip. and Aristoph.), which guarantees its existence.
καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι ἄφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀδήγων· μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκός ἀληθεύει τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων· ἐπεὶ δὲν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὡσπερ παιδίων ἡ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μελεῖ τῆς τούτων τιμῆς ἡ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς 17 γε τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ’ ἐπερ, δ’ ἄλλο τι. καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων· τὸ τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὔτεις γὰρ φιλεῖν μὴ χαίρον ὅνω) καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ. φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταύθα τοῦ υπάρχειν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὐ παντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι· τὸ δὲ 18 φιλεῖσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαι ἢ τινι αὐτῶν δ’ αὐτόν. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδύ δ’ αὐτὸ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. καὶ τὸ κολα-

§ 17. ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων] § 16, τῶν ἰδίστων, note on § 4 supra.

τὸ τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ...οίνω] Friendship or a friend belongs to the class of pleasant things—the term φίλος or φιλεῖν, 'to be fond of' anything, implies pleasure; no one is said for instance to be fond of wine who does not take pleasure in it; and the converse, 'to be liked' is also pleasant—for here again comes in the 'impression' or fancy that the thing liked or loved (φιλεῖν has just the same double sense as the French aimer, the stronger 'love', and the feeble 'liking') must have some good in (belonging to) it, good in some form or other being the universal object of desire of all sentient beings; i.e. of all creatures that are capable of appetites and affections, which capacity depends on sensation, the power of feeling pleasure and pain, de Anima B 3, 414 b 1—5, line 4, φ' αἰσθητος ὑπάρχει, τοῦτο ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οὐ δὲ ταύτα καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ γὰρ ἡδονὸς ὑπάρχει αὕτη. This φαντασία &c. belongs to, and is meant to illustrate, the active liking, τὸ φιλεῖν ἡδύ. Every one who likes anything always has the impression that the object of his liking has something good about it, which is the reason for his liking it, since good is the universal desire. 'And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one's own sake and for nothing else'. This is what may be called the 'passive' liking, said of the recipient of the action or liking; and is opposed to the active form of liking or love in this respect; that it is an end or ultimate object in itself, whereas the other looks to some further end beyond itself, namely, some good which it seems to see in the object of its affection. It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by 'esteem'. See further, in Appendix A at the end of this Book.

§ 18. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι] 'And admiration is a source of pleasure, due to the very honour or respect (that it carries with it or implies)'. αὐτὸ the honour itself, alone, and nothing else; notwithstanding that there is no more substantial benefit derived from it (Victorius). ῥεμός is pleasant, § 16.
Flattery is pleasant, because it is accompanied by the φαντασία (which is always capable of conveying pleasure, § 6) the pleasant impression (not reality) of admiration and friendship in the flatterer.

§ 19. The frequent repetition of the same acts is pleasant, because they become habitual and familiar; as we were told (ἐπ') in c. io. 18. Probl. XIX 5, ult., οτι κατ' το σύνηθες ἢδυ μάλλον το άσυνήθους.

§ 20. And change is pleasant; by the definition, because change is a relapse into the normal condition of our nature: ‘the constant repetition of the same thing causing a (vicious) excess of the settled state'. It is this vicious excess which is represented in the proverbial μεθ' ἡμών, πε qvid nimis, 'toujours perdríx': When we have reached a 'settled state', as a state of health finally established by a gradual course of medical treatment, the medical applications which were repeatedly employed during the cure should be at once discontinued or the state of body will be vitiated: and so in all cases when a state has reached its acme or normal condition anything that causes it to exceed this is injurious. Eating and drinking too much are other cases in point; when the system is settled or satisfied, the repetition of the acts of eating and drinking disturbs the harmonious balance and produces discomfort or disease. The same expression occurs in Eth. N. VII 13, 1153 a 4, ἀναληματικής τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ καθιστηκιων, where from the contrast of the two participles the first plainly signifies the state of progress towards satisfaction, and the second the complete or satisfied state; and so the Paraphrast explains it, πληρώθησεν ἡδονα κ.τ.λ.: and similarly ει τῇ καθιστηκιων ἡλικίᾳ, Thuc. II 36, means, a confirmed and settled, mature and vigorous time of life, when the age of growing is over.

And in general, all excess is vicious; as the Pythagoreans and Plato (Philebus) held, and Aristotle himself proves by induction in the establishment of the doctrine of the mean, in the Nicom. Ethics, II. The concluding words of the seventh book of the Nic. Eth. may serve as a commentary on this topic: μεταβολή δὲ πάνων γλυκύτατον, κατά τὸν πονηρόν, διὰ πονηράν τις: (i. e. imperfection: we are always wanting a change, because we never are in a 'complete state'). ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀθροισὶν εἴμεταβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ δεσμεῦσε μεταβολῆς ὑπάρχῃ αὐτῇ ἀπεικόνισθαι. The 'poet', referred to here and in the Rhetoric, is Euripides, Orest. 234, ἐκατ' γαῖας ἀρμάζει πόδας ἄκληκτος χρόνος ἔλεε; μεταβολῆ πάνων γλυκίας. The 'change-ableness' of the bad man in the illustration, is deduced, I presume, from the axiom that right is one, error and wrong infinite, ἐσθελοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς παντοδεότως δὲ κακοί: see the whole passage from which this apothegm is taken, Eth. Nic. II 5, ult. 1106 δ 29, ὅτι τὸ ἀμεράνων πολλαχῶς τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναξίας κ.τ.λ.

It is this pleasure which is felt in change that makes men and things pleasant that present themselves to us or happen 'after an interval';
'because they bring a change from our present condition or circumstances, (this is a di-version or a-musement,) and at the same time that which can be used (or enjoyed) only at intervals is rare': but rarity makes things 'better', c. 7, 14, 29, 32, or gives them a preference over others in value and importance—not necessarily however in the amount of pleasure which may be derived from them; though in many cases, such as the possession of any rare object, print, coin, gem, in a collection, it certainly does.

§ 21. And learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part; wonder, because in it is contained, manifested, the desire of learning; and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire (every desire is directed to some pleasure, § 5) and consequently pleasant; and learning includes, implies, a settlement into our normal condition: 弗ως here stands for the true and highest nature, the normal perfect state, of anything, see Grant, on Eth. N. II 3, Polit. II 2, 1252 b 32, óων γὰρ ἴκανον ἀπὸ τῆς γενεσίας τελεσθῆσθαι φαίην τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἰκανωτί, ἀνὴρ ἀθρόωνι, ἵκην, ἰκίας. This highest condition of our nature is 弗εισα, philosophy, the contemplation of truth, which is also the highest form or ideal of happiness, Eth. Nic. X 8 and 9. A state of knowledge, to which learning leads, may therefore be regarded as a settled or complete state, and to be the 'normal condition of the intellect', the noblest part of the entire 弗ει. A settlement into this condition must therefore by the definition, § 1, be a form of pleasure.

On wonder, or curiosity, as the origin of learning, of all speculative inquiry or philosophy, compare Plato, Theaet. 155 D, to whom the observation is due, μᾶλλα γὰρ φιλοσοφοῦσθαι τὸ ἀπό τὸ πιθοῦ, τὸ βαυμάζεσθαι σὲ γὰρ Ἑλλην ἄρχη φιλοσοφίας ἀνὴρ, κ.κ.λ. From Plato it is borrowed by Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 982 b 12, διὰ γὰρ τὸ βαυμάζεσθαι οἱ ἄθρωποι καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμᾶς τὸν ἰκανόν, and Poet. IV 4, αἰτήν μὲν δὲ καὶ τούτῳ, ἵνα μαθῶν τὸν μόνον τοῖς γὰρ θεούσοις ἦλθον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐλληνοὶ ἰκανοῖς ἀλλ' ἐνι αὐτοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῶν, and Coleridge again, Aids to Reflection, on spiritual religion, Aph. IX., has thus improved upon Plato and Aristotle, 'In wonder all philosophy began: in wonder it ends: and admiration fills up the interspace.' See also Sir W. Hamilton's Lect. on Metaph. Lect. IV. Vol. I. p. 77 seq. Ar. Met. init. πάντως ἀθρωποὶ τοῦ εἶδος ἔργουσι φύσιν, κ.κ.λ. Here (in the Met.) as elsewhere, the pleasure of learning or knowledge is assumed.

The reverse of this is the cynical Horatian Nil admirari, &c., followed by Pope, 'Not to admire is all the art I know, To make men happy and to
γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστίν, ὡστε
τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητὸν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ
κατὰ φύσιν καθίστασθαι. καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ εὖ
πάσχειν τῶν ἡδεῶν τοῦ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχάνε- Π. 137 b.
νείν ἐστὶν ὃν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔσχειν καὶ
ὑπερέχειν, ὃν ἀμφότερον ἐφίεσθαι. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ p.41.
εἶναι τὸ εὐποιητικὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἡδὺ τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶ τοῖς πλησίον, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἐλλιπή ἐπι-
23 τελεῖν. ἔπει δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν,
καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ανάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τὸ τε μιμοῦ-

keep them so." Plain truth, dear Murray, needs no flowers of speech,
So take it in the very words of Creech." [Epist. 1, 6. 1.]

§ 22. The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours
is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment,
from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification
of a desire being pleasant, § 5; and the other, the pleasure of conferring
favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again,
cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (ἔχω) the means
of bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (ὑπερέχω) by doing so.
Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent
affections as elements of human nature.

Similarly τὸ ἐρχεῖν is said to be ἡβιστοῖν, § 27.

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular
pleasure of 'setting our neighbours right' (rectifying, restoring their fallen
fortunes or character to its normal or upright state) either in their property,
when their affairs have gone wrong; or in their judgment, when
they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated
(παρεβαίνων) from the right path: and also of supplying their deficiencies
(as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to
a complete or satisfactory condition. ἐπιτείλειν is 'to put the end upon',
(καὶ ἐπιστήμην, ἐπισχημάτισιν, ἐπισχημοσύνην, ἐπεράβειν, ἐπεραίωσιν Πλατ. Rep. X 601 A,
ἐπιθεῖσα, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or 'fill up'.

§ 23. The pleasure derived from the 'imitative arts' is next traced to
the same sources, the pleasures, namely, of learning and wonder. These
being assumed, it follows that every work of imitation, as of painting,
sculpture, poetry—especially dramatic poetry—(we must either read here
with Vater γραφεῖς &c. in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or
suppose that the 'art' in the three cases is carelessly substituted for the
'product' or result of the art); and especially any exact imitation, even
when the object imitated is not pleasant in itself; the pleasure lies in the
mere imitation, and arises from exercise of the intellect in drawing an
inference or 'conclusion (εὐλογομόμε) from this to that'; which is a
reasoning process, and a kind of learning.

The inference is from the copy to the original, which must have been
seen before, if any pleasure is to be derived from the imitation; and the learning arises from the observation of the two and the comparison of them whereby we acquire some knowledge of what the things really are. This explanation is found in Poet. c. 4. 5. I will quote the entire passage from the beginning of the chapter, as a complete commentary on the passage of the Rhetoric, which indeed seems to be directly taken from the other. In the Poetics, as here in the Rhetoric, the love of imitation is ultimately based upon the love of learning; § 4, αἰτίω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦτον κ.τ.λ. ἐνσφέαρα. The faculty or power of imitation which attends us from our very birth, σύμφωνα, and the love of imitation which accompanies it, both natural, are the two causes of poetry, §§ 1 2, and also of the other mimetic arts. Ἐξεισάσθαι δὲ γνωρίσαι μὲν ἔργα τῆς ποιητικῆς αἰτίαν δύο τινές, καὶ αὐτὰ πνευματικά. τὸ τε γὰρ μεμεισθείς σύμφωνα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδιῶν ἑστὶ, καὶ τούτῃ διαφέρεισθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ζῷον δὲ τοῖς μεμεταλμένοις, καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιήσαι διὰ μεμεταλμένας τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τὰ χρήματα τοῖς μεμεταλμένοις πάντα. σημαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὸ συμβαίνει ἐκ τῶν ζητομένων ἄγαν αὐτὴ λογοτροπία οὐκετὶ τούτων τὰ εἰκόνες τὰ μεθύσκειά ἥμαρτον, χαίρομεν θεωροῦμεν, οὐκ θερίζω τῇ μαρτυρίᾳ τῶν ἀντιμαθῶν (the lowest and most degraded) καὶ περισσότερον. (§ 4) αἱτίω δὲ καὶ τοῦτον ὁ τιμητικὸς οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἔριστον ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως ἅλλ' ἐπὶ βραχίῳ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῖς. διὰ γὰρ τούτου χαίρομεν τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρώμεντα, διὰ συμβαίνει θεωροῦμεν μαθήσεις καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τῷ ἔκκαιτον, οὐκ ὁτι διὰ τοῖς ἑξικύκλῳ ἐπεὶ ἐδώ χτισθήτω προσωρικάς οὐδεὶς μήπως ποιήσαι τὴν ἔκκαιτον ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἀνπραγμάτω (the execution, elaboration, finish, Plat. Rep. vi 504 D) ἢ τῇ χρόνῳ ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην ταύτῃ ἔλεγχον αἰτίαν. In the first three chapters of this treatise it is assumed that all the fine arts, painting, sculpture, music, and poetry in all its branches—architecture, except so far as the sculpture employed in decoration is concerned, does not appear in the list—are imitative, and derived from the love of imitation and the power of imitation characteristic of humanity; and it is upon the various modes of imitation that the division of the fine arts is founded.

In the same way the pleasure which we derive from metaphors consists in tracing the resemblance—a process of learning, μάθησις τε—between the word ‘transferred’ and the thing it, sometimes remotely, resembles; so that here again the natural pleasure which attends all acquisition of knowledge, τὸ γὰρ μαθησθέν ἄδικος ἐδώ φύσει πάντως ἀντί, is assumed as the foundation of the love of imitation. Rhet. III 10. 2. Comp. III 8. 2, ἀδήσεις γὰρ καὶ γνωρισμόν τὸν ἀντιμον. III 9. 2, 11. 9. And in Probl. xix 5, the same principle is applied to music: διὰ τὸ ἔνθεν ᾧκιον ἀκούσαν φόβων ὅσα ἐν προσεπαθήματι τυγχαίνον τῶν μελῶν ἢ ἀν μὴ ἐπιτάθανον; ... ἢ διὰ τὴν μαθησην: τούτῳ δὲ αἰτίω δὲ τὸ μὲν λαμβάνει τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ χρῆμα καὶ ἀνεγαρίζεις ἐστιν.

Twining in his note on Poet. iv 4 (note 22, p. 186 seq.) in describing and illustrating this doctrine of Aristotle, remarks that ‘he does not see how any information can be said to be acquired by the spectator’ (or listener) from the mere identification of two objects, the inference that ‘this is that’. And this remark is true if this were all that Aristotle means by his doctrine. The mere identification of an object compared with one already known conveys no new knowledge, which is essential to
τική, καὶ πᾶν δ ἀν ἐν μεμιμητέον ἦ, καὶ ἴ μὴ ἤδυ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμητέον ὅ ὅ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦτο χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συνλογισμός ἐστὶν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκείνο, ὡστε μανθάνειν 24 τι συμβαίνει. καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σωζόταξι ἐκ τῶν κινόνων· πάντα γὰρ θαμμαστὰ

the notion of learning. But what seems to be Aristotle's real meaning is (as I have expressed it above) that by the comparison of the representation with the original, whether it be a picture, or a trait of character in a tragedy, or a metaphor, you learn something new in this respect; that the representation, in proportion to its accuracy and finish (the number of details introduced), enables you to discover or observe by the comparison something new in the object which you had never observed before: and this is the 'inference' from the resemblance, which the συνλογισμός, here and in the Poetics, is intended to express. On the love of imitation, and the pleasure derived from the imitation of objects in themselves disagreeable, Schrader quotes de Part. Anim. 1 s. 445, a 5. [καὶ γὰρ ἐς ἅπαν εἰ τὰ λεῖ ἀπὸ αὐτῶν θεωρῶν χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργίαν τέχνην συνθερμοῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφήν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσεων συνοπτῶμεν μὴ μάλλον άγαπάμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς ἀλίκες καθότι. διὸ διϊ μὴ δυνατεύειν παρακατά τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀναφηγήσιμον ζωῆς ἐπίστευσιν.]

§ 24. From the love of wonder arises the pleasure that we derive from (tragic) 'catastrophes' and 'narrow escapes from danger', which are all objects of wonder. Poet. xi init. ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἢ εἰς τὸ ἑσται τῶν πραπτομένων μεταβολῆ...καὶ τοῦτο δὲ...κατὰ τὸ εἰκότι ἢ διεγερτικόν. The term περιπέτεια therefore expresses merely the 'sudden change or revolution of fortune' of the actors in the drama; the later appellation καταστροφή (Polybius) conveys the same notion of 'revolution,' (στροφή), with the additional annotation of a 'downward' tendency (εἰκότι) or downfall, to degradation or ruin.

παρὰ μικρῶν.] The preposition, which in this and similar phrases, παρὰ βραχί, παρὰ ἄλγον, παρὰ ὀυδὲν (ἐςκεῖν, τίθενται, ἕγινεν), is usually translated in English by 'within', 'within a little of', 'within an ace or an inch of', in reality implies comparison; two things when set 'side by side' being more easily compared together. (Rhet. 11 23. 30, παρὰ ἀλλὰ φανερὰ...μᾶλλον, III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὸ ἐπίκτητα μᾶλλον φαινότα, Ib. 9. 8, 11. 9, 17. 3.) The comparison in these phrases is expressed in terms of quantity, 'about as much as, amounting to'; and so παρὰ μικρῶν becomes 'nearly about, closely approaching to, or within a little of'. A few instances of a very common idiom are given in Jellic's Gr. Gr. § 637 on παρὰ, Vol. II, p. 301, [Kuhnner's Ausführliche Grammatik, § 440, Vol. II, p. 445] and Matth. Gr. Gr. 588 a, who does not properly explain it. Victorius quotes from Phys. 5 8, 197 a 27, a sentence which conveys a sort of explanation of παρὰ μικρῶν: did καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρῶν κακὸν ἢ ἀμαθὸν μέγα λαθέων ἢ δυστυχεῖν ἢ πληγεῖν ἢ λυτυχεῖν ἢ ὑπονοοῦν, οὔτε ὁ ὑπάρχων λέγει διὰ λαθοῦς τὸ γὰρ παρὰ μικρῶν ὄστερ ὀυδὲν ὀπίχειν δοξεῖ.
§ 25. *εβαλ...τα συγγεγεχθὲν* δὲ Νοτες [Note on I. 1.11, p. 20. συγγεγεχθὲν are things that belong to the same γένος or family, congeners of all kinds, 'all things akin to and resembling one another'—the συγγεγεχθὲν, besides the examples given directly, man, horse, youth, are also indirectly illustrated by the things mentioned in the proverbs: they are 'class fellows,' any thing of the same kind with another. All that is natural is pleasurable—by the definition—things belonging to the same class have a natural connexion, ('καὶ ὁ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ σιδῆρος')—therefore all συγγεγεχθὲν are ηδέα; but only 'for the most part,' not always: for sometimes 'a man's greatest foes are those of his own household,' and 'two of a trade can never agree'; καθαρὰς καθαροῖς πολλαὶ καὶ τέκτονα τέκτων, 


§ 26. Next from the principle of the 'fondness of like for like' is
deduced the universality of ‘self-love’.  τὸ δὲ μοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενῆ ἤδει ἑαυτῷ ἀπαν, μάλιστα δ’

This love of self will naturally be extended to all that immediately belongs to, or is closely connected with, oneself, τὰ συνεργά, as our ‘words’ and ‘works’. λέγοι all that we ‘say’—and, as we should now add in this our ‘reading age’, ‘read and write’—all our talk, studies, habits of thought, theories, arguments and such like, everything in which intellect is expressed; and ἔργα, all that we do, or produce, all our actions and works; in which latter is included the propagation of children, αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. Comp. Plat. Rep. 330 C, ἔσπερ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ τὰ συνεργά καὶ τὰ παρέχει τῶν παῖδων ὑπάρχοντα τεῦχος τε καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνευτὴς περὶ τὸ χρήματα συνεργάζοντο ως ἔργον ταῦτα, καὶ οὐκ ἔτι τῆς χρήσεως ἄντερ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου. This natural fondness for our own ‘works’ is assigned in Eth. Nic. IX 7 as the reason why benefactors usually feel more affection for those on whom they have conferred their favours than these are inclined to return. The compensation principle, the debtor and creditor account between the two parties, belongs to justice, and has nothing to do with this natural affection, φιλία. δόξαι δὲ ἐν φιλετάρχον εἶναι τὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ αὐτῷ δύναται τῷ πρὸς τοὺς δανικαντάς, 1167 ο 29: and then follows the true explanation, διὰτ’ ἐκ τοῦ τεχνῶν συμβεβηκέναι τὰς γὰρ τὸ ἀλεξάνδρου ἔργα ἡγηθεὶ τε καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἔργον ἐμφάνιζε γενομένου. μᾶλτα δ’ ἐναντίον τοῦ νεότητος συμβαίνειν: ἐτεργασάσθη γὰρ οὖν τὰ ἀλεξάνδρι ποιήματα, στρίφοντες ἀνίκητα τέκνα.

It is this love which men feel for what is specially their own in word
or work that is the foundation of their liking for flattery, for the love of others, and for honour, the external tokens of respect—all of which are recognitions of their merit in word or deed in some shape or other, and evidence of respect, admiration, and regard; from the flatterer a mere pretence, with the others a reality. It is also the explanation of the parental affection, children being in a special and peculiar sense a man's own work.

And this accounts also for the pleasure which we find in supplying a defect, or bringing anything to a state of perfection (see on § 22), 'because now (by this time, not before, ἄδη) the work becomes our own': the perfection of it is due to ourselves, and we get the credit of the whole. Victorius remarks upon this, that the difference between this form of pleasure and that which is expressed in the same words in § 22, lies in the difference of the source of the pleasure and the motive of the action in either case. In the former the motive is benevolent, and the pleasure is that of doing good to others; here the motive is selfish, and the pleasure that of gratifying oneself.

§ 27. ἐπει τὸ ἀρχεῖν ἡδίστον] 'ut res plana certaque ponitur'. Victorius. However, it may most readily be deduced from the innate love of power, already indicated in §§ 14, 22, q.v. To this natural impulse or emotion is traced the pleasure that is derived from 'wisdom', or the reputation of it—this is not the same as the pleasure of learning or acquiring knowledge, but that of possessing and exercising it, or the influence which the reputation of it carries with it—Now 'wisdom' may be understood in two senses; 'practical wisdom', φρόνησις, τὸ φρονίν, which is pleasant to possess and exercise because it implies power, in the shape of influence over the actions of others; and 'speculative wisdom', σοφία, which gratifies our love of wonder, § 21, because it brings with it the knowledge of all sorts of things that are interesting and curious (and therefore objects of wonder). One would have supposed that the love of taxing, censuring, or finding fault with our neighbours and friends, ἐνημησαίον, is directly traceable to the pleasure of exercising power so frequently noticed before. Here however an intermediate step is introduced between the feeling and its real origin. This is the love of honour. Censuring and finding fault implies an advantageous contrast between ourselves and those whom we thus 'tax', a superiority in judgment or virtue, which gives us the right to
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α II § 28.

ηδόν ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἐστι δὲ ἡ σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἦτε ἐπεὶ φιλότιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἦδον 28 εἶναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν ὕ βέλτιστος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὡσπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ κατὶ τοῦτο ἐπείγεται, νέμων ἐκάστης ἡμέρας πλείστων μέρος, ὅν ἀυτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὅν.

find fault; and the honour we all love is reflected upon ourselves by
the contrast. But the pleasure lies ultimately not in the honour itself,
but in the superiority that respect and the outward signs of it indicate.

ms A' here adds καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν after ἦδον εἶναι, adopted by Spengel. It
would mean of course the general exercise of authority, an extension of
the special ἐπιτιμᾶν, and analogous to it, as manifested in various
modes of punishment or correction by word and deed. And herein would
lie the distinction. The private citizen can only find fault (viz. with his
tongue); the ruler can inflict actual penalties, personal or pecuniary.

§ 28. There is pleasure again in 'dwelling upon', lingering in (passing
one's time in, διατρίβειν) any pursuit or occupation in which one is 'at
one's very best'. διατρίβειν is by a similar metaphor applied to dwelling
on, brooding over, nursing, the prospect of vengeance, 11 2. 2. This same
topic is also applied to 'good', 1 6. 29; the difference being in the 'ends'
or motives severally proposed, which stimulate the action in each; in the
one it is success, a form of good; in the other, pleasure; the skill or
degree of excellence shewn in the exercise of any faculty, bodily or
mental, is the same in both. To dwell on that in which our superiority
is shewn is of course pleasant, by the preceding rule. Problem XVIII 6,
quoted by Gaisford, raises the question suggested by this topic. The
solution which corresponds to the explanation here given, is the second:
ὅτι ἐν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ὑπερτερῶν τῷ ἐπιτιμᾶται, δὲ αὐτὸ ἄρῃ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπείγεται (here follows the quotation from Euripides; and it is added,)
ὅτι δὲ τῷ ἐν ὑπὲρ ἐπείγεται, κἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν δεμιμένων, οὐκ ἐκ
κρίνων διόνυσας τὰ βέλτιστα διέφθαρεν γὰρ ἡ διάνοια διὰ φῶς ἐπιτιμᾶται: that is, men in
these cases choose a lower kind of pursuit instead of a higher, in con-
sequence of a deprivation of judgment arising from the familiarity created
by constant exercise of those practices in which their special skill lies.

αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ βέλτιστος] Matth. Gr. Gr. § 460. The superlative in these
phrases seems to be substituted for the comparative, and to belong to the
rather large family of misuses of the former, which are found in our own
language no less than in the Greek.

This fragment of Euripides' Antiope (Fr. xx Dind., xxvii Wagner)
is quoted also in Plato's Gorgias 484 E, &c., with one or two trifling
variations. The second line there runs thus, νέμων τὸ πλείστων ἡμέρας
τούτῳ μέρος; which, with αὐτῷ instead of τούτῳ, is also the reading of the
Problem. The third line is quoted in Alcit. II 146 A, with κράσιτος.
In the Problem also, κράσιτος stands for βέλτιστος. In the two following
29 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἑπεὶ ἡ παιδιά τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα π. 42. ἀνέσεως, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα: διὰ-π. 1372. ῥυσταὶ δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρίς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν ἡδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις φανέρα.

pages of the Gorgias a good deal more of the same passage has been incorporated in Callicles' speech as prose. Of the attempted restorations of this I have given an account in Note A, Appendix to Translation of Gorgias, p. 134. [On p. 64 the lines here quoted are translated as follows: 'Each shines in that, so that end presses forward, Devotes to that the better part o' the day, Wherein he chances to surpass himself.']

§ 29. τῶν ἡδέων] Note on i 11.4.—ἀνέσεις, 'relaxation', metaphor from unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering the tone; and ἀνεσίας the opposite: ἀνεσίαι and ἀνεσία are hence extended to denote 'intensification' and 'relaxation' in general. See note on i 4.12. The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment of 'the ridiculous' is noticed in Eth. Nic. iv. 14, 1128 a 13 (on ἀνεσία the mean in the use of the γελοιοῦ, ἀνεσίας ἐκ τοῦ γελοιοῦ, καὶ τῶν στείρων γελοίων τῇ παιδίᾳ καὶ τῇ στείρῳ μάλλον τῇ κ.α.). The discussion of τῶν γελοιοῦ here referred to as existing in the Poetics, and again in Rhet. iii 18. 7, where we are told that the 'kinds' of it are enumerated, cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there in c. 5. 2, which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the second book of the two of which the Poetics originally consisted; and most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work. Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; Verlorene Schriften Arist. pp. 87—103.


εἰληφθον] This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need be said or done about it. Thus εἰληφθον, 'let so much have been said upon the subject', means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be considered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now 'have done with it', and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle, though very much more common in him than in other writers. It occurs

1 The two lists of the Aristotelian writings differ. Diogenes v. 36 has Παυ-κ. ' the Anonymus, ap. Buhle, Vol. i p. 63, τέχνης ποιητικῆς, β'.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 12 § 1.

1 ὁν μὲν οὖν ἔνεκα ἀδικουσία, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν. πῶς δ' ΧΑΠ. XII.

ἐχοντες καὶ τινὰς, λέγωμεν νῦν. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως

for instance in Xenophon, Mem. iv 2.19, ὅμως δὲ εἴρησθαι μοι, 'be satisfied with my saying so much'; let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 57 C, ἐδήμησε, 'let it be said once for all', and no more about it. Ib. 62 B, μεθισθῶν, and Stallbaum's note on Phaedr. 278 B, πεταλοῦσθε, 'enough of this joking', Ib. 250 C, κεχαρισθή, Theaet. 197 D, πεταλοῦσθε, Euthyd. 278 D, πεταλοῦσθε νῦν, Rep. viii 553 A, 562 A, IX 588 D, πεταλοῦσθε. Thucyd. i 71, ἐφολοῦ, 'let this definition suffice'. Ar. Eth. Nic. I 1 ult. περισσώμεθα, 'let so much suffice by way of preface'; Top. A 8, 103 b 1, and 13, 105 a 21, διμιμοῦ, et passim.

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect and future (the paulo post futurum, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 408). Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, μεμηχύσαντος τοῖς γονιμοῖς, Philoct. 1280, πέντεμεν, Eur. Hippol. 1457, εκεκρίθησαν τοῖς, my powers of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and sufferings are over, and this is the end: compare πεταλοῦσι γὰρ, Rhet. II 8. 2; Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S. c. T. 1050, διανεύρεται (Paley's notes on both passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), διανεύρεται βίον. Eur. Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, εἴρηται λόγοι. Plat. Philib. 62 D, μεθισθῶν. Ar. Rhet. I 14 ult. καὶ περὶ μὲν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλῶν εἴρηται, 'so much for'; where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. Trist. fuit. Fuit Illus.

Of the paulo post futurum a good instance occurs Theaet. 180 A, in the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, 'and if you look for an explanation of the meaning of the meaning of this, ἀρίστη 

πεταλίζει πανίς μετανοομάχως, you will be instantly shot with (ɪl.) another phraselet, ἰδρομὼρς) another brand new word coined for the occasion', i.e. you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know where you are.

The observation on this use of the tense in Jell's Gr. Gr. § 399, obs. 1, is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 500, p. 841, is somewhat more satisfactory.

ΧΑΠ. XII.

§ 1. Such are the motives and incentives that stimulate men to injustice and wrong, which have been found to be so many varieties of pleasure: we next proceed to examine and classify, for the use of the forensic practitioner, the dispositions and characters of wrong-doers and of their intended victims, those who are most likely to be exposed to wrong.

First of all, the 'possibility' of effecting it must always be taken into account by any one who contemplates the perpetration of a wrong: and not only the general possibility, as whether so and so is possible to a human being (physical or absolute possibility), but a special possibility to

AR. I.
themselves, καὶ διατοί δυνατῶν; in other words, the moral possibility, when the act is done in such a way or under such circumstances as shall render it worth their while; such that the prejudice or injury sustained by the action or its consequences shall not outweigh the prospective benefit; an act done in spite of these considerations may be regarded as morally 'impossible'.

ἐὰν δὲ (οἷον ταύτα) λαθεῖν πράξαντες] ‘whether, that is, the intended wrong-doers think the crime will never be detected at all; or be detected, but remain unpunished; or if it be punished, that the loss or injury so sustained will be less than the gain resulting from it to themselves’.

§ 2. ἐν τοῖς ὑστεροῖς] The subject of ‘general probability and improbability’ shall be considered hereafter, that is, in 11 19, where the δυνατῶν and ἀδύνατων (one of the four κατοικοί τῶν) are analysed. This is expressed by the καὶ ὡς ταύτα πάντων τῶν λόγων of the parenthesis: ‘because they are common to all kinds of speeches’; (viz. the three kinds of Rhetoric, which is here taken as the basis of their κατοικοὶ, elsewhere it is their opposition to the ἔργη, see Introd. on τόνος, p. 128), ‘therefore they shall be considered hereafter’, viz. with the rest in 11 19. We now proceed to the subject of the special or moral probability, which affects would-be wrong-doers themselves (αὐτοὶ δὲ οἷον δυνατὸν εἶναι...), and under the circumstances of any particular case.

The first class of persons that rely on this kind of possibility, in the sense of a possible exemption from punishment if they do wrong, are able speakers and men of action—the one capable of defending themselves against attack with their tongues by plausible argument, the other of carrying through the business or transaction in the best and completest way, so as to secure all possible advantage; and men already practised in many forensic contests—and so with acquired experience of the resources available for defence against an accuser in a court of justice; and men with many friends, having an extensive or influential connexion, or well befriended,—these will be well helped; and the wealthy—who can buy off an accuser or antagonist, and corrupt the judges.

§ 3. The possibility of doing wrong with impunity is greatest when the parties themselves answer to any of the foregoing descriptions; and
if not, (in the next degree), when they have friends, or servants and followers, or associates of these kinds; for these circumstances and capacities make it possible for them (διὰ, the cause, the power is due to these) to do the things (this applies specially to the πρακτικὸν), and to escape either detection or punishment.

§ 4. Again, the possibility is increased, the attempt becomes easier, if they are friends either of the objects of the wrong, those whom they propose to injure, or of the judges who would have to try the case if brought before them: for friends are off their guard (ἐλεγμένοι), and thereby particularly exposed to injury and wrong, and moreover are inclined to come to terms or to be reconciled without ‘prosecuting’ the case, or bringing it before a court of justice; and judges are ready to oblige their friends, and either let them off altogether, or inflict a very slight penalty (so fair and upright were the Athenian dicaasts).

ολ...φιλοι ἀφιλακτο κτλ.] This sounds very atrocious, and certainly has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to recollect that the author told us in his apology for Rhetoric in the preface that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the theory of the art, which argues each side of every question indifferently without regard to moral considerations: but in practice, though the rhetorician as such can employ immoral arguments, no honest rhetorician would have recourse to them. Rhetoric does not profess to teach virtue; that must be learned aliunde. This is Aristotle’s view of the matter: the Sophists, who, as we are expressly told, identified the study of Rhetoric with a general, political education, had no such excuse or justification for the immoralities of their Rhetoric, which they inculcated without alloy.

προσκαταλάγωντες] ‘καὶ πρὸς, εἰ πρακτικα. pessime vulgo προσκαταλάγωνται’. Gaisford. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgar, to which there is no possible objection. καταλαγώνων alone, it is true, it conveys that is necessary to the sense, the reconciliation namely; but πρὸς is very often added to a verb, simple or compound, to express ‘direction’ to an object, as προσανετείειν πληγᾶς, Dem. c. Mid. 528. 25; προσανεσθείν, Α. Pol. vii (vi) 8, 1322 ρ. 9; and particularly with verbs that imply conciliation or reconciliation, as προσαγωγέων Thuc. i 103, iv 71, ‘to come over to a side’, προσαγωγήσαται, ‘to bring over to one, to conciliate’. Isocr. Nicoc. § 22, θεραπείαν προσαγωγήσεται. Thuc. iii 43, ἐπιτρή προσάγωςει τὸ πλῆθος, 111 48, καὶ διὰ τὴν μὴ ἔπεισιν, οἷο ὑπῆρξεν ἐπὶ προσάγωσει (to be won over). προσεκαταλάγει et similia. So here the compound verb καταλαγώνων denotes the mutual settlement of the disputed points, and the additional πρὸς the conciliation, being won over, which attends it.
§ 5. Persons likely to escape detection are those whose personal and moral or mental character is opposite (this is the 'opposition' of 'contrariety'), the extremes under the same genus, as black and white in colour, bitter and sweet in taste, hot and cold in touch or feeling, and such like) to that which the charge necessarily implies; as when a man of feeble bodily frame is charged with 'assault and battery', or a poor and ugly man with adultery.

The ἀδελθῆς charged with ἁλία was a stock example of the τὸνος of τὸ ἔλεος in the early rhetorical treatises. This τὸνος was the staple of Corax's νέος, Rhet. Π Π 41. 11; and the case of the 'weak man' is quoted by Aristotles as one of the examples there used. The application of the argument of 'probability' to the treatment of it, shewing how Rhetoric τάξεως πλούσια is differently treated. It appears again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 6, and Pl. Phaedrus 273 B, as an extract from 'Tisias' νέος, where the τὸνος of τὸ ἔλεος is represented as somewhat differently treated. Victorius cites Quint. v 10. 26, speaking of the same mode of inference; the probability namely of the conformity of a man's actions to his bodily condition and ordinary character. These are 'personal' topics of argument, argumenta a persona, § 23, inferences from personal conditions, qualities, habits, employed to determine the probability of a certain action, as proceeding from him: one of these is, habitus corporis: ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinos, robur petulantiae; his contraria in diversum—the two cases given by Aristotles.

οὗτος καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς, the definite article marking the genus, the member of a certain class. See note on I 7. 13 εἰ μὴ ἐστι ὁ πράξας, p. 130. In this and the next topic there is a change from persons to things, which are resumed as the objects of analysis in § 32.

καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ] 'And things, i. e. acts, that are excessively conspicuous, open to observation and under people's eyes.' τὰ ἐν ὁφθαλμοῖς, 'things in sight', qui sunt ante nos. Politi VII (vi) 4, 1319 b 18, ὁλγον μὴ γὰρ παραιτήσον παροίκησαι, οὐκ δὲ γνώμενον ἐν ὁφθαλμοῖς μάλλον ἐστών. Such glaring acts are not guarded against (ὁφθαλμα here occurs in a different sense to ὁφθαλμοι filio in § 4: that is 'unguarded', from φυλάσσω, the direct passive; this is 'not guarded against', the passive of (the middle) φυλάσσω) τι (to guard oneself against anything), comp. §§ 6 and 21), no precautions are taken to prevent them, 'because no one would suppose that any one was likely to attempt them'. Supply to complete the sense τινὰ ἐν πολλοῖς αὐτὰ, or ἐνυξιμότατον αὐτοῖς. This is a return to the original topic of δὴ δύναται πράξειν 'possible actions': τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ are therefore acts which are likely 'to be carried into effect'—not, 'to escape detection', λαθητικά from the preceding clause, which is in some sort parenthetical.
§ 6. And acts again which are of such a magnitude (τηλικά) and of such a kind as no one (else) would ever think of doing (supply θυσίαις); for these too (like the preceding) are not guarded against (viz. novel and audacious attempts and enterprises which people are unprepared for, and which therefore take them by surprise): for it is only against customary offences, just like sicknesses, that people are on their guard; against diseases hitherto unknown, (which no one has ever yet had,) no one ever takes precautions. ἄφθονοι, ἄφθοντα, ἄφθοντέα properly denote 'want of strength', bodily weakness, and hence any infirmity, such as sickness. Hence Thucydides applies it, III 15, to want of strength of will, or of inclination, ἄφθονία τινός στρατεύσις; and VII 47, to weakness of mind; the mental prostration or despondency which prevailed amongst the Athenian troops before Syracuse: and again in VIII 83, to Tissaphernes' weakness of will or inclination, as shewn in his 'remissness' or 'disinclination' to supply pay to the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels; which Arnold well expresses by 'he was sick of it'. In Plat. Rep. II 359 B it represents nothing more than the defect or weakness of a faculty. In Xenophon the three words usually denote some form of disease or sickness: Demosth. Ol. II p. 24. 5, ἀπέκτησεν ἐν τοίς σώματι ἡμῶν, ὥσπερ μὲν ἄφθονον ἄγαμον τί τις, οὐδέν ἀνασαθάντα τῶν καθ ἑαυτοῦ σαθρών, ἕτοι δὲ ἄφθονον διὰ οὐκάρια, πάντα αινίγατο, καὶ ἄθροι καὶ στράμα πᾶν ἄλλο τινός ἀπάσχοντος σαθρόν τις, any disease or other imperfection and unsoundness of body, including fractures, sprains, &c.

§ 7. καὶ οἰς μηδένες ἔχοντες ἡ πολλοί[,] is a return to the original construction of § 3. Supply οἰονται δύο σαθραὶ πράττενε π.π. or simply οἰονται δύσαθαι ἰδανεῖν. And also those (are disposed to do wrong, or think they can do it) undetected or with impunity who have no enemy at all or a great many: the former think they will escape undetected because there is no one (no enemy) to take precautions against them (and their attempts); the latter pass undiscovered, because they are not likely (ἀλλ'α) to be suspected of assailing people when they are on their guard against them (as enemies), ἀλλ' ἔνα μηδέν διὰ ἐπιχειρήσεις 'because they would not be thought (lit. seem) likely to assail', 'because no one would think them likely to assail'; and also, if they are suspected or detected (so Victorius), (and brought before a court of justice), they have a defence ready that they never would have made, were not at all likely to make, such an attempt; that is, that their guilt is highly improbable; Corax's topic of τὸ εἴλεις again.
8 ἐχεῖν δ' ὑπ' οὐκ ἄν ἑνεχείρησαν. καὶ οἶς ὑπάρχει κρύψις π. 43. ἡ τρόπος ἡ τόπος ἡ διάβεσις εἴσπορος. καὶ ὅσοι μὴ λαθοῦν ἔστι δίσωσις δίκης ἡ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἡ διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οἷς, ἐὰν γένηται ἡμια, ἐστὶ δίσωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἡ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου. ἡ (ei) δὲ 9 ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἐξεῖ ο τι ἀπολέσῃ. καὶ οἷς τὰ μὲν

§ 8. And those again who have any means of concealment (either of themselves, or of the goods they have stolen,) or any ‘mode’ (of changing it, so that it shall not be recognised, Victorius, or more generally, ‘any contrivance or device’) or any place (of refuge for themselves, or for stowing away the stolen property) or are of an inventive disposition, or habit of mind,’ (suggestive of τρόπων in the second sense, and μυχασμῶν).

Victorius confines the whole of this topic to the one crime of robbery, de furibus ac latronibus; and interprets κρύψις quae possunt quae sustulerint nullo negotio occulere; τρόπος quibus modis viaque facilius est illa immutanda. Quod aut figuram aut colorum variare possint; aut artificio denique suos aliquo modo facere ne ipsa agnoscantur. I should prefer giving it the wider sense of contrivances, devices of all kinds, tricks, artifices, any ‘ways’ or ‘modes’ of getting out of a scrape, and escaping the consequences of a criminal act. In Plat. Phileb. 16 A, it has a nearly similar sense, εἰ τις τρόπον ἑτοῖν καὶ μυχασμόν. Lastly, confining διάβεσις to the same subject, he translates it vendere, as we say to dispose of a thing; adding, διάβεσιν enim hic alienationem valere arbitror, and quoting, in support of the interpretation, Plut. Solon, p. 91 E, τῶν δὲ γενομένων διάβεσιν πρὸς ξένους διαλογὸν μόνον ἰδίος ἄλλα δὲ ἔξαγε τικλωσιν. Demosth. Olynth. 11, p. 22, ὅπερ δὲ ἐν προσέσων οὕτως ὅπως ἐν δίνομαι ταύτη ἐχοντες διάβεσιν. Isocr. Paneg. § 42, τὰ μὲν ὅπου χρῆ διάβεσιν τὰ δ' ὅποις ἐπογαγότως, (the word in this sense implies ‘distribution’, and so, ‘disposing or setting out for sale.’ Similarly ib. § 9, τοὺς ὁμοίωςν ἐν διάβεσιν ‘to set out, or forth, in words’; and several of the best authors use it of ‘disposing of’ a variety of different things, property, one’s own person, a daughter, goods for sale).

It seems to me preferable to extend the meaning, as in the other cases, beyond the mere ‘disposal’ of stolen goods, to any disposition or habit of mind, which is all events the usual meaning of διάβεσις. And there is this further reason for rejecting Victorius’ limitation of the topic, that if it is adopted no difference whatsoever is left between κρύψις and τόπος here and afterwards in §§ 33, 34.

καὶ οἶς, τὰν γένηται ἡμια κ.κ.λ.] And those who, if they don’t escape detection, have the means of getting rid of (lit. pushing off) the trial altogether, or postponing it, or of bribing the judges. And those who, if a penalty be actually imposed have the means of getting rid of the payment of it, or postponing it for a long time, or who from poverty have nothing to lose: (in the last clause the relative οἶς, which is convertible with εἰ τις, must be supposed to take that form when joined with ἢμια).

§ 9. Another class of cases in which men are disposed to do wrong,
κέρδη φανερὰ ἡ μεγάλα ἡ ἐγγύς, αἰ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ ἡ αφανείς ἡ πόρρω. καὶ ὅν μὴ ἐστὶ τιμωρία ἵση τῇ ἣν ὁ Β. 1372 6. 

10 οὐφελεία, οἶνον δοκεῖ η ἡ τυραννίς. καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, αἰ δὲ ζημίαι ὅνειδη μόνον. καὶ οἶς τούνατιον τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα εἰς ἐπαυνόν τυν, οἶνον εἰ συνέβη ἀμα τιμωρησαςθαι υπὲρ πατρὸς ἡ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνων, αἰ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς χρήματα ἡ φυγὴ ἡ τοιοῦτον τι. δὲ αμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ

and think wrong deeds possible, is where the profit likely to accrue is evident, or certain (patent to all, free from all doubt or obscurity), or great, or immediate; and the penalties to which they are liable small, or obscure and uncertain (not such as to attract attention, and so deter from the intended wrong; quae obscures admodum et cæsae sunt ut perspicat nequant: Victorius), or remote.

Or again, where no possible punishment is equal to the prospective benefit; as is supposed (ὅσεί) to be the case with absolute sovereignty or tyranny. On τυραννίς, and the distinction between it and μοναρχία, see note on i 8.4 and 5, p. 155.

§ 10. 'And cases in which the offence, and the profit or result of it, is a substantial, solid gain, and the penalty mere disgrace'.—λήμματα refers perhaps to pecuniary gain (lucrum).

'And the reverse; where the (legal) crime tends to any kind of praise (is directed to, as its meed or reward; i.e. where what is a crime in one point of view, is likely to meet with praise in another), as, for instance, if the crime was accompanied by vengeance for father or mother, as it was in Zeno's case; whilst the penalties are all directed against a man's purse or person, as fine, imprisonment, banishment, or anything else of the same kind (not affecting his character or reputation): for both circumstances and both dispositions may be motives to wrong acts, only not in the same persons and the same characters'.

Men of different characters are influenced by different motives in the commission of crime. Some care more for honour and glory and reputation than for their money and personal ease and comfort, and these, like Zeno, will be ready to commit what may be construed as a crime and render them liable to punishment, provided it be attended with something which leads to praise: the others, who value their personal well-being more than their good name, will be induced rather to do wrong acts which lead to substantial gain, and affect only their reputation. The one are virtuous, though they err; the others, sordid, mean, and vicious.

Of Zeno's case, here referred to, nothing is known, and we are reduced to conjecture. Of the two best known of this name, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, whose death is placed in B.C. 263 (Clint. Fast. Hell.), would, if alive, have been too young when Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric to have attracted public attention: it is just possible that the other, Zeno the logician, of Elea, Parmenides' follower, may be the person
here meant. Of this Zeno we learn from Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Diodorus (see the ref. in Brandis' Art. in Smith's Dict. Biogr.) that he joined in an attempt to rid his native country of her tyrant: and if the attempt was successful (of which we are not informed) and the tyrant slain, Zeno may possibly have mixed personal considerations with his public and patriotic motives, just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did, as Aristotle tells us in the Politics (viii (v) 10), in their attack upon the Athenian tyrant. Only it seems unlikely that if this were the true explanation of the allusion that Aristotle would have spoken of tyrannicide as an ἀδικία, a 'wrong', either legal or moral: and besides this, the act itself, as well as the attendant circumstance, would have been regarded as praiseworthy.

[ὁλὴ] 'only', an exception or reservation; see note on I 1.14, p. 26.

§ 11. 'And those who have often in previous attempts escaped either detection or punishment. And, on the other hand, those who have often failed in their attempts' (the opposite to the last); 'because there is a class of people who in such matters as these, as well as in actual fighting, are inclined (have a disposition) to renew the fight'. ὅλω for ὅλον is due to Victorius in addendas. Victorius quotes in illustration of this pugnacious character, Problem XVIII 2, de Sophistis, καὶ γὰρ μείνας διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προδέχονται μᾶλλον ἥξιζεν καὶ ήττάμενοι σὲ ἐναμαχούμενοι.

§ 12. καὶ ὅσοι] is no doubt masc., as it is through the whole series of these topics, and in accordance with of γὰρ δεψάς τοιοῦτον that follows. Otherwise it would be more naturally and conveniently translated in this and the following section as neuter, 'in all cases where’....

'And all those who have the pleasure (consequent on their action) immediately, and the pain comes afterwards; or the profit at once and the penalty later: because this suits the character of the δεψάς who are devoid of self-control, and this vice extends (beyond mere pleasure) to every object of man's aims and aspirations', to profit as well as pleasure. And therefore wherever there is immediate pleasure or profit, and only subsequent pain or loss, the δεψάς whose character is to be tempted by present pleasure and profit, though at the expense of future pain and loss, are naturally in all such cases prone to wrong-doing. What is here said of δεψάς and δεψαία is confirmed by Euth. Nic. vii 2, ult. ἦτε δεψάς λέγονται καὶ ὅμοι καὶ τῆς καὶ κέρδους, though, as the λέγοντα shows, this is only a popular way of speaking (and therefore suited to Rhetoric): and in vii 6, 1147 ὅ 31, seq. we are told that these are not ἀπλῶς δεψάς, δεψαία proper being προὶ τῆς συμμαχίας ἀπολογίας, limited to the same class of objects as ἀκολογία; and ὅ τοι ἦθεν διδόν τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 12 §§ 13—15.

ξημία ύστερον οί γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἐστι δὲ
13 ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται. καὶ οἷς ἂν
tοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ἡ ἦ ἡ ξημία, τὸ δὲ
ἥδυ καὶ ὁφέλιμον ύστερα καὶ χροιωτέρα: οἱ γὰρ
ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαύτα δικάνουν.
14 καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδεχόμενον διὰ τύχην δόξαι πράξαι ἡ διʼ
ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ διʼ ἔθος, καὶ ὅλως ἄμαρτεῖν
15 ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀδικεῖν. καὶ οἷς ἂν ἦ τῷ ἐπεικοῦς τυχεῖν.
καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὅσιν. διχῶς δ’ εἰς ὅ ἐνδεεῖς: ἡ
τῶν λυπηρῶν φύσιν, πείνας καὶ δύσης καὶ ἀλώς καὶ φύσιν καὶ πάνω τοῖς
περὶ ὀφέλεις καὶ ὑποτέσσαρα, παρὰ τὴν ἐρουσσίαν καὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν, δεικνύσει λέγεται.
§ 13. 'And also the opposite characters to these are equally prone to
wrong-doing in cases where the pain or loss is for the moment (ἔθος), and
the pleasure and profit later and more lasting; for this is the character of the
ἄμαρτητος, those that have acquired the habit of self-control, and of the
wiser sort (men of more practical wisdom, φόνευτος), who pursue them in
this order'.

§ 14. 'And those whose actions may possibly be thought to be due
to chance, or to necessity, or to nature, or to habit, and who in general
may be thought to have been guilty of error rather than of crime'. There
is a variation here in the classification of these impelling causes of action
from that laid down in c. 10, 7, 8, which is singular even in a rhetorical
treatise, considering that they stand so near together. In the former
there are three (of the seven) which are independent of ourselves and our
own will, (1) τύχη, and δύση subdivided into (2) βία and (3) φύσις. ἔθος in
the other list is classed with the voluntary sources of action, where we are
ourselves the causes of them. Here ἔθος is referred to the other class,
doubtless because habit when confirmed becomes a 'second nature', and
action from habit is so far involuntary. Rhet. I ii. 3, and de Memoria,
c. 2, φόνευτος ἢδη τὸ ἔθος.

ἀμαρτεῖν and ἀδίκειν] refers to the well-known threefold gradation of
wrong or criminality, (1) ἀτικήμα, accidental injury, (2) ἄμαρτημα, a mistake
or error arising from ignorance of the circumstances of the case (Eth. N. 111 2), and (3) ἀδίκεια, in which the προσαγωγή, the deliberate purpose,
enters and constitutes an intentional wrong or crime, malice prepense. In
Eth. Nic. v io, a fourth degree is added, ἀδίκεια, distinguished from ἀδίκεια
in this, that though the act is voluntary and intentional at the moment,
the intention is not preconceived and deliberate, the malice is not prepense;
it is without προσαγωγή, deliberate purpose; as an injury or death
inflicted in a sudden fit of passion.

§ 15. 'And those that have the prospect of, anticipate, a merciful con-
struction being put on their act by the judges'. On ἐνελεκτά, see i 13. 13,
and Introd. on that passage, pp. 190—193. It is thus defined in Eth. Nic.
v 14, 1137 b 12, ἔκατον μὲν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δὲ, ἀλλ’ ἐπινοεῖτον νομίμου
dικαίου, a rectification, 'supply of the deficiencies, of the strict letter of the
234 РΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 12 §§ 16—18.

γάρ Ὦς ἀναγκαίον, ὥσπερ οἱ πένητες, ἡ Ὤς ὑπερ-
16 βολής, ὥσπερ οἱ πλούσιοι. καὶ οἱ σφόδρα εὐδοκι-
μοῦντες καὶ οἱ σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦντες, οἱ μὲν Ὦς οὐ
dóξοντες, οἱ δ’ Ὤς οὐδέν μάλλον dóξοντες.
17 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὗν οὔτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν, ἀδι-
kοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἔχοντας
αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἡ ἐς τάναγκαια ἡ ἐς ὑπεροχὴν ἡ ἐς
18 ἀπόλαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγὺς τῶν μὲν
γάρ ἡ λήψις ταχεία, τῶν δ’ ἡ τιμωρία βραδεία, οἶον ἡ 44.

law, legal justice, ἧς ἰδιότητι ἀν ὅν τὰ καθολοῦ, ἰβ. ν 27, ὃ μὴ ἀπεριβολικὸν ἐτῆ
τί χάρων, ἃλλ’ ἀπαιτοῦσί, 1138. 1. Soph. Oed. Col. 1127 (Oedipus), ἐν τῆς ἕνωσιν μῶνον παρὰ
ὑπὸ εὐθύνων ἀνθρώπων ἐγγὺς καὶ τοιαύτας, milder
gesinnung, humanität, gegenüber starrem recht, Schneidewin ad loc.
Soph. Fragm. Inc. 699 (700, Dind.) δαμοία, δὲ οὗτο τῆς ὑπόδην ὅπου τὴν χάρων
οἴον, μῶν 8 ἐνεργεῖ τάν ἀνάλη δίνει.

'Any deficiency which a man feels may incline him to commit wrong
— for the purpose of supplying it. Such deficiency is of two kinds; either
deficiency in what is necessary, as poverty, or in some excess, as wealth.'
Rich men often feel a craving for something over and above their wealth,
something superfluous, as power, honour, license. Thuc. III 45. 4 reads
like a commentary on this topic, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν πόντα ἀνθρώπων τῆς τόλμας παρέχουσα,
ἡ δ’ ἐνοχεία ὑπὲρ τὴν πλεονεξίας καὶ φρονήμας 'great resources and the
consequent license breed the grasping spirit (their natural progeny, τῆς)
by insolence and pride.' Comp. also Pol. II 7, quoted in § 17.

§ 16. 'And those in excessively high and in excessively low repute,
the one as altogether unlike, the other as no more likely than before, to
incur the imputation of crime.' The first rely upon their character, either
for the success of their attempt, which will put their victims off their
guard, or for impunity by escaping suspicion; the second, having no
character to lose, are emboldened by this to make new attempts, by
which they may gain and cannot lose, because they cannot be in a worse
position in the eyes of the world than they are already.

§ 17. 'Such are the dispositions which lead men to attempt wrong'.
We now turn to the characters and dispositions, qualities and circum-
stances which most expose men to wrong; these are as follows:

§ 18. 'First, people that have what we want, either in respect of
necessity or excess (superfluity), or of sensual enjoyment, whether remote
or near; for the acquisition of the one is speedy, the vengeance of the
other tardy; as when we Greeks spoil the Carthaginians.' 'We Greeks'
are πίεται. Comp. Pol. II 7, 1267 a 2, οὐ μόνον δ’ οὐ διηθρωσθεῖ τὸν τάναγ-
cαία διδοκοῦν...ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνεργεῖ χαλεροὶ καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμοῦσι (this is the craving
after superfluities out of mere wantonness of appetite)...οὐ τοῖνοι δὴ ταῖν ῥξ
μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιθυμίαις ἐνα χαλεροὶ ταῖς ἀνω λυπηὶ ἡδοναὶ. τό ὅν
ἄοι τῶν τριῶν τούτων; κ.κ.λ. The difference of the two last of these lies
in this, that the one is the desire caused by the painful gap to supply the
19 oí συλώτες τούς Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖσιν μηδὲ φυλακτικοῖς ἂλλα πιστευτικοῖς· ράδιον γὰρ πάντας λαβεῖν. καὶ τοὺς ῥαθύμους· ἐπιμελεῖσι γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυνηθεῖν· οὐ γὰρ 20 μαχητικὸν περὶ κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἄδικηθέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν
deficiency; the other is a desire of pleasures which have no such painful craving attendant upon them, such are the pleasures of taste, learning, knowledge, and, in general, intellectual pleasures. The cure recommended for this vicious desire is philosophy, which may be obtained from within and δὲ ἀνθρώπων, without any extraneous aid. It seems therefore that this division does not exactly coincide with that of the Rhetoric, though there is a strong resemblance between them.

§ 19. 'And those who are not inclined to caution or precaution, but are of a confiding temper; for they are all easy to take by surprise' (λαθεῖν, lit. It is easy for the wrong-doer to escape their notice in attacking them).

And the careless (indolent, easy-tempered); because the prosecution of an offence belongs to (the opposite character) the careful, anxious attentive.

So Leech, in Punch, Aug. 2, 1862. Infuriate Captain. 'You scoundrel, I'll have you up as sure as you are born'. Cabman. 'What, summons me! Oh no, you won't, my Lord. You'll never take the trouble'. (Exit Cabman with 3d. 6d. over his fare.)

And the sensitive, timid, retiring, shamefaced; because they are not 'combative', inclined to contest the point, to stand out, in the matter of gain. αἰσχυνηθεῖν, II 6. 27, 12. 10, it is characteristic of young men: whereas Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 20, πρεσβύτεροι οὔτε ἐπημθεῖσιν ὥστε αἰσχυνηθεῖν. Plat. Charm. 158 C, Legg. II 665 E, αἰσχυνηθεῖν ἔδωκε. Vict. cites Aristoph. Equit. 264, καὶ σκοπῆς γε τῶν πολεμῶν διὸ τῶν ἀριστοκράτων, πιὸνοικὸν καὶ μὴ πονηρὸν καὶ τρίγυαν τὰ πράγματα.

§ 20. 'And those who have been wronged by many and yet never prosecuted, or taken vengeance on, the aggressors, these being what the proverb calls Mysians' spoil', that is, an easy prey. Μυσίων λέον dicitur de possessione quae defensoris caret et obnoxia est diergitori cuiviis, Dissen ad Dem. de Corona, § 72; of anything that may be plundered with impunity, Liddell and Scott, Lex.; von allem durchaus freigegeben, Rost u. Palm, L. Harpocrates and Suidas, a.vv., both explain the origin of the proverb to be the defenceless state of Mysia during the absence of their king Telephus, the famous beggar-hero of Euripides, and Horace's type of a pauper. See also Stallbaum's note on Gorgias 521 B, who quotes Olympiodorus (on the passage of Plato), ἣ παρομοια αὕτη ἐκ τοῦ Τρῆφου ἄτομος ἐν θαλάσσῃ, ἀκούεται κραῖλ. Whatever may be the origin of this proverb, it certainly was not derived from Euripides' play: for Harpocrates expressly says that it is to be found in Strattis (the Comic poet) and Simonides ἐν λάμβοις. This last is probably Simonides of Amorgos, a
21 παροιμίαν τούτους Μυσών λείαν. καὶ οὗς μηδεπώτος καὶ οὗς πολλάκις ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, 22 οἷς μὲν ὂς οὐδέποτε, οἷς δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἀν ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς very early writer; but if it be the other Simonides, of Ceos, it is equally impossible that he could have derived it from Euripides, since he died when Euripides was a child.

The above explanations seem to be founded upon the helpless condition of the Mysian people under some special circumstances which deprived them of their ordinary means of self-defence. I should rather suppose that the proverb implies an imputation upon their national character, because another proverbial expression, at least as common as this, represents the Myrians, as sharing with the Carians, the reputation of being the vilest and most contemptible of mankind; the property of such mean and cowardly wretches would naturally be an easy prey to any one who chose to take it. This imputation of cowardice or weakness is directly conveyed by Aristotle in the passage before us. This brings the two proverbs together as the expression of the same features of national character. This will furnish a sufficient explanation of Gorg. 521 B, ἐν Μυσῶν γα τήνοι κατείπ, and we need not have recourse with Stallbaum and Heindorf (ad loc. § 162) to the Μυσῶν λείαν to interpret it. This proverbial contempt for the Mysian character appears in Rhes. 251, Pl. Theaet. 209 (Schol. in Heindorf and Stallbaum), Magnes, (Com.) Fr. Poastriæ (in Meineke’s Fragm. Comic. Gr. II 11), Philemon, Sicel. fr. 3 (Meineke u. s. IV 25), Menand. Androg. VIII (Schol. Gorg. u. s., and Mein. IV 86), and Menand. Fr. Inc. 481 (Mein. IV 327), all in the words Μυσῶν δ ἔσχατοι, ‘the last and lowest—even of the Mysians’, worthlessness can go no further. Cic. pro Flacco, 27, 65, quid in Graeco sermone tam tritum et celebrium est, quam si quis despicatui dicitur, ut ‘Mysorum ultimus’ esse dicatur. Ib. 2. 3; 40. 100; Orat. VIII 27, quonam igitur modo audiretur Mysus aut Phrygii Athenis, quim etiam Demosthenes, & c. ad Quinct. Fratr. I. 10 hominis ne Graeci quidem, at Mysii aut Phrygii potius. (Erasm. Adag. Mysorum postremus, p. 354.) The other form of the proverb occurs in Dem. de Cor. p. 248, § 72, τιν Μυσῶν λείαν καλομένη, in Strattis, Medea, (fr. Harpocr.) Mein. II 776. (Erasm. Adag. Mysorum fraedia, p. 1774.)

§ 21. καὶ οὗς μηδεπώτος καὶ οὗς πολλάκις εἰς ἱδιήκεσαί. Both those who have never yet been injured and those who have been often injured (by the proposed wrong-doer) are proper objects of wrong: both of them are likely to be unprepared or taken off their guard (see on ἀφύλακτα, § 5, supra), the one because they feel secure and are careless of ignorance of all injurious treatment, and the others because they have already had so much of it that they think they must now be exempt from it for the future; that fortune or the Gods must be tired of persecuting them.

οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δὲ ὡς οὐκ ἀν ἔτι εἰς ἀδικομένου. The participle will suit both constructions. Soph. Oed. Col. 965, τάξιν καὶ τι μπρόνων εἰς γίνει πάλαι expressing ‘likelihood’, and convertible with ὁ τάξιν καὶ τι μπρόνων. (Hermann ad loc. 969.) Matth., Gr. Gr. § 599 C, quotes this passage as an illustration of ἄν with a participle signifying ‘mere possibility.
or probability, a conjecture or a modest indefiniteness', distinguishing this from the general case which is exemplified in § 598 δ. There is no ground for this distinction; the particle in both alike has its usual conditional signification; and the likelihood or probability and the rest is only one of the conditions under which the act is conceived. Here it expresses the opinion or expectation (ἡ) that they would be no longer likely to be exposed, or under such conditions or circumstances as would expose them, to wrong.

§ 22. And those that have already been the subjects of hostile charges, suspicion, calumny (all included in διαβαλλεῖν, 'to set one man at variance with, or against, another'), and such as are especially exposed or liable to it (easily calumniated, &c.); for such as these have neither the will (to prosecute) from fear of the judges (who are prejudiced against them), nor are they able to persuade (the judges, for the same reason, if they brought this case before a court of law): and to this class belong all that are hated and envied.

φθονούμενοι] On the irregular passive, see Appendix B (at the end of this Book).

§ 23. καὶ (ἀδικουοι τούτου) πρὸς οὖς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν] 'and those again are liable to injury against whom there is (lit. others have) any available pretext' (real or supposed for attacking, or doing them wrong) 'of injury received or threatened by their ancestors or themselves or their friends against themselves or their forefathers, or those whom they care for, (are interested in); because, as the proverb has it, villany only wants a pretext'.

For μελλοντόναυς Brandis' Anonymus (ap. Schneidewin's Philologus, IV, 1, p. 44) read μελετησάντων; no great improvement.

μέλλειν, to be about to do, hence of something impending or threatening. Plat. Theaet. 148 E, of the intention; see Stallbaum's note; of a threatening attitude or posture, μελλέντες. Thuc. I 69, οὗ τῆς δυνάμεως των ἀλλά τῆς μελλόντος εἰμιόνοι, and IV 126, Brasidas (of the threatening demonstrations of the barbarians before the battle), οὗτοι δὲ τὴν μελλόσα μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀνείροις φοβηθόντα.

The proverb 'any pretext will serve a knave' is thus expressed by Menander, Thittale, Fr. 1. (Meineke IV 133), μικρὰ γε πρόφασις ἐστι τοῦ πρᾶξαν κατὰ, ap. Stob. Flor. IV 40. To the same effect, Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1180, ἦταν βαργεῖας προφάσιας ἔδει μένο. ἐφ' ἵνα τοῖς καὶ παιδις ἐκ λαλημέ-μεναι δεξίωσα δίξω ἵνα δια διαφθορά ἱμηρών.

Victorius refers to a story of Agathocles tyrant of Sicily, in Plutarch, as an illustration of this topic. It is told (in the de eter numinis vindicta 557 b) of the Corcyreans, Ἀγαθοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Συρακουσίων τύραννος καὶ σὺν γέλω τε χαλεώτῳ Ἐκερωνίου ἔρρικτος, διὰ τι πορθῇ τὴν νήσον αὐτῶν,
Ḥ προγόνους ἢ ἄγνω ἡ παρομία,
24 προφάσεως δείται μόνον ἡ ποιηρία. καὶ τοὺς ἑχθροὺς
cαι τοὺς φίλους· τοὺς μὲν ἥγαρ ράδιον, τοὺς δ' ἥδυ.
καὶ τοὺς ἀφίλους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ δεινοὺς εἰσεῖν ἡ
πράξαι· ἡ γὰρ οὐκ ἐγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξείναι, ἡ καταλλάτ-
25 τοῦται, ἡ οὐδὲν περαίνουσιν. καὶ οἷς μὴ λυσιτελεῖ

ὅτι, ἢ Δία, ἢνε, οἱ παῖς ὑμῶν ὠπεδίᾳον τὸν 'Οδυσσέα' ἀνοίγοντο τοῖς οἰκεδαίμοναῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοι τοῖς ἐπίθεσις, ἵνα εὐθυγραμμικῶς ἔγινον τῆς πρᾶξεως τοῖς ἑγεῖρον τοῖς ἐν χρόνως τῶν ἡμῶν· ἢ οἱ τοῖς οἰκεδαίμοναῖς προεξεργάζεντο. And the last is repeated, Apophth. 176 F.

§ 24. 'And friends as well as enemies; the former from the ease, the latter from the pleasure, of the undertaking and its success'. Theogonis 1219, ἐχθρόν μὲν χαλεπὸν καὶ δυσμενὴ ἐξαπτώσει, Κύρον, ἐθνὸς δὲ φίλον ὑμῖν ἐκκλῆσαί. Lyssias, καθ' Ανδοκίδου § 7, p. 103 ult. (of Andocides), δε τὰ γεγένα τούτον ἦσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς μηδὲν τοιοῦτον ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους δεῖ ἐν ὀλίγοις κακῶς. Victorius.

'And the friendless. And those who have no skill and practice in speaking or action (business); (the opposite of them, ὁ εἰς εἰς δυσμενοῖς καὶ οἱ ἐπιστολεῖς, are opposite also in disposition; they are of those that are inclined to do wrong, § 2); 'for these either make no attempt at all to prosecute, or if they do make the attempt, soon come to an agreement, or if they do carry on the prosecution, produce no effect (bring it to no conclusion, make nothing of it)'. These are the ἐπάγγελματα, the ordinary victims of the Cleons, and public informers, the συκοφάνται, and all other troublesome and mischievous people, who, like fevers or nightmares, τοῖς πατίναις τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς πάσιν ἐπίθεσις, καταληκτικοὶ τοῖς τις κορίτσις τοῖς τοῖς ἐπάγγελματας ἐπὶ ἅμα ἀντιμετωπίζει καὶ προσεχεῖς καὶ μαράγιον συνεπέλει (Arist. Vesp. 1039), and, ἅπα τοῖς αὐτῶν γῆς (Cleon) ἐπάγγελμα ἄντα καὶ κεχυμάτα καταγόμενον ἐν κυρίων ἀδιαθείμων ἰκανίμων... καὶ συνεπεις γε τῶν πολιτῶν διὸς ἐντὸς ἀμφοτέρων, πλοῦτος καὶ μὴ ποιηρίας καὶ τρεῖς τὰ ἔργα, Equit. 261. On the impossibility of leading a quiet life at Athens, see Criton's case in Xen. Mem. π. 9. 1, ὅπα δὲ τοὺς αὐτῶν καὶ Κρίτωνος λόγον ἢ χαλεπὸν ἢ δίδον ἀλλήλους ἐν ἀλήθεια ἀγαθοτελείας τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράξεις. τῶν γὰρ, θη, ἢς τις εἰς δικαίους ἀγγέλους, οὐχ ὅτι διδοῦναι τὸν ἠμοὶ, ἀλλ' ὅτι νομίζοντο ἢδον ἃν μὲ ἐργάτων τιλάται ἡ ἐπιχείρησις. It ends by Crito's taking one of these 'sycophants' into his own service, like a dog, as he describes him, to keep off these wolves from his flocks.

§ 25. And those to whom it is unprofitable to waste their time in waiting for the trial or payment of the fine or penalty, such as strangers and farmers (who live in the country, and are so completely occupied in the cultivation of their land, that they cannot afford to waste time in attending the law-courts in the city); such as these are inclined to settle their differences on easy terms (departing, to dissolve, break off, put an end to, and so make up, a quarrel), and readily leave off (drop) the prose-
diatribein ἐπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἐκτισμόν, οἷον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτοῦργοι: ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλυόνται καὶ 26 ῥάδιος κατασπαύονται. καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἑδικηκότας, τοιαύτα οί ἀδικοῦνται: ἐγγὺς γὰρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ μῆ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι, ὃταν τι τοιοῦτον ἐδικήθη τις οἶον εἰσθεί καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν. λέγω δ' οἶον εἶ τις τὸν
cution. 'Strangers', who are merely passing through Athens, and incessantly occupied either with business or sight-seeing, have of course no time to spare in dancing attendance at the law-courts; and 'farmers', 'cultivators of their own land', just as little, for the reason already mentioned. These άυτοφοροὶ, 'independent cultivators', constitute the δῆμος γεωργικὸς, and are the best sort of democratical population, Pol. vii (vi) 4, init. βέλτιστος δῆμος ο γεωργικὸς ὅτι, a statement often repeated. One of the reasons for this is, 1318 a 12, διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πολλὸν οὖσιν ἔχων ἐξέχοει, ὅτι μὴ πολλὰς ἐξελησσάζων, and the same would prevent them from waiting at the courts of law. This is confirmed by Eurip. Orest. 919, ἔγγαις δὲν εὐδορᾶς χραίνων κύρος, ἀυτοῦργοι, οὐσὶ καὶ μόνισι συνεχοντο ἡμῖν. To the same effect, Pol. vi (iv) 6, sub init., τοι τὸν γεωργοῦ, ἔχουσαν ἐργαξόμενους ζητόν, οὔ δὲναντι δὲ σχολάζων. Comp. Eur. Suppl. 420, γαπῶνος δ' ἀνήρ πείσε... ἄργους οὗ ναεν δή δύνασται πρὸς τὰ κοινά ἀποδείκτειν. The praises of agriculture and agriculturists are sung by Xenophon, Oecon. vi §§ 8, 9, 10, xv 9, and elsewhere. In Rhet. ii 4.9, the αὐτοῦργοι are distinguished from the γεωργοὺς, the latter being confined to farmers and agricultural labourers, αὐτοῦργοι being extended to all that work with their own hands. See Thuc. i 141.3, and Arnold's note. Thucydides does not observe Aristotle's distinction, the αὐτοῦργοι here are γεωργικοὶ in the next chapter.
§ 26. And those who have committed either many wrongs themselves, or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering: for it seems almost no injustice at all, when a man has the same wrong inflicted on him as he himself was in the habit of inflicting (upon others); an assault, for instance, committed on a man who is habitually guilty of wanton insolence or outrage.

ælia and δῆμος are thus legally distinguished. ælia is personal violence, a blow, or an assault, τὸ τοῦ άυτοφοροῦν άληθος, Pol. viii (v) 10, 1311 b 24, and is the subject of a δίεξ or private action between citizen and citizen. δῆμος is threefold: (1) τὸ αἰγυρούς, (2) τὸ πληγή (this is further defined μετὰ προσθαλαμοῦ, which distinguishes it from ælia), δ didFinish; (3) λάχω; that is, a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of honour, humiliating, degrading, scornful, wanton, language or acts; the mental injury constituting a great part of the offence. This appears in Aristotle's definition of it, Rhet. ii 2.5, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυσεῖν ἂφ' ἐξ αἰχμῆς ὅτι τὸ πλῆχσιν, μὴ ένα τι γίνομεν αὐτῷ (not for any profit to himself) ἀλλ' ἐπὶ προσθαλαμοῦ, 'implies deliberate intention'. This then is the
27 εισθότα ὑβρίςειν αἰκίσατο. καὶ τοὺς ἡ πεποικότας
cκακῶς ἡ βουληθέντας ἡ βουλομένους ἡ ποιήσωντας.
ἐξει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἱδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγύς τοῦ μὴ
28 αἰκίσεως φαίνεται. καὶ οἷς χαρισόνται ἡ φίλοι ἡ
θαυμαζόμενος ἡ ἐρωμένοι ἡ κυρίοι ἡ ὅλος πρὸς οὖς
ξώσων αὐτοῖ. καὶ πρὸς οὖς ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψας τυχεῖν.

ground of the distinction between αἴαλα and ὑβρίς, and the reason for the
latter being made the object of a ἔγραψθη, or public prosecution, the honour
of the state being considered as compromised in the insult to one of its
members. See further on this subject, Meier und Schömann Der Attische
Prozess, p. 319 seq.

Hippodamus, the legislator of Miletus, who drew the plans and laid
out the Piraeus, was the architect of Thurii on its foundation, and of
Rhodes, divided crimes into three kinds, as we learn from Pol. 11.8, 1267 ὁ
38, γροῦ ἐν γὰρ αὐτ ἰδαμ γίνονται, τρία ταύτ' εἶναι τὸν ἄριστον, ὑβρίς, βλάπτῃ
靳ων, ι. ε. (1) crimes by which the feelings are wounded and the sense
of personal dignity wantonly outraged, (2) those which involve loss or
damage to person or property, and (3) murder and homicide.

§ 27. And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already
done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief:
because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (ἐξει) not only
pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a
sense of) right (the moral object of conduct), and so it seems bordering
upon almost no wrong at all. 1 Retaliation' or 'compensation' is right
upon principles of justice, τὸ δίκαιον; of which the 'reciprocal' or 'retali-
atory' is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. v c. 5, arising from the sub-
division of the original two, διαμετρητική, 'distributive', and διορθωτική,
'corrective'; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or com-
penstation for, frauds and crimes, διορθωτική proper, and (2) τὸ ἀπεισοδεῖν
(c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions.

The difference between this topic and that of § 23, καὶ πρὸς οὖς ἔριζε
καθότατα is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of
the wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks
a pretext or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion
comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been
provoked by previous injury.

§ 28. καὶ οἷς χαρισόνται] and those by whom, i.e. by whose injury,
they will oblige either their friends, or those whom they admire and
respect, or love, or their masters (any one who has power over them) or
those by whose opinions or authority they direct their life and conduct.

πρὸς οὖς [ἀν] in reference to whom they live, who are their guides
and authorities in life and action: or, on whom they depend, to whom
they look for support or subsistence; as a 'dependant' does. To which
is opposed in 1 9. 27, ἠλευθέρων τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον γὰρ, 'independence',
ἐπίσκεψα, where you don't look to any one else but yourself. See the note
there, p. 173.
καὶ οἴς ἂν ἐγγεκληκτοῖς ὡςι καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἱον Καλλιππὸς ἐποίει τὰ περὶ Δίωνα· καὶ γὰρ τὰ

καὶ πρὸς οὗτος 'those, in reference to whom', that is in our relations (or dealings) with whom, it is possible (we may expect) to meet with indulgence or merciful consideration. On ἔνθελε, see Introd. p. 190–93.

Victorius, followed by Vater, would connect this clause immediately with the preceding, πρὸς οὗτος ἦσθαι αὐτός, καὶ πρὸς οὗτος π.λ. in order to avoid a supposed repetition of a former topic, § 14, καὶ ἂς ἂς τοῦ ἐγγεκληκτοῦ νομίζει. Vater, who supplies this explanation, forgets that the two topics are differently applied; in § 14 the expectation of indulgent consideration is assigned as a motive of action in the agent; in this section it is a disposition in the patient which subjects him to wrong: though it is true that the feeling or tendency itself resides in both cases in the same person. Besides this, the union of these two seems to be an improper conjunction of two heterogeneous dispositions, a sort of moral κολεόμα; taking a man for the guide of your life or depending upon him, and relying upon his merciful consideration, are not closely enough connected to warrant their being classed together. I have therefore retained Bekker's punctuation, which makes them separate topics.

§ 29. And if we have had cause of complaint against any one, or a previous difference with him, (we do to him) as Callippus did in the affair of Dion; for things of that kind (a wrong deed done under such circumstances) appear to us (personally and at that time, not always or in general,) to border upon, bear a close resemblance to, acts altogether innocent.

προδιακεχωρηκότες διαχωρίσεως is used here as the neuter of διαχωρίσεως, to separate. In this sense it is almost a διάκεφαλίζω. No authority for this use of the word is given by Stephens or any other Lexicon earlier than Arrian. It represents morally and metaphorically a 'split', or 'separation', 'parting asunder' of intercourse and interests between two friends.

ἐποίει] The imperfect here seems unmeaning, as the act is only one. Spengel, in his Edition, 1867, has adopted without remark ἐποίησε from MSS Q, V, Z.

Καλλιππὸς...τὰ περὶ Δίωνα] Plutarch. Vit. Dion. 1 98a, de Sera Numinis Vindicta c. 16. The story is thus told by Victorius. Callippus was an Athenian, friend and companion of Dion during his stay at Athens, and the partner of his expedition to Sicily for the liberation of his native country. By his conduct and services he had ingratiated himself with Dion's mercenaries, whom he incited to murder their general, and thereby made himself master of Syracuse. Before this, he had spread calumnious reports about Dion and excited the citizens against him. Dion being informed of this took no precautions for his own safety; partly in scorn of the attempt, and partly because he was unwilling to preserve his own power and life at the expense of the destruction of his friends: the scheme accordingly took effect, and Dion was shortly after put to death. Aristotle says upon this that Callippus justified the act by arguing that as Dion had now knowledge of his designs, and his own life
was in danger, this anticipation of the other, was a mere measure of precaution or retaliation, and no crime at all. This suspicion of Callippus of the ground of his complaint and the occasion of the previous difference, or sowing of their apparent friendship. [Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, III 2. p. 159, 160.]

§ 30. καὶ τοῖς ὧν ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἀν μὴ αὐτοί, ἀσ οὐκ ἐν εὐθυμεῖνοι βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνειδήμος.

As Casaubon has observed, there is some object understood after ἄλλων. The simple τοῖς or τοῖς ἄλλων, will answer the purpose. Nothing more is known about the circumstances of the case.

The person here called Αἰνειδήμος, in Herod. Αἰνειδήμος, and in Pindar Αἰνειδήμος, is mentioned twice in Herodotus, VII 154 as the son of one Patäicus, and a member of the body-guard of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, and in c. 165, as the father of Thero, sovereign (μοίχοςσος) of Agrigentum, to whom Pindar's second Olympian Ode is dedicated. In Pindar his name occurs three times, but only as the father of Thero, OL II 46, III 9, and of him and Xenocrates, Isthm. II 41. To reconcile Herodotus' statement about him with that of Aristotle here, we may perhaps suppose that Aenesidemus had made himself master of Agrigentum, on the throne of which he was succeeded by his son Thero, before the period to which this story belongs. Aristotle's narrative certainly represents him as a sovereign prince, and not as a mere mercenary in another's service. Victorius, followed by Schrader, calls him 'tyrant of Leontini', but gives no authority.
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 12 §§ 31, 32. 243

Γέλων πέμψαι κοττάβια ἄνθρωποδισαμένης, ὡς τ. p. 45. 31 ἐφθασεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὐς αὐτοῖς ἀδικησαντες δυνάμονται πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥαδίῳ ἱασό- μενοι, ὡσπερ ἑφη Ἰδασών ὁ Θεταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνα, 32 ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν. καὶ αἱ πάντες ἡ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν εἰςθασίν· συγγενής γὰρ οἶνον ταῖς}

κοττάβιας. On the game of κοττάβος, the modes of playing it, and its varieties, see Becker, Charicles, on the Greek Games, Excursus III to Sc. vi, p. 349. Our information upon the subject is principally derived from Athen. XI 58, p. 479 c—e, and xvi 1, 665 seq., and Pollux VI 109. We learn from Athenaeus, on the authority of Dicaearchus (479 d) that it was a Sicilian invention and most fashionable in that country, (cf. Xv 666 b), ἡ τῶν κοττάβων εὔρεσις Σικελίας ἦτο παρεστήκη, ταύτην πρῶτον εὐρότατοι Σικελίων. Further we are told that the winner at the game received a prize, 657 d, ὅτι δὲ άδίκων προοίμιο τῇ εὐ προοίμιο τῶν κοττάβων προοίμιο μὲν καὶ ἀ' ἀρτι- φάνες φιλά γὰρ ἐστι καὶ συμμάτια καὶ τραγήματα. Similarly from Hegesander, 479 d, τοσοῦτο δὲ εγώντο συνοδή περὶ τὸ ἐπιθέματα ὅστε ξείς να συμμετα συνιστάρχου ἄδικα κοττάβια καλοῦμενα. From Gaisford's observation that the form κοττάβεια occurs in at least three verses, in Ath. XVI 666 E, 667 F, it seems that both this and κοττάβων were in use. Gaisford unnecessarily infers from it that there was only one, and that κοττάβεια.

§ 31. And those to whom the wrong can be readily compensated, or more than compensated by just acts, because such wrongs admit of an easy cure;—an instance of this is the saying of Jason of Phereis, that we are bound to commit some wrongs in order that we may have the opportunity of doing justice on a larger scale. The saying itself is to be found in somewhat different words in Plutarch, pol. parr uglm. 517 F (Buhle), it was always applied, όρι σε ὁμόφυλο καὶ παραφύλια τιμῆς αἰς λέγομένης, to his various acts of oppression and annoyance, όμως αναγκαῖοι αὐτοῖς τὰ μικρὰ τοιοῦ θουλομένου τὰ μέγατα διακαρπήγειν. This is in fact Robin Hood's plea, that he robbed the rich to give to the poor. This topic may be further illustrated by Bassanio's appeal to the judge, Merchant of Venice, Act IV. Sc. 1, line 209, And I beseech you, Wrist once the law to your authority: To do a great right do a little wrong, And curb this cruel devil of his will.

§ 32. Victorius observes that we here enter upon a new division of the chapter. The analysis has been hitherto confined to persons prone to wrong and liable to wrong: it is now applied to certain classes of things or circumstances which increase the liability to wrong. These are kinds of διαχώρια. It is in fact a transition to the subject of the next chapter. Such are offences of very common occurrence; men are tempted to commit such because they think they shall meet with indulgence: people have become so familiar with the offence by constant association (συνήθεια) that it has lost its repulsive character; and also they may argue that if 'all or many' are guilty of it, it must be a human infirmity, and being a natural defect is hardly to be called a vice.
§ 33. Crimes and the products of them that are easy to conceal, especially in the case of stealing, which is here most prominent in the author’s thoughts. Such are things that are soon consumed, as eatables, or things that can be easily changed (in their appearance, without losing their value; so that they shall not be recognized, and the theft escape detection), in respect of their shape (as plate and coin by melting), or colour (cloth or silk by dyeing), or mixture (as liquids of all kinds). Victorius refers to Cic. de Fin. v 25. 74, of the Stoics, Atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum quas coeperunt signa commutant, sic illi ut sententias nostris (sc. Academicorum) pro suis uterentur nomina tanquam rerum mutandae. There is about the same amount of resemblance in this topic to that of § 8, as we found in § 28 (q. v.) to that of § 14; the circumstance is nearly the same, the application different.

§ 34. Or things that are easy to make away with, put out of sight (officer, cause to disappear) in many different ways; such are things portable, which can be hid away in holes and corners (lit. small places).

§ 35. And things (stolen goods), like others, of which the thief has already a good many in his possession, either exactly like (with no difference at all between them) or nearly like (bearing a general resemblance, and so not easy to distinguish). The first is the case of coins or medals, and in general, things that are made in sets, one exactly like another.

ἀδιάφορος, which in the sense here assigned to it seems to be a διὰ τῆς λεγόμενος, is not to be confounded either with the logical signification of it—Anal. Post. ii 13, 97 δ 31, ἐν τοῖς καθόλου καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιάφοροις, Top. A 7, ἀδιάφορο τὸ ἠδος, ἀδιάφορος, ἑπώς; this is ‘without specific difference’, ‘an individual’—or with the meaning it bears in the Stoic philosophy, things ‘indifferent’, without any moral differences, neither good nor bad; from which our sense of the word is derived.

‘And things which the injured party is ashamed to reveal: as any outrage committed upon the women of one’s own family, or one’s self or one’s children’. Victorius quotes Lysias, c. Simon. § 3, μελιστα δ’ ἀγανακτοι, ἤ βασιλῆ, ὅτι περὶ τούτων πραγμάτων εἴπειν ἀναγκασθήσομαι πρὸς υἱὸν ὑπὲρ ὅν ἐγὼ αἰσχύνομαι, εἰ μελλον πολλὸι μοι συνείσεθαι, ἣνοσχέμην ἀδικούμενον.

καὶ ὅσα φιλοδίκες] ὅσα cognate accusative for ὅσα δίκαιοι; or perhaps the local accus., ‘the cases in which (as the seat of them) the litigious spirit is shewn’, Appendix B, note 1, at the end of this Book.
145 δικεῖν δοξεῖν ἂν ὁ ἐπεξεῖν· τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε μικρὰ καὶ ἐφὶ οἷς συγγνώμη.

1 οὐς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσιν καὶ ποία καὶ ποίους ΧΑΡΑ.ΧΙ.Μ. Π. 1376 δ. καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτά ἐστίν· τά δ' ἀδικήματα πάντα καὶ τά δικαιώματα διέλθμεν, ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐνετείνθην. οὕτων δὲ τά δίκαια καὶ τά ἁδικα 2 πρὸς τέ νόμον [δύο] καὶ πρὸς οὗ ἐστι, διὰ τι. λέγω δὲ νόμον τόν μὲν ἵδιον τόν δὲ κοινόν, ἱδιον μὲν τόν

'And all cases in which prosecution would seem to indicate a litigious spirit in the prosecutor': that is, where the offence is trifling, or, again, in the case of acts that deserve indulgence—some of which are mentioned in c. 13, 16, 17. Victorius refers to Lysias, κατὰ Θεομήντον A § 2, ἐγὼ δ', οἷς τόν ἔναν μὲν ἀντικείμενον ἔχων, συγγνώμην ἐν εἰγόν αὐτῷ τῶν εἰρήμενων οὐθ' ἐπὶ τόν ἀποφθέγματα ήκοινα, οἷς ἐν ἀντικείμενω αὐτῷ, ἀντικείμενο πέρι καὶ λαόν μακαρίων εἶναι κακοχρήσια διακεκριμένοι.

The chapter concludes with a summary enumeration of its contents.

'So now of the characters and dispositions that incline men to crime, the several kinds of those crimes, the characters that invite crime, and the motives that incite to crime, we have given a tolerably complete (σχέδον) account', or analysis.

ΧΑΡΑ.ΧΙ.Μ. Π. 1378 ε.

A connected sketch of the contents of the following chapter, a particular account of ἐνδικαίωσις or equity, and of the relations of the different kinds of 'law', will be found in the Introduction, p. 187—193, and on p. 239 (Appendix E to chap. XIII).

It analyses and classifies actions right and wrong, first from the strictly legal, and secondly from the equitable or moral point of view.

Equity is the principle of merciful consideration, that indulgent view of men's actions which makes allowance for human infirmities, looks rather to the intention than the act, and thus mitigates or corrects (ἐπαφερθεῖς) the strict rigour of the 'written law'.

§ 1. 'In distinguishing or analysing wrong and right acts, let us commence with the following consideration' (or, let us take the following for our starting-point). On δικαίωμα here 'an just act', the opposite of ἄδικον, and its various senses, see note on I 3, 9, p. 56. 'Accordingly the definition of justice and injustice has reference to two kinds of law' (§ 2), and two kinds of persons (§ 3). The divisions of just and unjust depend upon their relation to two kinds of law, and two kinds of persons: πάντα ὄρθια τῆς τίτλου.

§ 2. 'I distinguish therefore two kinds of law, the special and the universal; and by special, I mean that which is determined in each people or nation (separately or individually) by themselves, (lit. that which has for each class of people or nation its definition directed or referred to themselves,) by their own peculiar habits, customs, feelings, opinions, form of government, and this either unwritten or written' (see
in explanation of this, Introd. Appendix E p. 242—243); 'and by universal law, the "law of Nature." For there is, as all are instinctively convinced, a natural and universal notion of right and wrong, quite independent of any mutual communication (association, intercourse) or compact, such as Sophocles' Antigone evidently alludes to, when she says that it is just, (right), though forbidden, (by the positive law of Creon's enactment) to bury Polynices, implying (as, on the supposition that) that this is naturally right.

Not of today nor yet of yesterday
Is this, but everlasting is its life,
And none doth know what time it came to light.

And, as Empedocles says about killing living animals; for this is not right for some and not right for others, 'but this same law for all (this universal law) spreads without break or flaw' (φρένας, usually δι φρένας, 'continuously') 'over the wide ruling sky and again over the boundless earth'.

Law universal of no human birth
Pervades the sovereign sky and boundless earth.

On the distinction of the κωστές and ὁδόις ῥήσος here taken, compare Eth. N. 110 (Eth. Eud. IV 10) 1134 b 18 seq. quoted in Introduction, p. 241. The same distinction is found supra I 10. 3. On 'natural law' see Whewell, Elements of Morality, § 380 seq. Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, Definitions of Law, c. 2.

μαρτυρῶν] of a presentiment or foreboding, or as here an instinctive conviction, a sort of divination; see note on I 9. 40, καταμαρτυρίωνι.

'Αντιγόνη...λέγουσα] Soph. Antig. 456.

'Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει] Empedocles, Fragm. lines 404—5. Karsten ad loc. p. 281 says, 'Scaliger ad vocabulum αὐγῆ in margine annotavit lect. αὐ γῆς. Codices variant (the best including A' appear to give αὐγῆς); hoc perperam receptam Bekkerus, quem plures sunt secuti, qui loci sensum parum habuerunt perspectum.' Spengel follows Bekker in reading αὐ γῆς. In illustration of the doctrine alluded to in the lines quoted, Karsten cites Diogenes Laertius, de Pythag. viii 13, qui dicet, eum velare ἀποθεμα ὀινών ἵνα ἐκόμιζη τῆς ψυχῆς; and Sextus Empiricus adv. Math. ix 127, who says that the entire school of Pythagoras and
Ἐμψυχον τότε γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δὲ οὐ δίκαιον,

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμομον διὰ τ’ εὐφραίδιους αἰθέρους ἤνεκέως τέταται διὰ τ’ ἀπλέτου αὖ γῆς. 3 καὶ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει Άλκιδάμας...πρὸς οὖς δὲ, δίχα ὄρισται· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς ἑνὰ p. 46. 1 +διαφ., ὑπὲρ infra.

Empedocles, and all the Italians, assert that we have intercourse not only with the Gods and one another, but that this extends also to irrational animals; ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχει τιμία τὸ διὰ παντός τὸ κόσμου δίκαιον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἐνυόν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἑκάστα· διά παντὸς καὶ κτεῖνοντες αὐτά... ἀντιβολέων. On the interpretation of αὐγῆς Karsten has this note. "Ergo commune iussu pertinent διὰ τ’ αἰθέρους i. e. per aerem (cf. annot. ad v. 109) quod omnes anihilantes vestuntur, διὰ τ’ αὐγῆς per lucidum caelum (ut vs. 127) in quo Dii degunt." The verse cited by Karsten in support of his interpretation of αὐγῆς seems insufficient for its purpose; the word there seems to have no other meaning than its ordinary one, "sunbeam or sunlight"; I doubt if αὐγῆ could stand for "heaven"; and perhaps it may be better to accept Bekker's reading.

On Alcidamas, see the article on the Sophistic Rhetoric, in the Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, Vol. III. No. 9, p. 263 seq., and on the Μεσσηνιακὸς λόγος, ib. p. 257. It is quoted again, 112 1. 1. Vater, and Spengel (Arium Scriptores p. 173), cite the anonymous Scholiast, who supplies the missing quotation thus; ἱεροῦ ὑπέφανεν ἐν Θεός, οὐδένα δόλων ἢ φῶς πνεύματι. It seems to be totally inapplicable to the work which it professes to illustrate, and if it comes from the speech at all in all events quite out of place here. Spengel (Praef. ad Rhet. Gr. vi) says of it, fictum non verum: but being as it is so utterly inappropriate, it can hardly have been 'manufactured' for an occasion to which it is not suitable.

Of the 'Messeniaca declamation' the Schol. says that it was a μελετὴ ὧν ἦν Μεσσηνίων ἀστυστῶν λακαδαμίαν καὶ μὴ πνευμάτων δούλευσιν, Conf. Sauppe, ad Alcid. Fragm. 1, Orationes Alcidi. 154. [Vahlen, der Rhetor Alcidamas, (Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Academie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1863, pp. 491—528, esp. p. 505). S.]

§ 3. πρὸς οὖς δὲ διαφωτίσε, διαφωτίσε διαφωτίσε, Vulg.—diça ὄρισται Α.², adopted by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], omitting the first διαφωτίσε; in Rhetores Graeci [1853] he reads [διαφωτίσε] διαφωτίσε, in conformity with § 1. (I do not myself see why the first διαφωτίσε need be omitted without manuscript authority.) 'In respect of the persons to whom it is referred, this division of law is twofold, for the right and wrong, justice and injustice, in acts, are referred to (severally determined by, divided in relation to) either the public, society in general, the whole community (against whom the offence is supposed to be directed), or an individual member of it. And therefore just and unjust acts are divided into two classes, according as they are directed against a single and definite individual, or the community at large. Adultery and assault are injuries or wrongs to the indi-
tων κοινωνούντων, ὁ δὲ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. 
διὸ καὶ ταξικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαίωματα διχῶς ἐστὶν 
ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἑνα καὶ ὀρισμένον· ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν· ὃ γὰρ 
μοιχεῖν καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινα τῶν ὀρισμένων, ὃ δὲ 
μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινὸν.

4 ἀπάντων δὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων διηρημένων, καὶ τῶν 
μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἢ πρὸς 
ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν 

viduals, refusal to serve, or desertion, is a wrong to the entire community 
or nation’. This is the basis of the distinction in Attic jurisprudence 
between the δίκη, the private civil action or suit of man against man, and the 
γραφή, or public, criminal prosecution; since the latter is a state offence, 
common to the whole community, a public prosecution may be 

conducted by ὁ βουλόμενος, ‘any one that pleased’, provided, that is, he be a 
qualified Athenian citizen. See further on this subject, in Introd. I 13, 

Accordingly ὁ τίμων is liable to a δίκη αἰκαί; ὃ μὴ στρατευόμενος, one 
that either declines to serve altogether, and so fails in his duty to 
society and his country, or a deserter, to a γραφὴ δεσπαρίας or λειτουργίας. 
μοιχεία is here included with αἰκαί in the class of wrongs that are the 
subject of a δίκη or δίκη ἱδία; under the ordinary classification it exposed 
the offender to a γραφή, a criminal prosecution, which, as it could be carried 
on by the husband or one of the near relations, might also properly be 
called ἱδία. Meier u. Schönmann, u. s., p. 163—4, 327 seq. In this case 
the state, as well as the husband, considered itself aggrieved as the guardian 
of public morals. In illustration of this twofold aspect of a crime, Victor 
rius quotes Cic. in Verrem, v (111) 69, 161, quibus in rebus: hon solum 
filio, Verres, sed etiam reipublicae fecisti insuriam: suspensens enim liberos 
non solum tibi sed etiam patriae.

§ 4. ‘After this division, or classification, of wrong acts, some of 
which are directed against the entire community, and the others against 
one or more individuals, let us first repeat our definition of ὁ δίκαιον, 
that we may know what being treated unjustly, or suffering wrong, is; 
and then proceed to the rest’.

The introduction of ἄλλον here leads to a new distinction: a civil 
action between parties in their private capacity may be brought either 
against one or several, as when an action is brought against a club 
or commercial company or the partners in a firm: in either case the 
offence which is the subject of it is private and particular, and directed 
against individuals, and both of them are distinguished from state 
offences.

αναλαβόντες] to repeat or resume (take up again) seems to be a refer-
ence to I 10. 3, where ἄδικος, the exact opposite of ἄδικος, was defined,
5 τὰ λοιπά. ἔστι δὴ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὕπο ἐκόντος τὰ ἀδικα πάσχειν τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ἀριστοῖ πρότερον 6 ἐκούσιον εἰναι. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικοῦμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουών βλάπτεσθαι, αἱ μὲν βλά-βαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραὶ εἰσιν· τὰ γὰρ ἁγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διήρηται καθ’ αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ 7 τὰ ἐκούσια, ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες. ὧστ’ ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ

and the latter can readily be inferred from the former. This may be called a resumption, or, in a sense, a repetition of the preceding definition, or at all events of the same subject; and this seems to be confirmed by the reference, in the next sentence, to this very definition. On the entire question of the voluntary character of ἀθέμα and ἀθεία see Eth. Nic. v 11 (Bekk.); and that of vice in general is discussed in the same work, III 7 (Bekk.). The conclusion in the two chapters of the Ethics is that which is here assumed to be the fact.

§ 5. 'To be wronged then is to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent, or to do wrong has been previously defined to be voluntary', 110 3. And since 'doing' and 'suffering', action and passion, are opposites, and opposites fall under the same γένος, we may infer at once that if doing wrong is voluntary, suffering wrong is voluntary too—not in the patient of course, but in the agent. Comp. Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 a 15, ὅτι μὴ τῶν διαλελων καὶ διὰκα τῶν ἐκρημένων δικεί μὲν καὶ δικαστευγμένων ὅταν λιῶν τις αὐτά πράττῃ ὅταν δ’ ἄκακον ὃ ἄκακεν ἄλλον δικαστευγμένον ἀλλ’ ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ... ἀθέμα δὲ καὶ δικαστευγμένος ἀριστεῖ τῷ ἐλέο-σίφ καὶ ἀκούσῃ ... ὅτι ἐστὶ τὰ διάλελον μὲν, ἀθέμα δ’ ἀδίκω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσή.

§ 6. 'Now injury, and injury against one's will, being both of them necessary to the notion of injustice or wrong, it will be clear from what has preceded, what the injuries are (αἱ βλάπται the injuries of different kinds which are contained in the notion); for things good and bad in themselves (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7) have been previously analysed (in c. 6), and of things voluntary it has been stated (c. 10 § 3) that they are things done with the full knowledge' (of the special circumstances of the case. Eth. Nic. III 2). Spengel has adopted ἀθἐμα from MS A', for δικαστευγμένος the Vulg., which Bekker retains.

§ 7. 'So that all charges (accusations, complaints of wrong) of every kind must be referred to two different distinctions, the first that of the persons offended, whether individuals and private persons, or the community at large; and the second (§ καὶ, 'or again'), in the nature of the act, whether it was done in ignorance or unintentionally (i.e. under compulsion, by a superior external force), or intentionally and with full knowledge; and of these last (ἐχθροὶ καὶ ἐλθόσοι) either with deliberate purpose, malice pre pense, or under the influence of passion or excited feeling'. Bekker and Spengel have omitted καὶ with MSS Q, Ὡ, Ἰ, before
ίδιον εἶναι, καὶ ἡ ἄγνοος καὶ ἡ ἔκτος καὶ ἐκτός, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προσκομιένω τὰ δὲ διὰ 8 πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθῶσα τὰ ὂτι περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποία δὲ προαρωγότα καὶ πόσ ἔχουτες, 9 εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἑπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ 1 ἡ καὶ ἄγνοος ἡ ἱστορία.

Ἀγνοοῦσα, or rather changed the order of ἡ καὶ into καὶ ἡ, and substituted καὶ for ἡ after ἄγνοος. This is certainly unnecessary, though perhaps preferable. The sense is perfectly good as I have translated, following MS A*, which appears to give the vulg. reading. The first καὶ is ‘again’, the second distinction: ἡ ἄγνοος of course corresponds to ἡ ἐκτός: ἄγνοος ἡ ἐκτός is quite defensible, the two don’t always go together; τὸ ἀνόητον includes other things besides ignorance, ἐνος τοῦ ἀκονευτοῦ τοῦ βία καὶ δ’ ἄγνοια, Eth. N. III 3 init., the involuntary is due to external force or compulsion as well as to ignorance. This does not apply to ἐκτός καὶ ἐκτός, because knowledge and voluntary action always do go together; voluntary action implies full knowledge of the circumstances of the case, τὸ ἐπίγραμμον δέχεται ἢ ἔρως ὁ ἐρχεῖ καὶ ἐπὶ ἐκτός τὰ καθ’ ἐπίγραμμα ἢ ὡς ἡ πράξ. Eth. N., u.s., and see the preceding chapter on ignorance as the justification of an act. Of the two last classes of acts liable to ἑπίγραμμα, τὰ προσκομιένων and τὰ διὰ πάθος, the former are acts done with προσκομιένω, the deliberate purpose or enlightened and deliberate intention which alone gives them their virtuous or vicious character, and stamps them as morally good or bad; the latter are acts due to the two impulses, here called πάθος, appetite and desire (ἐπιθυμία), and ‘passion’, any sudden and violent, especially angry, excitement (θυμός). Acts of this latter kind cannot properly be said to be involuntary, οὐ μετὰ λέγεται ἀκονευτα εἶναι τὰ διὰ πάθος καὶ δ’ ἐπιθυμίαν, Eth. N. III 3, 111 1 24, because though they are done in ignorance (ἐγνωστ ἐπιθυμίαν), or in the temporary blindness of a fit of passion, they are not due to ignorance, δ’ ἐπιθυμία, ignorance is in no sense the cause of them, and therefore no justification, 1b. III 2. These are in fact the four degrees of criminality of Eth. Nic. v 10, on which, and on this subject in general, see Introd. p. 181—9. They are afterwards reduced to the ordinary three in § 16, infra.

§ 8. Of θυμός we shall have to speak when we come to treat of the πάθος or emotions in II 2—11, where the second chapter gives the analysis of ἔργο, as it is there called. The motives and incentives to crimes and the intentions and dispositions of the criminals have been already dealt with (in cc. 10 and 12).

§ 9. On this and the two following sections, which refer to what were subsequently called στάτα, status, the legal issues of cases, and by Aristot. Αἰσθανόμενος, see Introd. p. 189, 190.

But whereas it frequently happens that men when called to account for an imputed criminal act, admit the fact, but refuse to admit either the title, or name that has been applied to it’ (by the prosecutor namely, who
RHETORIKE A 13 § 9.

δὲ τὸ ἐπιγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κλέψαι, ἡμ. 1374 καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενεῖς ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μοιχεύσαι, ἡ κλέψαι ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἱεροπυλίσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἡ ἐπιγράφασαι μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ

has had it registered under a certain name or title whereby it is referred to a certain class of crimes, and some particular tribunal, and has a special penalty attached to it: this is the στάσις ὑπό, status finitis, nomen, or finitio, of the subsequent classifications, "or that which is contained under the title" (that is, the description of the act which is supposed to correspond to the title, but may not actually do so): a man may say, for instance, that he 'took' the thing but did not 'steal' it, or that he struck the first blow but was not guilty of wanton outrage, or that there was intercourse but no adultery, or that he was guilty of theft but not of sacrilege (because the thing stolen belonged to no god), or that he had committed a trespass but not on public lands, the state domains, or had conversed (held communication) with the enemy but was guilty of no treachery—from the frequent occurrence of these and similar distinctions it becomes necessary that it should be determined what theft is, and what ἐφύμος, and what adultery, and so on; in order that if we want to prove that the fact is so, or the reverse, we may be able to set in a clear light the real merits or rights (τὸ δίκαιον) of the case.

The distinction of the ἐπιγραμμα and περὶ τὸ ἐπιγραμμα I have already indicated. The one is the στάσις ὑπό, the name or title by which the act should be designated, which determines the court that it shall be tried in, and is represented in all the examples given except the case of trespass; the other is the description given of the act, as may be seen in the instance that illustrates it, the trespass (the name) is acknowledged, but the detailed account described it as a trespass upon the public land, which is denied. This, if it corresponds to any of the στάσεις when they were regularly classified (on which see Introd. p. 397 seq. in Appendix E to Book III), must be the στάσις of quality, ποιμενικά, quale: but it seems certain that in Aristotle's time they had not yet been systematised and arranged under constant technical names. At all events, in this passage in the two last cases it seems that no very clear distinction is made out; or apparently intended, as appears from the mixing up together of the examples of both. Quint. III 6.49, where Aristotle's division of στάσεις is noticed, must be referred, not to this passage, but to Rhet. III 116, 6, and 17. 1.

πορεύεσθαι [πρότερον] to be the aggressor in an affray. It is otherwise termed ἄρχειν χρείαν ἀπὸν ἀρχήν, II 24.9, Rhet. ad Alex. 26 (37). 39.

ἐπιγράφασαι] Donaldson, New Cratylus § 174, has introduced this passage amongst his examples of a large family of verbs compounded with ἔπι, in which the preposition corresponds to the Latin (and English) inter (in composition), implying reciprocity, or mutual right or association, as ἑκκοιμεῖσθαι, inter-communion, ἑγεῖσθαι, the right of inter-marriage, Rhet. I 14. 5. It is quite true that ἐπιγραφαί and ἐπιγραφέως (see the examples in Donaldson, p. 296, and the Lexicons) are both used in this sense
δημόσια, ἡ διειλέχθαι μὲν τῶν πολεμίων ἀλλ' οὐ προ-
δούναι, διὰ ταύτα δέοι ἄν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι,
τί κλοπή, τί ύβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὡς ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν
ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλαλόμεθα δεικνύναι, ἔχουμεν
10 ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα
περὶ τοῦ ἂδικοῦ εἶναι καὶ φαύλον ἢ μὴ ἂδικον ἢ ἁμ-
1 + κεπὶ ὧν λιβρὶ διετέρων.

for the right of inter-cultivation of land, just like ἐπωμίλια the right of
mutual pasturage, as on a border territory. But here ἐπεργάσωσθαι must
mean to encroach or trespass, otherwise it is no offence: and so the word
is used by Aeschines, Ctesiph. § 113, of the Locrians of Amphissa who
'encroached upon' the sacred soil of Crissa, by cultivating, Thucyd. I 139,
and elsewhere; as well as ἐπωμίλια and ἐπωμίμες, for a similar trespass on
the pasturage of some one else. The primary sense must be no doubt
that of reciprocal right or occupation, the interchange of cultivation.
Perhaps the notion of going backwards and forwards over a border to
cultivate land may have suggested the notion of trespassing, by extending
the original signification to cases where there was no such right existing,
or only in the trespasser's imagination.

I will add some instances of similar formations which are not given in
the New Cratylus.

ἐπαλλάττειν, Eur. Heracl. 836, ποιεῖ ἐπαλλαχθεὶς ποδὶ, 'interchanged,
interlaced': common in Aristotle, Pol. I 6 (quoted by Donaldson), c. 9,
1257 b 35, ἐπαλλάττει ἡ χρήση ε.κ.α. Ib. VI (IV) 10, 1295 a 9, διὰ τὸ τὴν
dύσαμιν ἐπαλλάττεν γιὰ τοὺς, Ib. VII (VI) 1, 1317 a 1, ποιεῖ τὰς 
πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττεν. Parva Naturalia, de longitute et brevitate vitae, c. 1, 464
b 28, ἐπηλάττετο τὰ μοσχὰ),' τὸν ψέυδης σώµατα τοῖς βραχύβλεοι, de ortu anim.
II 1, 732 b 15, ἐπαλάξει, 733 a 27, ἐπαλάττοντων ἀλλάζει ε.κ.α. de insomniis
II 18, 460 b 20, καὶ τῇ ἐπάλαξε τῶν διακόλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνεται, Theophr.
Hist. Pl. I 3 2.

ἐπιμειγγοῦσθαι, Thucyd. I 2 and 13, ἐπιμεμβάστης, ἐπιμεγγόντων; Herod.
I 68, ἐπιμειγγοῦσ, Thuc. v 78, Xen. Cyr. VII 4 5, Ar. Pol. IV (VII) 6, 1237 a 39:
ἐπιρέχοντα, Thucyd. IV 120, ἐπηρεύοντα, 'were going backwards and for-
wards paying one another visits': ἐπικοινωνοῦν, ἐπικοινωνεῖ, Plat. Gorg.
464 c, Soph. 251 D, 252 D, ἐπικοινωνοῦσθαι, Protag. 313 β, Ar. Top. Δ 2,
123 a 6, ἐπικοινωνοῦσθαι γὰρ ὁ τόπος, Anal. Post. Α 11, 77 a 26, ἐπικ."ποιη"τας 
ἐπισύμμα ἀλλάζει, Rhet. ad Alex. 5 (6) 5.

§ 10. 'In all such cases the issue (the dispute, question in dispute,
disputed point) turns upon this, whether namely (the accused party) is
criminal and vicious or not: for the vice and injustice (of the act) lies in
the deliberate purpose or intention, and names of this kind, such as want-
on outrage and theft, connotes (signify in addition to their direct and
literal meaning) the deliberate intention or purpose; for the act of strik-
ing is not in every case (co-extensive with) wanton outrage, but only if it
was done with a particular object or purpose, of insulting the other for
instance, or for his own gratification (the wanton pleasure in the insult
itself and in the humiliation it inflicts, ἄσανος τρόποι, Rhet. Π 2 5). Nor is
surreptitious appropriation in every case theft, but only if the theft was for the injury of the other and for the thief's own private use and advantage. And so the same rule that applies to these cases holds in like manner of all the rest'.

πέρι οὖ. These words, suspected from Victorius downwards, omitted by A3 and three other MSS, and finally rejected by Bekker and Spengel, were probably inserted by some transcriber or commentator who was doubtful about the construction. If they are omitted, the accusative, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, will be, as Victorius says, equivalent to καὶ πάντα, 'in all such cases'; which is thus grammatically to be explained. The accusative follows the analogy of that class of accusatives which indicate the local seat of any 'affection' in its widest sense, and follow passive and neuter verbs and adjectives, (περιθελε νοῦ τοῦ, Eur. Ion 541, ἁμα κατάγοντε, Plat. Gorg. 515 ἐ, τὰ τοιαῦτα, Protag. 342 ἐ, δύου τῇ κεφαλῇ, νοσίν όμοιοῖο, δοῦν ῥηθεὶς Μετελακ, πόθεν ἐκεῖ Ἀχιλλεύς) and are themselves probably nothing but extensions of the ordinary cognate accusative; which passes first from the direct expression of the same notion as that in the verb, μακρεῖνα μακάριον, τίρπευσαι τίρπων, to the indirect and general and indefinite neuter, μακρεῖα μακάριον, τίρπευσαι τίρπων or τοῦ (see Wunder on Oed. R. 259), and secondly into the expression of any equivalent notion almost without limit, of which the seat of the affection is one form. This is the explanation of Kühner [§ 410 adnmerk. 5 of 2nd ed.], Jelf, Gr. Gr. §§ 545, 6, and I think probably the true one. Here therefore πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 'all such instances' are represented locally as the seats of the several ἀφικομενήν, the points on which each case turns, or legal issues: in them the points in dispute or issue are said to reside.


προαιρέσεως] perι ἐμφασισ. c. 3, 16 b 5, μέμα δὲ ἑστι τὸ προαιρετικὸν κρίσιν. Ib. lines 8, 9, 13, 18, 24; ubi Ammonius, προαιρετικὸν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τὰ πράξεις δηλοειμάντων κατὰ δεινῶν λόγων καὶ ἄλλα τὰ συνεμφαίνει. Eth. Eudem. 11 3, 1221 b 18 seq. (where much more is said as is said in this passage of the Rhetoric in many more words).

RHTORIKHΣ A 13 §§ 11, 12.

εἰ λάθρα ἔλαβεν, ἐκλεψεν, ἄλλα ἐν ἐπὶ βλάβη καὶ
σφετερισμῷ ἐαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων
έχει, ύστερο καὶ περὶ τούτων.

11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἄδικων ἦν δύο εἰδή
(τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμένα τὰ δὲ ἀγραφά), περὶ δὲ ὁμοι
οἱ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἰρηται, τῶν δὲ ἀγράφων δύο
12 ἐστὶν εἰδὴ: ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ᾽ ύπερβολὴν
σφετερισμὸν ἔστιν 'the making a thing one's own', appropriating it to
one's self, and one's own use. Plato has σφετεριζόμενον, and Arist. Pol.
viii (v) 11 sub fn. 1315 β 2, σφετερισμὸς. The meaning of the genitive
ἐαυτοῦ, which looks as if it meant 'appropriation of oneself', must
be interpreted by the opposite βλάβη ἄλλω, with which it is contrasted. As
ἄλλω after βλάβη is the objective genitive, injury to another, so ἄλλων
after σφετερισμὸς is the appropriation to yourself and your own
benefit, appropriation for your own use and advantage.

§ 11. [ἐπ] 'there are, as we said,' viz. in § 2. This however was not
'said' precisely as it is here; there, laws were divided into universal and
special, and then the special subdivided into written (or positive law) and
unwritten: and we now learn that the universal law is also unwritten,
and that the special branch of the unwritten law, which must now be
distinguished from the other, is to be found in that spirit of fairness and
mercy and consideration, which consists in an inclination to relax the
unnecessary rigour of the written code arising from its own imperfections,
and at the same time to make due allowance for human errors and
infirmities: all which is contained in the principles of equity, the
unwritten law which prescribes such a course of conduct in matters of
doubt. I have observed in the Introduction p. 244 that we are probably
to extend this subordinate kind of ἄγραφος νόμος so as to include all the
prevailing feelings and opinions as to propriety and right and wrong in
general which prevail in each special state (and are therefore a kind of
όνομα νόμος, distinguished from the universal): of which indeed the views
and feelings represented by equity form a very considerable part.

§ 12. The two kinds of unwritten law are, first the universal law, the
precepts of which suggest higher considerations and higher duties than
mere legal obligations to pursue virtue and avoid vice, this is what is
meant by the 'excess, or higher degree, of virtue and vice' above the legal
standard, expressed in καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὀρέγει καὶ κανόνα, quod eximium virtutem
aut viatum inde continent, Victorius), obedience to which law is
rewarded by praise and honour and gifts (the two kinds of rewards; the
'gifts' in this case being conferred of course not for their value as a pecu-
niary compensation, but in so far as they are signs of moral approbation)
and the breach or violation of it punished by (not fine or imprisonment
or any personal penalty, as the violation of a legal enactment, but by) cen-
sure, reproof, dishonour (not deprivation of civil rights, which is a legal
penalty): of such precepts examples are, gratitude to benefactors, the
return or repayment of obligations (differing from the feeling of gratitude),
the inclination and readiness to aid and defend one's friends, and such like. It is remarkable that amongst the precepts of the universal law which we are all bound to obey Aristotle should have here omitted the duty of intervening and paying honour to the dead, so strikingly exemplified by the appeal of Antigone against Creon's tyrannous proclamation in the play to which he himself had just called our attention (comp. Eur. Suppl. 16—19, 526, 538), and still more so perhaps in the trial of the eight generals after Arginseae.

The second kind of unwritten law is that which belongs to law special, and is what is omitted by (i.e. intended to supply the deficiencies of the) written law.

Some of these universal principles of the popular morality are occasioned mentioned by the poets and other non-scientific writers: they are the most general rules of conduct which every one everywhere is supposed to recognise and obey. A short list of the most fundamental of them is given in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (3). 6, 7, which almost coincides with Aristotle's in the Rhetoric, δίκαιος μὲν οὐ νεώτερος οὐδὲ τῶν ἀνώτατων ἢ τῶν συνετῶν ἢ τῶν πλείονων ἢ τῶν δηρασθηκόντων διά δηρασθῆναι τοῦτο καλὰ καὶ τὰ συγχρήματα τοῦτο δηρασθῇν τῶν διώκησις τῶν ἡμῶν καὶ τῶν ἐνεργείας ἡμῶν ἐπιδιόντων τόσον γὰρ καὶ τὸ τούτως διώκειν διὸς μεταστᾶσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἱ γεγραμμένοι νόμοι ποιεῖται, ἀλλ' εἰδότες ἢγαρφός καὶ κοινὸς νόμος μηλίζεται. Eurip. Antiope, Fragm. XXXVIII (Dind.), τρεῖς εἰσὶν ἄραν ταῦτα κρίνει τοῦ ὑποκρίνεις, τίκτοι, θεοὶ τι κρίνειν, τοῖς τῶν λοιπῶν γονεῖς, νόμοις τοις κοινοῖς έλλαδός. Comp. Xen. Memor. IV 4. 19—24, which are the same are mentioned with one or two additions. On the unwritten law in general, see Plato, Legg. vii 703 A, B, C; he says ἓντε ἀλλα, οἷς παρέχει οὖν ἡμῶν ἐπισημάζωμεν, δεσμοῖς οὐκ ἐπερεῖ εἰκότως τῶν παρὼν τῆς ἡμῶν καταλίθησις τῶν καὶ εἰρείναι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῆς ἐθικομοίρᾳ, ἀντικροίνες οὗ οὖν πάτρια καὶ πατήσασιν ἄρχαία νόμοι, ἀλλὰ μὲν τεθέντα καὶ ἐνοπλήνοτα πάλατοι θερμαλώσασα ἢς εἰς πρὸς τοὺς γραφέστας νόμους, and he finally classes with the unwritten law the θυγ καὶ εἰπεδώρατα, Aristotle's second class of ἄργοφως νόμοι, as I have mentioned in p. 243 of the Introduction.

§ 13. On what follows, see Introdc. pp. 191—2, on equity; and the 14th chapter of the Nic. Eth. Book v. For equity appears to be just (or a kind of justice), and it is the supplement to the written law that is equity (equitable). Comp. Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 b 8, τὸ τι γὰρ ἐπιμελεῖ δικαίον τινὲς δὲ ἐνθάλθοι ἢς δικαίως, καὶ οὖχ ὑπὸ ἀλλ' τίς τι γένες δὲ βλημάτων ἢς τού δικαίου. 10. line 12, τὸ ἐπιμελεῖ δικαίου μὲν ἢς οὖν, οἷς κατὰ νόμον δὲ, ἀλλ' ἐπιμορφώμενα νομίμως δικαίου. Line 26, καὶ ἐντων αὕτη ἢς φώσιν ἃ τοῦ ἐπιμελεῖς, ἐπιμορφώμενο νόμων, ἢ ἀλλείπτει διὰ τὸ καθόλου.
ΠΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 13 §§ 13, 14.

τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τούτο τὰ μὲν ἀκόντων τὰ δὲ ἐκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθη, ἐκόντων δὲ ὅταν μὴ δύναται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἢ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μὴ ἢ δὲ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. καὶ ὅσα μὴ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι δὲ ἀπερίαν, οὐδὲν τὸ τρώγανε σιδήρῳ πηλίκῳ καὶ ποιῆσι. ὑπολείπετο γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰῶν 14 διαρθιμοῦντα. ἐν ὅνι ἡ ἀδιάριστον, δὲν δὲ νομοθετηθὲσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὡστε κἂν δακτύλιον

'‘This is done sometimes unintentionally, sometimes intentionally, on the part of the legislators, unintentionally when the omission escapes their notice, intentionally when they find it impossible to define or determine every thing (to provide by their definitions or determinations for all possible cases in detail), and are therefore obliged to lay down the rule as absolute (to pronounce universally), though it is not so in fact, but only true and fair for the most part; and so fail to provide for exceptional cases. Eth. Níc. v 14, 1137 δ 15, ἐν οἷς οὖν ἄνγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷον τὲ δὲ ὅρδες, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀργοῦ τὸ ἀμαρταιόμενον. καὶ ἐντὸς οὐδὲν ἔττον ὅρδες τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματος ἐστι' εὔθει γὰρ τοιαύτη ἢ τῶν πρακτῶν ὄντι ὕψωσι. Pol. III 11, 1282 δ 2, so in the administration of government, and in enforcing obedience to the laws of the state, the sovereign power assumes the office of equity in the administration of justice; δει τοῦτο νόμον ἔδωκα κυρίου κυρίαν ὀρθὲς, τὸν ἐρχόμενα δὲ, ἐν τε ἐν τῇ πλείους δια, περὶ τούτων εἶναι κυρίου περὶ ὅσων ἐξενισευτοῦσίν οἱ νόμοι λέγειν ἐκατον ἐκατον διορίζει, ἀλλὰ καθόλου λέγει, ὅ ὅσοι τοῖς παραχωροῦν, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ πρὸς ὅσον καθ' ἐκατον διορίζει, οὐκ ἄπειρη δια, ὅ τοιοῦτον ἐπικείμην, and concludes, τῶν μὲν γὰρ φύσεως καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅσων διακόλου ὡς ἀπαντῶσι, ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ' ὅσον, δ' ὁ νομοθέτης ἐδακτυλίως ἀπόλεε. On the defects of the written law, see also Rhet. I 1. 7.

And not only is the legislator unable to provide for all exceptional cases to general rules, but also the infinity of particular circumstances which distinguish human actions and crimes precludes the possibility of his enumerating in detail all those varieties which in justice should have different degrees of punishment apportioned to them; as for instance, in enacting the prohibition of 'wounding with an iron instrument', to define the size and the kind of instrument in every case; for life is too short, and would fail a man in the attempt to reckon them all up in detail (on this case, which is given also by Quintilian, vii 6. 8, see Intro. p. 191).

§ 14. If then it be thus impossible to determine all these particular and exceptional cases, and yet there is a necessity for legislation, the law must be expressed in general terms; so that if a man wearing an iron
Εξων ἐπάρθησε τὴν χείρα ἥ πατάξη, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἐνοχὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ 1374.<br>

15 τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἐστὶν. εἰ<br>
δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, φανερὸν ποιὰ ἐστὶ<br>
τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποιοὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἂν<br>
16 θρωποὶ. ἐφ’ οίς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἐχειν, ἐπιεικῆ<br>
ταῦτα, καὶ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μη<br>
τοῦ ἱσον ἀξίου, μηδὲ δὲ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ αὐτηχή<br>

ring lift his hand (to threaten) or strike another, by the written law (the letter of the law) he is liable (to the penalty), and has committed a crime, but in truth and in fact he is not guilty of a crime, and herein (rōs, in this fair interpretation of the act) lies equity'.

§ 15. 'If then equity be such as we have described it, it is plain what sort of things (i.e. charges, imputed crimes) are equitable (i.e. suitable for equitable treatment), and the reverse, and what sort of men are not equitable'. And hence to the end of the chapter we have an analysis of the popular objects of equitable treatment, and the characteristics of it, or of the absence of it, the negative which may be inferred from the positive, in these subjects.

§ 16. 'The first of these, the kinds of actions which are suitable objects of equity are such as these. Cases which ought to be treated with indulgence, and mistakes or errors (implying ignorance in particulars, Eth. Nic. iii 2, on involuntary ignorance) and mere misfortunes, accidental, which should be carefully distinguished from actual crimes, and not visited with equal penalties: the latter of the two, accidental misfortunes, are such acts as are sudden and unexpected, or beyond calculation, and do not spring from a vicious habit or evil intention; errors are such as are not accidental, in the sense of unexpected and beyond calculation, and yet do not proceed from vice (in the same sense as before): but crimes are acts that are not without calculation (i.e. deliberate), and are prompted by a vicious habit or inclination, because all wrong acts that are due to desire, proceed from this depraved will and moral judgment'. This is the usual classification of the degrees of criminality in actions; for acts, of which the mischievous consequences are purely accidental, and therefore altogether beyond our own control, and for mischievous acts committed under some mistake as to the particular circumstances of the case (not of general moral principles, for which we are responsible), as when a man is killed with a gun that was not known to be loaded, we are not responsible; what makes us responsible for an act is not only the harm or injury that is its consequence, but the deliberate intention or purpose with which it was done (and in all cases where the wrong was prompted by desire, this is sure to be an evil one, τὰ γὰρ δὲ ἐνδυμάλλων ἀπὸ πόμπης) and full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case. In the treatment of this subject in Eth. Nic. v 10, a fourth degree is introduced between the error and the crime.
§ 17. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀδικημένοις συγγνώμενον] 'the indulgent consideration of human accidents and infirmities', especially errors, in mitigation of the application of the strict letter of the law. On τὸ ἀδικήμα, see note on I 2.7, p. 34. These human errors and infirmities in the culprit should be met by a corresponding *humanity* on the part of the judge, the opponent, and indeed men in general. Victorius quotes 'Ter. Adelph. III 4. 24, *persusit nos amar viuum adolescentia: humanum est:* τὸ δὲ ἀδικήματι καὶ πρὸς τὰ πράξεις ἀνθρώπων οὐ μόνον εἰσὶν αὐτῷ δεοί (φθορα), ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς δικαστέως καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις ἀδικήμασι, Rhet. ad Alex. u. s. § 10.

§§ 17—18. 'And to look (in interpreting the offence and the amount of the penalty), not to the law, but to the legislator, and not to the mere words (the letter) of the law, but to the mind (the intention) of the legislator'; ἄυτω εἰς τὴν λέγη μὲν τὸν νόμον καθόλου, συμβεβηκτός δὲ τοῦ τούτου προτὸς τὸν καθόλου, τοὺς ἀδικήματα ἔχει τὰ παραλίθανα τὸ νομοθέτης καὶ ἱκανοὶ εἰς ἀνθρώπους τὸ ἀλλοφόβοι, ἀδὲ αὐτὸς τὸν νομοθέτημα αὐτοὺς οὕτως διὰ εἰς ἔναν ἔκα τούτῳ, καὶ εἰ δὲ τούτῳ ἐννομόθετυν ἡ. Eth. Nic. ν 14, 1137 δ 20). 'And (to look) not to the act (of the accused) but to the deliberate purpose or intention, and not to the part but to the whole' (i.e. not to take a narrow view of the criminality of the act by confining yourself to the consideration of the bare naked fact, or of some particular part or circumstance of it, which gives it a specially vicious appearance; but to look at it as a whole, to take into account the general character of the doer and all the attendant or surrounding circumstances which will throw light upon the intention of it, the purpose with which it was done), 'and not merely to the present character of the offender but to the constant or usual character that he bore (to what sort of man he was, always or usually)."
§ 18. "And to remember rather the good than the ill treatment you may have received, and the benefits that you have received rather than those that you have conferred".

μᾶλλον ἢ (δε, attracted, or ἂ ἐπίσης,—το δίκαιον, strict justice, the letter of the law, requires an even balance of benefits on both sides, on the reciprocal (retaliatory, tit for tat, par pari) principle, τὸ δικαιοσύνης, Eth. N. v 8.—ἐπικείμενα, merciful indulgent consideration, remembers only the benefits and forgets the injuries; remembers kindnesses received, forgets those that it has bestowed. ἀφ νομίζω τὸν μὲν εἰ παθόντα δεῖν μεμηχάνει τὸν πάντα χρόνον τὸν δὲ ποιήσατα εὐθέω ἐπιληφθάναι, εἰ δεὶ τὸν μὲν χρυσοῦ τὸν δὲ μὴ μεροφύγου ποιέν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου. τὸ δὲ τὸν ἱδαν ἐνίγραμα υπομνημάζει καὶ λέγεις μικρὸν δεῖν δρομὸν ἔστι τῷ ὑπερβηθεῖν. Dem. de Cor. p. 316. Victorius.

καὶ τὸ ἀνέχοντο ἀκοόμοιν κ.τ.λ.] ‘and to put up with injury or injustice’, to endure it without retaliation, ‘and, the disposition or inclination, to have a matter decided rather by word than deed’.

λόγῳ κρίσεως to decide a dispute by an amicable settlement, by talking the matter over with the opposite party, or reasoning with him, rather than proceed ἔργῳ, appeal, that is, to the ultima ratio, the voix du fait, and actually fight out the quarrel: or (in the case to which Victorius would confine it, that of a quarrel between two neighbouring states) an appeal to arms. ‘Omnia prius consilio experiri quam armis sapisium decet. Ter. Eun. IV 7-19. Apoll. Rhod. III 185.’ Victorius.

§ 19. ‘Or again’—a particular case of the same kind of general disposition—‘to be more inclined to refer a matter to arbitration than to a court of law: for the arbitrator always takes the equitable view of the case, whereas the judge looks to the law’ (the letter, or literal interpretation of the law, which he is bound by oath strictly to carry out and interpret to the best of his judgment). ‘In fact the very motive or intention of the invention of arbitration (the introduction of it into jurisprudence and social relations in general) was that equity should prevail’.

ἰδιωτικῶν note on ὑπηρεσία, 11. 29 ult.

‘And so let this manner’ (this rough, hasty, popular sketch or outline) of describing (marking out the boundaries in detail, determining the boundaries of the whole and the several parts, defining, analysing,
This chapter, a continuation of the preceding, contains the application of the 'common topic' of degree, 'greater and less', to the offences or crimes which formed the subject of the other.

§ 1. 'The magnitude of a wrong varies with the degree of the injustice that prompts it'. There is here the same distinction taken between δίκαια, a wrong done—an abstract wrong, regarded independently of the motive or intention—and the confirmed habit (the deliberate purpose, προαιρέσθαι, is the measure of moral worth, and distinguishes virtue from vice, Eth. Nic. v 10, 1135 b 20, ὅτως δὲ εἶπεν μὲν μὴ προαιρεθῆναι δὲ (πράγμα τις), δίκαια, οἷον δέ τι διὰ θυμὸν καὶ δίκαια πάντως, δοκεῖ καίριον ἡ φυσική, συμβαίνει τοῖς αὐθεντοῖς ταύτα γὰρ βιάστοντες καὶ διαφθάνοντες δικαιοῦνται τέτοιοι μὲν, καὶ δικαιοῦνται οὕτως, εὖ μνήμου τοῖς διδάσκαλοι διὰ ταύτα δεῖ διδασκαλεῖν διδάσκαλος καὶ μοχθήρος.

'And therefore (sometimes) the smallest things are greatest', acts apparently most trifling are sometimes indicative of the worst intentions and dispositions, 'as is exemplified in Callistratus' charge against Melanopus, that he cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-olives'. Such a charge subjected the offender to a γραφὴ λεγομένης, Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 335 [=p. 435 § 293]. The exact nature of the offence imputed to Melanopus cannot be ascertained: it was probably some fraud (possibly an error construed as a crime,) in the settlement of accounts between himself and the persons charged with the building or restoration of a temple, the μονοουλί.

The word μονοουλί appears to be an ἐπιζ λογομένων. Stephens, Thesaur. s. v., gives no other example. On the same analogy are formed νεοχωρίων, μηχανωνοί, δακτυλωνοί. The office is described in Pol.-vii (vi) 8, 1322 δ 19, ὡς ῥητοῖ καὶ ἐπιζευγμένοι τῶν περὶ τὰ λεγομένα ἡ τὸν ἐπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνδροθύμην τὸ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῶν  ἀλλών δοκεῖ τέταρται πρὸς τοὺς τινίς. The word ἐπορευόμενο, which follows immediately, in line 24, is referred by Stahr (erroneously however) to this office of curator of sacred buildings, where he translates it τεμπελ-βασιμπείσταρί.

The magnitude of the vice is argued in this case from the trifling amount of the profit; if a man would commit so great a sin as sacrilege for three halfpence, how great must be the depravity of his character and intentions. Melanopus and Callistratus, as Victorius notes, are mentioned together as ambassadors to Thebes by Xenoph., Hellen. vi 2 and 3; and by Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. (p. 851 f.), represented as political rivals and opponents. On Callistratus, see note on i 7. 13.

[παραλογίσμοι] This verb has two different applications in conformity with the double sense of λογίζεσθαι and λογισμὸς; the two senses, though closely connected and often identified, are at all events distinguishable;
tria ἡμωββεία ἰερὰ τοῦς ἱεσοποίους· ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνης
dὲ τοῦναντίον. ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτα ἐκ τοῦ ἐνντάρχειν τῇ
dυνάμει· ο γὰρ τρία ἡμωββεία ἰερὰ κλέψας κἂν ὀτιοῦν
ἀδικήσειν. ὀτὲ μὲν δὴ οὕτω τὸ μεῖζον, ὀτὲ δὲ ἐκ

(1) 'reasoning' and (2) 'calculation'; the παρά, which conveys the imputation
of fraud (παρά, amiss, awry, wrong), being common to both. Here (as
in Dem. c. Aphob. a, p. 822. 25, where it stands for simple 'miscalculation',
and Isocr. Panath. § 243, for 'cheating', 'fraudulent miscalculation' in
accounts) it has the latter sense. Elsewhere, and usually (at all events
in Aristotle, as Rhet. I 9. 29, II 23. 3, 25. 10 bis, III 12. 4, et passim,) it
denotes 'wrong, fallacious, false, reasoning', a 'fallacy' in argument.
Lastly ἐπατανίζει means 'consecrated to sacred uses; devoted to the service of
the gods or religion'.

'In the case of justice, the opposite is true'. That is, the magnitude or
strength of the just and virtuous disposition, inclination, resolution, is
shewn, not now in the trifling character of the temptation or motive by
which it is led astray, but in the greatness of the temptation which it
withstands. 'Ut qui ingentem vim auri, apud se nullo teste depositam,
cum initiato impune possit, reddidit, justior sit necesse est quam si idem
in exigua pecunia fecit.' Victorius. Injustice varies inversely with the
magnitude of the profit or advantage to be derived from it, the less the
temptation the greater the sin; justice directly, the greater the profit
and the consequent temptation to do wrong, the higher the virtue in forego-
ing it: as, the greater the deposit, the greater the justice in restoring it.

'The reason of this' (ταυτὰ ἐὰν ἀποκάλεσθαι μὴ ἄλλα) 'is, that
(the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less); for one who could steal
(lit. stole) three half-obols consecrated to religious uses would be capable
of any other iniquity whatsoever'. The δῶρον, the indefinite latent
capacity of vice, is tacitly opposed to the ἐνίοτε, any possible enormity,
to which it may, or may not, be developed. If a man will commit a
crime which may be interpreted as sacrilege for such a trifle as three
half-obols, he is plainly 'capable' of sacrilege in any degree of atrocity,
where the profit and temptation are greater.

On the subject of δῶρον and ἐνίοτε, physical, moral, and metaphys-
cical, the fundamental and all-pervading antithesis of the Aristotelian
Philosophy, a commentary on Rhetoric is not the place to enter. It is
explained by Trendelenburg, Comm. on de Anima, II 1, Elem. Log. Arist.
§ 6, p. 61. δῶρον is treated in Metaph. Θ 1—5, and ἐνίοτε, ib. 6—9, on
which consult Bonitz's Commentary. Grant, Essays on Ethics, Essay IV,
pp. 181—201, 1st [or 2nd] ed., gives a full and clear account of the
relation between them, and the doctrine in general, especially in its
application to Moral Philosophy. Aristotle himself nowhere gives a com-
plete and intelligible description of this antithesis and its bearings, but
assumes the knowledge of it in all his writings.

'Now sometimes the degree of crime, the comparative criminality,
may be determined in this way; in other cases it is decided, or estimated,
by the (actual amount of the) harm or injury done'. ἐκ 'from', means
that the decision or estimate of the amount of criminality proceeds or is derived from the comparison of the injury or consequences resulting from the two acts.

§ 2. 'And when there is no punishment (in use) equal or adequate (to the offence), but any one (that exists or can be devised) is too slight for it; supply δικαίωμα μείζον ἑστί.

'And where the mischief done is incurable: for it is hard (or grievous), or indeed impossible'. To fill up the sense either repeat πάθη, 'to find any adequate remedy or compensation'; or, from ὑπὸ τῆς τιμωρίας, 'to devise any adequate punishment'. Otherwise it may be supposed (though it is unnecessary) that Aristotle wrote ἀδύνατον, having δικαίωμα or some similar adjective in his mind, meaning 'a helpless, hopeless, irremediable' case.

'And again crimes for which no legal redress is to be obtained by the injured party: for such a wrong is incurable: because 'justice' (trial and sentence) and punishment are so many remedies'. On this doctrine of punishment, and the difference between κόλασις and τιμωρία, see above p. 232. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 b 16, μνήμονε μὴ καὶ αἱ κόλασις γνωμέναι διὰ τοῦτον λατρείαν γὰρ τοῖς εἶσον, αἱ δὲ λατρείαι διὰ τῶν δεισιῶν πεφύκασι γίνονται.

'And if (in consequence of the wrong done) the sufferer and the victim of the wrong inflicted some heavy punishment on himself; for the perpetrator of the act deserves a still severer punishment (than that which he thus unintentionally brought upon his victim): as Sophocles, in pleading the cause of Euctemon—after he had killed himself in consequence of the outrage he had sustained—said that he would not lay the penalty at a less amount than the sufferer had estimated it at for himself', i.e. Euctemon by his suicide had virtually fixed the penalty of the offence at death.

§ 3. δικαίωμα κολασθῆναι] On this idiomatic usage of δικαίωσ, and similar constructions—in which the adjective, instead of being expressed impersonally in the neuter, as δικαίων ἑστι, is attracted as it were to the subject of the sentence—especially with δέλος and its compounds, φαντώμα, γελώμα, and such like, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 297, comp. 549. 5. It is to be observed that the case of δικαίωσ is peculiar; this takes the infinitive, whereas all the rest are construed with the participle. To Matthiae's examples add δος, similarly constructed in Thuc. I 70, sub init. δόμοι ποιήματι εἶναι τοῖς πιλασ ψάγον ἐκπειράσαι; some Platonic examples in
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 14 § 4.

μον, ἐπεὶ ἀπεσφαξέν ἐαυτὸν ὕβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσεις Ρ. 1375. 

έφη ἐλάττων θα ὡς ὁ παθὼν ἐαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν. καὶ ὁ

Stallbaum’s note on Gorg. 448 D; Soph. Aj. 634, κρήσεως γὰρ “Δίκη

κείσθαι, and Lobeck’s note; the proverb μὴ κείσει Καμάρινο, δείγματος γὰρ


1241, ζεὺς γελοῖος ἀμώμενος: Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 δ 34, γελοῖον φαι-

νοτο ὁ μεγαλόφυσις μὴ ἄγαθος ἄν: Pl. Phaedrus 236 D, γελοῖον ἐνομα...

ζωῆς ἀὐτοχεισάζων.

Σοφοκλῆς Not the poet, but a statesman and orator advanced in life

at the close of the Peloponnesian war. He was one of the ten πρόθυροι, 

Rhet. III 18. 6, appointed by the Athenians, after the Sicilian disaster in

413 B.C., to devise measures for the public safety, Thuc. VIII 1, Grote’s 

Hist. Gr. Pt. II, ch. 61, Vol. VII, p. 499, and note: and afterwards one of

the thirty tyrants, Xen. Hellen. II 3. 2. This Sophocles is doubtless the

same who is again mentioned, Rhet. III 15. 3. He is there described as

an old man, which agrees with the statement of Thucydides, u. s., that the

πρόθυροι were an ἄρχη προσβεβότων ἄνδρων; and the ‘charge’ brought

against him (Rhet. I. c.) was probably connected with his conduct as a

member of ‘the thirty’.

τιμήσεως, ἐτίμησεν) In all causes civil as well as criminal which could

be brought before an Athenian law-court, one point to be considered in

the judgment was the τιμήμα or estimate, assessment, either of the kind

or amount of the penalty in criminal prosecutions, or of the damages in

civil actions. This gives rise to the division of all legal processes into

ἀγάθω ἐτίμησεν and τιμητικός. In the former of these the penalty and

damages are already fixed by law or by previous private arrangement

(C. R. Kennedy), and are therefore ‘unassessable’ by the judges; in the

τιμητικός ἀγάθως of all kinds, the amount of the damages or penalty to be

awarded is at the discretion of the judges, who τιμήσεως, estimate, assess,

or fix the amount. This is the explanation of Harpocratian, and Ulpian,

followed by Meier & Schömann, Attischer Process, p. 171 note, Böckh


Antig. § 143. 7—12. Suidas, and other ancient writers, invert this

distinction, and make τιμητικός ἀγάθας the cases in which the penalty is already

fixed, and ἀποτίμησις those in which it is open to adjudication. See Meier

& Schömann, u. s. p. 171 note.

On the whole subject see Meier & Schömann u. s. et seq. and Mr C. R.


and cf. note on Dem. Select Private Orations, Part II, Or. 55 § 18. 8.]

The accuser in a criminal process, where the penalty was not already

fixed by law, himself in the first instance assessed its amount, which the

judges confirmed or not as they thought proper. The first was called

τιμήσας, the second τιμᾶς, in accordance with the usual distinction of the

active and middle voice, as marking by their contrasted significations the

functions of the judge and the parties in the case, ἵμακας and δικαίωσας,

κρίνεις and κρίνουσας, &c.; the one administering justice and deciding the

question, whilst the others ‘get this done for them’ by the intervention of

another. Aristotle has here neglected this ordinary distinction, for

reasons best known to himself. As far as the phrase ὁ παθὼν ἐτίμησεν
is concerned, the reason is supposed to represent the estimate by the deceased of his own wrongs as of equal authority with a judicial decision: but this will not apply to τιμή and τίμη may denote an 'estimate' in general, the use of the verb here must be regarded rather as a departure from ordinary usage, than as a solecism, or violation of the laws of the language.

On the συνήγορος, see Schneider's note on Pol. vi 5. 10, vol. ii, p. 391, and addenda, pp. 502-4. συνήγορον here is not technical: there is no reason to suppose that it denotes one of the public συνήγορος, appointed by the state.

Lastly, the entire topic, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑπαψί—ἐκίσσα, is thus illustrated by Schrader: 'Septi Tarquinii flagitium ideo maius est, quod illius foeditate inducta Lucretia sibi ipsi vix intulit. (This is suggested by Victorius.) Et Appii Claudii decemvirii sceleratum de L. Virginini filia iiducium eo sceleratus est, quoniam pater illo commotus filiam interfecit (Liv. III 48).'

§ 4. 'And any crime that is unique, or the first of its class (that has been committed), or has been seldom paralleled'. These three cases of especial prominence have been already applied to acts as topics of praise, E 9. 38. See in illustration the references there given.

'And the frequent commission of the same offence magnifies it': because this shews the deprived habit, or confirmed state, the ἐξει which constitutes vice. 'Nec enim est casu aut affectus, sed habitu et pravitate animi, delinquit.' Schrader.

'And any crime for which any checks and preventives or penalties have been sought and found (invented or discovered), as, for instance, at Argos a penalty is incurred by any one on whose account a law has been enacted (i.e. one of the εὐλογεῖν, or (if I may coin a word for the occasion) θεμιστικὸν, τίμων), or on whose account the prison was built': supply ἡμιόνοις. This same topic has been already employed in the opposite sense, to heighten the praise due to an action, c. 9 § 38. Schrader quotes in illustration Lysias, Or. XXII § 1β (καὶ τῶν στρατεύων), οὔτω δὲ νάλαι τῷ τούτων παραργήν καὶ εἰκονολαθὴ νῦν ἐγνωκεν, διὸν ἐκ τούτων δίδοοι ἔλεγε τοὺς διμαραθύμοις φιλάκας καταστήσεται, οὐ δὲ ναοῦν γυνῆς τῇ τύχῃ χερσὶ στρατεύων ἀνελκεφόρων; the appointment of a special board of officers for the control of the corn-market signalsizes the special rascality of the dealers.

§ 5. 'And the more brutal the crime is, the worse'; that is, the nearer approach it makes to the conduct and instincts of a mere animal or brute, who is incapable of virtue and self-control; and the more cruel, savage, 'inhuman' it is, more degraded below the level of humanity.

There are three degrees in the scale of natures, moral and intellectual, (1) the beast, (2) the man, and (3) the god. Thus, Pol. 1 2, 1253 a 27, it is
5 desmu'thion φιλοδομήθη. kai to θηριωδεστερον ἀδι-
said of a man that is incapable of society, or is in want of nothing, being all-sufficient to himself, that he is ἡ θηρίον ἡ θέα; in respect of this complete independence he is either below or above all the various wants, instincts, affections, desires, aims, and aspirations that characterize humanity. Precisely the same view appears in the little disquisition on θηρίον at the opening of Book VII of the Nicom. Ethics, except that here the distinction between the three natures is made to rest solely upon intellectual and moral virtue: this is human, whereas the beast and the god are alike incapable of it, the beast, from the defects already stated, being below the human standard, the gods above it.

On this superiority of the gods to the practice of moral or human virtue and their entire independence of it, see Eth. Nic. x 8. A fine fragment of Cicero’s lost dialogue de Philosophia sive Hortensius, quoted by Augustine, de Trinitate xiv c. 9, is manifestly borrowed, not translated, from this passage of Aristotle. It is printed in Nobbe’s edition of Cicero, p. 1171, fragm. 35.

Here therefore ‘brutality’ consists in the absence of all capacity for virtue, moral and intellectual, and is consequently opposed to τὴν ὑπαρ ἡμᾶς δρατην, ἡμαν ὑμας καὶ θείας. This brutal nature, like the divine, is extremely rare amongst mankind. (This statement is qualified in Pol. III 11, 1281 b 19, ai to τι διποδομον ζωτοι τῶν θηρίων δε ὅσοι εἰσίν; ἄλλα περὶ τι πλήρος οὔτε ἦμαλ διήθει καλῶς τὸ λεγεῖν). It is found chiefly in ‘barbarians’. ‘Barbarous’ and ‘barbarity’ in fact express pretty nearly the same notion of character.) Again, the absence of all moderation in the indulgence of our desires and emotions and general want of self-control is characteristic of the ‘brutal’ nature; Ib. c. 6, 1148 b 34, τὸ μὲν ἄλο πάντων ἢ μᾶς τινὸς ἢ μᾶς τῶν ὄρων ὡς τῆς καλῆς, καθότερ καὶ ἡ θηρίας.

And again, 1145 a 4, τὰν ὑπερβαλλόντα καὶ ἐφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ δοκιμασία καὶ γυμνήτητα αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοηματώδεις εἶναι. And these are then illustrated, ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις τοὐτοίς οἷς δεδώκει τάξη, ἔνας νόμος μός, θηριώδες δειλίας δειλίας … καὶ τῶν ἐφροσύνον οἱ μὲν ἐκ φύσεως εἶσθεν καὶ μόνος αἴσθησις τότες θηριώδεις. (ἀθηρίας is the characteristic of ‘animal life’ in general; that which distinguishes animals from plants. de Anima.) Brutal ‘tastes’ or instincts are illustrated a little earlier in the same chapter, 1048 b 20 seq. Brutal (or animal) pleasures are those which we have in common with the lower animals; the pleasures of feeling and taste; in the over-indulgence of which, this form of bestiality lies, III 13, 1118 a 23—b 4. Gaisford refers to Magna Moralia II 5 init., ὡς δὲ ἡ θηριώδες ὑπερβαλλόντος τις κακίας τῶν γὰρ τινας παντελῶς θαμος φαίλον σοι” αὐθεντικόν φαιμεν εἶναι ἄλλα θηρίων, δε οὐσίας τοιαύτης θηρίωτης. ἡ δ’ αἰσθητική ἀρτών ταύτην ὑποτήτως αὐτῶν αὐθένταν, ὡς δὲ τοιαύτη ὑπὲρ ἀθρόων οὖσα, οἷον ἡμαν τις καὶ θεία: expressions directly taken from the passages of Eth. N. vii just quoted. Finally, the instinctive ὀρέξεις (θυμὸς καὶ ἐνέσθημα) belong to this animal part of our nature, and are therefore not always under our control; Pol. III 16, 1267 a 28; where the divine part of our nature, the controlling, regulating, intelligent νοῦς, is contrasted with the lower instincts of the brute elements of our nature, the emotional and appetitive.
κημά μεῖζον. καὶ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ ὅι ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἑλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥητορικὰ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀμύθηκε δίκαια ἢ π. 49. ὑπερβέβηκεν, οίον ὅρκους δεξίαις πιστείς εἵπεμαίας.

'And when it arises from or is due to malice aforethought'. προνοία is the 'forethought', the deliberate vicious purpose which constitutes 'malice prepense', aggravates a wrong act in proportion to its intensity and the length of time during which the evil intent has been nursed; and converts an act otherwise innocent into a crime. The προνοία is that which distinguishes murder from homicide. It is in fact the moral προούσινε, distinctive of vice and virtue, of which an account has been already given in the first note on this chapter. See the passage of Eth. Nic. v 10, there quoted. Comp. Rhet. 1 13.10. There ἐκ προνοίας is identified with the (in Ethica) more ordinary ἐκ προούσινε. ὅταν ἕκ προούσινε (ἡ βίθα) ἄκυκλο καὶ μοχθόρα. ἴδια καὶ ἕκ τὰ ἐκ θεοῦ (actions which are done in a state of violent excitement, under the impulse of overpowering passion, are considered as involuntary, and exempted from the penalty of crimes) οἰκ ἐκ προνοίας πρίντευ. The case quoted by Schrader from Magna Moralia 1 17, of a woman who had caused the death of her lover by a love-potion which she had sent him only with the view of inflaming his passion, and was consequently acquitted by the court of Areopagus on the charge of murder, because the act was done without deliberate malevolent intent, is a case of ἀμάρτημα (one of those in which the wrong done does not amount to a crime), in which the mischief is done without due knowledge of the circumstances of the case. In Demosth. c. Aristocr. p. 634, there is a similar distinction between two kinds of ἀμορφοφοί: in one sense the name is applied ἐκ ἀμορφοφοί φόνοι, and to acts of this kind 'a wise and humane law', πώς ἀμορφοφοί καὶ καλῶς κτίμουσ, does not apply the name of murder; from this are immediately afterwards distinguished ὅταν ἐκ προνοίας (φοβώσαντες). Aeschines c. Ctesiph. § 212, ἐλεφε τραύματος ἐκ προνοίας γραφὰς γραφόμενος. Dinarch. c. Demosth. § 6, τῶν ἐκ προνοίας φῶν. Compare Cíc. de Off. 1 8, sub fin. Sed in omni insitistis permutim interest utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitata fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt quae repentinò aliquo mortu accident quam ea quae meditata ac praefarata inferuntur.

'And any act, or wrong done, which inspires the hearers rather with terror than compassion'. An act which tends to consequences which inspire terror, the stronger emotion, in those who may be exposed to the like treatment, must plainly be more striking in its character and important in its social effects, more noxious and prejudicial, and worse in general, than one which excites mere pity or sympathy with the sufferer, without raising alarm on account of what may follow to oneself. That which excites terror must be terrible; formidable and dangerous to the individual or society. An atrocious crime makes men tremble, and fear expels pity; the stronger emotion overpowers the weaker. Comp. Rhet. 11 8. 5 and 12, 'Amasis shed no tears when he saw his son led away to
death, but wept when his friends asked an alms': τούτο μὲν γὰρ ἔλεησέν, δεύτερο δὲ δεύτερον τὸ γὰρ δεύτερον ἔτερον τοῦ ἔλεησέν καὶ ἐκρούσατο τὸ ἔλεος καὶ πολλὰς τὰς ἐναρκτιφ χρήσεις. Victorius quotes Cic. Tusc. Qu. III 27, Constabat etsi qui incidentem vulneribus Gn. Pompeium vidissent, quum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timentem quod se classis hostium circumsuros viderent, nihil tuum aliud egisse nisi ut remiges hortarentur, et ut salutem adipsicerentur fuga: posteaquam Tyrum venissent tum affectari lamentarique coepisse.

'And the rhetorical artifices or exaggerations' (such as αδικήσεις, διαφωτισμοί, rhetorical tricks for giving extra importance and interest to a subject; or for magnifying, exaggerating, intensifying the atrocity, enormity, of a crime), 'for instance, that the accused (whose crime you desire to magnify) has subverted many principles (or obligations) of justice at once, or transgressed them; for instance, oaths, the right hand (pledge of faith, καὶ δεξιὰ τὰς ἐπείσεις, 11. B 341), 'all confidence or good faith, all the laws of intermarriage, and the rest; for this is an excess of many crimes over the one which has really been committed'; or 'a multiplication of one crime into many'.

The exaggeration of this rhetorical fallacy lies in the enumeration, and apparent accumulation, of offences by division of the single offence into its parts, or the repetition—as in the instance—of the same offence under different names, which seems thus to swell its bulk and magnify its enormity. This is the reverse application of the same rhetorical artifice of exaggeration as has been already referred to in I 7. 31 (see note), the methods of διαφωτισμοί εἰς τὰ μέρη, συνθεσίας, and ἔνωσις κατ' ἐπιπέδης applied to the 'amplification' of good things; the object and use of them being stated in nearly the same words, πλείως γὰρ ὑπερέχει ταῖς φαντασίαις.

ἀναιρεῖν, 'to take up, so as to remove, annul, or destroy'; here tollere, subvertere. The simple verb, as well as the phrase ἀναιρεῖν ἐκ μέσου—comp. Lat. de medio, e medio tollere (Cic., Liv.) is common in Demosth., Aesch. and the Orators, and occurs occasionally in other writers, as Plato and Xenophon, with words like νέμω, τὸ δίκαιον, διαφέρων, ἐνικήσεως (Plato), or τόλμειν, πολιτείαν, ἀλαχράντας (Xenoph.).

Gaisford illustrates the various forms of pledges or guarantees here mentioned by a corresponding passage in Arist. Acharn. 306, πάντ' ὅσ' ἄν καλὸς λέγω ἂν, ἐνεργεῖν ως' ἄναξ οὖν οὖν ὁμοίος οὖν πίστις οὗθ' ὄρεις μένειν.

ἐνέργεια, ius commissi, the right of intermarriage between different states, together with the rules and obligations which it entails, which are here in question. On the 'reciprocal' ἐν, 'inter', see note on ἐνέργειας σκηνας I 13. 9, p. 251.

§ 6. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα (δικαίως) οὐ κ.ρ.λ.] 'and to commit a crime in the very place where offenders are punished' is an aggravation of the criminality; 'which is the case with perjurers or false witnesses: for where would a man not commit a crime if he is ready to do it even in the very court of justice?' This is the argumentum a forti or; the rule, omne
maius continet in se minus. ‘Hinc P. Clodii culpam amplificavit Cicero, cum insidias Gn. Magnum per servum tollere eum voluisse pro Milone dicens criminarum est: Insidiatorem erat in foro collocatus, atque in vestibuulo senatus’ [pro Milone § 19], Victorius. (Victorius has forgotten the still more striking Etiam in senatum venit, &c. of the first speech against Catiline, § 2.) The sanctity of the place converts theft into sacrilege. The atrocity of the murder of ‘Zacharias the son of Barachias’ was heightened by the circumstance of its occurrence ‘between the temple and the altar’ (Matt. xxiii. 35).

‘Another aggravation of an offence is, where it is attended by disgrace (to the victim); and this in proportion to its amount (μάλιστα).’ This, together with the wantonness, the unprovoked character of the aggression, is what converts a mere assault, ἀλα, into an act of δέμος, a wanton outrage. See Rhet. II 2. 5, definition of δέμος, and I 13. 10; also note on I 11. 26, p. 239. The wound inflicted on a man’s pride and sense of dignity, the injury to his feelings and honour, constitute a great aggravation of the offence. δέμος is, τὸ διότι καὶ λογίων ἐφ’ ὀσι ἀλεξίην ἐστὶ τῷ πάθεων κ.κ.α. In II 6. 2, ἀλεξίην is defined, λόγον τινά ἢ ἀρχήν τῇ τῇ ἔκδοσιν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν ἢ παράπτωσιν ἢ γεγονότων ἢ ἐλθόντων...ἐκ τοῖς τούτοις τῶν κακῶν δοκεῖ δοκεῖ ἐξαι ἔν δόλῳ ἢ ἀν ἐν φροντίδα.

καὶ εἰ τούτων (τὸ διότι τοι) ‘and another is, when the victim of his wrong has been his beneficiary; for his offence is thereby multiplied; in that he not only does what is wrong (positive wrong, a sin of commission), but also fails, omits, to do what is right (negative wrong, a sin of omission). The last explanatory clause is thus illustrated by Victorius from Cicero’s criticism of the third Stoic Paradox, § 25 ὅτι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀμφιβολίᾳ καὶ τῇ κατοχήματα. Illud tamen interest quod in servum necando, si adsit inuria, semel peccatur; in patria vita violanda multa peccantur; violator is qui procreavit; is qui aluit: is qui erudivit; is qui in sede ac domo atque in republica collocavit: multitudine peccatorum praestat (ὑπερήψει), ecque poena maiore dignus est.

§ 7. ‘And an offence against the unwritten laws of right’ (is worse than the violation of a written or positive law): ‘because it is indicative of a better character and disposition, of a higher degree of virtue, to do right without compulsion’. (Any external force destroys the voluntary character of an act, and therefore its virtue. And if this voluntary obedience to the unwritten law implies a more virtuous disposition than that which is enforced by the positive enactments which have power to compel it, then the opposite is true, an act of disobedience to the unwritten law is a worse offence, and a sign of a more vicious disposition,
than the violation of the other.) 'Now the written laws are compulsory, the unwritten are not'.

'From another point of view', (in another way of arguing or looking at the case; Rhetoric κωλογος κτος εναποντικα, I § 12) the crime is worse 'if it be a breach of the written law: for (it may be argued) if a man does wrong when it is dangerous (fearful) and liable to penalty, (a fortiori) he would do it when it is not'. This again is by the rule omnes minus continent in se minus; the greater and more powerful inclination to wrong necessa-

riely involves the less.

φοβερα] acts fearful, alarming, formidable, from the probable con-
sequences. Supply the cogn. accus. αδικηματα.

ἐπιζημα] Note on I 4. 9, ἐντεκον, p. 66.

εἰρηται] 'so much for', 'enough of', 'no more of'; note on εἰρηθα, I 11. 29.

CHAP. XV.

The general sense and connexion of the contents of this chapter upon the ἄρχειν πλονεις of the practice of Rhetoric, those adjuncts of proof and external supports of the case, which consist in the various kinds of evi-
dence which can be adduced by the pleader in confirmation of his state-
ments and arguments, have been already given in the Introduction to this Commentary, pp. 193—207, to which I now refer and which I need not here repeat. They are called 'unartistic' or 'inafficial' because they are not due to the artist's inventive skill, but are supplied to him from the outside, as it were, of his art; and all that he has to do is to use them to the best advantage. Rhet. I 2. 2. It is this distinction of two kinds of proof or modes of persuasion which explains the application of the term inventio by the Latin rhetoricians to that part of the art to which Aristotle first gave the name of ἄρχειν πλονεις, and the title of one of Cicero's rhetorical treatises, the de Inventione. The author him-
self, I. c., applies the term εἰρην to the ἄρχειν πλονεις.

In commenting therefore upon this chapter we shall have to occupy ourselves principally with the details of language, argument, and allu-

sion, and so fill up the outline which has been sketched out in the Intro-
duction.

§ 1. 'Next to the subjects already discussed' (the ἄρχειν πλονεις, the logical or dialectical proofs of Rhetoric and their topics in cc. 4—14), 'we have to run over (give a hasty sketch, or summary of) what are called the unartistic proofs, or modes of persuasion, because' (γαρ, this is the appropriate place for them, because we have just been engaged upon the
§ 3. χρηστον προσφέρουσα i.e. πας δια των χρήσατον αυτοίς προσφέρουσα. The verbal adjective can be resolved into διά with an indefinite object, with which the participle is made to 'agree'. Demosth. Olynth. β. 21, 24. πολλή διά των μετάτασις καὶ μεγάλου δικαιού τῶν μεταβαλλομένων εξήγωσα. Other examples in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 447. 4.

It appears from the addition of προσφέρουσα and διασφέρουσα that the first of the ἔργα πλεοτέρων, the laws, are not confined to forensic practice, but can also be used by the deliberative orator in addressing a public assembly: and this is true also of some kinds of witnesses, viz. the 'authorities' appealed to in support of a statement, which may be as serviceable in enforcing considerations of public policy, the συμφέρον καὶ διάφορον, as the δίκαιον καὶ δικαίου of a legal process in a court of justice; see § 16. The original statement therefore of § 1, ἵνα γάρ αὕτω τῶν δικαστών, requires modification.

§ 4. ἵναν τὰ πράγματα 'opposed to the facts on our side, to our view of the case'. Comp. infr. § 12.

§ 5. With ὅτι here, and in the following topics, λακέω or something similar must be supplied from χρηστόν, §§ 3—4.
τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἁριστῇ τούτῳ ἐστὶν, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς 6 χρήσιθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικές ἂεὶ μὲνει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδὲ τὸ κοινὸς (κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ ἐστὶν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις ὀθέν εἰρηταὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ Σωφροκλέους Ἀρτιγόνης ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι έθαψε παρὰ τὸν τῶν Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἀγραφόν·

οὐ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κάχβες, ἀλλ' ἂεὶ ποτε.

ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενὸς.

7 καὶ ὅτι τὸ δικαίων ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν ὃς τ' οὖν νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ

νὸμος τῇ ἁριστῇ] Supply κρίνειν or διαίζειν; the former is expressed in Κνεί. 1125 of τοῦ γνώμη τῇ ἁριστῇ κρίνειν. This was the dicasts' oath, taken when they entered the court. The usual form was γνώμη τῇ δικαιώτῃ. Dem. c. Aristocr. 652 sub fin. γνώμη τῇ δικαιώτῃ δικαιῶν ἀμαρτάκινος (ὁ δικασταῖ), οὐ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξα αὐτὲν ἀν ἀκούσις παρατάσσεται... παρ' γὰρ ὁ μήτε ἄλλον μήτ' ἐρωτευταί τοὺς ἐφοδοῦν μήτ' ἄλλην ἄλλης πρόβασιν μηδεμίως, παρ' ὁ γεγράφη, δήμους τῆς ψηφίας εὐσέβει...ἀλλ' δὲ τὰ εἰς εὑς δικαίων προδίδοντα ἢ διαφαγός, ὡς τό τ' ἀνήκει τῷ δικαστῷ, συνελεγμένος δι' ἑαυτὸν τῆς δικαίωτης. Bocot. de Nom. 1006. 27, ἀλλ' μὴν ἀν γ' ἐν μή οὐδ' νόμοι γνώμη τῇ δικαιώτῃ δικαίων ὁμολογήσει. adv. Lept. 493. 1. Ar. Pol. III 16, 1287 a 25, ἀλλ' μὴν οὐκ ἂν γε μὴ δοκεί δύσομαι διαρίσεις ἢ νόμος, οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπων ἢ δύσαται γνωρίζεις. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ θυμίζωμεν τὸ νόμος ἐφιάστη σα πολλα τῇ δικαιώτῃ γνώμη κρίνειν καὶ δικαιῶν τοὺς ἄρχεται, which explains the meaning and object of the oath.

The form of the oath is found in Pollux viii. 10 [ὁ δ' ἄφος ἐφ τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν δι' ἄλλοις φαινόμενον ἐκάθεν τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ἄλλοις, γνώμῃ τῇ δικαιώτῃ]; see Meier & Schömann, Attischer Process, p. 128; comp. p. 135.

νὸμος τῇ ἁριστῇ χρήσιθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις] The meaning of the oath is, 'that the judges are not to employ, i.e. to enforce, to its full extent, in its strict and literal interpretation, the rigour of the written statute'.

§ 6. 'And that equity and the universal law are constant and unchangeable, like the laws of nature whose operation is uniform; to which the appeal is made in Sophocles Antigone (line 450 seq.); for her defence is, that the burial (of her brother) was indeed against Creon's law, but not against that which is unwritten'. οὐδὲ τὸ κοινὸς (μεταβάλλει).

§ 7. ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν διαμενον ἀρθοῦτο κ.τ.λ. 'and that justice is something real, genuine, and salutary, but this sham, apparent justice (the rigorous interpretation) is not. And therefore the written law, the letter of the statute, is not; because it sometimes—and this is one of the cases—does not do the proper work of the law', which is to do substantial, not merely apparent and fallacious justice, that which which seems to be,
POIHE τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ἀσπερ ἀργυρογράμμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κιβώτιον καὶ τὸ ἀλθῆς. καὶ ὅτι βελτίων ἄνδρος τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφων ἡ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρησθαί καὶ ἐμ-9-μένειν. καὶ εἷς ἐναντίος νόμων εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἡ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁ λοιπόν ἐνιοτό ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἰναι ἅ-ττ' τ. 50. ἀν συνδέεται, ὁ δὲ ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ

but is not justice. On the superiority of natural justice to positive enactments, see Cicero, de Legg. l 15, referred to in Intro. p. 194.

And we may further argue that the judge is like an assayer of coin and appointed for the purpose of distinguishing base justice from genuine'.


στεκαὶ. Τινὲς οὖν τούτους καλεῖς; Ἀργυρογράμμων. Pollux, vii § 170. To the same family of words belong ἀργυρογράμμων Agam. 768 (see Blomfield's Glossary) a 'discerner of the trick', one that can distinguish the several sheep of a flock; hence 'a judge of character'; ἀργυρογράμμων in the same metaphorical sense, Aesch. Fragm. Tox. 224 Dind. Cf. φωστογράμμων, Ar. de Gen. Anim. iv 3. 32, and on φωστογράμμων, as an art (the study of character from the indications of the features and other external peculiarities), see Anal. Pr. ii 27, 70 ὁ 7—38; and the treatise φωστογραμμωτικα, printed with Aristotle's works, Bekk. Vol. ii. p. 805. Compare Cic. de Fato, 5. 10 (quoted in Blomfield's note, as 'De Nat. Deor. i 8'), Quid? Socratem nonne legitimus, quemadmodum notaris Zephyrus, physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum morem naturalem ex corpore osculis visuits frontis percepte? Compare, lastly, the simple γνώμων, Xen. Memor. i 4. 5 (ap. Blomfield), of the tongue as distinguishing between sweet and bitter, and Agam. 1599, θεοφάνων γνώμων ἅρως.

§ 8. See Introd. p. 194. Correct there the second line of the quotation, Hor. i Ep. xvi. 52, which should be, το nikil admittis in ta formidine poenas: 'tu' is addressed to men in general, and therefore the second line speaks as generally as the first. Schrader appears to refer this topic to c. 7 § 12, καὶ δυον ἀρχῶν τὸ ἄκο τῆς μειονος μαίζων, for its authority; the topic of § 16, καὶ ὁτρητε μὴ ὁτρητε...τὸ μᾶν γαρ τέλος, τὸ δ' οὐ τέλος, is equally applicable.

§ 9. 'Or if the (written) law (which is against us) chance (wou) to be contradictory, either to any other law of repute, or to itself; as, for example, in some cases one law enacts the validity of all contracts whatsoever, whilst the other (of the two opposite laws) forbids the contracting of any engagement contrary to the law (except those that the law allows). On this Victorius, 'Exemplum hoc est leges legi repugnantis; αὐτωμελα
10 τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὡστε στρέψειν καὶ ὄραν ἐφ’ ὁποτέραν τὴν ἁγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφορ- 11 μόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἰτὰ τοῦτο χρὴσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ’ οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκὲν μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατεύν τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτη 12 πρὸς τὸν νόμον. εάν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ πρὸς τὸ

autem id vocatur. Alterius vero exerthplum, cum lex aliqua secum ipsa discordat, omisit, ut rei suæ vi satis notæ.

§ 10. This very elliptical sentence must apparently be thus filled up, καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος (ὁ νόμος, χρηστὸς αὐτῷ from §§ 3, 4, or λέκτων), ὅσον (so as to, in such a way as to...) στρέψειν (αὐτὸν) καὶ ὀρὰν κ. κ. λ. ‘and if the law (which we have to interpret) be ambiguous, (we must deal with it, treat it, or interpret it) in such a way as to wrest (twist) it (in either direction according as it suits our purpose) and to see to which of the two constructions either strict justice (the letter of the law) or expediency, i. e., equity, (whichever of the two we are arguing for) will adapt itself, and then employ that’ ὑπ’ αὐτὸν here stands for ‘equity’ because: by accommodating itself to the varying circumstances of particular cases it is more ‘generally serviceable’ than the stiff unbending letter of the law. ἁγωγὴ (τοῦ νόμου) ‘leading’, ‘guiding’ of the law. This ‘leading of the law’ represents the law itself as leading those who have to use it by the ‘interpretation’ or ‘construction’ that may be put upon it in one or another direction, and corresponds exactly to ducitur in the phrase ducit litterarum. The following passage of the Politics, VI (IV) 5, 1292 ὅ 12, throws light upon this use of ἁγωγή, and as they mutually illustrate one another I will quote it entire. οὐ δὲ δὴ λαβάνων διὰ πολλῶν συμβάλλειν διὸς τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὴν ἁγωγὴν πολλῶν καὶ δημοτικὴν, ἀμφότερος δὲ καὶ πάντων πάνω ἄλλως τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἰς πολιτείαν δημοτικωμένην, τῇ δ’ ἁγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔλεγχοις χειρισθοῦσα μᾶλλον. Here again the ἁγωγή is τοῦ νόμου, the leading, direction given to, or interpretation put upon the law in the actual practice of the society. The difference which sometimes arises between the theory of the constitution as laid down in the laws, and the actual administration and conduct of the government, is accounted for, first, by the character and habits of the people, either natural to them or as cultivated and formed by education; and secondly, by the ‘direction’ they give to, or the ‘interpretation’ they put upon, the actually existing laws, in accordance with the character which they wish to give to the practical administration of the government. Compare καθ’ αὐτῶν ἁγωγὴ τὴν πολιτείαν, c. 11, 1296 a 26, and Thuc. 11 65, of Pericles’ direction of the state policy, καὶ οὐκ ἔγειρο μᾶλλον ὅπ’ αὐτῶν (τοῦ πλῆθους) ἡ αὐτὸς ἤγετη.


§ 12. The highly condensed contents of this section, which gives the other side of the foregoing arguments for the treatment of laws, shewing

AR. I.
πράγμα, το τε γνώμη την ἄριστη λεκτένν ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἕνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοοησθῇ τι λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἑπιορκῇ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἅγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κείσθαι ή μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυωτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ιατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀμαρτία τοῦ ιατροῦ ὅσον τὸ εὐίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖ τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφότερον ζητεῖν ἦναι, τούτῳ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινομένοις νόμοις απαγορεύεται.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διώρισθω· περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρες εἰσὶ δικτοῖ, οἱ μὲν παλαιοὶ οἱ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κυνύνου οἱ δ᾽ ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τοὺς τε

how to argue when the written law is in our favour, have been developed in extenso in the Intro. p. 195—6, and we may now proceed to the details. ὅτι το πράγμα] 'in favour of our case' as τὸ πράγματι § 4.

τὸ ἀπλῶς, τὸ αὐτῷ I 7. 35, καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and note there.

παρασοφίζεσθαι 'to attempt to outdo (to go beyond, παρά) the physician (note the generic τῶν; one of the two uses of the definite article, to mark the member of a class) in skill and subtlety, ingenuity and cleverness'. The proverb, 'to be wiser than your physician', is applied to ἰδιώται who pretend to rival the professors, τέχνησις οὐ σοφοῖ, men of special knowledge, skill, and experience in any art or science. In Athen. p. 137 F, quoted by Victorius, the verb stands for 'over refining' in the art of cookery, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ λαβύριν κράει ταχύτητος εἰς τάργας διακειμένων μαστυνοθεῖται, δὲ παρασοφιζόμενον τονηρῷ.

τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφότερον ζητεῖν εἶναι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Cleon ap. Thuc. III 37, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τῶν νόμων σοφότεροι βουλονται φαίνεσθαι...καὶ οὐ τοῦτον τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰ πόλεις: and a little before, τῶν δὲ δεικνυτῶν εἰ...μήδε γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χείρος νόμων ἀκείμενος χρωμένη πόλις κραίτουται εἰς καλῶς ἢ καλῶς ἐχούσοιν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τα ὑπ᾽ ἀρχηγο琮 ἀφολογημένον ἢ δεῖγμα non ἀκολούθιον, κ.τ.λ. Bacon, de Augmentis, Lib. VIII. Aphor. 58 (Vol. i. p. 316, ed. Ellis and Spedding), quotes this maxim as proverbial, 'licet enim non male dictum sit, neminem sorditer e labedit esse sapientiorum;' on which Ellis has this note, 'Bacon refers perhaps to D'Argentré's maxim, Stultm videtur sapientia quaæ lege vult sapientior viderti. In the passage from which these words are taken he is condemning the presumption of judges who depart from the text on the pretence of equity—which is precisely what the advocate is supposed to be doing here.'

ΠΗΣΟΙΚΗΣ Α 15 § 13. 275

ποιητας και ὁσων ἄλλων γνωρίσων εἰσὶ κρίσεις φανεραί, οἷον Ἀθηναίου Ὄμηρος μάρτυρι ἔχρισαντο περὶ Σαλαμίνος καὶ Τενέδιοι ἐναγχος Περιάνδρῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ πρὸς Σιγεεις. καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου

κρίσεις φανεραὶ 'decisions, judgments, published, or notorious'. Quint. v 11. 36, Adhibetur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. Haec secuti Graecos, a quibus κρίσεις dicuntur, judicia aut indicationes vocant ...si quid ita visum gentibus, φησι πρὸς ἔντεκανόν, καὶ σαβεγεινότοι viris, claris civibus, illustribus poëtis (all γνώριμοι) referri potest.

οἷον Ἀθηναίοι Ὅμηρος μάρτυρι ἔχρισαντο περὶ Σαλαμίνος] Quint. u. s. § 40 (as an instance of the appeals to 'authorities' mentioned in § 36), Neque est ignobile exemplum, Megareos ab Atheniensibus, quum de Salamin contenderit victos Homeri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omni edidicere repetitur, significans Aiacem navem suas Atheniensibus iuxtiss. The 'versus' or rather two verses here in question are, II. B 557—8, [Ἤκε δὲ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυσαθένει νῆσος, στῆθος δὲ ἕγης, ὅ Ἀθηναῖοι ἱστασαν φάλαγγαν] which were quoted by Solon (and said to have been interpolated by him in the text of Homer for that purpose, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Sol. § 48) as an 'authority' in favour of the Athenian claim to the possession of Salamis. See Heyne, Paley, and Trollope's notes on the passage of Homer, Plut. Vit. Sol. c. 10, Strabo, Attica, ix 1. Plutarch says that the current opinion in his time attributed the interpolation of the line (th: second of the two) to Solon, though the Athenians denied it: in Strabo's time it was condemned by the critics: he enters at length into the question, and gives the reasons for rejecting the verse. Another well-known instance of the authority of a γνώριμος, or distinguished man, is the proverbial αὐτὸς ὁ φήμη, ἵππος διήμενος of the disciples of Pythagoras.

καὶ Τενεδίου ἐναγχος κ.τ.λ.] Of this event, 'recent' at the time of Aristotle's writing, nothing more is known than we learn from this passage. 'Ex verbis his colligo', says Victorius, 'Tenedi insulae incolas cum Sigeensibus disceptantes usos et ipsis prisco teste Periandro: qui, quamvis multis antea saeculis mortuus esset, poema reliquerat quo praecipua quaedam ad beate vivendum, ὑποδήμα vocatae a Graecis, continebantur. Laertius qui vitam ipsius scripsit hoc narrat: in eo autem, ut suspiciari licet, alicquid fuit quod causam Tenediorum adiuvaret.'

Κλεοφῶν] a mischievous profligate demagogue, who took a leading part in public affairs at Athens during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War. He was tried and condemned by the Council during the siege of Athens in 405 B.C. One of the results of the political rivalry between him and Critias, one of the leaders of the opposite party, was this charge which he brought against him, at some time not ascertained. The various references to him in Aristophanes, Xenophon, and the Orators, will be found in the article on him in Smith's Dict. of Biography, and other particulars respecting his habits and character in Meineke, Fragm. Com. Graec. 1 p. 171 seq., in the account of the play bearing his name, which Plato the Comic poet wrote to assail him.

Κριτίου] The person accused by Cleophon was the well-known oli-
τοῖς Σόλωνος ἔλεγειοι ἔχρισατο, λέγων ὃτι πάλαι ἀσέλγης ἢ οὐκία. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἵπποισε Σόλων ἐισεῖν μοι Κριτία πυρρότριχι πατρός ἀκούειν.

garchical leader, one of the thirty tyrants, maternal uncle of Plato the philosopher, and great-grand-nephew of Solon, Plat. Charm. 155 a. He was son of Callaeschrus, ibid. 153 c, who was the son of another Critias, son of Dropides, brother of Solon. Comp. Tim. 20 e.

Cleophon, in his accusation, took occasion to quote 'as from an authority' some elegiac verses of Solon from whose family he was descended, to shew that reckless licentiousness was hereditary in the race.

ἀσέλγης] Hesychius δεδεμένος, δεδομένος. Gram. ap. Bekk. Anecd. 1 451, ἀσέλγης, παύ τὸ σφυρίκων καὶ βλαστ., καὶ ἀσέλγης ἢ μετὰ εὐπρεσιού καὶ δραστήριον βλαστ., καὶ ἀσέλγης ὁ ἀνάγωνος (intractable, unmanageable, like 'unbroken' horses and dogs, Xenophon, from αὐτήμ, 'to train or educate').

Δημοκράτης (c. Mid. 521, 2), καὶ ὁ κομικός. "Ὅσκορ αὐτίκοις ἐλεύθερος ἀσέλγης γενομένου (Eupolis, Fr. Inc. XXV. Meineke, Vol. II. p. 558). ὁ δὲ αὐτίκων (οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα) ὁ δὲ ἀσέλγης (Pherocres, Fragm. Inc. XXIX. Meineke, I. 348). ἀσέλγης στάμμα, Eupolis, δίς. Hence it appears that the primary sense of the word is 'untamed or untameable', from α and βλάστεων (on the analogy of ἄμυς ἐμμικτός', unmingled', one who cannot be soothed, charmed, tamed; hence violent, extravagant, excessive—Arist. Plut. 559, παρὰ τὸ μέν (πλατύς) γὰρ ποδοράτας καὶ γαστράθεις καὶ παγόημα καὶ πικοῦς πειράτας ἀσέλγης, 'extravagantly fat'—and specially in the indulgence of the appetites and passions, reckless in character and conduct; licentious, profligate to excess. Arist. Pol. VIII (v) 5, sub init. διὰ τὴν τὸν δημόσιον ἀσέλγης, 'license' in conduct; ib. c. 6, 1305 b 40, γίγνονται δὲ μεταβολὰ τὴν ἀληθείαν καὶ ὅπως ἀναλάλωσι τὸ δεῖ ἅπαντα αὐτίκος, 'by a life of reckless extravagance'.

Πλατ. Rep. IV 424 e (the word is rare in Plato). Deinemh. Olynth. II 23. 19, Phil. IV. 131. 11, c. Mid. 521. 2 u. a., ap. eundem ἀσέλγης καὶ διακρίσεως, διάστεν τὸν ἄνδρα, χρῆσθαι τῷ

εἰσάγῃ μοι] This, and the following line of Solon's elegy, is quoted, with two variations from Aristotle's version, by Proclus ad Tim. 20 e,

εἰσέρχειν Κριτή ξανθότριχη σωρᾶς ἀκούειν

the father of Critias being Solon's brother, Dropides. These verses, which were probably intended by the author as a compliment to the father, are misconstrued by the malicious Cleophon into a reflection on the son, whose recklessness and licentiousness had brought upon him his father's displeasure: the authority of Solon is appealed to to shew that the grandson inherited his grandfather's vices. Whether κυριότριχι is another malicious perversion of Cleophon, on the hypothesis that red hair implies a licentious disposition, or depravity in general—as seems to have been the opinion of the Normans, who had the proverb, entre poil roux et fétion infâme, grant compagnie, (Wace, Roman de Rou, quoted by Sir F. Palgrave, Hist. of Norm. II 721)—or Aristotle, quoting from memory, has mish quoted, more so, cannot now be ascertained. At all events it is unlikely that Solon intended any such imputation on Critias' character, whatever may have been the case with Cleophon; for
14 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιούτοι μάρτυρες, Π. 1376. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἵον Θεοματοκλῆς, ὅτι ναμαχτέαν, τὸ ξύλινον τείχος λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, ὅσπερ εἴρηται, μαρ-

Critias is evidently considered as a boy or very young man from the tone of the address or message, and Victorius shews from Theocr. Id. viii. 3, ἄμμω ταῦτα ἔδρα, πυρὸς ἡμισφαιρία, ἄμμω ἄνθευ, that red hair in a boy in the eyes of the Greeks was a beauty and not a deformity. It seems to me that Solon wrote ἴωθηρηρη, as Proclus gives it, and that the other reading is due either to Cleophon's malice if we interpret it in δετερία, or to Aristotles's want of memory, if we take it as synonymous with ἴωθηρηρη. The evidence of Critias' ἰστεία derived from the verses is plainly a false inference of Cleophon and not really contained in the original: the statement in Plat. Charm. 157 Ε, that Solon wrote Elegies in praise of 'the house of Critias,' and spoke of its members as 'distinguished by personal beauty and virtue and all other so-called happiness,' is altogether against any such supposition. Victorius, who regards the inference drawn by Cleophon as justified by the language of the verses, endeavours to reconcile this with the eulogistic character of the elegy, by the remark that Critias may have been an exception to the general good character of his family. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 331, follows Proclus' version. The other variation, εἰσίν μοι, and εἰσίμενα, may be either another slip of Aristotle's memory, or εἰσίν μοι a mere false reading of εἰσίμενα, the one being very easily mistaken for the other.

Lastly, μοι, if it were retained, would be a good example of the δατινος εθικος corresponding in Greek to the familiar use of 'me' in the earlier English writers: as Shakespeare, Rob me the treasury; He smiled me in the face (Dame Quickly of Falstaff); See how this river comes me cranking in (Hotspur). [Abbott's Shaksp. Gr. § 220. 8.]

§ 14. χρησμολόγοι amongst whom Themistocles is included as the interpreter of an oracle which referred to future events, περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων, here denotes not merely professional soothsayers, but amateurs also who followed the diviner's craft. Herod., vii 141, gives the oracle here quoted: the verses run thus, τείχος Τριστυγείξε ξύλινων διδοι εὐφίσματα Ζεὺς μονὸν ἐπάρθην τελείως, τὸ σε τίκει τά ὀψήλα. c. 143 gives Themistocles' interpretation. The professional interpreters of the oracles are called χρησμολόγοι by Herodotus.

ἀλ παροιμίαι, ὅσπερ εἴρηται] These words will not bear the ordinary interpretation of ὅσπερ εἴρηται, 'as has been already said,' because this is not true. Therefore Victorius and Vater propose to render ὅσπερ as if it were ὅσπερ, ἄντισεμοι, 'proverbs are also used as evidence, such as has been mentioned'; viz. evidence of the future: and Muretus proposed καί τὸ ὅσπερ εἴρητα, 'and the 'as has been said,' any general remark that has been habitually made, whether proverbial or not. We may follow Victorius in his explanation, without however supposing that ὅσπερ is used in any but its literal and proper meaning 'proverbs are evidence, in the way that has been stated,' evidence (that is) of the future,
ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 15 §§ 14, 15.

τυρια ἐστὶν ὁποὶ εἰ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιεῖσθαι φίλου γέροντα, τοῦτα μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παρομία, 
μὴποτ' εὖ ἔρθει γέροντα.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς νυός ἀναρεῖν ἄν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας,

νῆπιος ὁ πατέρα κτείναις παῖδας καταλείπει.

15 πρόσφατοι δ' ὁσοὶ γυνώριμοι τι κεκρίκασιν χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τοῦτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν αμφιβητοτούσιν. ὁποῖοι Εὐθύμος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἔχρισατο

μὴποτ' εὖ ἔρθει γέροντα] Suidas, s. vν. δέροντα et μὴποτ' εὖ ἔρθειν, quotes the proverb at length, in two different forms, both of them corrupt. The proverb conveys the maxim εἰς δέροντα μὴ ἀπαλλάσθην. Gaissford from the materials supplied by Suidas has put together the following lines, μὴποτ' εὖ ἔρθει γέροντα, μὴδε παῖδα βάζασθον μὴ λαλητική γυναίκα, μὴδε γείνοντο κύνων μὴ ευθανάστην φίλουν, μὴ λάθον καυσῆτε. 


§ 15. Εὐθύμος. 'Αρσιλάτος ἡ γυναίκα (ψήφαμα ap. Dem. de Cor. § 29), a demagogue (so Harpocrat and the Schol.) orator and political opponent of Demosthenes, who menions him very frequently in de Cor., de F. Leg., and elsewhere. This Eubulus is omitted in Smith's Dict. of Biogr.; but Baiter and Sauppe, in their excellent Index Nominum (Orat. Att. 111. Ind. Nom. pp. 48, 9), have furnished a complete list of all the references to him from the Greek Orators, Scholiasts, and Lexicographers, which in some degree supplies the place of a biography. See also Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. p. 146 (and especially Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, i 173—191. §). He is attacked 'ab and apostrophized by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. §§ 290—293, and a passage of one of his speeches is referred to in § 292. 'Eubulus in the law-court (at the trial) employed against Chares the saying of Plato (the Comic poet) against Archibius, that "the avowal of knavery (rascality) has grown in the city." Meineke, in his Fragm. Comm. Gr. (Plat. Fragm. Inc. xli.) Vol. ii 692, merely quotes this passage without attempting to restore the verse or explain the allusion. In his Hist. Crit. (Fr. Com. Gr. i 161, note) he had proposed to substitute 'Αγτίδος for 'Αρχίδος in the text of
κατὰ Χάρτης ὡς Πλάτων εἶπε πρὸς Ἀρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδεδωκέν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖν ποιητῶν εἶναι.

16 καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἂν δόξησι ζευγδησθαί. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιούτῳ τῶν τοιούτων μόνον μάρτυρες εἰσίν, εἰ γέγονεν ἦ μή, εἰ ἐστίν ἦ μή, περὶ δὲ τῶν ποίον οὐ μάρτυρες, οἶον εἰ δίκαιον ἦ ἅδικον, εἰ συμ-17 φέρον ἢ ἀνώμφορον ὁ δὲ ἀπεθηκαί καὶ περὶ τούτων πιστότατοι. πιστότατοι δι οἱ παλαιοὶ· αἰδίάφοροι γάρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυρίων μάρτυρας μὲν μη ἐχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τούτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γνωμή τῇ αἴρεσι, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐστίν ἕξαπα-τήσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἄργωρφ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀλήσκεται

Aristotle, an opinion which is afterwards retracted in the other place referred to.

§ 16. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες...ζευγδησθαί] 'Those who share the danger' (with the person for whom they give evidence, i.e. are liable to the penalties of ἰευδομαρτυρία, as the other is to those of the offence with which he is charged) 'if they be suspected of falsehood', sc. πρόφηται εἰσί, are reckoned amongst 'recent' or contemporary witnesses. That they are so is shewn by their actual presence in court, and the risk they consequently run. See Intro. p. 196, for the explanation of the remainder of the section. δέξων. 'quia si credantur etiam mendaces falsique, non tantum si fuerint, plectuntur.' Victorius.

With οἱ συμφέρον ἢ ἀνώμφορον, which recognises this kind of ἰευδομ πίστει as available also in deliberative speaking, comp. § 3, and the note.

§ 17. οἱ ἀπεθηκαί i.e., according to the Greek usage, those who give their evidence, not at a distance (as we say) but from a distance, measuring the distance from the object to the subject. See note on i 11. 16, p. 213.

πιστώματα οἱ παλαιοί] Living witnesses may be corrupted, bribed to give false evidence: the ancient witnesses or authorities, appealed to in confirmation of statements or opinions, are inaccessible to corruption, and therefore most to be relied on.

πιστεύω, which seems to occur only in Aeschylus (Pers. 171 γεράλει πιστεύω, abstr. pro concr., for πιστοῖ γέραλες, and Choeph. 977, Eumen. 214, in the sense of 'pledge, guarantee, assurance') and in Empedocles and Clearchus and one or two late authors, is here no doubt connected with the rhetorical πιστεύω, and means the assurances that are produced in the minds of the audience by the rhetorical proofs alleged. It can hardly be identifiable with the πιστεύω themselves, though 'proofs' of some kind is the meaning required.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστων ἱκανάτησιν—ἰευδομαρτυρίῳ] Compare Hermogenes, περὶ οὕτως (Speng. Ἀθ. Gr. 11 p. 144), ὁ δὲ κατηγορός ἀποθανεῖ τῶν διά
§ 18. *Evidence (may be brought) either for ourselves or against the opposite party*; the indiscriminate *peril*; *about*, *concerning*, takes its specific meaning from the words with which it is immediately joined; like the chameleon its colour from the objects round it. *Peril* to the *pragmatos*... *either to facts or character*; to support our own, and to invalidate and deprecate those of the opposite party.

*eis μὴ γαρ* (εὐπορεῖ τις) or *εἰς οἱ μαθηταί των θεωρεῖν, with which ἑιμλογογομάθη is supposed to agree). ἀλλά (at any rate, at least) *subaudii εὐπορεῖ γε*... *For if we have no evidence as to the fact, either in agreement with our own side of the case, or opposed to that of the adverse party, at all events (we shall be sure to find plenty) as to character, (else, tending to, bearing on,) to establish, that is, either our own respectability or the opponent's worthlessness*. ἑιμλογογομάθη, *in agreement with*, comp. 22. 15, ἑιμλογογομάθη and (the opposite) ἑιμλογογομάθη. In § 21 of this chapter, the sense is different, *admitted*, as in Plato and Arist. Rhet. 1 13. 9 διέ.
theon oion authein h kathairein h piasadas poiein h apistous, ean mene authe uparxos, piastas kai kurias,
21 epi de tov amphiophtotonous tovnavton. prose men ouv to piastas h apistous katakneuzein oudev dia-
pherei tis perideotovn martoyn pragmaeteias, opoiou
gar an tinies asin oi epignoeramemeno h phulattontes,

§ 19. ek twv autovn topow...lugomev] (the arguments on these subjects) must be drawn from the same topics (i.e. the odoi) as those from which we derive our enthymemes also. See Introd. p. 198.

§ 20. peri twv synoikow] On synhika see note on 1 1. 9, peri ta synoiki-
lagmata. They are contracts, bonds, engagements, agreements of any kind between two or more parties. They are probably intended to include documentary evidence of all kinds, which is expressed by the Latin tabulae of Cicero and Quintilian. See on this head Quint. v 5.
afor] 'for oneself'. Add this to the instances of autou, &c. for autou and the rest, in notes on 1 1. 12; 1 7. 35; and see the references there given.

'On the subject of contracts, arguments may be so far employed as to magnify or reduce (pull down, met. extenuate, depreciate, disparage (their value and importance), or (in other words) confirm or destroy their credit (or trustworthiness); if we have them (to produce) (krivei touto poue) we must argue for their credit and validity (epolas, their authori-
tative character); in the case of (if they apply to, are on the side of) the opposite party, the reverse'.

§ 21. katakneuzein is a technical term of dialectics, denoting the con-
structive process and object of argumentation or syllogism, viz. to estab-
lish some positive conclusion, to maintain or confirm a thesis; and opoioi to katakneuzein, which represents the 'subversive', 'destructive'
twv autou 'to undo', comp. kouv 'to break up, or dissolve a thing into
its elements'), 'refutative' syllogism or reasoning which proves a nega-
tive. On these terms see further in Introd. p. 268, and note (on p. 267) on the same page.

'Now in regard of establishing their credit or discrediting them, the treatment of this in no respect differs from that of the witnesses; for according to the character of those whose names are attached to, sub-
scribed to, (inscribed upon, as epistrophos, the title of a crime or a legal
prosecution, 1 13. 9,) the document, or contract, or who have it in their
keeping, the measure (degree) of credit or trustworthiness of the contract
is determined (lit. by them are the contracts made trustworthy).'
toûtois ai συνθήκαι πισταὶ εἰσίν. ὁμολογομένης δὲ εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν ὅσης αὐξητέου· ἡ γάρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἵδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθήκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ἄλως αὐτῶς ὁ νόμος συνθήκης τε ἐστὶν, ὡστε οὐ τις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναι-22 βέλτιστα, τοὺς νόμους ἀναίρει. ἢτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκοινωνία κατὰ τούτους πισταῖς] is a somewhat irregular expression, meaning τοσοῦτο πιστοίρις εἰσὶν αἱ συνθήκαι οἱ τοιαίτες καὶ αἱ συνθήκαι τῆς πιστᾶς εἰσίν.

The degree of integrity of those who have the document in their custody is a measure of the probability of its having been tampered with or not.

'The existence of the contract being admitted, if the document be our own (§ 25), we must magnify it (cry it up; increase, exaggerate, its value and importance); for the contract (we may say) is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that give authority, or validity, to the law, but the laws to the contracts which are made in conformity with them (legally)'. Either of these arguments may be urged to show that a covenant has the sanction of law, and shares its authority. 'And, speaking generally, the law itself is a kind of contract, and therefore any one who violates (disobeys) the provisions (understand συνθήκης after ἀποκαλύπτει) of a contract or makes away with it, is in fact subverting, doing away with, the laws'. This doctrine has already been stated in other words, c. 13, 2, νόμον...ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκάστος ἀριστος χρῆμα τοῦτον. This is therefore the positive, written, local or national law, varying in different societies, and enacted by each of them severally for mutual convenience, under an implied contract to observe and maintain them.

Analogous to this view of law as a contract is the theory, in Politics, of the Social Contract, which has been maintained by Locke, Rousseau, and many others. This view of the origin of the social organization and of government, is founded upon the natural freedom and equality of men; and assumes a common agreement amongst the members of a state to live and act together for purposes of self-defence and mutual advantage in obedience to laws and an executive authority which the theory supposes to have emanated originally from themselves, and to be invalid without their consent. Similar to this are the 'laws of war', which give the conqueror certain rights over the conquered, amongst them that of enslaving, and result from a sort of international compact, or universal agreement. Polit. 1, 6, sub init. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὑπολογία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν τῇ τὰ κατὰ πάλης κρατίσεως τῶν κρατίσεως εἶναι φαινόμενον. Compare also Pol. III. 9, 1280 b 10 seq. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκης, καὶ καθάπερ ἐπὶ ἰδιωτῶν ἐν συνθήκης, ἐγγυηθεὶς ἀλλήλων τῶν δικαιῶν, ἀλλ' οἷς ὀλοκλήρως ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαιοῦ τούτων πολιτείας.

§ 22. ἢτι δὲ πράττεται οὐκ. ...Transl. in Introd. p. 199. πράττεται 'are transacted'. ὁ χώρος ἡμεῖς 'the ordinary dealings' of men with
one another, especially in trade and exchange of commodities, see note on I 1.9.

καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια 'all voluntary transactions', in general, is added because συναλλάγματα may include τὰ ἐκούσια, frauds, crimes, offences, which may arise in men's dealings with one another: Eth. Nic. v 5 sub fin., 1131 a 2, τῶν μὲν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια ἦστι τὰ δ' ἐκούσια: ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοῦδε, οἷον πράξεις, ὁμήρωσις, ὑγιῶς, χρήσεις, παραπλανήσεις, μισθωτικά ἐκούσια δὴ λέγεται, ὅτι ἄρχη τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἐκούσια, τῶν δ' ἐκούσια τὰ μὲν λαθρεῖα, οἷον εὐλογία, μοιχεία, φιλοσυλλογία, προσωπεία, διαφωνία, πυρωνία, κακουργία, προσπηλαξιμός.

χρείας] 'necessity' as χρήσεις 'use', 'intercourse', the use that men make of one another.

ἐπιστείλης ἰδεῶν ἑστών This phrase occurs again, Rhet. II 16.1, and Hist. Anim. ix 38.2, ἀδάν τὸν μυρμήγκιον ἀγγελια πώς ἐστιν ἐπιστείλης ἰδεῶν. In Rhet. II 23.30, τὸ ἐπιστείλης ἰδεῶν expresses 'superficiality'. It seems to be said of things that 'lie on the surface, things prominent and conspicuous, so as to be seen by every one', ἦστε τὰ χρήσεις ὧν ἵνα ἀποκαλύπτωμεν. This explanation is confirmed by the substitution of σύνεδρα, to express the same notion, in § 25 ἱστα (so Victorius). If this be so, the verb should be written ἑστών, and not ἑστῶν (for ἕστων) as in Bekker's text.

ἐπιστείλης is the genitive of a substantive ἐπιστείλης 'a surface', only used by later and non-Attic writers; 'vetebirus illius...ἐπιστείλης adverbii vicem fuit, Herod. I 187, Arist. Plut. 1207, Eccles. 1108, Thucyd. vi 96, et complures Xenophon. Neque eius substantivorum alius tum casus in usu fuit'. Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 126—7. It is an adverb of place or position, after the analogy of Ἀθήνης 'at Athens', καίς χρόνος (Aesch. P. v. 720) 'on the left hand', &c.; see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 377: (this seems to be omitted in Jell's Grammar, though there are articles on the 'genitive of position'; §§ 524—528, which however is illustrated only by the genitive of relative position, not that which expresses place itself. The genitive, it is to be presumed, is in both cases partitive, denoting a point in space;) it is also after the analogy of the local adverbs, αὐ, ὅπου, ὅποι, ὅποδημοι, ποι καὶ ποι, ὁχος, ἡκος, παραθύρων. ἐπιστείλης itself not being in use, the substantive 'surface, supercicies' is formed by the addition of the definite article, as Plat. Phileb. 46 D, (ἐκούσια) τὸ...ἐπιστείλης μόνον διαχείρισε. Ἀρ. περὶ ἐπιστείλης 2.8, τὸ ἐπιστέλης τοῦ ἑντοτοκεῖ, 'the surface of the mirror'. Its derivatives ἐπιστείλαι and ἐπιστείλωσις, on the surface, have three different senses all arising from the properties attributable to things on the surface; either (1) 'popular', 'prevalent', 'fashionable', 'current', like things that come to the top, come uppermost, and so 'prevail' over the rest, as διάκοσμυ ἐπιστείλωσις, Arist. Eth. N. i 2, 1096 a 30, ἐπιστείλωσις τοῦ γελοίου, ib. IV. 14, 1128 a 13, Hist. Anim. IV i 26, τὸ μέλητα ἐπιστείλωσις 'the most abundant kind', Ἰτ. 37.2, de Gen. Anim. i 29.11, οὗ μὲν ἐπιστείλωσις γε ἃλλα ἄκριτα ἀκατάρακτα: or (2) (if indeed there be any difference between this
metà tôn ἀμφισβητοῦντων, πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπ' ἄν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίων μαχέσαιτο, ταῦτ' ἀρμόττει: ἄτο- πον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ᾠσὶν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πεί- 24 θεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνήκαις ἀναγκαῖοι. εἴθ' ὦτ' τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτής οἱ δικαστής· οὕκοιν τούτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ἐς δικαιότερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἐστὶ μεταστρέφειν οὕτ' ἀπάθη οὐτ' ἀνάγκη (πε- and the preceding) 'conspicuous', 'prominent', compared with such as are deep down, or buried, out of sight; Rhet. διη, Hist. Anim. quoted above on ἐκποιήτης· and (3) 'superficial', opposed to βαθύν; either literally, de Insomni. (πειρ ἐποιλικά) 2. 12, οὐκ ὁμοίως εἰσόδουν εἰ κακίς ἀλλ' ἐπικολαύσθρον, or metaphor., as Rhet. III 13. 10, ἀλλότροι καὶ μὴ ἐπισκόλαυοι. II 23. 30, above referred to. III 10. 4, τὰ ἐπισκόλα τῶν ἐνθυμομάχων, followed by the explanation, ἐπισκόλα γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παρὰ δήλα, καὶ δια τεῦχ' δι' ἡγίσ- σει, is doubtful; for an enthymeme may be too easy to follow and therefore unacceptable, either because it is intellectually 'superficial' (this I think is the more probable meaning, because more applicable to an intellectual process) or because it is 'prominent and conspicuous', saute aux yeux, and therefore is δήλον πάσιν, Top. A 1, 10 ο δήλον. Similarly in Pol. III 3, 1276 a 19, ἄ μὲν οὖν ἐπισκολουστᾶς τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἡγίσσας (the most obvious and apparent, the clearest and plainest) πειρ' τῶν τόπων καὶ τούτω ἀνθρώπων ἑστίν, and again, ib. c. 12, 1282 b 30, ἂ τούτῳ ἐπισκόλα τὸ ψέρ- δος; (evident on the surface). In these two last instances the literal sense of the word is uppermost.

§ 23. 'But if the contract or document be opposed to us, and (on the side) of the adverse party, first of all, the same arguments are suitable as may be used in contending against an adverse law'. ἕνεπ is a cognate accusative extended by analogy from the direct cogn. acc. ἕνεπ μάχη μά- χεσφορόν, for which the neuter plural, expressing the details of the contention, or the arguments employed in it, is substituted. 'For it is absurd to suppose that we are not bound to obey the laws, if their constitution is defective and the framers of them have been led into error, and yet that (in like cases) contracts are necessarily binding (that it is necessary to obey or observe them). [For κείμενοι...τιθέμενοι compare note on I 1. 7, p. 10. s.]

§ 24. εἴθ' ὦτ' The gist of the topic is to be found in Introdt. p. 200. βραβευτής: the umpire in the games, who awards the prize to the successful candidate, i. e. to the most deserving, is here used as an image of the judge who dispenses justice to the competitors in a court of law. It is he that is to be appealed to, not a mere contract, which has no regard for the general principles of justice. Justice (ὁς δικαιότερος) must prevail over contracts when they are in conflict. Dem., Cl. III 36. 7, has the verb in the same sense, τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δικαίων βραβεύειν. βραβευτής is the prose form; βραβεύει belongs to the Poets.

τοῦτο is 'what we are talking about', 'that which is before us', δεικτικός; the contract, namely, and its contents.
§ 25. 'And again, justice cannot be perverted (have its nature altered) by fraud or compulsion like a contract, because it is natural (constancy and uniformity are characteristic of nature); whereas contracts are undertaken, entered into, under the influence of deceit (under false pretences) and compulsion.' The two genitives in construction follow συνθήκαι, 'contracts of men deceived are made'.

οἰκεῖον ἢ ἀλλοτρίον] 'domestic or foreign'.

tὸ συμφέρον] In arguing against the validity of a contract, you may take into account the consequences of carrying its provisions into effect, so far as they affect the judges, whose 'interest' or 'advantage' (or the reverse) may be involved in them: when these results happen to be adverse to the judges' interest, arguments from this source may be employed to invalidate the contract; and all other topics of the same kind, (may be used) (which need not be enumerated) because they are equally easy to observe (with the preceding'), too clear to need enumeration.


dιαλοίαν ἢ τις] or λόγω and διαλοία, see Introd. p. 267 note.

τάλαθη λέγουσι] These words have been variously interpreted. Muretus omitted τάλαθη, as contrary to Aristotle's opinion on the subject of torture—which however must be gathered from the words of the text, and not assumed a priori, and the text altered in conformity with the hypothesis—evidently supposing that if retained it must be construed with διαλοία and not with λέγων. There can be no doubt that the latter is right, and that the words do express Aristotle's opinion upon the use of
PHTORIKA H A 15 §§ 26, 27.

βασάνων οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδή λέγουσιν ἢ ταληθῆ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦστε μὴ λέγειν ταληθῆ, καὶ ῥαδίως κατάψευδόμενοι ὡς παυσόμενοι βάττον. δεὶ δὲ ἐχεῖν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαύτα γεγενημένα παραδελγάτα ἓ ἵσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες. 1

27 περὶ δὲ ὄρκων τετραχῶς ἐστὶ διελείπειν ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνειν, ἢ οὐδέτερον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τὸ δὲ οὐ,

[1 op. η ἡ λέγειν ὡς ὧν καὶ εἰς ἔλεγχον το βάσιμον. πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ παρείσχεον οἱ καὶ λαβόντες καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὲρ διάκρισιν ἕκατεροι ταῖς ἄνδρας, οἱ δὲ διὰλεψεῖ πρὸ τοῦ τὰς ἄνδρας ἱδρὼν αὐτῶν καταθεροῦσας ὡς πάντως ἐστὶν πιστωτὸν ἐν βασίμων. λ.]

[1] torture, by asserting the truth and right of the arguments directed against the use of it. [On 'torture' see C. R. Kennedy's Demosthenes, Vol. IV, pp. 382—391, appendix. s.]

diakarteroûston] (thoroughly, διὰ,) obstinately, resolutely, persisting, (holding out).

καὶ ἔρθω καταψευδόμενοι] 'and ready to make false accusations (κατὰ 'against others') in the expectation of a speedier release'.

On the passage which in ms A concludes this section, and is printed in the note of the Oxford reprint of Bekker's 1st ed., see in Introd. p. 201, and the note. It is omitted by Bekker. Spengel, On the Rhetoric, in Bau. Trans. 1851, p. 51, thinks that it is an extract from some other treatise on Rhetoric, introduced by the transcribers. The last sentence at all events must be corrupt, being as it stands devoid of meaning and connexion with the preceding. Brandis in his tract in Schneidewin's Philologus, IV i. p. 43, informs us that his Anonymous Annotator found the passage in the MSS that he used, though he thinks that Victorius was right in rejecting it as an interpolation. Victorius, a man whose judgment is to be relied on, writes thus. 'Delevi autem quia adulterinos putavi; aut enim ex alio scriptore artis haec pars summa est (so Spengel), aut Scholion olim fuit quod importune post in contextum verborum Aristotelis translatum sit;... Qui accurate quae supra a philosophio iam tradita erant perpendit ipsius haec non esse manentei intelligi; cuncta enim illa quae ad quaestiones pertinentia dicere voluerat iam explicaverat; sententia vero quae his viribus exponitur superioribus continetur; vox etiam juncta ilic est quae sermonem Aristotelis non redoet, viz. λεγόμενοι (this applies still more strongly to καταψυχέον); et omnis denique haec locutio, e. c. τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπὲρ διάκρισιν, locationis Aristotelicae dissimilis videtur'.

§ 27. περὶ ὄρκων...διελείπειν] On περὶ, and other prepositions, redundant in the later Greek writers, see note on 1 9. 14, 'oaths admit of a fourfold division'.

On oaths, see the corresponding chapter of Quintilian, V 6. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 17 (18). A full explanation of the connexion and general meaning of this and the following sections to the end of the Chapter will be found in the Introd. pp. 202—205, to which the reader is referred; so
that we may confine ourselves here as before to the details that require notice. One puzzling circumstance which pervades this Chapter, tending to confusion, and adding to the difficulties arising from the extreme brevity of the expression ("brevis esse laborat obscurus sit," is especially true of Aristotle here, as indeed in most of his writings,) it may be worth while to draw attention to; and that is, that throughout it both plaintiff and defendant are made to argue in the third person; to avoid this, you may be substituted for Aristotle’s he to designate the person who is in immediate possession of the argument, whichever side of the case he may be at the time maintaining.

On the technical expressions belonging to ἔρως, see note in Introd. p. 202, διδόμενος ἔρως, in Aristotle and the Orators, is to offer or tender an oath. λαμβάνει (or δίχεθαι, in the Orators), to accept, or take it.

ἐὰν ὁμώσαται ὁντος] ‘when this (the oath above mentioned) has been already taken by one or other of the two parties’. ὁμώσαται here is represented by γεγοςανό is § 32.

§ 28. οὐκ ἁπαθῆσαι] Supply ἀρνάμεστ (the deposit, or something else which the opponent is unjustly withholding), which is added in three MSS, apparently from a marginal gloss.

The case is: you refuse to tender the oath to the adverse party because it is of no use; he is so little embarrassed by scruples of conscience that he will take the oath and keep the money, so that you gain nothing by your motion. τοῖς ἐκ, but the judges, you think, if he do not swear, will decide against him’.

Another reason, or topic, for refusing to tender the oath is, that ‘this form of risk’, the risk that one runs by leaving the matter to, by throwing oneself upon, the judges (ὁ κίνδυνος οὗτος ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς), is to be preferred (κρείτως), viz. to the risk incurred of losing your suit by tendering oath to the adversary, who will probably perjure himself: you therefore refer your case to the decision of the judges, because you can trust them, but not the other.

§ 29. ἀνὶρ χρημάτων] is, setting a pecuniary value upon the oath (estimating it against money, at so much money value), which is degrading to the dignity and sanctity of the oath, and therefore it is that you refuse to take it, and not from any baser motive.

κατωμόσατο] κατομόσα (ἔρως) occurs in Arist. Ran. 305, 306, appa-
recently as a mere synonym of the simple verb, Δ. καλθες κατόμουσαν. Η. να δ’; Δ. δροκος. Η. να Δια. With δροκος and a second accus. of the thing sworn by, Eur. Hel. 835, ἄλλ’ ἄγρον δροκον σὺν πάρα κατόμουσα. The middle voice is found again in Herod. vi 65, but in a different sense ‘to swear against’, with a genitive following. Here, and in the two other cases quoted above, the καρᾶ seems to have an intensive force, expressing the ‘binding force’ of an oath. This sense of καρᾶ comes from the original, physical, notion of ‘keeping down’.

For the interpretation of this obscure topic, see Introd. p. 203. The obscurity is a little heightened by Bekker’s punctuation, and may be very slightly cleared up by reading μη διόμοσαι δ’ συ’ (with colon instead of full stop) and at the end of the next clause τὸ μη’. (with full stop instead of colon). There is a considerably closer connexion between the two clauses which he separates by a full stop, than there is between the two which are divided only by a colon.

The intention of the topic is to shew the purity and disinterestedness of the speaker’s motives in refusing to take the oath.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους] Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school of Philosophy (Plat. Soph. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παρ’ ἔρημος Ἕλληνικος ἔθνος, ἀλλ’ Ἴξενοφάνους...ἀρχαῖους)—of which Parmenides his follower was the most distinguished representative, who converted the theological conception of universal being, represented by Xenophanes as God, into the metaphysical conception of the Universe as One, ἐν τὸ δὲ—appears to have conveyed his philosophical doctrines in hexameter verse, an example subsequently followed by Parmenides and Empedocles. He also wrote elegies and iambics, the latter directed against Homer and Hesiod, whose manner of speaking about the Gods he disapproved. Diog. Laert. ix 2. 18. The verse quoted here is a trochaic tetrameter; on which Mullach remarks, Fragm. Phil. Gr. Xenoph. Fr. 25, p. 166, note, ‘culius versiculi hiatus in voce adēresæurae excusationem-habet, prima autem syllaba in prothoræ producitur ad aliorum nominum velut ἄδωνας similitudinem’. So Karsten, Xenophanes, p. 79. The work which contained this verse is unknown. Mullach and Karsten agree in the opinion that this verse is all that belongs to Xenophanes in Aristotle’s reference; the succeeding illustration is his own. All that is repeated in the converse of Xenophanes’ maxim, § 30, is what is contained in the verse itself. I have no doubt they are right. On Xenophanes and his philosophy, besides the two works already referred to, which contain collections of the surviving fragments, see the histories of Greek Philosophy, by Brandis, Zeller, Ritter, Butler, with Dr Thompson’s notes and the rest; also Grote’s Plato, Vol. i. pp. 16—19.
30 προκαλέσαι το. ει δε λαμβάνει, οτι πιστεύει αυτῷ, έκείνη δ' ου. καλ το τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατόν ούτως ίσον είναι αν δ' ο μεν ασεβής διδόθη, δ' εύσεβης ομόνη. δεινόν τε το μή θέλειν αυτόν, υπέρ αν δε 31 εκείνους αξίω ομόσαντας δικάζειν. ει δε δίδωσιν, οτι εύσεβείς το θέλειν τοις θεοῖς επιστρέψειν, καλ οτι ουδὲν δει αυτόν ἀλλων κρίτων δείσθαι. αυτῷ γάρ δίδωσι 32 κρίνειν. καὶ οτι ἀτοπον το μή θέλειν ομοίως περὶ ὅν

Δικαίως διὰ πληγήματα] Τας τροπες οι πληγήματα] Τας τροπες διὰ πληγήματα, καὶ ει δημιουργηθεὶς οι πληγήματα, μόνον δει λαλήκαλλον κοιλασθήσει. Ἰβ. ν 4 4, p. 1132 a 8, ὅταν δ' έν πληγήμα το δια ταράδας, δια και τετράς δ' ἐποδάμη, de Anima, β. 8, ψαυτά λόγω το τέσσερας τον τόν τετάρας τον παραλληλούσας και τόν τετάρας τον παραλληλούσας. Στοιχείο, δια τον τον τέσσερας. Ποιεῖται. γάρ δια τον τέσσερας. Δια τον τέσσερας. For further illustrations see Dem. Select Private Orations, II. pp. 207—211, Exercitus on the defective verb τός. 

§ 30. οτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ, ἵπτεται δ' αὐτῷ] 'that he can trust himself (not to swear to what he knows to be false), but not the other'. (In this case, if you accept the oath, or consent to swear) 'Xenophanes' dictum may be inverted (turned round to the other side), and you may say, that this is the fair way of proceeding, for the godless man to tender the oath, and the godfearer to take it'; (because the latter won't perjure himself, the other will). πεπερασθεναι, in § 25, was used in a somewhat different sense 'to pervert' justice; 'and (you may add) it is monstrous for you to refuse to take it yourself, in a matter in which (ὑπερ αὐτό) you' require those gentlemen (the judges, namely) to take an oath before they decide'. The judges were sworn upon entering the court to decide 'according to the best of their judgment', § 5, supra.

§ 31. 'If you tender the oath, (you argue) that to entrust the case to the decision of heaven is an act of piety; and that (your opponent) ought to require no other judges than himself; and therefore (for you say this because, γὰρ) you offer him the decision of the matter'. Comp. Quint. v 6. 4, Αt is qui desert alieni agere modesti videtur quam litis adversarium indicem faciat, et eun cuius cognitio est onere liberali, qui projecto alieno iure iurandique stari quam suo mavult. Victorinus thinks that this is borrowed from Aristotle.

1 I have translated this 'the adversary' in the Intro. p. 203, but I now think that it should rather be referred to the same person as αὐτός.

AR. I. 19
ałaous ἢξιοὶ ὁμοῦναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ἐκαστὸν δῆλον τῶς λεκτῶν, καὶ συνδυαζόμενοι πᾶς λεκτόν δῆλον, οἷον εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνει διδόναι δε ἡ, καὶ εἰ δίδασι μὲν λαμβάνει δὴ ἡ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνει καὶ διδόναι θέλει εἶτε μηδέτερον ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη συγκείσθαι, ώστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγκη συγκείσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. εἰπὲν δὲ ἣ γεγενημένοι υπὸ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ' ἐπιορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἑστί, τὰ τὴ βία καὶ ἀπάτη ἀκόνισι. ἐνταῦθα οὖν συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἄλλῳ οὐ τῷ στόματι. εἰπὲν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ἢ ὁμοφανεῖν ὅτι

§ 32. ὃν’ αὐτοῦ] 'by yourself', supra, § 20, note on 1 1. 12, 1 7. 35.

ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν] On the 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' as affecting the character of actions, see Eth. Nic. III cc. 1, 2, 3, where the subject is thoroughly discussed; and on the degrees of criminality, and the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense, έκ πρωτότοκος, or with deliberate purpose, προαρέσι, and those which are due to accident, mistake, ἀττική, or the momentary blindness of passion, see Eth. N. ν 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred to. On βία as a supposed source of action, 1 10. 14, and the Appendix 'On the seven sources of action', Introd. p. 225.

The term 'injustice' or 'criminality' can only be applied to actions voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his engagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him from responsibility.

§ 33. συνάγειον] συνάγειον like συλλογίζομαι, συλλαμβάνω, συλλέγω, συνάγω, συνάζω, συνάπτω, &c., and similarly comprehendere, colligere, all convey the notion of 'gathering' facts together, for the purpose of comparison, and so drawing a conclusion of some kind. συνάγειον and συλλογίζομαι are to 'draw logical inferences', from facts or premises which you put together, and so by comparison are led to infer some general conclusion respecting them.

τὸ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἄλλῳ οὐ τῷ στόματι] This is the famous ἡ γλῶσσα ὁμφακίᾳ ἡ δὲ φησὶν ἀνώμορος, Eur. Hippol. 612. The success of Aristophanes, and the vulgar misapprehension arising chiefly therefrom, have brought on Euripides a most baseless charge of immorality, so far at least as it is grounded upon this line. Cicero, de Off. III 29, has seen and exposed the fallacy. All the moralists without exception admit that the essence of a lie resides not in the words, but in the intention and moral purpose; and the verse when properly interpreted asserts no more than this.
πάντα ἀναιρεῖ οὐ μὴ ἐμένων οἰς ὁμοσεν διὰ γάρ
tούτο καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρώνται ὁμόσαντες. καὶ "ὑμᾶς
μὲν ἀξιοῦμεν ἐμένειν οἰς ὁμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ
δὲ οὐκ ἐμενοῦμεν." καὶ ὡσα αὖν ἄλλα αὐξών τις
ἐπειεῖν.

[περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων εἰρήσθω
τοσαῦτα.]
APPENDIX (A)

ON

A 11 § 17.

στοργή, ἔρως, φιλεῖν, ἀγαπᾶν.

[The following Appendix has already appeared as an article in the Journal of Philology, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 88—93.]

There are four terms in Greek which represent different states or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general acceptation. Of these στοργή and ἔρως are co-ordinate terms, in this respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls πάθη, instinctive affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature.

στοργή is the natural and instinctive affection that subsists between parent and child; irrational, but moral; an ἀλογον πάθος, but ἵθων. ὡσ τε πατήρ τέκνουν αἱ στοργῆν ἔρως, Philem. ap. Stob. Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. i 63. Fr. Inc. 108. στέργεων, Oed. R. 1023, στερεῖν of parental affection, Oed. Col. 1529. Plat. Legg. vi 754 b, καθήπερ παῖς...στέργει τε καὶ στέργεται ὑπὸ τῶν γενησάνων. Ar. Eth. N. ix 7, 1168 a 2, στέργοντες ὡστερ τέκνα : ib. line 7, στέργει δὲ τὸ ἔργον, τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν, which describes an instinctive feeling, though not here the specially parental; comp. viii 14, 1161 b 18, ὁ γονιός μὲν γὰρ στέργοντα τὰ τέκνα...τὰ δὲ τέκνα τοῦ γονιοῦς: and line 25, ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὔθεα γενόμενα στέργοντο, for which immediately afterwards φιλεῖν is twice substituted, lines 27, 28. But the verb is by no means confined to this special sense, and passes readily into the more general signification of 'liking' in the modified form of 'acquiescence' and 'toleration' (to acquiesce in, put up with, as ἀκιδεῖν and ἀγαπᾶν); and is even applied to the sexual affection, as Xen. Symp. viii 14 and 21; and in Ar. Eth. N. viii 5, 1157 a 29, it is used to express the instinctive liking or love which children feel for one another, δὲ ἡδονὴν ἀλλήλων στέργοντες, ὡστερ οἱ παιδεῖς : ἔρως, again, the other form of instinctive or animal affection, is sometimes substituted for στοργή, as Eur. Fragm. Erecth. 19 (Dind.), ap. Stob. 77, p. 454, ἐκεί μητρὸς παιδεῖν ὡς ὁκε ἐστίν ἔρως τοιοῦτος ἄλλος, οἷος ἡδονῆν ἔρων.
ἔρως differs from the preceding only in respect of its special direction and the absence of moral character: otherwise it is an ἄλογος ὄρεξις, a natural, animal impulse; the sexual form of ἐπιθυμία, or natural appetite. Ὑπ’ ἐπιθυμία τις ἢ ἔρως παντί δῆλον, Plat. Phaedrus 237 d. ἰδιότι καὶ λόγη μμεγαλόν (the characteristic of ἐπιθυμία) ἐρωτά, Tim. 42 a; and though it is doubtless applied metaphorically, in the sense of a 'passionate desire' similar to the animal appetite, to represent intellectual and moral desires, as when Plato says ἔρως μαθήτευς, φιλοσόφος, τῶν καλῶν, yet I believe that when directly and literally applied to its object, it seldom or never means anything else. Arist. Eth. N. ix 10, 1171 a 12, ἔρως...ὑπερβολή γάρ τις ἐκ τῆς γενετῆς ὀρειχαλκών, τὸτε δὲ πρὸς ἑαυτά, is an exception; here ἔρως is said to be a kind of ὀρειχαλκών: the individual passion opposed to 'affection' or 'love' in general. The reverse of this—the ordinary distinction of the two words—appears in Pl. Phaedrus, 231 c, τούτων μίλιστα φωσι φιλεῖν ἄν ἐν ἔρως, that is, they feel the highest (moral) affections for those who have inspired them with the sensual passion. Comp. 255 e, καλὰς δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ἀληθεῖς συν ἔρωτα ἄλλα φιλεῖν εἴναι. Symp. 179 c, ὑπερβάλλει πρὸς ἔρως διὰ τῶν ἐρωτῶν, where ἔρως represents the στοργῆ, or natural affection. Ib. 182 c, φιλεῖν, δὲ μίλιστα φιλεῖν ὅ ἔρως ἐπικοίνων. Aet. Polit. II 4, 1162 b 12, ὡς τῶν ἐρωτῶν διὰ τὸ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν τιμήθηκαί, Eth. N. ix 5, 1167 a 3, ὅπως δὲ ἀρχήν φιλεῖν εἴη, ἀπόθετον τῷ ἔρως, ἢ διὰ τῆς βίον τῆς ἱδιότητος. The distinction of ἔρως and φιλεῖν appears very clearly in Eth. Nic. ix 1, sub init., 1164 a 3 seq., ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐρωτήματι κ.τ.λ. The application of the word to a higher and purer love, in such passages as Eur. Fragm. Dict. vii (Dind., Wagner), ἀλλ’ ἵνα δὲ τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως, φυτής δικαίως σωφρόνος τε κακοῦς, καὶ χρὴν δὲ...τῶν ἐπεξευθείας ἀντικείμενοι σωφρόνες ἐρωτεύσωσιν: and Fragm. Oedip. III (Wagn.), ἵνα δὲ ἔρωτας δοτος αὐτῷ μ’ ἱδιότητι οἱ μὲν κακῶν ἔρωτος, οἱ δὲ τῶν καλῶν: ὅ δ’ εἰ πόσον ἐπεξεύθεν ἔρων ἔρως ἐφεξῆς ἀνθρώπους. This is no exception, for here it is still the animal impulse which is represented as sublimed and purified, and transformed (by a metaphor) into a moral appetite, just as the ἔρως in Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium is converted by the same process into a passion of philosophical enthusiasm.

φιλεῖν and φιλεῖα are designations of 'love' in its widest and most comprehensive sense. The verb may even stand as a synonym of ἔρως, as Topic. A 15, 106 ὡ 2, τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τῷ μακρίν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν ὁδόν, where the τὸ φιλεῖν κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν is of course equivalent to ἔρως. It also includes the whole family of likings and fondnesses, natural and acquired, which are attached to special and particular classes of objects, expressed by compound adjectives; as φιλοσοφοῦντος, 'one
who is fond of so and so', φιλονυσ, φιλεκτος, φιλητυμος, φιλανύκος, φιλήτωρος, φιλονυσ, &c. In the eighth and ninth books of the Nic. Eth. φιλία embraces every kind of moral and intellectual affection, instinctive or acquired, and is identified both with σπέργειν (viii 14, 1161 a 27, 28) and ἀγαπέω—see for example vii 3, where all three are employed as equivalent terms (1156 a 14, 16), ἐρωτικαί, the sensual appetite being expressly distinguished from them by its own name, δ’ 2, 4. In Plato, Phaedrus 241 c, d, it comprehends even ἐρωτικαί, την ἀγαπώ τοι φιλίαν, followed by τοῖς παιδα φιλούσιν ἀγατωτα: and in the same verse ἀγαπώ is used in the same sense (τοῖς λίκοι ἐρωτικά ἀγαπών, τοῖς παιδα φιλούσιν ἀγατωτα). In the Ethics therefore it expresses every shade and variety and gradation of the feeling of love in its moral and intellectual aspects from the instinctive affection of the parent, to the highest and ideal form of love; which according to the Greek notion was not that which subsists between the two opposite sexes, but that between two members of the superior sex; and again within that the friendship of two good men. The definition of φιλία in the Rhetoric, Π 4. 2, is 'the wishing any one what you think good, for his sake and not for your own' (this is repeated from the Ethics), 'and the inclination or tendency to do such things to the best of your power'. This is disinterested affection, love in its moral aspect, and also in some degree intellectual, in so far as it implies choice: and in this respect corresponds with the Latin diligere, or deligere, to choose the object of your affection, which implies a judgment of his value. The analysis as well as the definition of the πάθος in the Rhetoric excludes all consideration of ἐρωτικαί, and in fact it is treated rather as friendship than as love.

We next come to the distinction between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπέω. Döderlein, Lat. Syn. p. 103, and Rost and Palm in their Lexicon, connect ἀγαπέω with the root of ἀγαμαί and its congener; this would make the distinctive character of ἀγαπέω an intellectual form of love derived from 'admiration' or a high estimate of the merits of the person loved. Whether this be the true derivation of the word or not, this notion of selection or affection, conceived, on the ground of admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. Xen. Mem. Π 7. 9 is decisive on this point. Speaking of the relations of a master to his female servants, Socrates says, ἦν δὲ προστατησόμενος ἐπεὶς ἄνεργος δοσι, οὐ μὲν ἐκεῖναι διάφοροι ὑφέλλομαι σευστοι ἐκεῖνοι δὲ σε ἀγαπήσωμαι αὐτόμενοι χαρίστα σε αὐτοῖς. The same conception of value (estimation) and hence esteem, as the foundation of love—complete φιλία—appears in a passage of Plato's Lysis, 215 A, B, τα δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἐν ὑπ' ἄλληλα ἀγαπήσει μεθέμιναν.
στοργή, ἐρως, φίλειν, ἀγαπᾶν.

ἀγαπᾶν ἀλλήλους ἔχοντα (the service rendered or benefit conferred is the ground of the esteem and affection); Ὡ δὲ μὴ τὸν δεόμενος οὐδὲ τι ἀγαπᾶν ἂν. Ὡ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπᾶν ὀδὴ ἂν φιλοῖ.

I have looked over, with the help of an index, the instances of the word which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics, and find that in every case it may, and in many must, have this sense of an acquired affection, founded upon the judgment or intellectual faculty, which is indicated by the term ‘esteem’, and thereby distinguished from the irrational appetite ἐρως, and the purely emotional, and usually moral affection, φίλα. In 113, init. 1095 ὀ 17, the esteem which the vulgar have for a life of sensual enjoyment is represented as the result of a judgment about pleasure: and the same is the case with δό αἰρά ἀγαπᾶσαι at the end of the Chapter, ‘they are valued, prized, esteemed, in and for themselves’. In 113, 1118 ὀ 4, it is distinguished from γαϊρων, the instinctive affection, in the sense of to ‘estimate or prize’; and at the end of c. 14 there is a very marked and decisive exemplification of this sense of the word, ὅ γὰρ σῶσον ἔχων μᾶλλον ἀγαπᾷ τάς τοιαύτας ἰδιόνοις τῆς ἀξίας, where the ἀξία, ‘their value’, shews clearly what determines the particular character of the affection. In further illustration of this I will merely refer to other places of the Ethics. In 116, from 1167 ὀ 32 onwards, four examples of the word in this signification occur nearly together: in one of them it is actually contrasted with φιλεῖν: and 7, 1177 ὀ 2, and 9, 1179 ὀ 28, where it is placed in juxtaposition with τιμῶν, another word which conveys the notion of ‘value’, are two clear instances. ἀγαπᾶν therefore as contrasted with ἐρων and φιλεῖν represents the Latin diligere as opposed to amare.

It may be questioned whether this is the primary and original sense of ἀγαπᾶν, since the meaning that appears most prominently and conspicuously in the Homeric use of it and ἀγαπᾶξαι is that of the external manifestations and signs of affection shewn in ‘welcoming’ a friend or stranger, or in fondling and caressing as a father his child, Odys. ἔ 17: and the word is the precise counterpart of ἀναξέσθαι. See the examples in Damo’s Lexicon, which all have this character; except Odys. ἔ 289, where it bears the sense, common in the later language, and shared with ἀλοῦν and στέργειν, of acquiescing in, putting up with, contentment. But as it seems easier and simpler to derive the notion of the external indications of


2 Dr Lightfoot in Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, No. 7, Vol. 111 (1857) p. 92, regards this usage of Homer as determining the primary and original sense of the word.
welcome from an internal sense or judgment, previously acquired, of
the worth or value of one whom you receive so kindly, than the
reverse process, the derivation of the feeling, whether it be esteem or
affection, from the external manifestations of it, I prefer regarding
the intellectual judgment as the basis of the distinction between
it and the other forms of affection, and 'esteem' as its primary and
original signification. If Döderlein's derivation from ἄγαμος, and
words of that family, could be depended upon, no doubt would be
left upon this question.

In common usage, however, it is, like φιλεῖ, by no means con-
 fined to a single sense. In Plato's Symposium 180 b, it takes the place
of ἐρωτεῖν in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form
of the passion or appetite of love, ἔτεκεν ὃ ἐρωμένος τὸν ἐρωτεῖν ἄγαμῳ
ἔτεκεν ὃ ἐρωτεῖ τὴν παιδία. In Lucian, Var. Hist. 1125, we find
similarly, ἐγιμανῶς ἄγαμῳ τὸν νεανίσκον.

We therefore arrive at the conclusion in respect of these terms,
expressive of different kinds of love or affection, that, although they
are all of them more or less interchangeable in the ordinary lan-
guage, yet in the strict and proper application of them they may be
thus distinguished:—

στοργή and ἐρως are alike in that they are natural, spontaneous,
and instinctive; but ἐρως is properly a sensual appetite, and στοργή
a moral affection.

φιλεῖ, the most comprehensive (in its ordinary use) of the four,
belongs to the emotional part of our nature, includes all grades of
the natural instinctive affection from a liking for wine to the perfect
friendship (the highest form of love) between good man and good
man; and in this its highest and normal sense acquires a moral
aspect.

ἄγαμῶ (ἄγαμος does not appear in any writers earlier than those
of [the Septuagint and] N. T.) gives the intellectual aspect of love,
in the shape of esteem; no longer a mere emotion, but an affection
acquired and conceived after an exercise of judgment, consisting in
a valuation or estimate formed of the worth of the object of preference.
APPENDIX (B)

ON

A 12 § 22.

On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb.

[The following Appendix has, like the last, already been allowed to appear in the Journal of Philology, Vol. i No. i (1868), pp. 93—97. The additions in square brackets are taken from the margin of Mr Cope's own copy of the Journal, now in Mr Sandys' possession. s.]

φθονείσθαι, φθονοίμενος, is an example of the irregular formation of the passive, which is not seldom found in other Greek authors, but is so much more frequent in Aristotle's writings that it may perhaps be regarded as one of the characteristics of his style. In the Greek Grammars that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Dr. Donaldson, who only bestows on it a passing observation¹, it is left unnoticed, and I will therefore illustrate it by some examples that I have collected.

The best account of it that I have found is given in Madvig's Latin Grammar, Ch. iii. on the dative case, § 244 b, and Obs. 3, 4, Engl. Transl.; his explanation of the Latin usage will apply equally well to the Greek.

The transitive verb, which expresses a direct action of subject on object—the relation of the two being inverted in the passive, in which agent becomes patient and patient agent, I strike A, A is struck by me—is the only kind that according to strict grammatical rule admits of the passive formation: verbs neuter, in which the action ends in itself, to walk, to run, and verbs which transmit the action, but indirectly—these are verbs which in Greek and Latin 'govern' other cases than the accusative (the case which expresses the direct action)—cannot, properly speaking, be converted into passives.

¹ Greek Gram. § 431. Obs. h b, ii.
Speaking of the dative case, ‘the object of reference’, in Latin, Madvig says, § 244 b, “this cannot, like the proper object, become the subject with the passive, and such verbs (like those that are intransitive) can only be used impersonally in the passive, invideo, nemini nocetur.” (I am not sure that there is any exact analogy to this in Greek, ἀμαρτάνειν is a doubtful case.) Obs. 4 gives a few exceptions. “To make such a dative the subject, and to use the verb of it personally in the passive, is a rare irregularity; invidior, Horace, A. P. 56, eridor, Ov. Trist. iii 10. 25, malendis corporibus, Liv. viii 36,” add regnari, Tac. Hist. i 16, virginibus bacchata Lacenis Tageta, Virg. Georg. ii 487, regnata, Hor. Od. ii 6. 11, iii 29. 27, Ovid. Heroid. x 69. 2, imperor, Hor. Ep. i 5. 21. Heusinger ad Cic. de Off. ii 4 gives a list of neuter verbs which become passives, but does not make the necessary distinctions: most of those which he quotes are used as impersonals. [On Latin participles of this formation, see Munro, on Lucr. ii 156, 363.]

Obs. 2, “Some few verbs are used both with the accusative and the dative (in applying this to the Greek, for dative, must be substituted, ‘some other case with or without a preposition’), without any perceptible difference in their signification, adulator, aemulor, desperror, praestolor.” In Greek θορυβεῖσθαι (ἡμᾶς θορυβεῖσθαι, Plat. Phaedr. 245 B), ἀμαρτάσθαι (ἀμαρτάνειν with accus. Herod. vii 163) are analogous.

In English a similar license is admitted, particularly in verbs which are constructed with prepositions, ‘do as you would be done by’, or ‘done unto’, Locke; Essay, Bk. i ch. 3, §§ 4 and 7, ‘to be sent for’, ‘gone for’, ‘looked for’, ‘to be relied upon’ (hence the vulgar reliable, unaccountable, and similar irregularities). See an observation on this subject in Marsh’s Lect. on the Engl. Language, Lect. xviii § 14. “The rejection of inflexions, and especially the want of a passive voice, have compelled the use of some very complex and awkward expressions...such a thing has been gone through with, to be taken notice of, to be last sight of, are really compound, or rather agglutinate, passives, &c.” [See Thring, Exercises in Various Gram., p. 3, ‘I am told.’]

I subjoin some instances of this irregular passive from various Greek authors. Euripides, Ion 87, Παρασκεύασας βασιλεύς κοροφαλ καταλαμάτησε, ib. 475, χορευομάνω τρίσοδα, Iph. Taur. 367, αἰσθάτω δὲ τὰν μυθάδων.

Thuc. i 126, ἐπιτραμμαθὲν τὴν φυλακήν, (“even the dative or genitive of the person, which had formed the object of the active verb, may become the subject of the passive.” Thuc. i 126. Xen. Anab. ii 6. 1, ἐπιτραμμαθένες τὰς κεφαλάς’, &c.” Donaldson, Gr. Gr. u.s.).

1 I rather think that this is not the right explanation of the construction in these two cases; at all events it may be otherwise explained. The verbs ἐπιτρα-
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The deponents ἀλέσθαι and ἀναθάναι are converted into passives in Xen. Memor. iii 2. 3, Ar. Pol. vi (iv) 45, 1299 a 19, ἀλέσθαι δὲ καὶ προσβεθείται (this may possibly be justified by the transitive use of ἀλέσθαι, but in a different sense, the middle being necessary to the notion of ‘choosing’, or ‘taking for oneself’). Plat. Phaedr. 69 B (in Ast’s note several other examples of ἀναθάναι pass. from Xenoph. and Plat.) sim. ἀναφύγει, passive, Ar. Anal. Pr. i 32, 47 b 2, 3. 4. ἀναβαθής, Xen. de re equestr. iii 4, of a horse that is mounted (the regular constr. is ἀναβαθέω, ἐπὶ ἵππων, or ἐπὶ ἴππου). ἀναβαινων in Hom. with the accus. has a diff. sense, ‘to go up to.’) ἀναλῦσθαι, Conv. iv 31. ἀλεπαλαθώσθαι, to be regarded, or treated, with angry feeling. Plat. Rep. i 337 a. σωναδότος, to be eagerly pursued, (several other examples in Ast’s Lexicon s.v. ἀνοικοδομήων, Isocr. Panath. § 1 44) ib. vii 485 ε, ἀμαλίσθαι (see above) viii 551 λ, καταφορέωσθαι, ib. 556 δ, κατεγελασθήναι, Euthyphro. 3 c, πλημμαλώθησα, Phaedr. 275 e, Dem. de Cor. § 155, (in a law). σωναδότος, καταφορέωσθαι, Ar. Rhet. ii [2. 16], 3. 7, ἀνάφθει, Rhet. 1 7. 2, 3, and Eth. N. iv 8, 1124 β 10, (ἀνάρχειν τι or τινα do occur, but rarely). ἀναβαθεῖται, i 2. 10, ii 23. 30, Topic. I 12, 105 a 16, Isocr. Panath. ἄριστου αὐτοῦ καὶ τεθυρυμένου (on ὅρμεντος see above). βοηθεῖσθαι, Rhet. ii 6. 6, ἄναλητα, iii 1. 3, ἀναβολεύσθαι, Pol. viii (v) 10, 1311 β 35, φονεύσθαι, ib. ii, 1313 α 23, πνευμάτωσθαι, ib. 10, 1310 β 16. Xen. Symp. iv 29, Isocr. c. Demon. § 30, πατεροῦντος, π. ἐρήμ. § 76, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 623, § 4. μέταγχος, ‘to be participated in’, Arist. Metaph. α 9, 990 β 30, Top. D 131 α 12, τοῦ μεταχειμον ἁγου, 126 α 18 and 21, Eth. Eud. i 8. 2. προστάται, Top. E 129 a 14, ἡπατάται, Metaph. α 2, 982 α 18. ἀνάφθει (an unusually strange form), Anal. Post. i 4. 73 b 18. (Waitz ad loc.) καταγελασθεῖν passim ap. Arist. (Waitz ad Anal. Pr. 47 b i.) [βοηθεῖσθαι, Rhet. ii 6. 6; παραμύθωμος, Eth. N. i 4, 1175 a 10; Plato, Crat. 404; ἀναθυμήσας (Heindorf) Phae- drus, 246 c (with Thompson’s note); ἀκατέσθαι, Soph. Phil. 140; Homer, Od. iv 177; παραλογίζοντα, de Soph. Elench. 165 a 169. καταρσόν in Plato, Phaedrus, 250 c, το αθεταύρετον, Rep. ii. 375 a.]

Ἀνθικαὶ ἀνακμαῖον are both transitive, and therefore the passive form is regular. The accusative is the local accusative, which expresses the seat of any affection or quality, and follows adjectives and verbs neuter and passive; Jell (Kühner), Gr. Gr. § 245. 6, supposes with great probability that this is a mere extension of the ordinary cognate accusative and its varieties, ἄγαθος τὴν γυνή, τὰ πολυμε, ἔρητον, &c. (Plat.), καλὸν τὰ πράσων, ἐλευθὴν τὴν κεφαλή, τὰ ἐμπνευ, ἐρνευτὶ τὸ νῦν, τῶν τὰ ἡτία καταγώγων; Gorg. 515 ε. ἄλοιπον ἄγαθος Μοθύλαος, πόλεως ἦς ἡ ἀκμάλον, καὶ so on. By the same rule, τὸν φυλαται ἀρτήρεσαμον expresses the seat of, the place as it were in which it is deposited or lodged; the trust (viz. the watch) committed to them. [Similarly παραλογίζοντα τι, to be entrusted with something, the thing being the local seat of the trust, that in which the trust resides.]
APPENDIX (B).

ἀμαρτάνεσθαι certainly occurs as a pass., frequently in Sophocles and Plato, Eurip. Troad. 1028, Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 a 19, in the form ἔμαρτημένος; and in some other forms which are undoubtedly passive; Xen. Mem. I 2. 9, ἀμαρτανόμενα, δις, Arist. Eth. Nic. III 3, III I a 35, ἁμαρτηθότα, (also ἁμαρτάνεται, as II 5, 1106 b 26, and elsewhere, which in this place from the opposition to καταρθοῦναι, line 30, seems more likely to be passive than middle); but in those cases where the choice between passive and middle is open, and the form does not determine it, as ἁμαρτάνεται ἁμαρτανόμενος, it is often difficult to decide between the two. Homer certainly employs the middle, Od. ix 512, ἁμαρτήσεως; and there seems no positive objection to the interpretation of some of the forms employed by Plato and Aristotle as middle. (Ast in his Lexicon ranks all of them in Plato amongst the passives.) If the forms in question, ἁμαρτάνεσθαι &c., are regarded as passive, the accusative, which in this case becomes the nomin. to the passive verb, is the cognate, and not the direct, accusative. The object of the erroneous proceeding is the mistake that is made, ἁμαρτάνει ἄμαρτη ἡμᾶς; which becomes the subject to the passive.
APPENDIX (C)

ON

A 15 § 23.

On ei ou.

Hermann on Viger, p. 833, n. 309, followed by Matthiae on Eur. Med. 87, defends this combination of ei with the direct negative instead of μὴ against Elmsley, who holds it to be inadmissible, on the ground that, when it occurs, the negative does not belong to the hypothetical conjunction, but is attached closely to the word which it negatives, so as to combine with it one negative notion; as in Soph. Aj. 1131, ei τοῦθεν ἔστω σώκος ἔσθω διάκυκλον παρῷ; where σώκος is equivalent to καλός: in which cases the direct and not the hypothetical form of the negative is properly used to express an abstract negation.

But this explanation, though it is well adapted to the passage of the Ajax quoted in support of it, is not universally applicable, and requires therefore to be supplemented by another and a different solution. For example, in Plat. Phaedo 62 A, we have in two consecutive sentences, first ei οὐδέντως, and secondly ei μὴ δοκῶν ἄτοις, and both after the same word θαμματοίς. Now according to Hermann’s rule this μὴ δοκῶν should be οὐκ δοκῶν, because the negative here is just as much an abstract negation of δοκῶν as οὐκ ἕν is of ἕν in the Ajax, the one ‘unhallowed’ as the other ‘to forbid’: the same rule ought to be equally applicable to both; but it is not, and therefore this explanation of the distinction in this case breaks down.

The explanation, that I would add, as more generally applicable, is this. It is universally acknowledged that ei does not always pre-

1 Eur. Ion, 388,

οὐ εἰ μὴ οὐκέναν ἀστων, ἀσκωθὴ τάφῳ,

ei δ’ ἄτων, ἐφ’ ῥυμῷς εἰς ἕφι χορί.

can doubtless be explained on this principle. And the same may be said of ei δ’ οὐκ θεό, quoted by Herm. on Med. 348 (on Elms.) from Antiphan. ap. Athen. III 99 A.
serve its hypothetical force, but may be put in the place of ἄρι or ὅποι to express a simple fact; or of ἢτι, 'since', as a hypothetical consequence, where however no doubt is implied; or of πῶς 'whether', as an alternative, after ἂντι and similar verbs of questioning. See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 617. 2; Viger, p. 504, c. viii § 6. 3, and the passages quoted by Hoogveen and Zeune in the note; Jelf (Kühner), Gr. Gr. § 804. 9; Buttm. Ind. to Mid. el pro ἄρι post αἵδεα, ἀλὼχιβερθαῖ (Buttm. does not mean that the usage is confined to these two verbs, but merely that these happened to be the only two instances of it in this speech of Dem.); Id. in Ind. ad Plat. dial. iv 'el in re certa, et cithra hypothesin, valet siquidem (da) Men. c. 3. d (p. 72 A) el ἀνεκρίνη.' Now it seems to me that whenever el is used in this non-hypothetical sense, it naturally and properly is construed with the direct negative, just as ἄρι and ὅποι, or ἢτι or πῶς, would be, and in the same sense. And I appeal again to the passage of the Phaedo, where, as I think, in default of this explanation, there is no reasonable way of accounting for the variation of ὅ and μή in the two cases after the same word, θαυμαστόν. In the first sentence the hypothesis is altogether discarded, and the translation is, 'perhaps it will be surprising to you that this alone...and that it never happens, &c.' in the second, the hypothetical form is retained, though the sense is lost, and el is still 'if'; 'it seems perhaps surprising if (as is the fact nevertheless, of which however there is no doubt) it is not allowed to these same men to do themselves a service'. Now there is a special class of words, like ἀλὼχιν, δεινόν, οὕτων, θαυμαστόν, θαυμαζόν, which are habitually followed (especially in the Orators) by el in the sense of ἄρι, and are sometimes accompanied by its attendant ὅποι: still, although exact accuracy seems to require the direct negative in these cases, the ordinary fondness for indefinite and hypothetical expressions, which has been noticed as characteristic of Greek habits of thought and speech (the use of the indefinite μή, with relatives for instance, ἢ μή τοῦτο, ὅτε δὲ τούτο μή τούτῳ, Dem. c. Lept. 464, et sim.), prevails so far that in the great majority of cases the μή is retained. In Medea 87 (one of the lines on which Herm. writes his note) el τοῦτο δὲ γ' εἰνής ὥσπερ ὅποι στάρην κατὰρη; el is certainly equivalent to ἢτι, and el's technically correct (though Hermann's rule might also apply; as is ἢτι in the verse quoted Rhet. 11 23. 1, ἢτι πάρ γερ ὅποι κ.τ.λ. This is so clear, that Eimsley, who condemns el ὅποι altogether, proposes to read here ἢτι for ἢτιπ. (Note ad Med. 87.) Hermann's example from Thucyd. 1 121, δεινόν δὲ εἶν', el ὅποι μὲν...οὐκ ἀπεξαράνθημεν, ἦμεν δὲ...οὐκ ἀρά δαπανῶθημεν, which, according to him, are equivalent to κατηρασμένως and φιλομεθά, is much more reasonably and naturally explained on the other principle; of the two verbs, the first being in fact no part of the hypothesis at all, and with the second ὅποι being justified by the meaning of el, which is
equivalent to δι. Herm. adds, however (note on Elms. Med. 87), "Obiter adicumus, etiam ubi al an significat ('whether or no', a common signification of the particle; where again no hypothesis is implied, not merely an alternative) recte sequi οἴ, ut apud Plat. Protag. 341 b, si nulla est negationis ad affirmationem oppositio." al οἴκοι αλοχύνομαι. On Elms. Med. 348, he quotes, as exemplifying his rule, Hom. Od. β' 274, ει δ' οὖν κείνον 'γ' εινι γονός καί Πηλεοκτιστή. This seems to me no instance of it at all; and as it is equally unexplained on my principle, it must be regarded as an exceptional case, and remain without explanation. All the rest of the examples quoted by Herm. l.c. from Herodotus and the Orators, in illustration of his theory, (with one exception) are instances of ει 'that' after δειν. The exception is Andoc. περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων § 33, ει δὲ σοφία ημᾶρτημαι ἐγώ κ.τ.λ. How this can be brought under Hermann's rule I am quite at a loss to perceive; but on the other principle the explanation is most clear and satisfactory. Andocides is defending himself, and offers an alternative; ει μὲν τι ήσθη βη δ...ἀποκεκαίμενη με. ει δὲ σοφία ημᾶρτημαι μοι κ.τ.λ. Who can doubt that in the latter member of the alternative the speaker means to represent this as no admissible hypothesis—in fact he says so himself, καὶ τοῦτο υμῖν ἀποδιαλύουμαι σοφί— and therefore no hypothesis at all? It is therefore to be rendered, 'but the fact being that I have committed no offence', and is a signal example of the inapplicability of Hermann's rule.

In Dem. c. Mid. 581. ι, we have ει δὲ καταγγείλει αδικαί κάτι δια ταύτης οὖ διηκόνουσα κ.τ.λ., where οὖ διηκόνουσα forms no part of the supposition, but is stated as a fact of past time, and contrasted with what he may possibly do at present. The same applies to Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 250, δ' οὖ δεινων δοκεῖ ημῖν...οδ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων...ταύτα των οὖ διηκόνουσα κ.τ.λ. Arist. Pol. ii 11, 1273 b 3, ἄτονον γὰρ ει πένης μὲν ἐν...φαυλότερος δ' ἦν οὖ βουλίζοντας δαπανήσεται.

I will conclude this note with two examples of a parallel case in which δε with the optative is found following ει, contrary to the ordinary rule of Greek grammar. One occurs in Dem. c. Lept. p. 475, εἰ μᾶλλον μὲν εἰ τάσχειν συνοφάντην δὲ τῶν ταύτα λέγοντα ἤγοροθε, εἰ τὸ δ' ἀφελέσθαι κ.τ.λ., where the contrasted μὲν and δὲ (on which Butt. Gr. Gr., and Index to Mid.) show that the first of the two members is independent of the supposition: the other in Aesch. c. Timarch. § 85, ἄτονον δὲ εἰ, καὶ ἂθηραίοι, εἰ μᾶλλον μὲν...καὶ μὴ γενομένη μὲν κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἢλας δὲ κ.τ.λ.
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